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Abstract 
Chapter One consists in a more complete survey of the writings of Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari on the works of James Joyce than has previously been available, 
together with an overview of Deleuzian philosophy. The focus in the first chapter is 
on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's reading of philosophers and writers alike as 
4 symptornatologists' of their times and the ethico-political beliefs which they 
implicitly share with Joyce. I relate this to Hardt and Negri's political speculations. 
The conceptual 'tools' which make up 'schizoanalysis' are set out. The second 
chapter uses these tools in a 'symptomatological' diagnosis by first setting out and 
then going beyond Joyce's depiction of the 'paralysis' of the populace in Dubliners 
and A Portrait to his fuller understanding of our problematic situation in modernity 
depicted and diagnosed in the masochism of Bloom in Ulysses. In Chapter Three, I 
look at the epiphany, Deleuze's concept of Joyce's 'epiphanic machine', 'duration' as 
understood by Bergson and Deleuze, and the Deleuzian concept of 'affect' as 
potentially liberatory insights, after the preceding focus on negative 
4 symptornatological' diagnoses. Together with a critique of the prevailing views of 
Joyce's epiphany I analyse three stories in Dubliners as illustrative of Deleuze's 
understanding of the concept of the epiphany. In the fourth and fifth chapters I focus 
on Issy in the Wake read in terms of the 'bird-girl' of A Portrait and couple this with 
the Deleuzian concept of the 'girl' as a crucial, but misunderstood, node in what can 
be seen as the 'rhizomatic assemblage' or 'network' constituting the 'epiphanic 
machine' of the Wake. In Chapter Four, after first setting out the range of readings of 
Issy available in current Joycean criticism, I look at 'The Mime ofMick Nick and the 
Maggies' (FW219.18-252.21) in terms of a further Joycean challenge to modernity's 
' oedipalising' tendencies through Izod/ Issy. Here, I place a final emphasis on the 
significance of incest and the incest taboo in 'the Mime' as the culmination of Joyce's 
'symptomatological' diagnosis of modernity, and in counterbalancing this, his use of 
the 'affect' of colour to offer us a productive 'line of flight'. In Chapter Five I 
recapitulate on Deleuze's highlighting of the letter in his positive comments on the 
Wake and then, by using some established discussions in Joycean criticism as an 
introduction, engage in a reading of Issy's letter (FW 279F 1) as the Wakean 'line of 
flight' by reading "her' as liberatory ý desiring machine' with all of its ethico-political 
potentialities. 
i 
Table of Contents 
Pages 
Chapter I 
Deleuze and Joyce 1-3 
Part 1. Introduction to Deleuzian philosophy 4-34 
Part 2. Deleuze's philosophic antecedents 
Deleuze's Bergsonism 35-52 
Deleuze's Nietzsche 53-57 
Deleuze's Spinoza 58-64 
Joyce and the ethico-politics of community 65-71 
Part 3. Deleuze and Guattari's 'schizoanalysis' 
The Body without Organs and 'schizoanalysis' 72-82 
Conclusion 83 
Chapter 11 
Introduction 84-89 
Bob Doran in Dubliners and Ulysses 89-96 
Bloom and masochism 97-123 
Molly 124-129 
Conclusion 130 
Chapter III 
Introduction 131-137 
'Duration' 137-142 
Joycean criticism 143-160 
Conclusion 160 
Chapter IV 
Introduction 161-168 
Issy and the Wakean critics 168-174 
Incest and the incest taboo 175-178 
- The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies' 179-191 
ii 
Issy's fragmentary productivity 
Chapter V 
Introduction 
Bernard Benstock and the Wakean letter 
Issy's letter at FW 279F I 
Comments on this interpretation of Issy's letter. 
Conclusion 
Appendix 
Bibliography 
192-198 
199-205 
205-208 
209-246 
247-250 
251-263 
264-274 
275-293 
iii 
Footnotes and Abbreviations used 
Footnotes 
Footnote entries comply with Section 10 'References', Paragraphs 2.1 and 3, of the 
MHRA Style Guide: A Handbook. for Authors, Editors, and Writers Qf Theses 
(London: Modem Humanities Research Association, 2002), and follow the rule that 
'the first reference to a book, article, or other publication is given in full', and later 
references in 'the shortest intelligible form'. 
References to Joyce's major works, plus the page number (and also for Finnegans 
Wake the line numbers) are given in parentheses in the text itself- 
Abbreviations 
(D) 'Dubliners': Text, Criticism and Notes, eds Robert 
Scholes and E. Walton Litz (New York: Viking, 1977) 
(SH) Stephen Hero: Part of the first draft of 'A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Allan', ed. by Theodore Spencer 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1956) 
(CK) The Critical Writings ofdames Joyce, ed. by Ellsworth 
Mason and Richard Ellmann (New York: Viking, 1959) 
(LI, LH, LIH) Letters ofdames Joyce, vol. I ed. by Stuart Gilbert, vols 
11 and III ed. by Richard Ellmann (New York: Viking, 
19571,1966) 
(P) A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Text, Criticism 
and Notes, ed. by RobertScholes and A. Walton Litz 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1968) 
Ulysses: Annotated Students'Edition ýLondon and New 
York: Penguin, 1992) 
(FW) Finnegans Wake (London and NewYork: Penguin, 
1992) 
iv 
References to Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's major works are also given in 
parentheses in the text together with the page numbers: 
Abbreviations 
GillesDeleuze, Masochism: An Interpretation of 
Coldness and Cruelty, together with Venus in Furs by 
Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, trans. by Jean McNeil 
(New York: George Braziller, 1971) 
(NP) Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Athlone Press, 1983) 
(KCP) Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the 
Faculties, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habeýarn (London: Athlone Press, 1984) 
(B) Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Haber am (New York: Zone Books, 1988) i 
(S) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. by R. Hurley (San 
Fransisco: City Light Books, 1988) 
Foucault, trans. by S. Hand (London: Athlone Press, 
1988) 
M The Logic ofSense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles 
Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 
(EP) Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin 
Joughin(New York: Zone Books, 1990) 
(Cl) Cinema ]. - The Movement Image, trans. by Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjarn (London: Athlone 
Press, 1992) 
(C2) Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson 
and R. Galeta (London: Athlone Press, 1989) 
(FLB) The Fold. - Liebniz and the Baroque, trans. by Tom 
Conley (London: Athlone Press, 1993) 
(DR) Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton 
(London: Athlone Press, 1994) 
(N) Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. by Martin Joughin 
(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1995) 
(ECC) Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. by Daniel W. Smith 
and Michael Greco (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997) 
(PS) Proust and Signs, trans. by Richard Howard (London: 
The Athlone Press, 2000) 
(AO) GillesDeleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 1, trans. by R. Hurley, 
M. Seem, and H. Lane (London: Athlone Press, 1984) 
(K) Kafica: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. by D. Polan 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1986) 
(TP) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
fl, trans. by-Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987) 
V 
(WIP) "at is Philosophy?, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchill (London and New York: Verso, 1994) 
vi 
Chapter I 
This chapter will attempt to provide both an overview of Deleuzian philosophy, and 
an introduction to Deleuzoguattarian 'schizoanalysis', as well as a more complete 
survey of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's readings of Joyce than has previously 
been available. Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari use Joyce's works in a variety of 
ways some of which appear to conflict. These apparent discrepancies will be addressed. 
This inevitably long and complex introductory chapter will be divided into three parts in 
which a number of sub-headings will be included. The chapter will conclude with a 
provisional assessment of the Joyce which Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari construct. 
Deleuze and Joyce 
Neither Deleuze alone nor Deleuze and Guattari offer a lengthy critique of Joyce's 
work as they have with Proust and Kafka. In fact they appear to address Joyce through a 
'multiplicity of fragments'. It might be argued, as Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer' 
note, that this may be because 'there is no firmly entrenched French tradition of Joyce 
criticism (as there is in the case of Kafka, who has long been an important element in 
the French literary and philosophical debate ... )', as indeed has Protist. However, I 
would rather see this in terms of the breaks, cuts, and fragmentations of Deleuzian 
philosophy's 'machinic' approach which maximises its productive potential. I will 
discuss this approach below. 
in the many fragments which they devote to Joyce, Deleuze and Guattari clearly 
show that they are familiar with his works and through their 'machinic' 
(dis)connectivities they bring to Joycean criticism an entirely new dimension. 
Nevertheless, precisely because of Deleuzian philosophy's fragmented approach very 
little attention has been paid to the high regard which Deleuze writing alone and with 
Guattari has for Joyce's works in general, and in particular Finnegans Wake, and his 
unique insight has consequently not been fully appreciated. There has been little 
opportunity to take an overview of Deleuze's engagement with Joyce because of the 
1 Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer, eds., Post-structuralist Joyce: Essays ftom the 
French (Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 9. 
2 
scattered nature of his references to him and his works. There is no compilation in 
English which brings all of Deleuze's many references to Joyce together. 'Joyce 
Indirect' 2 is the only anthology of Deleuze's writings on Joyce listed in the 
'Bibliography of the Works of Gilles Deleuze'. 3 It was composed by Jean Paris and 
acknowledged by Deleuze, but it contains only a few of the original passages in French 
which mention Joyce. 
Unfortunately,, 'Joyce Indirect' is restricted to three early texts by Deleuze covering 
a period of less than ten years (Proust and Signs, Difference and Repetition, and Logic 
ofSense), and even so, a number of passages dealing directly with Joyce in these books 
are not included. As this anthology was never updated, no references to Joyce made by 
Deleuze writing alone, after 1972, have been incorporated, and the many references to 
Joyce and his works in the co-authored publications with Guattari do not appear either, 
although they are probably better known to us because of the fame or notoriety which 
the two-volumed Capitalism and Schizophrenia has attracted. 
It follows that 'Joyce Indirect', although the only publication of its type, can hardly 
be regarded as a definitive anthology. Moreover, Paris himself made no comment on the 
passages but simply reproduced them. There is no means of knowing whether he, or 
more importantly Deleuze, regarded these passages as being of greater significance than 
the ones which had not been selected or missed. I have chosen to treat all the passages 
which refer to Joyce or his texts as being of potentially equal value, given Deleuze's 
anti-hierarchical approach and his refusal to judge - 'better be a roadsweeper than a 
judge', 4 as he holds. This better accords with his belief that it is the reader who needs to 
2 Gilles Deleuze, 'Joyce Indirect', comp. by Jean Paris, Change, 11 (1972), pp. 54- 
59. 
3 Paul Patton, ed., Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Oxford and Cwnbridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1996), pp. 270-298. 
4 Gilles Deleuze. ) and Clair Parnet, Dialogues, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habbejam (London: Athlone Press, 1987), p. 38. 
3 
use and instill value into any given section of his works rather than the author acting as 
final arbiter, despite the necessity of I following in his wake' [3.1 ]. 
Paris extracts five passages from these three books,, but there are at least twenty 
five passages which directly name Joyce and/ or his books in their works. These include 
three references to Joyce in Proust and Signs of which Paris notes two. There are five 
passages in which Joyce is mentioned in Difference and Repetition, and again Paris 
highlights two of these. Six passages refer, at some length, to Joyce in Logic of Sense 
and Paris has extracted one of these. In addition there are two relevant passages in Anti- 
Oedipus, a reference to Joyce in Kajka, five such passages in A Thousand Plateaus, one 
in The Fold, one in What is Philosophy?, and one in Essays Critical and Clinical, which 
are not mentioned in 'Joyce Indirect'. I have collected all of these references to Joyce in 
an Appendix to the thesis. These are numbered and, when they are referred to, these 
numbers appear in square brackets. I believe that it is necessary to stress the fact that all 
of the references to Joyce which Deleuze made and Paris selected were approved by 
Deleuze personally and that 'Joyce Indirect' contains no negative comments on Joyce's 
work. 
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Part 1. Introduction to Deleuzian philosophy 
Deleuze draws on many philosophies and literary and artistic sources to construct 
his philosophy. The overview will include partial summaries of those earlier 
philosophies which, read differently by Deleuze, impact most significantly on my 
reading of Joyce. Consequently I will be highlighting his interpretation of Bergson, 
Nietzsche, and Spinoza rather than his work on Lucretius, Hume, Liebniz and Kant. To 
the last named he dedicated an affectionate study of 'an enemy', whilst all the rest were 
conjoined through 'a secret link constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation 
of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation 
of power'. 51 will argue that not only does Deleuze share this 'secret link' with these 
philosophers but also with Joyce himself 
I will not be making any distinction between the work of Deleuze when he is 
writing alone and that of Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative work. Guattari is a major 
theorist in his own right and his contribution to their joint work is not that of a junior 
partner. Yet, despite the possible added vitality - or as Bogue has put it 'humour, 
energy and audacity 6- which their joint work displays, Deleuze is the professional 
philosopher and it is primarily Deleuzian philosophy with which I am concerned here. 
However, in fairness to Guattari, I will not omit his name from any reference I make to 
their joint work despite the occasional textual clumsiness this causes. 
Throughout the thesis I will be concerned with drawing attention to the parallels 
between Joyce's and Deleuze's ethics and will begin to explore this in the first chapter 
through Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's reading of philosophers and writers alike 
as 4symptomatologists' of their times. 'Symptomatology' is an important part of both 
Deleuzian philosophy and Deleuze and Guattari's 'rhizomatic' or 'schizoanalytic' 
practice. Briefly stated, Deleuze notes that 'symptomatology' is the diagnosis of a 
5 Gilles Deleuze, 'I have nothing to admit', trans. by Janis Forman, Semiotext(e) 2,3 
(1977). 
6 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Literature (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 8. 
5 
coalescence of external forces or investments which opens up the possibility of 
productive change, and he states that achieving this 'is always a question of art'. (M 14) 
It gives us an ethical diagnosis of the ills which beset society, and as such has an 
evident political dimension. Deleuze opposes ethics, which he equates with life and 
desire, 7 to judgemental moralising. He draws on Nietzsche in the latter's contrasting of 
life with a morality which he argues holds us all in chains and must be properly 
understood before we can gain any release from it: '[m]orality is merely sign language, 
merely symptomatology ... one must already know what it is about to 
derive profit from 
it ,. 8 He further states that 'we need to determine the value of morality from the 
perspective of life itself. 9 I will be arguing that Joyce too develops his 
'symptomatological' insights, which stem from his intuitive awareness of this 
judgemental morality, through a progressive delineation of modernity's societal ills. 
In summarising his work on Deleuze, 10 the philosopher Alain Badiou has said' I that 
there are only three types of thinking in Deleuze and Guattari's final work together 
(WIP) and these do not include the political. These are thinking on science (as 
7 In disagreeing with Foucault (Gilles Deleuze, 'Ddsir et plaisir', Magazine littiraire, 
no. 325 (octobre 1994), 59-65), Deleuze explains that whereas Foucauldian 'pleasure' is 
simply inert and reactive, the concept of 'desire' grasps the active dynamic of the 
production of social reality, and he concludes that '[p]leasure interrupts the positivity of 
desire and the constitution of its plane of immanence'(p. 64). He sees desire in positive 
' machinic' terms as 'desiring machine', concepts which will be explained below. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twighlight of the Idolsl The Antichrist, trans. by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Hannondsworth, Penguin, 1990), p. 66, (My italics). 
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. by Shaun WIliteside 
(Hannondsworth, Penguin, 1993), p. 7. 
10 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. by Louise Burchill 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
1 Alain Badiou, Lecture at 'Immanent Choreographies: Deleuze and Neo-Aesthetics 
Conference', Tate Modem, London, 21 September, 2001. 
. tate. org. uk/modem/projzrammes/webcasting html 
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function), 12 on art (as 'affect') 13 and on philosophy (as the creation of concepts). 
14 He 
went on to say that Deleuze writing alone was only interested in philosophy and not 
politics and that even when writing with Guattari only the political concepts of 
'becoming', 'desire', and 'minorities' occur. According to Badiou there is not a 
Deleuzian politics as such only a Deleuzian ethics. Writing from a different perspective 
the Joycean critic Joseph Valente concurs by stating that the 'becoming-woman' 
keystone of Deleuzian philosophy has 'no determinate political effects'. 15 Wbilst I agree 
that both are correct in Deleuze's privileging of ethics over politics, Deleuze and 
Guattari themselves address their own statement that: 
The fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that 
Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: 'Why do men fight 
for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation? '(AO 29) 
and this exploration has set the stage for developing a political theory and practice from 
their work. 
Although Paul Patton began to explore the political potential of Deleuzian 
philosophy in his micro-analysis of current Australian Aboriginal resistance to white 
rule, 16 it is undoubtedly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's Empire, 17 and its 
companion volume, 18 which has received more attention. They attempt to follow 
12 'Function' brings into play the 'machinic' aspect of Deleuze's philosophy, explained 
below. It emphasises 'use' and 'purpose' rather than meaning. 
13 , Affect' is explained on page 52 below. 
14 Philosophic concepts feature particularly prominently in Deleuzian philosophy, and 
all concepts will be shown by words or phrases in single inverted commas together with 
definitions and explanations. I will elaborate on Deleuze's understanding of the concept 
below. 
15 Joseph Valente, 'Who Made the Tune: Becoming-Woman in "Sirens"', James Jo ce Y 
Quarterly, Pt. I, A Deleuze Guattari Cluster, 30.2 (Winter, 1993), 191-207. 
16 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). 
17 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
18 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of' 
7 
Deleuze and Guattari's line of thought in A Thousand Plateaus and by applying it at the 
widest global level claim to see beyond the unquestioned bases of Anglo-American 
political theory which prop up capitalism. Empire's central premise is that the phase of 
imperiai capitalism has been replaced by a new global capitalism. This 'new forin of 
sovereignty' consists of corporations, global-wide institutions, and other command 
centres without any responsibility to or governance by the people. Hardt and Negri 
claim repeatedly that the defining feature of this new postmodern sovereignty is its 
'deterritorialisation' or dispensing with territorial borders along with the contrasts and 
distinctions which they have traditionally supported. Yet, they argue that far from 
offering a bleak future such globalisation gives the prospect of a radical global social 
transformation. They conclude that the accelerating integration of economic, political 
and cultural powers in the world is a force for good. Their most contentious but 
optimistic claim is that the population of the world and in particular the poor, deprived, 
oppressed and inarticulate masses now potentially form a fluid and powerful network 
with the strength to bring about the most radical step in the liberation of humankind 
since the Industrial Revolution. This 'multitude', they argue, is the key to 'true' 
democracy on a global scale. 
Consequently, they dispense with old modernist theories of sovereignty, and the 
state of perpetual warfare as seen in Hobbes. 19 They reject the commercial need for the 
security of contracts as advocated by Locke and Hume, 20 and go beyond a Marxist 
analysis based on dialectic and class warfare with its supposedly inevitable proletarian 
revolution; holding that all such modernist formulations no longer apply because of the 
csocial eruption' of the 'global multitude'. 21 They espouse a new republicanism, 
demand that democracy be taken more seriously than the Rousseauesque 'elective 
aristocracy' which now passes for democracy in the Western world, and advocate 
Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 
19 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 343. 
20 lbid, p. 344. 
21 fbid. 
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through the 'common(s)' the abolition of private propery, 22 coupled with the 
unrestricted movement of peoples by granting 'global citizenship' to all. Slavoi Mek 
has summarised their approach as follows: 
Hardt and Negri describe globalization [in Deleuzian terms] as an 
ambiguous 'deterritorialization': victorious global capitalism penetrates into 
every pore of our social lives, into the most intimate of spheres, and installs 
an ever-present dynamic, which is no longer based on patriarchal or other 
hierarchic structures of dominance. Instead, it creates a flowing, hybrid 
identity. On the other hand, this fundamental corrosion of all important 
social connections lets the genie out of the bottle: it sets in motion potential 
centrifugal forces that the capitalist system is no longer able to fully control. 
It is exactly because of the global triumph of the capitalist system that that 
system is today more vulnerable than ever. The old formula of Marx is still 
valid: Capitalism digs its own grave. Hardt and Negri describe this process 
as the transition from the nation-state to global empire, a transnational space 
which is comparable to Rome, where hybrid masses of scattered identities 
develop. 23 
As Gopal Balakrishnan writes,, this approach 'represents a spectacular break' with 
the negativity of current left-wing political thinking, 24 and it has excited much euphoric 
comment such as that of Duncan Bell: 
[Despite the plethora of published material on Globalisation] ... there 
has been little 
profound, sustained political reflection on the process(es) [involved], on its 
intellectual roots and structure, and on the radical potential that it may contain. 
Empire is a glowing exception to this, a stunningly ambitious, multi-faceted, and 
richly suggestive book. ... 
it can rightly claim to be the most important critical- 
25 theoretic analysis of the topic yet attempted . 
22 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 204. 
23 Slavoj Ziz'ek, 'Empire', in SiOdeutsche Zeitung, [ýný. barnesandnoblexom. j 
[website accessed 1/ 12/ 2004]. 
24 Gopal Balakrishnan, 'Hardt and Negri's "Empire"', New Left Review, 5, 
(2000), p. 304. (Also Debating Empire (London: Verso, 2003), passim). 
25 Duncan S. A. Bell, 'Empire', Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, 
. theglobal site. ac. uk 
2001] [website accessed 1/ 12/ 2004]. 
9 
Certainly, Anna Tsing, amongst many other commentators on globalisation, fails to 
appreciate Hardt and Negri's powerful insights and portrays globalization as an 
'imagined congeries' of 'hit or miss convergences' rather than a 'single claimant as a 
world-making system'. 26 
I will take into account Hardt and Negri's powerful new thought in this thesis, 
although I believe that a major weakness in their argument is that it gives scant attention 
to the massive recuperative ('reterritorialising') forces which global capitalism inherits 
and commands by bringing its peoples back to unitary subjectivity and little more than 
passive consumers. Understandably, in constructing a positive revolutionary approach, 
Hardt and Negri concentrate on 'deterritorialisation' through capitalism's liberatory 
potentialities. They are well aware that 'all that is solid melts into air' in modernity, 27 
and that this creates a social space in which radical change can take place. Furthermore 
they draw upon Anti-Oedipus to substantiate their argument for social revolution. 28 
Here, Deleuze and Guattari state that rather than resist capital's globalization we have to 
accelerate it and 'go in the opposite direction. To go still further, that is, in the 
movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialisation'. (AO 239) 
Yet, in doing this, Hardt and Negri downplay Deleuze and Guattari's stress on the 
importance of the massive 'reterritorialising' forces which constrain and suppress any 
activity or thought which threatens the capitalist system: 
What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of 
production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, 
against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear. (AO 34) 
26 Anna Tsing, 'The Global Situation', Cultural Anthropology, 15.3 (2001), 327-60, 
(p. 334). 
27 Marshall Bennan, All that is solid melts into air: experience of modernity (New 
York: Simon Schuster, 1982). Berman takes his title from Marx's description of 
capitalism's ability to transform the world. 
"8 Hardt and Negri. Empire, p. 206. 
10 
and '[d]eterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has 
degrees and thresholds'. Nevertheless, it 'is always relative, and has reterritorialization 
as its flipside or complement'. (TP 53-54) It seems evident that Hardt and Negri's call 
for 'global citizenship' and the unrestricted movement of peoples will, without a major 
ethical change, surely result in a backlash against immigration as has already been seen 
throughout Europe as globalisation begins to take effect. The power shift envisaged in 
such statements as '... throughout the ontological terrain of globalization the most 
wretched of the earth becomes the most powerful being', 29because: 
the poor [are] the paradigmatic subjective figure of labor today ... they are included in the circuits of production and fall of potential, which always exceeds what 
capital and the global political body can expropriate and control, 30 
is a state of affairs which will surely not be realised overnight, if at all, without an 
ethical shift. There is little evidence as yet that the patriarchal symbolic order has been 
finally overturned, that the power of the nation state has been fatally undermined, that 
hierarchies are disappearing, or even that the modem unitary subject has been or is 
about to be ethically reconstituted outside of consumerism as a result of the economic 
changes already brought about by this new 'turbo-capitalism'. Yet, it is precisely this 
new subjectivity which Hardt and Negri quite rightly place at the centre of any real 
revolutionary change: 
We need to identify a theoretical schema that puts the subjectivity of the 
social movements of the proletariat at center stage in the processes of 
globalization and the constitution of global order. 31 
To be effective, although they ignore the possibility, this surely must be a change which 
cannot be recapturable by the reterritorialising forces of capitalism. 
29 lbid, p. 363. 
30 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 40. 
31 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 235. 
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Despite their occasional references to Celine, Kafka, Melville, Dostoyevsky, and 
Robert Musil, and assurances that 'the idea of "affect" plays a decisive and multifaceted 
role in Empire' 32 and the construction of 'the multitude', I believe that Hardt and Negri 
do not fully recognise and give appropriate weight to the critical importance of 
literature's ethical input to Deleuzoguattarian thinking. Although in Multitude they 
devote several pages to Bakhtin's concepts of the 'carnivalesque' and 'polyphonic' as 
he applies them to Dostoyevsky's novels, 33 and note that 'in a polyphonic conception of 
narrative there is no centre that dictates meaning', 34 they relate Bakhtin's insights to 'a 
theory qf organisation based on the freedom of singularities that converge in the 
production of the common'. 35 This seems to be antithetical to Deleuzian thought which 
might be better stated as a theory of disorganisation. They seem to be unaware that the 
ethical shift,, required in a changed subjectivity, which can be provided by 'great 
literature' - including but going beyond 'Rabelais's laughter and Dostoyevsky's tearS, 
36 
- is required to accomplish this. As Derek Attridge rightly points out, with respect to 
the camival and the camivalesque, 'by virtue of its subordinate status, [the 
carnivalesque] digression serves the whole of which it is both part and not part. Crucial 
to [such] digression is its temporary nature. It always swerves back', 37 and allows for 
recuperation, or 'reterritorialisation' within the dominant order. We need to go beyond 
the carnivalesque to the 'affects' of 'great literature' to achieve lasting change. 
32 John Kraniavskas, 'Empire, or Multitude. Transnational Negri', Radical Philosophy, 
103 (September/ October 2000), 29-39 (p. 34). 
33 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, pp. 208-21 1. 
34 lbid, p. 21 1. 
35 Ibid. (My italics) 
36 Ibid, p. 21 0. 
37 Derek Attridge, Peculiar Language: Literature as Difference. From the Renaissance 
to James Joyce (Ithaca, New York: Comell University Press, 1988), p. 222. 
12 
It is this aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy which I will be highlighting 
in my thesis on Joyce. The revolutionary changes to be wrought in Hardt and Negri's 
analysis crucially rely, not on the 'affects' of 'great literature, 38 but on instant world 
wide communication via cyberspace, the internet, and television ('the ether' as they put 
it) to compose the new subjectivity of 'the multitude' as the motivating force in the 
radical change they envisage. Thus, in Multitude, they state that '[d]eprivation may 
breed anger, indignation and antagonism ... 
but revolt arrives only on the basis of wealth 
- that is a surplus of intelligence, experience, knowledge, desires', with this intelligence 
and knowledge being acquired very largely from interactions in cyberspace. 39 
Yet, it is not only the commercialisation of television but the threat of increased 
consumerism through the advertising potential of the internet, by capitalism in its global 
form,, which makes for the capture, or 'reterritorialisation', of 'desire' through 'the 
ether' not just possible but even likely. Evidently, were global capitalism to accomplish 
this with the supposedly coalescing 'multitude', even in part, then the internet itself 
would have become a major tool in suppressing the very revolutionary flame which, 
according to Hardt and Negri, it is about to spark. The new subjectivities of potential 
Third World members would then be constituted not into revolutionaries but into 
passive consumers powerless under an 'elective democracy' as are the majority of their 
present counterparts in the Western world. In these circumstances, cyberspace seems to 
be an unreliable, though evidently necessary, revolutionary tool and a major force is 
required to counterbalance any partial capture by the capitalist forces of consumerism. 
Unlike Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari clearly argue that 'the 
multitude' are created through authorial endeavours: Jh]ealth as literature, as writing, 
consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the fabulating ftinction 
to invent a people'. (ECC 4) When such a people coalesce into a 'multitude' thereby 
forming a fluid and powerful network they must surely first acquire a new subjectivity 
38 In their recapitulation of Bakhtin"s Dostoyevsky they refer to this as a 'literary 
detour'. 
39 Kramavskas, 'Empire, or Multitude. Transnational Negri% pp. 42-43. 
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which 'operates primarily through knowledge, communication, and language 
40 in order 
to accomplish this, as Hardt and Negri rightly argue. Deleuze and Guattari envisage that 
4great literature' has to play an essential part in bringing this about. In making this claim 
Deleuze does not see the book or the author dictating the process in transcendent terms 
but rather acting as conduits through which incorporeal revolutionary 'intensities' (DR 
222-3 )41 pass in order to be perceived by their readers: 'the incorporeal is not high 
above (en hauteur), but is rather at the surface'. (L 130) These productive incorporeal 
'intensities' which the author is able to summon up in the book exist only as part of a 
functioning social machine working in conjunction with and on the same level as other 
available productive forces. (TP 4) Consequently, the importance of literature in any 
revolutionary social change remains a strong and consistent strand in both Deleuze and 
Guattari's thinking and cannot be dismissed or elided. 
Despite these caveats, Hardt and Negri's approach is invaluable, I argue, as it maps 
and reveals some of the latent potential available in this new phase of global capitalism 
which has never been done before. If their theorisations are seen as a state of affairs 
which could conceivably come about rather than something which is inevitable, I would 
not wish to contest but rather add to their overall analysis. As they state: 
We have to recognize where in the transnational networks of production, the 
circuits of the world market, and the global structures of capitalist rule there is the 
potential for rupture and the motorfor afuture that is not simply doomed to repeat 
the past cycles of capitalism. 42 
However, whilst we may not be inevitably doomed to to repeat the past of 
capitalism neither are we free to assume that its 'boom and crash' cycles cannot occur 
40 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 29. 
41 Deleuze states here that 'intensity' is a direct measure of difference and the 'sufficient 
cause" of everything which we regard as an essence or being. According to him 
everything is a 'becoming' defined by a process driven by differences in 'intensity': 
'Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of 
differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, [these are] 
difference of intensity ... the condition of that which appears ... 
is determined and 
comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference. ' 
42 Hardt and Negri. Empire, p. 239. (My italics) 
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again, (ECC 113) and the ethical function of literature must be allowed to play its part 
here in order to help ensure that we can 90 beyond capitalism. Following Deleuze and 
Guattari, I continue to believe that there is a basic continuity in all of the phases of 
capitalism in the always present threat to recuperate and nullify new developments 
which undermine the system. Consequently, I believe that in Deleuzoguattarian terms 
Hardt and Negri's political analysis is both invaluable and incomplete. In order to go 
beyond capitalism it is necessary to recognise such 'reterritorialisations' and that 'great 
literature' - when it is not itself captured by such 'reterritorialisations', an important 
point which I will make below - has a major role in diagnosing and alerting people to it 
as well as pointing out and even creating the forces of ethical liberatory potential 
available within global capitalism. 
Joyce, I argue, is well aware of capitalism's 'reteffitorialising' tendencies as he 
shows in Dubliners, A Portrait, and Oysses, he is however able to look forward to a 
different state of affairs in part in Ulysses and much more significantly - given Hardt 
and Negri's stress on capital's 'deterritorialisation' - in Finnegans Wake with its 
adumbration of 'transnational space' and 'hybrid masses of scattered identities', pre- 
dating but suggestive of and looking forward to the life-affin-ning potentialities which 
go beyond the subject unified as consumer in global capitalism. In Joyce's work, not 
only do we have the social paralysis afflicting the people in Dubliners, much as it may 
be said to compose the voiceless Third World poor today, 43 but in Uysses Joyce gives 
his protagonist Bloom - whom I will argue is an exemplar of societal masochism under 
capitalism - the role of a worker in advertising, the very activity which is concerned 
with making us passive consumers, and continues to threaten today and tomorrow to 
insinuate itself throughout Hardt and Negri's 'ether'). 
43 Ranjit Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies, 7 vols (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the subaltern speak? Speculations on widow 
sacrifice'. Wedge 7,8 (Winter/ Spring 1985), and 'Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography', in In Other Worlds. - Essays in Cultural Politics (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1987). 
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Deleuze states unequivocally that his work, with and without Guattari. is 
'philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word', 44 yet 
literature offers a thread of continuity throughout all of his and their joint publications. 
When asked in an interview in 1988 if literature shouldn't be treated as distinct from 
philosophy, Deleuze disagrees. He states that he does not recognise a difference 
between them, and regards great authors as 'symptomatologists' very much akin to 
philosophers. (N 142) This Nietzschean theme he first broached in Proust and Signs, 
continued to develop in Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty, 
elaborated on with Guattari in Kq1ka, and retained throughout his entire oeuvre. 
Deleuze's last publication in 1993, Essays Critical and Clinical, which is primarily 
devoted to literature, includes major philosophers as well as writers of fiction without 
any overt distinction being made between the two groups. Thus, as one critic puts it 
'Melville and Kafka rub shoulders with Kant and Spinoza: all are writers', 45 and one 
should add 'symptomatologists' or diagnosticians of society: 4more a physician than a 
patient, the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world'. (ECC 53) It 
is the ethical imperative which literature can provide in the revolutionary process, when 
it is not entrapped by the 'reterritorialising' forces of capitalism, which Deleuze wishes 
to highlight and why he refuses to separate philosophy and literature. Hardt and Negri 
need to take this into account. Nevertheless,, despite his refusal to separate them 
Deleuze regards philosophy as working through its concepts in parallel with the 
'affects' of literature, as will be explained below. 
In drawing literature into philosophical discourse Deleuze is not attempting to 
make it either more theoretical or arcane but rather emphasising its importance. He 
would agree both with Irigaray's assessment that philosophy enjoys the status of 
4 master discourse', for Ji]t is indeed philosophical discourse [which] one must question 
44 Gilles Deleuze, 'Entretien 1980', LArc, 49, rev. edn (1980), 99-102, (p. 99). 
45 John Marks, Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity (London, Sterling and 
Virginia: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 123. 
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and disturb ... it lays down the law for all the others ... 
it constitutes the discourse of 
discourses',, 46 and with Derek Attridge that: 
The exercise of making the Wake a central and not a digressive text in our literary 
culture can ... create a space where 
it might be possible to reassess the function and 
character of the literary and its potential importance for us as members of an 
always changing, always changeable society. 47 
I wish to stress here that Attridge's observation is one which I develop as the basis 
for my thesis. Hardt and Negri's analysis indicates that such a space now exists. As 
Balakrishnan notes, 'In an excursus on Machiavelli [in Empire], they maintain the time 
has come to compose great manifestos which pry open an empty space for 
48 
transformative intervention, and beckon the multitude to surge through'. Read in 
Deleuzian terms, I believe that the Wake itself may be regarded as such a manifesto. 
In stating this I wish to dissociate my argument from that of Philippe Sollers. As 
Tel Quel's influential editor, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, Sollers consistently 
argued that avant-garde literature, with Joyce's work at the heart of it, played a central 
role in influencing the political climate. At the Fifth International Joyce Symposium 
held at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1975, Sollers, then in his Maoist period, brandished a 
copy of Finnegans Wake, held it aloft, and cried, Wive la R6volution! ' A taunt 
seemingly directed at the Americans and their attempts to 'tame' the Wake., but also 
apparently because underneath the dustwrapper, the cover of the book was red as was 
Mao's little red book, and he was evidently equating the two and suggesting that the 
Wake could be presented directly to the Western 'masses' as an equivalent 
revolutionary tool. 49 In his attempt to align the Wake with 'Mao's' propagandist 
46 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 72. 
47 Attridge, Peculiar Language, p. 238. 
48 Balakrishnan, 'Hardt and Negri's "Empire"', p. 304. 
49 Anecdotal evidence confirmed by Pieter Bekker, joint editor of 'The James Joyce 
Broadsheet' and member of the Leeds University James Joyce Reading Group, who 
was present at the session in Paris when Sollers made his intervention. 
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writing, and the Chinese Communist revolution, Deleuze and Guattari would 
undoubtedly see Sollers approach as wrong-headed if not fascistic. (AO xiii) My point is 
simply that Hardt and Negri's Deleuzoguattarian theory which might help to bring 
about a different revolution would benefit enormously by taking 'great literature' and 
particularly the Wake into account, in order to strengthen its necessary ethical 
dimension. 
Following Spinoza, who claims that the prophet produces his own people, 50 
Deleuze and Guattari regard 'great literature', as an essential component in creating 'the 
multitude' as revolutionary assemblage. In this connection works which Deleuze and 
Guattari cite include those of D. H. Lawrence,, Virginia Woolf, Hardy, Melville, Kafka, 
Proust, and both Joyce's Ulysses, and the Wake. All of which, except the Wake, have 
been conscripted into 'the literary canon' of academia. This both captures 'great 
literature' for an hierarchical and elitist audience and in its 'reterritorialisation' by the 
forces of an hegemonic capitalist socius through the Institutional State Apparatus of 
academia, 51 stifles and tames much of its productive revolutionary intensities, although 
nothing can completely nullify the latent ethical and hence political potential of these 
works. Deleuze and Guattari do not see 'great literature' in hegemonic, transcendent or 
elitist terms although they fully appreciate that it can be and frequently is read in this 
way. Rather, as with Kafka's work, they believe that it is the often unrecognised'or 
suppressed but always potentially subversive aspect of such literature which makes it 
(great'. 
Seemingly paradoxically they name all such 'great literature' as 'minor' and note 
its potential socio-political effects through 'deterritorialisations'. For them (minor 
literature' is the 'revolutionary force for all literature ... pushing 
deterritorialization to 
such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities'. (K 19) They stress its absolute 
50 Benedictus de Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, in The Chief Works of Benedict 
de Spinoza, vol - I, trans. 
by R. H. M. Elwees (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 
1955). 
51 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster 
(New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 197 1), passim. 
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necessity in the revolutionary process. Deleuze and Guattari regard 'minor literature' as 
ethical and political, collective, and revolutionary in its impact. It 'deterritorialises' one 
territory as it maps out another. According to them, 'minor literature) creates the means 
by which 'deterritorialization' can take place and therefore it is a literature of the 
people: 
The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come 
... 
because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a 
collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu: literature is the 
people's concern. (K 18) 
I believe that the very difference or 'singularity' of the Wake separates it from other 
(great works' of literature and has resulted in its exclusion from the 'literary canon'. 
Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's considerable insight enables them to grasp this but 
they fail to go beyond the portmanteau and esoteric words, which they correctly 
highlight, and consequently do not fully appreciate its absolute radical potential. For 
instance,, other 'great' works, even when read as 'minor', offer patriarchal forces an 
easier means of recuperation because they are couched in the language and syntax of the 
Symbolic order. The Wake, on the other hand, through Joyce's deliberate elevation of 
lexis over syntax - whereby the 'multiplicity' of words to be drawn out themselves 
create the syntax - resists such incorporation, and does not allow an easy subsumation 
into the 'literary canon', much as standard Joycean criticism attempts to draw it in. In 
Joyce's deployment of several types of grammar we, as readers, are forced to reorganise 
the phrases and syntax which he supplies and draw out disparate meaning. Such creative 
difficulties are deliberately compounded at the macro-level by Joyce's 'accretive' 
composition, clateral integration of sections', and presentation as 'a uniform textual 
continuum'. 52 which stylistically emphasises spatiality and time as 'duration'. They 
nevertheless can be held to appreciate that the Wake offers us: 
... matter-movement 
bearing singularities [epiphanies] or haecceities ... an 
expressivity-movement always bearing a foreign tongue within each language and 
nonlinguistic categories within language as a whole (nomad poetic lineages). 
[Writing], then, on the same level as the real of an unformed matter, at the same 
52 David Hayman, 'Draft Analysis: Reader's Guide', in James Joyce, 'Finnegans 
Wake', Book H Chapter 2: A Facsimile of Drafts, Typescripts, and Proofs, Vol 11 (New 
York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1978), p. vii. 
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time as that matter traverses and extends all of nonfon-nal language [and becomes] 
a revolutionary machine, all the more abstract for being real. A regime that no 
longer operates by the signifier or the subjective. ... singular and immanent abstract 
machines. (TP 512) 
In total this creates an impossible incomprehensibility from a patriarchal 
perspective and offers an opportunity as its exceptional 'minoritarian' qualities 
consequently remain undiminished. These extend not only to the undermining and 
problematisation of the accepted understanding of what 'great literature' supposedly 
tells us, in liberal humanist terms, but go well beyond this to give the means of 
liberating our full ethical potential, and in doing so undermine the mores of a society 
constituted under capitalism. Yet, the new global order remains undergirded by a 
powerful and unified 'reterritorialising' moral climate. Terry Eagleton notes in this 
connection the influence of the unquestioned 'universal values' distilled from 'great 
literature' and propagated by the academy, as Institutional State Apparatus, which 
imposes on it belief in: 
[the] timeless unity of the human spirit, of the superiority of the imaginative to the 
actual, of the inferiority of ideas to feelings, of the truth that the individual stands at 
the center of the universe, of the relative unimportance of public as against 
interpersonal life, and of the practical as against the contemplative, and other such 
modem prejudices. 53 
and he concludes that '[flike all the most effective forms of power, high culture presents 
54 itself simply as a form of moral persuasion'. The Wake, I argue, is consequently the 
only work of 'great literature' advocated by Deleuze which can be held to retain its full 
subversive and liberatory capacity and as such is crucial to Deleuzian ethico-political 
thought. It deserves to be accorded even greater weight by Deleuze and Guattari than 
even they give it, as it does in Hardt and Negri's Deleuzoguattarian analysis and 
prognosis, but it receives no mention from them. 
Evidently I need to explain further what is meant by Deleuze and Guattari's 
concept of 'symptomatology', but even prior to this I need to examine their particular 
53 Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 52. 
54 Ibid., p. 54. 
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understanding of philosophy and the philosophic concept. In What is Philosophy? they 
hold that 'philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts', (WIP 2) 
and as such they conclude that most other understandings of philosophy, principally 
conceived as 'contemplation', 'reflection' or 'communication', are both incomplete and 
questionable. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari designate any philosophy taken to be 
C contemplation' as 'objective idealism', and they regard Plato as the founding father of 
this method because of his 'contemplation' of 'Ideas'. (WIP 29-30) 
If, for instance, one takes the 'Idea of Justice' in The Republic 55 which resides in 
the world outside of the cave in a separate realm of pure 'Ideas', 56 it is evident that for 
Plato only the overarching disembodied mind containing these 'ideas' can act as 
impartial judge giving us a pure idea of justice uncontaminated by worldly or bodily 
issues. Yet, such an approach judges life and justice from the impossible godlike 
perspective of someone who isn't alive and has never lived in the world. Consequently, 
Plato is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the very different understandings of 
justice in different times and in different parts of the world for different peoples. This is 
because he has elevated the concept of 'justice' to an 'other worldly' position which 
belies its construction in the socio-historical context which Socratesl as Plato's 
spokesman, and his opponents have hinted at in their earlier discussions on the city. He 
is even unable to give due weight to the impersonal forces, such as the economic, 
religious and linguistic which manifest themselves in the world and have played an 
important part in any given formation and understanding of this concept. Deleuze and 
Guattari regard such transcendental elevations and the reduction of concepts to essences 
as unacceptable as they evade the centrality of worldly, bodily issues and consequently 
of their understanding of the concept. Plato, in effect, needs to be brought down to 
55 Plato, The Republic, revised by C. D. C. Reeve, trans. by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1992). 
56 lbid, Book VI. 
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earth. Consequently, both Deleuze himself (L 253) and Foucault57 in commenting on 
Deleuze have stated that his thought is a 'reversal of Platonism'. 
Deleuze and Guattari similarly target Descartes and Kant when they look at 
philosophy conceived as 'reflection', and they call this the philosophy of 'subjective 
idealism'. Although they acknowledge that in Cartesian philosophy the doubting subject 
cannot be sure of the objective status of 'Ideas', and that Platonism must consequently 
be bracketed out of the equation, idealism is nevertheless allowed in via the back door 
through Descartes' creation of an occult, irreducible, immaterial, and ontological 
'cogito', (WIP 24-27) which is now taken to be located in the subject rather than in a 
supposedly objective realm of transcendent ideas. Therefore, as Deleuze and Guattari 
see it, 'subjective idealism' in the case of Descartes is mistaken insofar as it appertains 
to the subject's implicit knowledge of thought as creative of being. 
Although Kant calls Cartesianism into question, '[w]e cannot say with Descartes, "I 
think therefore I am. I am a thing that thinks"', (KCP viii) he nevertheless maintains the 
same emphasis. (WIP 32) He does this by giving primacy to the apperceptive or self- 
conscious nature of human experience and action by endowing it with the status of 
'phenomenal experience' and separating it from 'the world in itself, (WIP 31-32,85) 
thereby perpetuating a Cartesian dualism where it becomes a reflection upon space and 
time as well. (WIP 27) From Plato's theory of forms to Kant's noumenal reality of 'the 
thing-in-itself, Platonic, Cartesian, and Kantian metaphysics erect a two world theory 
of reality. Consequently, in all of their philosophies a supposedly 'true' world 
overshadows an 'apparent' world available to our senses but regarded as inauthentic and 
a mere semblance of the original. 
Finally, Deleuze and Guattari take issue with the philosophy of 'communication', 
which they name 'intersubjective idealism', and here they have Husserl and 
57 Michel Foucault, 'Theatrum Philisophicum'. in, Language, Counter-memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and trans. by D. F. Bouchard and S. 
Simons (Ithaca, NewYork: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 167-168. 
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phenomenology in their sights. Husserl's proj eet58 aims to reinstate the Kantian 
'transcendental subject' in the phenomenal world, in order to place it within the 
empirical ground of 'actual experience': 
Husserl. sees it [Kant's thought] through to the end by discovering, in non- 
numerical multiplicities or immanent perceptivo-affective fusional. sets, the triple 
root of acts of transcendence (thought) through which the subject constitutes first of 
all a sensory world filled with objects, then an intersubjective world occupied by 
the other, and finally a common ideal world that will be occupied by scientific, 
mathematical,, and logical formations. (WIP 142) 
Therefore, Husserl figures the transcendent 'Idea' as neither a pre-existing object, nor a 
presupposition of subjective reflection, but rather as a consequence of intersubjective 
interaction. On this understanding, Deleuze and Guattari argue, philosophical activity is 
indistinguishable from the 'communication' which takes place between subjects. Joyce 
shows us the problematic of such communication which does and does not take place 
between subjects through Bloom in the 'Aeolus' episode of Ulysses. 
In attacking the philosophies of 'contemplation', 'reflection' and 'communication', 
and designating them as variants of philosophic idealism, Deleuze and Guattari clearly 
indicate their own philosophic stance. They eschew such 'psychologisms'. Theirs is an 
absolute philosophy of immanence, materialism, and difference opposed to idealism and 
the transcendent in any of its forms. Following Hume, Deleuze had already adopted a 
version of empiricism, 59 an interest which he continues during his association with 
Guattari. (WIP 53-54) For Hume, all supposedly true, timeless, logical and universal 
principles - including causality, necessity, identity and lawfulness (WIP 214) - are 
effects of experience; they are fictions which the mind imposes on the experiences of 
our material being allowing us to order our world and our constructed selves within it 
into manageable forms. Moreover, Deleuze couples Hume's insight with that of 
58 Edmund Husserl., Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. trans. 
by Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1960); The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy, trans. by D. Carr (Evanston, 1L.: Northwest University Press, 1970). 
59 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human 
Nature, trans. by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 199 1). 
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Spinoza which in his understanding of 'substance' allows him to speak of the 'plane of 
immanence' on which 'the truth of the new humanity is determined historically, 
technically, and politically [and] the singular is presented as the multitude', 60 as Hardt 
and Negri put it. 
Deleuze and Guattari categorise the philosophies of 'contemplation', 'reflection' 
and 'communication' as 'arborescent' and their own immanent philosophy as 
'rhizomatic'. Both these concepts are used in a wide variety of different circumstances, 
(TP 3-25) with the former in general terms indicating hierarchies of height and depth 
and the latter a proliferation of 'grounded' surface connections. 'Arborescence' in this 
specific instance indicates ideological systems which seek to establish both hierarchy 
and a fundamentally dichotomous sets of relations in all their lines of thought. Deleuze 
and Guattari's 'rhizomatic' philosophic system conversely denies this bi-polar method 
of thought by working through 'the middle' and employing decentred sets of material 
linkages between concepts, processes, relations, 'intensities', and speeds and 
slownesses: 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely 
alliance. The tree imposes the verb 'to be', but the fabric of the rhizome is the 
conj unction, 'and ... and. . and. . .' This conjunction carries enough 
force to shake 
and uproot the verb 'to be'. ... proceed 
from the middle, through the middle, 
coming and going rather than starting and finishing. ... move 
between things, 
establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, 
nullify endings and beginnings. ... The middle 
is by no means an average; on the 
contrary, it is where things pick up speed. ... a transversal movement that sweeps 
one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its 
banks and picks up speed in the middle. (TP 25) 
Deleuze states that 'we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we 
deserve given our way of being or our style of life', (NP 1) consequently our prevailing 
'arborescent' way of thinking inevitably leads to judgemental moralising and 'sad' 
outcomes. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari argue that 'rhizomatics' as a fon-n of 
pragmatics solely concerned with what can be achieved in the world gives us a 'joyful' 
ethical alternative. It is because of this alternative offered by literature that Deleuze 
60 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 73. 
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would no doubt argue that his injunction to author's to 'create a people is in no sense 
to offer the author a privileged, transcendent, arborescent position. In effect, Deleuzian 
'rhizomatics' shows how concepts, texts and the forces which compose them can be 
made to work differently through the establishment of new material connections. 
Pivotal concepts which define the relationship between things within a Deleuzian 
'rhizomatic' cartography include 'becomings', commencing with 'becoming-woman', 
and also the 'Body without Organs' ('BwO') located on the 'plane of immanence', as 
the focal point of 'schizoanalysis', as will be explained below. 
Contemplation, reflection or communication, they argue, cannot be definitive of 
philosophical activity because what is ftindamentally elided here is the creation of the 
material concepts on which they rest and the linkages then established. By taking for 
granted the invention of these concepts and the immanent forces which constitute them 
such philosophies lose their groundedness in the material world. Deleuze and Guattari 
hold that the philosophers cited and the philosophies they have created teach the exact 
opposite of what they actually do. These idealisms actually create concepts and material 
connections whilst arguing for uncreated ideal essences which are held to Precede them 
in a transcendent state somehow divorced from the real world. Deleuze and Guattari are 
not suggesting that human beings do not 'contemplate, reflect or communicate', nor that 
philosophy should not concern itself with these actions, only that it is a mistake to 
equate these actions directly with philosophical activity itself. For them philosophy is 
grounded in the creation of concepts allowing for new ways of thinking. These are 
entirely dependent on and bound up with the problematics and differences of this world 
and philosophy becomes 'idealism' when it forgets this fundamental fact. 
This approach to philosophy not only placed him at odds with traditional views but 
also with his structuralist, post-structuralist, postmodern peer group. Deleuze's 
materialism rcJects any conception of the sign, or symptom, which limit it to a linguistic 
model. Rather than sticking to the Saussurean derived serniology with many of his 
contemporaries, he bases his understanding of signs on Pierce's 'sem(e)iotics 61 and 
61 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of'Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols, 
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couples this with the work of Hjelmslev, 62 and then brings into play the 'order words' of 
Austin 63 and Searle, 64 agreeing with them that command and performance are at the 
heart of grammar and communication. 
In contrast to this approach language is foundational for the greatest post- 
structuralist Jacques Derrida, yet its uncertainties allow for infinite deconstruction. This 
stance ultimately undermines any belief or argument, 'political' or otherwise, which he 
or anyone else cares to posit. This is the dilemma which he finally presents us with. As 
Andre Pierre Colombat points out: 
Deleuze's two books on cinema shed a new light on his criticism of linguistic signs. 
They also exemplify his radical opposition to any form of structuralism based on 
linguistics or even to the most brilliant and subtle word games played by Derrida's 
Deconstruction. The point is not to unveil a Signifier nor a paradoxical founding 
trace but to evaluate forces, arrangements and an entire battlefield; to map thinking 
as a vital process. 65 
James Williams too contrasts Deleuze and Derrida to the latter's detriment: 
Broadly, the contrast between Deleuze and Derrida lies in the former's 
preparedness to adopt systematic forms, arguments and concepts from the history 
of philosophy and then to cast them, still fully functional, in a new and disruptive 
setting. The latter shies away from this inclusive approach, preferring to undermine 
historical arguments from the outset and replacing them with a much looser 
methodological framework. Deleuze offers us principles and methods for a 
philosophy of difference, whereas Derrida offers us an ethos and style of writing 
about difference explicitly resistant to the emergence of principles or methods. 66 
ed. by Charles Hartshorne, et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 193 1- 
1958). 
62 Louis Hjelmslev, ProlegomMes a une theorie A language (Paris: Editions de 
Minuit,, 1968-7 1). 
63 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). 
64 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy ofLanguage (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
65 Andr6 Pierre Colombat, 'Deleuze and Signs, in Delelize and Literature, ed. by Ian 
Buchanan, and John Marks (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 22. 
66 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Dijj&ence and Repetition': A Critical 
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It is the life-enhancing, life-giving 'vitalism' of such a cartographic process which is the 
key to Deleuze's philosophy. He does not take language as foundational. As a 
philosophic vitalist, though one of a different stripe to those who were concerned with a 
mystical, transcendent life force, as everything is immanent for him, he takes a 
materialist perspective on life: life seen as 'machinic connections'. 
Similarly, Deleuze's dispute with Jacques Lacan was based on the latter's early 
refusal to take 'the real' as possible. It is impossible for the Symbolic order, as Lacan 
conceived it, and consequently for patriarchal language but not for life itself (Lacan 
appears to move towards this position himself when he engages directly with Joyce's 
later works, when 'the category of the sinthome allowed him to think the Symbolic as 
permeated by the Real, instead of [being] radically distinct from it'. 67 ) The real is 
absolutely essential for life and production and requires no mediation via language. For 
Deleuze the importance of 'great literature' lies in the impersonal 'affects' which its 
language mobilizes or generates for our use. Deleuze points out, for instance, that we do 
not need language as an intermediary to tell us when we feel the warmth of sunlight on 
our face, we simply experience its 'affect' as real. In this his approach is quite distinct 
from Derrida, the earlier Lacan and all who took the linguistic turn following and/or 
critiquing de Saussure. 
Deleuze states that the two intimately linked prizes of philosophy are the 
attainment of a Nietzschean 'cheerfulness' (Heiterkeit) at the death of God, and the 
concomitant abolition of transcendent values. 68 Eschewing materialism, Derrida's 
Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p. 26. 
67 Dominiek Hoens, and Ed Pluth, 6The sinthome: A New Way of Writing an Old 
Problem? ', in Re-inventing the Symptom. - Essays on the Final Lacan, ed. by Luke 
Thurston (New York: Other Press, 2002), p. 14. 
68Antonio Negri, 'Notes on the evolution of the thought of the later Althusser', trans. 
by Olga Vasile, in Antonio Callari and David E Ruccio (eds) Postmodern 
Materialism and the FnIure ofMarxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition 
(Hanover NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1996) pp. 51-68, (p. 61). 
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recourse in his later works to a theo-philosophy of transcendence, influenced by 
Levinas and linked to the theme of negative theology stemming from Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Meister Eckhart 69 would be considered by Deleuze and Guattari as a completely 
unacceptable move: '[w]henever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State 
in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is 
immanence'. (WIP43) Finally,, Deleuze stresses that philosophy's main concern must be 
to seek a 'restoration of immanence' and, in so doing absolutely forbid 'the return of 
any transcendence'. (ECCI 3 7) 
Nevertheless, Deleuze's philosophical approach may appear to open it to Derridean 
deconstructive linguistic criticism, but this need not be the case. In Anti-Oedipus 
Hjelmslev's linguistics is proposed as an alternative to that of Saussure. Hjelmslev had 
developed an immanent theory of language, which escapes the constraining identity of 
the signifier. Language for him is deterritorialised, decoded, and subject to the flows of 
desire; a very satisfactory position for Deleuze to adopt. In addition, Peirce provides 
Deleuze with a generalised, non-linguistic semiotics, rather than a Saussurean or indeed 
Derridean semiology. Deleuze made a distinction between semiotics and semiology, 
and expressed a very clear preference for semiotics which he defines as 'the system of 
images and signs independent of language in general'. (C2 29) For him, 'U]ust as 
philosophy must constantly come into contact with "non-philosophy", 70 so language 
comes into contact with "non-language material"', 71 and resolves itself in 'the middle'. 
For Derrida, as for the early Lacan, everything is ultimately posited on lack or loss, 
implying an original plenitude. Unlike Deleuze, Derrida has not taken 'difference' as 
irreducible. Insofar as such lack is bound up with desire for Derrida and Lacan, Deleuze 
would hold that this ties their approaches to the 'oedipalisations' of capitalism, and their 
69 Jacques Derrida, On the Name, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) notes Derrida's 'theological turn(s)'. 
70 Gregg Lambert, The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (New York and London: 
Continuum, 2002), passim. 
71 John Marks, Gilles Deleuze, p. 142. 
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politics to a recoupment by it. Consequently, despite their often public disagreements, 
Rene Major has shown how similar, and indeed interdependant, much of Derrida and 
Lacan's work is. 72 Moreover, Derrida is exercised by the loss of meaning which is of 
little concern for Deleuze. For him, the 'sting of the negative is extracted from the 
structural semiosis, allowing a truly diacritic sign to emerge. And the Derridean 
diff6rance yields to the Deleuzian different/ciation'. 73 Following Bergson, 
'differenciation' concerns the 'actualisation' of the 'forces of virtuality' and 
'differentiation' the totality of diacritic relations of 'the virtual' on which it draws. 
Despite asserting that his work is 'philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the 
traditional sense of the word )74 when one turns to the traditional philosophic view of 
concepts there are substantial differences between established views and Deleuze's 
understanding of how such concepts should be understood. The traditional means is to 
understand concepts as determinate ideal entities serving as points of identification 
which must conform to the logic of exclusive disjunction. In other words, things either 
do or do not belong within them. Traditionally understood concepts are concerned with 
clear-cut categorization and thus the establishment of identity. Deleuze and Guattari 
regard the philosophic concept quite differently. It is not to be seen in such a cut-and- 
dried fashion. They see it as determined by context and difference, 'pure and simple 
variations ordered according to their neighbourhood'. Their formulation of the concept 
is therefore: 
: ** incorporeal, even though 
it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies. But, in fact, it 
is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have 
spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates. It has no energy, only 
intensities 
... The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing-pure Event, a hecceity [sic] ... It 
is like the bird as event. (WIP 2 1)75 
72 Rene Major, Lacan avec Derrida: analyse disistentielle (Paris: Flammarion, 2001) 
73 Constantin V. Boundas, 'Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual', in Deleuze: 
A Critical Reader, ed. by Paul Patton, p. 90. 
74 Deleuze, 'Entretien 1980', p. 99. 
75 My italiCS 
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This effectuation of the concept 'in bodies' was addressed by Joyce through 
Stephen Dedalus's Aristotelian ruminations at the beginning of the 'Proteus' episode in 
Ulysses where he goes beyond 'coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane', with its idealist 
limitations, to the materialism and immanence of Aristotle's conclusion: ' [blut he adds: 
in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By 
knocking his sconce against them, sure. '(U 45) 76 Nevertheless, I am not concerned with 
the certainties, essences or clearly defined identities which Stephen's Aristotelian 
speculations, filtered through a Thomist prism, appear to be seeking here, but rather 
with Deleuze and Guattari's seemingly cryptic understanding of the concept as giving 
the material 'event', in all of its 'thisness' or 'haecceity'. 
Thus, it would seem that Deleuze and Guattari in equating the bird with 'the event' 
have in mind the 'musicality' of the bird song and its 'line of flight' to freedom rather 
than any species specific bird which might better suit Stephen's musings, and indeed the 
traditional idea of the philosophic concept. One is reminded here of the young girl in 
Giacomo Joyce who is likened to ja] bird twittering after storm, happy that its little 
foolish life has fluttered out of reach of the clutching fingers of an epileptic lord and 
giver of life, twittering happily, twittering and chirping happily'. 77 Flight and music 
feature prominently in my later readings of Joyce's works. The Deleuzian concept 'like 
the bird as event' escapes the clutching fingers of a traditional, patriarchal philosophy. 
To understand Deleuze and Guattari's definition of the concept better one needs to 
understand its near equation with 'the event' before proceeding further. 
Deleuze's Logic qfSense is the principal work in which he addresses the concept of 
'the event' most fully. He does this in an exploration of what can be regarded as sense 
and what is to be seen as nonsense. Deleuze always treats 'sense' as having great 
76 Jacques Aubert (The Aesthetics ofJames Joj)ce (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992) here identifies the French translation of Aristotle's, De Sensus 
et Sensibilia, 111, p. 439, which Joyce used, as well as the specific quotation: Tolour is 
the limit of the diaphane in any determined body' (Aubert, 'Appendix B', p. 134). 
77 James Joyce, Giacomo Joyce (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 11. 
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ontological significance by opposing it to 'essence'. He notes elsewhere that there is ý no 
ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense'. 78 In a unique philosophic 
combination, in Logic of Sense, Deleuze takes a surprising approach and examines 'the 
event' in terms of both Stoic philosophy and psychoanalysis. He selects from Stoic 
philosophy their 'theory of bodies'. (L 4) For the Stoics 'events' are not bodies seen in 
commonsensieal terms but are incorporeal entities which 'subsist' and 'inhere'. 'Pure 
events' precede language not as essences but as singular and impersonal 'intensities' 
indicating a pre-individual existence inside the language which expresses them. Deleuze 
argues that it is particularly through the release of such impersonal intensities in Joyce's 
use of portmanteau and esoteric words that he constructs his 4epiphanic machine'. 
'Events' are thus independent of their actual formation and use in language and 
always exceed it. The 'event' is a 'haecceity ... a 
draught, a wind, a day, a time of day, 
a stream, a place, a battle, an illness'. (N 141) Moreover, in order to underline its 
nebulous qualities impossible to capture in words, Deleuze has ftirther stated that '[a]ny 
event is a fog of a million droplets'. 79 Hardt and Negri in critiquing Deleuze's concept 
of the event as 'the production of the social ... as a chaotic, 
indeterminate horizon 
80 marked by the ungraspable event' , 
fail to grasp that it is precisely the crucial unknown 
features of 'social production' stemming from the 'virtual' which characterises the 
event for Deleuze and for Guattari. 81 It cannot be reduced to the Marxian analysis which 
they then attempt. 
In speaking of his use of Stoic philosophy in Logic of Sense, Deleuze points out 
that the Stoics draw a mental line between things and events, which allows them to 
explore the impersonal aspect, the ý'it% of 'the event' which tends to dissolve the self. (L 
78G illes Deleuze, 'Review', in Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. by L. Lawler 
and A Sen (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 191-195. 
79 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 65. 
80 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 28. 
81 Felix Guattari. Chaosmosis: An Ethico-A esthetic Paradigm, trans. by P. Bains and j 
Pefanis (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995), passim. 
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63) 1 will be relating this conception of the 'it' or 'haecceity' to the epiphanic 'bird girl' 
of A Portrait in Chapter Three, and to Issy in the Wake in Chapters Four and Five. The 
'it' consists of the 'virtual intensities' which make up the 'thisness' of 'the event' as a 
processual 'becoming'. These concepts will be explained below. 
In addition to the Stoics and psychoanalysis, Deleuze's understanding of the 
gevent' also owes something to Maurice Blanchot who particularly notes the 
ambiguities inherent in the concept. For Blanchot 'there is the part of the event which is 
realized and accomplished [and] there is that "part of the event which cannot realize its 
accomplishment"'. (L 151-152) Thus, the 'narrative event' for Blanchot can never be 
fully described: jn]arrative is the movement towards a point - one that is ... unknown, 
ignored, and foreign'. 82 Drawing on this, Deleuze holds that an 'event' elucidates the 
seeming paradoxes of sense and nonsense. In order to illustrate this he brings into play 
Lewis Carroll's literary and logical paradoxes [2.1 ] and links these to Joyce's work 
which he sees as 'a method of questions and answers which doubles that of 
problems'[2.2]. Instances of this in Deleuze's Logic qf Sense are taken from Carroll's 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (L 234-236) where the 'smile without a cat' shows us 
an 'impersonal event' by freeing the 'virtual' 'affect' of the smile from its 
'actualisation' on the face of a particular cat. (These concepts will be defined below. ) 
Deleuze points out too that, in The Hunting of the Shark, 83 Carroll used literary and 
logical paradoxes to conjure up an absurd, nonsensical, world through the use of 
invented, esoteric, language which yet creates and coalesces into a kind of 'sense' with 
its own inherent logic. With Carroll, according to Deleuze, we are cast into a sea of 
difference. Thus, the very word 'snark' has not an 'always already' given meaning, 
which would allow an Althusserian interpellation 84 by hailing us and effectively 
82 Maurice Blanchot, The SirensSong, Selected Essays, ed. by G. Josipovici, trans. by 
S. Rabinovitch (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 12. 
83 lbid, pps. 46,234. 
84 Louis Althusser, For Marx, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970),, p. 233. The concept of 
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underwriting an already coherent self Carroll draws on impersonal forces to configure 
new animals and create 'events' by actively inventing a new language, and a different 
world, and implicitly sets it alongside common sense understanding through his use of 
invented and portmanteau words: 
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogoves, 
And the mome raths outgrabe. 85 
In his conception of the 'event', we can also see that Deleuze is implicitly 
connecting us to the Wake. For as Tim Conley points out, in his assessment of the Wake 
as the supreme example of 'nonsense literature', it goes much further than does Carroll 
in its 'gesture to the immeasurable, ludicrous, and dangerous depths of meaning'. 86 
Such 'nonsense' for Deleuze is not simply whimsical. He would believe that it points to 
the possibility of the creation of a different world and new 'becomings' through 
physical, chemical and biological changes. As Duszenko notes, Joyce, in the Wake, was 
also aware of such potential changes. 87 
This then is the significance of 'the event' for Deleuze, conceived in terms of its 
'speaking' the philosophic concept. The Deleuzian concept epitomises new thinking, 
whether newly created or re-worked from earlier meanings., it always brings into play 
new meanings, new understandings of life, and new opportunities through its revelation 
'interpellation', or hailing into identity, was derived from Lacan's argument that the 
subject is created when it responds positively to the call of the 'Other', as 'Name-of- 
the-Father'. Such hailing offers an (illusory) unitary consistency within the Symbolic 
order. Louis Althusser developed the notion of 'interpellation' further, within a 
structuralist-Marxist theory of ideology. 'Interpellation' is held to be an advance on 
Marx's concept of 'false consciousness'. 
85 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, The 
Complete Works ofLewis Carroll (London: Penguin Publishers, 1988), p. 140. 
86 Tim Conley, ' "Oh me none onsens! ": Finnegans Wake and the Negation of 
Meaning', James Joyce Quarterly, 39.2 (Winter, 2002), p. 242. 
87 Duszenko, 'Introduction', The Joyce ofScience: New Physics in Finnegans Wake 
<http: // duszenko. northem. edu/joyce/index. html> (1997) [accessed 17 February 2001 
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of change and difference. Moreover, for Deleuze it is this creative thinking which 
emphasises life itself as change and difference and underpins Deleuzianism as an ethical 
philosophy. I should perhaps add that the creation of such Deleuzian concepts is 
potentially available to everyone and is not restricted to professional Philosophic circles. 
One can now see how it is that in his formative work Dýfterence and Repetition, 
contemporaneous with Logic qf Sense, Deleuze is able to offer a critique of the 
predominant Western philosophic tradition as a system of thinking, predicated always 
upon concepts as determinate ideal entities serving as points of identification. James 
Williams 88 summarises the importance of Difference and Repetition as 'stand[ing] out 
as one of the great philosophical works of the twentieth century'. He notes that 
Deleuze's 'outstanding achievement lies in the comprehensive and rigorous innovation 
Difference and Repetition implies for philosophical accounts of the structure of reality 
... extend[ing] to new 
ideas about values and action'. 89 Furthermore, as Williams 
stresses, it is 'as much about how to live and how to create as it is about a philosophical 
view of the world'. 90 
Thus,, Deleuze shows in Difference and Repetition that concepts traditionally 
conceived of as determinate ideal entities which result in points of identification ensure 
a categorization, including a unified theory of the self, which obscures and tames the 
radical otherness of difference. He argues that this effaces creativity or what he calls 
'the genitality of thinking'. (DR 266) It is just such Joycean creativity, although this is 
achieved by 'affect', which leads me to highlight the Wake in this thesis. Deleuze's 
philosophy accepts the claim that concepts are only formulated in conjunction with 
problems which are necessarily located in this world even though they are 'not mixed 
up with the state of affairs in which [they are] effectuated'. (WIP 21) Such worldly 
problems are frequently brought to the attention of philosophy through the 
88 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference and Repetition', p. 1. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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6 symptornatological' 'affects' of great literature. The concept is meaningless if 'it is not 
... linked to a problem that it resolves'. (WIP 79) For Deleuze conceptual thinking offers 
a new and different response to such problems, (WIP 133) as the construction of 
concepts is not simply an epistemological but an ontological project in which 'the 
multitude', in its quest to attain a new subjectivity in global capitalism, must be 
completely invested. This is an awareness which Joyce also shows in his fictional 
characters' confrontations with 'the Imperial British state' - capitalism's then chief 
protagonist and historical 'actualisation' - coupled with its hegemonic collaborator 'the 
holy Roman catholic and apostolic church'. (U 24) 
Anyone who believes that Joyce was only incidentally concerned with capitalism in 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, with money providing its ultimate value judgement, 
should read Osteen on the former, and Critchley and MacCarthy on the latter. 91 To take 
one obvious example from the Wake, which Critchley and MacCarthy do not use, Joyce 
humorously retells La Fontaine's fable of the ant and the grasshopper as the tale of 'the 
Ondt and the Gracehoper' (FW 414.14-419.10). Here Shaun tells the story and attempts 
to place himself as its bourgeois hero by showing himself as the prudent ant with Shem 
as the wasteful grasshopper. Clearly, Shaun's intention is to use the fable to illustrate 
capitalist values. However, in his choice of the Ondt as his double he betrays himself as 
this is a word that is both the Danish word for evi192 and a permutation of 'don't', all of 
which ties in with his generally negative view of life. The Ondt's 'Ad majorem I. s. d! ' 
(FW 418.4) means 'for the greater glory of pounds, shillings, and pence'. 
91 Mark Osteen, The Economy of Ulysses: Making Both Ends Meet (New York: 
Syracues University Press, 1995) passim; and Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy, 'Of 
Chrematology - Joyce and Money', James Joyce Broadsheet, 68 (June 2004), 1-2, and 
Hypermedia Joyce Studies, 4.1 (July 2003). 
92 Dounia Bunis Christiani, Scandinavian Elements of "Finnegans Wake" (Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 188. 
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Part 2. Deleuze's philosophic antecedents 
Deleuze's Bergsonism 
Deleuze's commitment to a materialist philosophy resonates with his involvement 
with the philosophy of Bergson which he develops further in Bergsonism and Cinema 2. 
Contrary to the Cartesian philosophy highlighted above there can be no separation of 
mind and body for Bergson. Moreover, his philosophy has no room for occult or 
unknowable power which Descartes has imported into his philosophy. Bergson's 
philosophy is an anti-Cartesian monism which does away with appeals to the 'soul' or 
4 spirit' in its insistence that mind is just an emergent phenomenon of the bio-physical 
matter of the brain. There is only matter and its energetic movement and this complex 
movement entirely explains mind and consciousness itself. Any difference between 
these aspects of matter is simply one of degree not of kind. Therefore for Bergson the 
relationship between consciousness, the brain, and the material world is one of 
continuity and connectedness. Consciousness is simply the product of a bio-physical 
process. This process is one of selection which involves a resolution of forces. This 
selectionist model results in the twin concepts of the 'virtual' and the 'actual', both of 
which are basic to Deleuzoguattarian philosophy and underpin many of their conceptual 
developments. 
Whilst Hardt and Negri in Empire implicitly privilege Spinoza over Bergson, as the 
most important formative influence on his thought, a growing number of commentators 
assert that Deleuze's philosophy is fundamentally Bergsonian. 93 Thus, for Alain Badiou 
in The Clamor of Being, Bergson is Deleuze's major philosophical reference point, and 
Constantin V. Boundas argues that, in returning to Bergson, Deleuze has argued for a 
93 Alain Badiou. Deleuze: The Clamor o Being; Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and ýf 
the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the time of life (London and New York, 
Routledge, 2002), passim; John Mullarkey, ed., The New Bergson (Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 137; Vincent Descombes, Modern 
French Philosophy, trans. by L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 26; Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: 
Post-Structuralism and Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 87-108. 
36 
philosophy of 'difference' much more convincingly than Heidegger, structuralism or 
Deffida. 94 Nevertheless, Deleuze's considerable inventiveness and his use of 'free 
indirect discourse' comes into play when confronting other philosopher's works, 95 as it 
does with both Bergson and Nietzsche. Thus, in order to understand Deleuze's use of a 
key Nietzschean concept, 'the eternal return', which holds particular significance in my 
Deleuzian understanding of the Wake, and is held by Keith Ansell Pearson to be 
arguably 'the central teaching ... of Nietzsche's whole philosophy', 
96 one needs to take 
into account that he is reading it differently through a Bergsonian 'lens' as an aspect of 
'duration', or the time of the 'virtual' as 'the time of life'. 
Moreover, Ansell Pearson would seem to position Deleuze with respect to Bergson 
more precisely than has my previous unqualified statement: 
[i]t is inadequate to describe Deleuze as a Bergsonian, not simply because of the 
many and varied sources he draws upon, but rather because of the highly 
innovative character of his Bergsonism. ... Deleuze 
is both profoundly Bergsonian 
and radically different from Bergson. 97 
Nevertheless, Ansell Pearson may seem to beg the question as to precisely what 
Bergsonism is. As Hanna 98 points out: 
Even as Whitehead gives Bergsonism a final impersonal and universal focus which 
it did not possess, so does Existentialism give Bergsonism a final personal and 
individual focus which it did not possess [either]. Bergson's insights survive 
incorporated within viewpoints other than his own and more sharply drawn than his 
own. 99 
94 Constantin V. Boundas, 'Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual', in Paul 
Patton, ed., Deleuze: A Critical Reader, pp. 90-1. 
95 Deleuze, 'I have nothing to admit', p. 112. 
96 Keith Ansell Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Peffect 
Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 109. 
97 Ansell Pearson. ) Philosophy and the 
Adventure of the Virtual, p. 3. 
98 Thomas Hanna, The Bergsonian Heritage (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1962). 
99 lbid, p. 26. 
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Furthermore, Deleuze not only calls for a 4return to Bergson', but defines his own 
philosophy in terms of such: 
[a] 'return to Bergson' [which] does not only mean a renewed admiration for a 
great philosopher but a renewal and extension of his project today, in relation to the 
transformations of life and society, in parallel with the transformations of science. 
(B 115) 
I will examine their differences as they impact on my reading of Joyce's works in 
Chapter Three when I address the Joycean epiphany, his 'epiphanic machine', and his 
and their different understandings of 'duration'. 
The Bergsonian 'virtual' is the totality of the material universe and the 'actual' is a 
minor subset of this which from a human and animal perspective is based on our 
survival needs. Here, one must stress that both the 'virtual' and the 'actual' are as 
material, and therefore as real and solid, as each other, even though we seem only to 
recognise this in the term 'actual'. Yet, the 'virtual' in all of its enormous complexity 
constantly impacts on, enters into, and actually constitutes our body/ brain through our 
senses, although we may well not be aware of this. For instance we may only become 
aware of our heartbeat at moments of emotional stress or exertion. Thus, beginning 
from the quantum level through its atomic and molecular structures and movements, 
then proceeding to the machinery of the cell, and the complex electrical, chemical, 
hydraulic., pnew-natic and kinetic functioning of the body and its organs, including the 
brain and the nervous system, we have a functioning 'machine' which 'actualizes' 
consciousness by selecting, from this 'virtual' totality, that which is necessary for the 
survival of the organism. However, as the 'actual' is extracted and solidified from the 
totality of the 'virtual' it always loses something vital in the process: 
[L]ife is a movement,, materiality is the in 
' 
verse movement ... the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through 
it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track. Of these two currents the second 
runs counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the 
second. There results between them a modus vivendi, which is organization. 100 
100 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, M. D.: 
University Press of America, 1983), p. 272. 
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Later, I will be relating such 'cuttings' and interactions to Issy in the Wake when I read 
'her' as Joycean 'desiring machine' and 'line of flight'. 
Although there cannot be an exact equation between the Bergsonian concepts of the 
(virtual', and the 'actual' and Deleuzian concepts, I believe that it is helpful to see a 
correspondence between the concepts of 'the plane of immanence' and its textual 
counterpart 'the second plane of writing' as equating to the Bergsonian 'virtual'. Its 
significance for this thesis cannot be overestimated for as Hardt and Negri note, 'the 
primary event of modernity [is] ... the discovery of the plane of immanence'. 
101 
Moreover, I am inclined to align Deleuzian 'chaos' with this concept as for Joyce 
'chaos = cosmos'[1.4]. Moreover, I believe that for the purposes of this thesis, 'the 
plane of organisation', or its textual equivalent 'the first plane of writing', can usefully 
be conceived as more or less equivalent to 'the actual'. Nevertheless, one must recall 
that the Deleuzian concept is determined by context and difference, 'pure and simple 
variations ordered according to their neighbourhood' and no exact correspondence 
between these terms should or can be drawn. 
Bergsonian 'becomings' are key to any understanding of Deleuze's philosophy, 
which is above all concerned with the ontological processuality of 'becoming' rather 
than with static unitary 'being' or 'essence'. Deleuze and Guattari stress its importance: 
... the 
becoming without which nothing would come about in history [although it] 
does not merge with history ... 
it launches a people, an earth, like the arrow and 
discus of a new world that is never-ending, that is always in the process of coming 
about 'acting counter to time, and therefore acting on our time and, let us hope, for 
the benefit of a time to come. ' Acting counter to the past, and therefore on the 
present, for the benefit, let us hope, of a future - but the future is not a historical 
future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now - the Intensive or Untimely, 
not an instant but a becoming. (WIP 1122) 
On this definition ý-becoming', as Deleuze and Guattari understand it, is clearly located 
in Bergsonian 'duration' as the time of the (virtual', and time as 'duration' is a joyful 
affirmation of 'becoming'. In particular their emphasis on the 'untimeliness' of 
101 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 71. 
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'becoming' stresses the importance of future time and Deleuze's interpretation of the 
Nietzschean 'eternal return' of difference, as I will explain below. These are the keys to 
the openness of life which always offers previously unimagined or even unimaginable 
lines of new 'becomings', through 'lines of flight', as again will be explained below. 
Hardt and Negri accept such 'becomings' which 'launch a people, an earth', and the 
inevitability of changed subjectivities for 'the multitude': '[t]he multitude has 
internalized the lack of place and fixed time; it is mobile and flexible .... The coming 
imperial universe, blind to meaning, is filled by the multifarious totality of the 
production of subjectivity'. 102 
Deleuze and Guattari inform us that ja]bove all, becoming does not occur in the 
imagination [the] reality specific to becoming [is] the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence 
of very different durations, superior or inferior to ours, all of them in communication'. 
(TP 240) Consequently, reading in a 'rhizomatic' or 'schizoanalytic' manner, I believe, 
means attempting as readers to begin to work with 'duration' or 'pure time', as 'a 
single, universal and impersonal Time' rather than with our commonsensical 
understanding of a clock-time contaminated by space. (B 80) The concept of 
'becoming' culminating in 'becoming imperceptible' derives from Bergson but it is 
extensively developed by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. As 'becoming-woman' is 
the starting point for such autopoietic 'becomings' and is particularly important in my 
thesis,, I will introduce it at this point. 
It is 'becoming-woman' on which I will focus in this thesis because it is the 
medium through which everyone (man or woman) must pass in order to commence and 
continue with 'rhizomatic processuality': 
Becoming-woman is... not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting 
particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a 
microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman. (TP 275) 
102 lbid, p. 380. 
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'Becoming-woman' is the first kind of 'becoming' simply because it takes us beyond 
the Symbolic order and patriarchy: 'all becomings begin with and pass through 
becoming-woman'. (TP 277) It is the entry into a world of minoritarian marginality and 
4 multiplicity', of 'collective assemblies of enunciation' which change as they operate. It 
is the space which 'the multitude' will occupy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
'Woman' does not have an essence but she 'expresses a territory and processes of 
deterritorialization', (TP 232-309) and the processuality of 'becomings' are not to be 
pursued along pre-ordained pathways: 
To become is not to progress or regress along a series. Above all, becoming does 
not occur in the imagination ... Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor 
phantasies. They are perfectly real. But ... 
it is clear that the human being does not 
c really' become an animal any more than the animal 'really' becomes something 
else. ... What 
is real is the becoming itself... not the supposedly fixed terms 
through which that which becomes passes. ... The 
becoming-animal of the human 
being is real, even if the animal the human being becomes is not; and the 
becoming-other of the animal is real, even if that something other it becomes is not. 
... a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself... it has no term, since its term in 
turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and 
which coexists, forms a block, with the first. This is the ... reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different 'durations, ' 
superior or inferior to 'ours, ' all of them in communication). (TP 240) 
'Becoming-woman' is symbiotically linked to 'becoming-girl' and it is only in 
combination that they allow for both the necessary initial 'becoming' and the channel 
through which all other becomings can take place. Deleuze and Guattari statements that 
Ji]t is certain that molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child', and 'becoming 
itself is a child or a girl', (TP 277) have particular resonance in my thesis. To see 
'becoming-girl' in common-sensical. terms as obviously preceding 'becoming-woman', 
directly followed by 'becoming-animal' - as one moves logically from gender 
difference to biological development then to the broader field of the animal kingdom 
and beyond - through 'becoming-plant', then 'becoming-atom'.. until the final stage of 
'becoming-imperceptible' is reached would be a complete travesty. It would capture the 
concept of becoming from 'virtual' time or 'duration' on the 'plane of immanence', and 
imprison it on the actualised plane of space, or 'plane of organisation', as I will explain 
below. If this were done then in our 'becomings' we would be simply imitating the girl, 
woman, or the animal. One is dealing with 'becomings' which lack a subject, 
becomings without unitary representation. Thus in 'becoming-woman"/ 'becoming- 
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girl', it is never as this woman or that one, never as this girl or that one, that becomes, 
since the 'woman' or 'girl' in turn exist only in order to be taken up in another 
'becoming' which only as it 'becomes-other' is then nameable (eg. as woman or girl), 
and which simply coexists, or as Deleuze and Guattari style it 'forms a block, with the 
first. This 'real' is the only reality specific to the process of becomings. It is reality as 
the coexistence of very different 'durations, ' superior or inferior to 'ours, ' all of them 
interacting together. (TP 240) 
If one cannot see 'becoming-girl' as the natural first step to 'becoming-woman', 
what is one to see it as? What is usually overlooked, in most discussions about or 
applications of the concept of 'becoming-woman', is that Deleuze and Guattari finesse 
it by placing at the centre of the 'becoming-woman' assemblage the further concept of 
'becoming-girl'. This is not a subordinate, or developmental, concept added as an 
afterthought, nor is it a deliberate Brunoian complicatio introduced in order to create 
excess, difference, and life -a move for which Deleuze praises Joyce elsewhere [1.4/ 
2.3]. Deleuze and Guattari rather see 'becoming-girl' as the 'real product' and 
'differential essence' of 'becoming-woman': ji]t is not the girl who becomes a woman; 
it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl ... 
becoming-woman or the 
production of molecular woman is the girl herself', (TP 276) and '[t]he girl is like the 
block of becoming that remains contemporaneous to each opposable [actualised] term, 
man,, woman., child. ) adult', 
(TP 277) as the reality of 'becoming-wornartV 'becoming- 
marginal'. Moreover, '[s]exuality, any sexuality, is a becoming-woman, in other words, 
a girl'. (TP 277) 1 take the largely neglected but vital concept of 'becoming-girl' as 
crucial to my thesis in later chapters. It is precisely the significance of 'becoming-girl' 
in relation to 'becoming-woman' which I will begin to exploit in my readings of 
Ulysses and bring to a head in the Wake, as I read such 'becomings' in terms of the 
Stephen/Joycean muse or epiphanic 'bird girl' of A Portrait. 
It is in 'Memories of a Bergsonian' (TP 237-239) that Deleuze and Guattari set out 
what they mean by 'blocks of becoming' which is primarily seen in 'becoming-girl'. 
Such a block allows, indeed ensures, 'rhizomatic' connections with any other becoming 
in any order, it is the very stuff of 'becomings', which can and should follow the first 
autopoietic step of becoming through 'becoming-woman'. It need not necessarily do so 
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of course. As I will show,, in Chapter Two, Bloom's constant 'molecular' movement 
towards 'becoming-woman', through his empathetic responses to women's suffering 
and our awareness of him as the new 'womanly man'(U 614) are constantly thwarted at 
the many moments of his 'becoming-woman' - with all of its productive epiphanic 
potentialities through 'becoming-girl' - because of his masochism and the coldness and 
manipulative calculation which this engenders, as 'he plots and plans everything out', 
(U 910) and in doing so turns away from 'becoming-girl'. This masochistic denial will 
also be explored further below in 'symptomatological' societal terms. 
One sees the above mentioned interaction and 'cutting out' in Bergson's conception 
of time too. ' 03 The time of the 'virtual' is designated as 'duration' but the time of the 
4 actual', particularly in modernity, is that of clock-time which in its extraction from 
'duration' loses much of 'duration's' temporality as the time of life. 'Duration' is not 
simply concerned with the differing lengths of life of a human being, a mayfly, a two- 
hundred year old carp, or a redwood tree, but with the 'intensites' which make up that 
life. We are all well aware of the excessively quick passage of clock-time when we are 
absorbed in something or emotionally involved and contrariwise the snail-like progress 
of clock-time when we are marking the seconds, minutes, days, and weeks before we 
can end a tedious task. Yet we generally claim to be unaware of any time other than the 
clock-time of everyday living. However, when sensitive and intuitive people become 
aware of the impossibility of synchronising clock-time and 'duration' it can result in 
real problems for them. For instance Max Brod, notes of Kafka that 'something very 
like a breakdown occurred resulting from [an acute awareness that] his "inner" and 
"outer" clocks were not in unison'. 104 
David Wood' 05 has suggested that the turn to and emphasis on language which has 
characterised philosophy and, we might add, literary criticism and cultural 'theory', 
103 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 272. 
104 Franz Kafka, The Diaries: 1914-1923, ed. by Max Brod, trans. by Martin Greenberg 
and Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1949), pp. 201-202. 
105 David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities 
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during so much of the twentieth century will be replaced by a 'spiralling retuM'106 to a 
more fundamental issue, in this one: that of 'time'. If this is the case, he argues, the 
contribution of Bergson will undoubtedly have to move centre stage. Several 
philosophers and critics such as John Mullarkey 107 support this contention. Mullarkey 
focuses on Bergson's argument that 
... most representations of time abolish what is peculiarly temporal about it. Our 
supposedly common-sense notions of time stem, he claims, from a philosophical 
heritage with roots going back to Plato. What that heritage has given us is a 
constant tendency to ignore what is special about time in favour of confusing its 
properties with those of various other phenomena: space, language and thought. 108 
Thus time is not an innocent concept. Not only is it not immediately clear but our 
ideas about time are themselves transient. Mullarkey argues that this is precisely what 
makes Bergson's approach to time so interesting and problematic: the representation of 
time has a history to it which is not incidental but necessary. In reflecting this evolving 
nature of the depiction of time Bergson's own philosophy undergoes a continual process 
of recreation. It is transient, evolutionary, and temporal. It is apparent that for Bergson 
that the passing of time cannot be adequately conceived simply in terms of the 
straightforward succession of chronological time. This does not mean that Bergson 
completely abandons clock-time, as a corruption, in favour of duration. He retains it in a 
state of both constant tension and unequal union with the latter. Deleuze and Guattari 
build on Bergson's concept of 'duration' as I will show in Chapter Three where I relate 
this to Joyce's 'epiphanic machine'. Moreover, Joyce is himself Bergsonian when he 
states that 'we cannot or will not conceive the past in any other than its iron memorial 
aspect. Yet the past assuredly implies a fluid succession of presents, the development of 
an entity of which our actual present is a phase only'. 109 
Press, 1989). 
106 Ibid, p. xi. 
107 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophj; (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999). 
108 lbid, pp. 1-2. 
'09 Robert E. Scholes and Richard M. Kain, eds, The Workshop of Daedalus: James 
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Deleuze in the Logic of Sense constructs an image of thought, based on the thought 
of the Stoics, which has temporal dimensions. In Stoic philosophy there are two forms 
of time: Aion and Chronos: 
... on one hand, the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as 
causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, the 
essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the 
surface, as effects (Aion). (L 61) 
Thus, Deleuze sets against 'Chronos' (L 60-61) - the clock-time of the extended present 
- which '... situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject,, the 
time of 'Aion', (L 77,132,162-165) as 'duration' which he later sees as: 
the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and 
continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same 
time not-yet here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both 
going to happen and has just happened. (TP 262) 
'Aion' releases from the 'whole' past the previously unrealized potentialities of the 
passing presents, potentialities which have never actually existed, or could even have 
been thought of by us prior to their 'actualisation'. In doing this it does not rely upon 
the possibilities and missed opportunities which we can see in our personal and social 
histories. It goes beyond these to address the impersonal forces from which we are 
constituted and, by drawing on the unimagined and unimaginable potentialites residing 
in the 'whole' past, enables the completely and perpetually new to emerge as 'event', 
'haecceity', or 'epiphany'. 
Through his encounter with Bergson and Nietzsche, Deleuze develops his 
understanding further by setting out three orders of time. The first deals with a 
continuous present represented by clock-time. Here past and future are regarded as 
extensions of the present with 'nothing new under the sun'. This gives 'bare repetition' 
or the repetition of the same. Hardt and Negri note of global capitalism that it attempts 
Joyce and the Raw Materialsfor A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Evanston, III: 
Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 60. 
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to 'suspend history and thereby fix the existing state of affairs for eternity'. 110 This 
epitomises 'bare repetition. I will suggest that many Joycean critics implicitly read the 
Wake in such terms. The second order brings into play the living past as co-existent 
with the present. Here, the past is seen to press in upon the present with all of its 
unrealized potentialities. In this second order, the order of 'duration', it is the past 
which really exists, the fleeting present being rapidly and continuously subsumed into 
it: 
The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements 
which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the 
past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass ... The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure 
condition without which it would not pass. In other words, each present goes back 
to itself as past. (B 59) 
The third order of time is revolutionary. It is the time of the future. It creates the 
completely new by drawing on the hidden, unrealised forces of the 'whole' past or 
'duration' and violently destroying the 'bare repetitions' of the extended present. Such 
'creative destruction' is echoed in Hardt and Negri's statement that the 'multitude' in 
their 'new way of living will ... act as "new 
barbarians". They will "destroy with an 
affirmative violence and trace new paths of life through their own material 
existence"'. "' Deleuze specifies Nietzsche's 'eternal return', in its perpetual newness 
and creativity, as emblematic of the third order of time. 
Deleuze draws upon Bergson's concept of 'duration' as the time of 'the virtual', 
and the productive power of difference, in order to visualize this. He links it with 
Hamlet's 'time out of joint' as Nietzsche's 'eternal return'. By conjoining this third 
order of the passing of time, with the second order, he conceptualises the 'eternal 
return' as the return of difference, a difference which, as we will see, is quite distinct 
from diversity as: 
we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary 
upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which 
110 Hardt and Negri. Empire, p. xiv. 
111 rbid, p. 215. 
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speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with 
masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters - the whole 
apparatus of repetition as a terrible power. (DR 10) 
For Deleuze, the concept of the repetition of difference epitomises a repetition in 
which change and life are given, through the 'circle in which Sameness is said only of 
that which differs'[1.1]. Time is eternal only in its power to always produce the new, 
over and over again - with no origin and no end. The only constant in time, the only 
'Same'. is the power of not remaining the same. This is what characterises 'duration' as 
ethical as opposed to clock-time. Thus, Deleuze argues that 'the eternal return' only 
concerns the return of life's active forces whilst 'reactive force will not return'. (NP 71) 
It is likely that Deleuze's understanding of 'the eternal return' allowed Hardt and Negri 
to posit the 'clean break' between the 'reterritorialising' aspects of imperial capitalism 
and its globalised successor without taking properly into account the forces of 
difference and the new offered by 'great literature' and in particular those of the Wake. 
The 'eternal return' for Deleuze is entirely bound up with 'becoming' and 'duration' 
beyond either the spirit of revenge or the forces of negative resentment which Nietzsche 
has highlighted. For Deleuze it embodies the life-giving differences basic to his 
Bergsonian philosophic vitalism. It evidently contests the basis of globalising capitalism 
which as Hardt and Negri have to admit seeks to 'create the very world it inhabits' by 
'operating on and containing all registers of the social order', 112 in its 'reterritorial i sing' 
attempt to reduce life to 'bare repetition'. 
Deleuze links Joyce's work to the Wakean 'eternal return' as 'a world of 
differences ... without 
identity' as a Joycean 'chaosmosis' or chaodyssey (chao- 
errance) and nothing other than the power of affmnation of 'chaos' itself [1.1,2.4] 
What does Deleuze mean by equating the Nietzschean 'eternal return' with Wakean 
chaos as 'a single and same affirmation'9 [ 1.1 ]. As D. H Lawrence in 'Chaos in Poetry', 
relayed by Deleuze and Guattari state: 
Lawrence describes what produces poetry: people are constantly putting up an 
umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a fin-nament 
and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the 
112 lbid, p. xv. 
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umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos 
and frame, in a sudden light, a vision that appears through the rent ... Then come the crowd of imitators who repair the umbrella with something vaguely resembling 
the vision, and the crowd of commentators who patch over the rent with opinions: 
communication. Other artists are always needed to make other slits, to carry out 
necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions, thereby restoring to their 
predecessors the incommunicable novelty that we could no longer see. ... The 
painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a 
blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with preexisting, 
preestablished cliches that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to 
shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision. (WIP 
203-204) 
All of this is perhaps best summarised in Klee's famous aphorism 'not to render the 
visible, but to render visible', 113 or as Colin MacCabe puts it: '[t]he argument is no 
longer about whether the novelist represents reality correctly but whether the novelist 
produces new elements within reality which must then be taken account of. 114 
In effectively equating 'the eternal return' with the Wake, Deleuze puts it within an 
entirely positive framework. The Wake offers itself to us as a cosmos but the condition 
under which it does so is that this cosmos is equivalent to the potentially productive 
intensities of chaos [1.4]. It is 'a chaos-become-cosmos'. 115 Deleuze believes that the 
Viconian process of recirculation, apparently only capable of creating stasis, seems 
rather to offer the 'anenergetic' dynamic which causes this 'chaosmos to turn'. Joyce's 
process of Wakean 'chaosmosis', in which chaos gives rise to consistency 'transforms 
chaotic variability into chaoid variety'. [8.1] Joyce's creativity and inventiveness is 
presented to us through the conscious, minute control of his text which Beckett recorded 
as 'a paroxysm of wroughtness', 116 echoed in Finn Fordham's observation that the 
113 Daniel W. Smith. 'Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian 
Duality', in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, p. 4 1. 
114 Colin MacCabe, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word, second edition 
(Basingstoke, Hants., New York: Palgrave, Macmillan., 2003), p. 228. 
11 s Bogue, Deleuze on Literature, p. 4. 
116 Ellmann papers at Tulsa University, Number 3, Beckett. [see Finn W. M. Fordham, 
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Wake gives us writing which is 'a kind of metalwork filigree'. 117 Yet, despite this 
control, I argue, we are always given excess, an 'eternal return' of difference not only 
through the deployment of esoteric and portmanteau words, but also the structural and 
other lexical and syntactic devices he employs, in order to repeatedly let 'in a bit of free 
and windy chaos' as singular and impersonal intensities which show us their pre- 
individual existence inside the language which expresses them independent of their 
actual formation and use. 
Unlike Kaufmann's' 18 liberal-humanist interpretation of Nietzsche's 'etemal 
return' which can be regarded as nothing more than the 'bare repetition' of Bergson, 
Deleuze makes the most extraordinary and 'monstrous' use of this concept as the third 
order of time, without deviating Erom anything which Nietzsche has written. He reads 
'the eternal return'. and hence the Wake,, as constituting the highest possible thought of 
difference and repetition, an ethical thought both beyond the moral law of good and evil 
and even beyond the natural laws which govern only the surface of the world. Deleuze 
reads it through a Bergsonian lens as giving us the perpetually new through difference. 
In linking the Wake so closely to his reading of the Nietzschean 'eternal return', 
Deleuze clearly thinks that it holds enormous productive potential and it has a very 
special place in his literary canon. 
Thus, Joyce's monstrous use of Vico is seen by Deleuze as taking the Viconian 
constraining cycles which seem to offer only 'bare repetition', and showing that they 
become in Joyce's hands the Nietzschean 'eternal return' of true difference: the 'seim. 
anew", (FW 215.23) as he locates Viconian 'returns' in 'duration'. In arguing for the 
'ungrounded chaos'[1.2] of Viconian repetitions in the Wake, Deleuze's view contrasts 
'James Joyce's Finnegans Wake and Lucia Joyce's Breakdown. "Languishing Hysteria? 
The Clou Historique?: Lucia Joyce in Finnegans Wake"' (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of London, Birkbeck College, 1997), p. 56]. 
117 Fordham, 'James Joyce's Finnegans Wake and Lucia Joyce's Breakdown', p. 89. 
118 Walter Kauffmann, 'Introduction", in Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science: with a 
prelude in rhymes and an appendix ofsongs (New York: Vintage, 1974 ), pp. 3-3 1. 
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with the stasis which these repetitions have often previously been taken to demonstrate 
by a long line of Joycean scholars, spanning several generations, including such 
weighty contributors as Atherton, Hart, Tindall, Norris, and McCarthy. 
Thus, Atherton saw the entire structure of Finnegans Wake as dependent on a 
Viconian cyclic view of history with 'the incidents described ... 
happening over and 
over again', with the lives of gentile men merely being reflections of the patterns set 
down by the gods and heroes of Vico's first two cycles, in a depressing repetition of the 
same. ' 19 Later scholars followed his lead and McCarthy took Atherton's assertion even 
further, stating that whilst Viconian cycles, 'are not simply circular but involve an 
upward movement towards an apocalypse of fulfillment of purpose [in the ricorso] 
Joyce denies his readers even this'. 120 1 believe that Deleuze's Bergsonian 
conceptualisation of the NietzSchean 'eternal return', offers a different model which 
allows us to read the Viconian cycles employed in the Wake, not as the deadening return 
of the unchanging 'bare repetitions' specifically attributed to them by McCarthy, and in 
more general terms by Kaufmann, but as the joyful opening up into life itself through 
the differences of the 'third order' of time. 
Consequently, for Deleuze, as for Bergson, 'common-sense reality', on which 
many Joycean critics appear to rely, gives us an incomplete and biased version of 
reality. Even post-structuralist Joycean critiques such as that of Christine van 
Boheemen-Saaf, 121 seem to be 'based on the concepts of loss, lack and lapsus',, as 
119 James S. Atherton, The Books at the Wake: A Study ofLiterary Allusions in James 
Joyce's Tinnegans Wake'(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959), pps. 28,30. 
120 Patrick McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', in A 
Companion to Joyce Studies, eds Zack Bowen and James P. Carens (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984) Chapter 11, pp. 559-632. 
121 Christine van Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trallma offfistory: 
Reading, Narrative and Postcolonialism (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Marie-Dominique Gamier puts it. 122 Reality, for Bergson as for Deleuze, must 
encompass both the 'actual', as the object or thing itself, and the 'virtual' as the forces 
and intensities which make it up and consist in its processual 'becomings', as it changes 
and differs from its former self One may care to see this processuality of difference in 
the Wake too where in the opening word we get the 'riverrun' rather than the static 
concept of 'river'. For as Heraclitus notes, and Joyce was well aware, 'it is not possible 
to step into the same river twice'. 123 
From the above one can see why the philosophic concept, with all of its life-giving 
potential, as Deleuze and Guattari define it, resides in the Bergsonian 'virtual' rather 
than the 'actual' of everyday life, although it comes into being or is created as a result 
of the problems posed in the latter. Thus, the Deleuzian concept is drawn from, or is 
created by Deleuze from 'virtual' intensities. The invention of such a concept draws on 
these forces and materialises or 'speaks' as a unique 'event'. (WIP 2 1) 
Moreover, it is clear that their concentration on the forces of the Bergsonian 
'-virtual', rather than the 'actual', underpins Deleuze and Guattari's later statement that 
in their work '[a]ll we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines 
of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types', (TP 4) 
characterised by difference. This indicates their focus on the material life-giving forces 
coalescing into the forms which make up our world, as much as on the 'actual' forms in 
the world itself. Such 'forces' and 'intensities' cannot be readily isolated and classified 
by the logic of exclusive disjunction, or indeed easily pinpointed: 
The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of 
its postures, colors, and songs: something indiscernible ... A concept is a heterogenesis ... an ordering of 
its components by zones of neighborhood. ... an intension present in all the features that make it up. (WIP 20) 
122 Marie-Dominique Gamier, 'The lapse and the lap: Joyce with Deleuze', in James 
Joj; ce and the Difference of Language , ed. 
by Laurent Milesi (Cambridge, New York, 
etc: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 97-111, (p. 99). 
123 Quotation from Plato, Cratylus, 402A, in C. L. Wayper, Political Thought (London: 
English Universities Press Ltd., 1958), p. 18. 
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The Deleuzian concept evidently derives from Bergsonian vitalism. 
Like their equivalent literary 'affects', Deleuzian concepts can allow us to recreate 
our very being as their newness enables us, as Louis Althusser puts it, to become aware 
of and contest ourselves constructed as 'alwa already subjects ... constantly 
practic[ing] the rituals of ideological recognition' and completely in tune with the 
exigencies of the 'Ideological State Apparatuses'. These 'ISAs' trick us into believing 
that 'we are concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable 
124 subjects . Constructing concepts for Deleuze and Guattari means bringing into 
existence an ethical project which can result in a changed outlook and, community, as 
for them '[t]he world awaits its inhabitants, who are lost in neurosis'. (C2 205) Hardt 
and Negri maywell argue that ISAs are on the wane and that the 'multitude' has been 
or is being constituted in cyberspace, but I would agree with Deleuze that 'the world 
still awaits its inhabitants'. As John Kraniavskas, points out, 'the multitude is the body 
without organs of politics'. 125 Its existence is still largely located in 'virtuality' on the 
'plane of immanence', not on the 'plane of organisation' and 'actuality'. 
Bergson's philosophy has contributed massively to Deleuzian philosophy and 
'rhizomatics' or 'schizoanalysis' through its underpinning of the concept, its ontological 
'becomings' rather than 'being', its emphasis on the 'virtual', and above all its 
'vitalism' and ethical emphasis on life. However, although Deleuzian concepts can 
create our very being this cannot be done without the parallel 'affects' generated 
through the arts and particularly great literature, as I have stressed above with regard to 
Hardt and Negri's theorising. 
Despite his refusal to distinguish between philosophers and writers, in fact Deleuze 
always recognizes some difference between the functions of literary and philosophical 
texts. The former are principally concerned with the creation of 'affect' and the latter 
with the invention of new concepts. 'Affect' does not equate directly to emotion or 
124 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 55. 
125 Kraniavskas, 'Empire, or Multitude. Transnational Negri', p. 36. 
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feeling as we again have the Bergsonian process and principle of selection coming into 
play. 'Affect' can be seen as 'virtual' emotion or the totality of emotional movement 
potentially available within the body, and the 'actual' feelings, 'affections', or emotions 
experienced as a selection and assimilation of some of these into consciousness. 
Nevertheless, great literature's creation of 'affect', if it functions for the reader, can and 
should bypass or disrupt the selective censors of everyday commonsense living and can 
release or create previously unrealised or unacknowledged emotions. In addition to 
literature, painting, music, and the arts in general, can ensure 'affects' as the 'non- 
human becomings of man'. Achieving such 'affects' are 'the task of all art ... which 
raise[s] them to the height of the earth's song and the cry of humanity: that which 
constitutes tone, health, becoming'. (WIP 170) 'Affects' are life-enhancing and 
consequently ethical. Deleuze sees new 'affect' and the creation of new concepts as 
parallel developments within literature and philosophy rather than '... a matter of one 
monitoring or reflecting the other'. (N 125) They come together at the point where life, 
literature, and the arts throw up new problems for philosophy. For Deleuze the new 
'affects' which literature creates pose problems for philosophy which it needs to resolve 
by creating new concepts. Contrariwise, the new concepts which Bergson's philosophy 
introduced, for example, were taken up by Proust in his In Search ofLost Time. 
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Deleuze's Nietzsche 
Nietzschean thought and particularly his concept of the 'eternal return', reworked 
through Deleuze's Bergsonism, has already been shown to be of great significance in 
the latter's philosophy. Nietzsche's thinking is also adopted and adapted by Deleuze 
and Guattari to considerable effect in their understanding of 'symptomatology'. Deleuze 
can be seen as one of Nietzsche's 'new philosophers', one of those who 'have found 
their task ... in being the bad conscience of their age' 
126 by both alerting us to the 
problems which afflict us and at least implicitly pointing to the way in which these 
might be overcome by offering us a new art of living. I believe that Joyce's work can be 
viewed in the same light. 
Thus, Deleuze refers to Nietzsche's statement which designates 'the philosopher as 
a physician of culture', 127 and broadens this to include writers and artists ja]s Nietzsche 
said, artists and philosophers are civilisation's doctors', (N 143) and '[p]erhaps one day 
we will know that there wasn't any art but only medicine'. (WIP 173) As such, the 
diagnosis of the symptoms should allow these 'doctors', if not to offer a 'cure', at least 
to indicate where 'health' might lie, and give us the opportunity to obtain it. 
Consequently, Deleuze defines both the philosopher and the writer as 'the physician of 
himself and the world'. (ECO) He shows how Nietzsche diagnoses 'the disease' of 
nihilism by isolating its symptoms of 'ressentiment', (NP II 1- 12 1) stemming from the 
bad conscience bequeathed by Christianity, (NP 131-132) through the widespread 
acceptance of its impossible ascetic ideal, (NP 143-144) its consequent moral strictures, 
and an afterlife created to enforce them. 
126 Michael Mahon, Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power and the Subject 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1992), pp. 86-87. 
127 Friedrich Nietzsche,, 'The Philosopher as Cultural Physician', in Philosophy and 
Truth: Selectionsftom Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, trans. and ed., with 
an intro, and notes, by Daniel Brezeale, with a foreword by Walter Kauffnann (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 67-76. 
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Nietzsche traces nihilism's etiology to a certain relation of active and reactive 
forces and in doing so invents the genealogical method as a critique of the history of 
moral values argued for by traditional historians. He rejects their understanding of 
morality as an innate human capacity by pointing out its historical emergence through 
the material forces which produce moral concepts. He argues that conscience, shame, 
and guilt are produced by dominant historical forces. 128 1 will read HCE's shame and 
guilt in the Wake, in this light. In this respect, Nietzsche focuses on Christianity's 
asceticism and its sacrificial rhetoric with its life-denying aspect and develops an 
immoral or 'non-moral' thoughtto replace it. His genealogical perspective creates a 
version of the past which privileges the most vital and powerful life enhancing forces 
available to us in the present. 129 
Thus, Nietzsche distinguishes between 'passive nihilism', 'a paralysis of the will' 
engendered by Christianity - depicted so effectively by Joyce in Dubliners - and 'active 
nihilism'. which 'does not believe but does not thereby lose itself.. [as it] gives the 
spirit a dangerous freedom'. 130 Nietzsche then gives us the diagnosis of 'passive 
nihilism' as self-defeating together with a means of treatment through 'active nihilism' 
leading to the 'transvaluation of all values' 13 1 and creative possibility in which 'active 
joy is the supreme ethical test'. (S 29) Joyce too, I argue, moves from depicting 'passive 
nihilism' in Dubliners to advocating 'active nihilism'. According to Joseph Valente, in 
Ulysses: 
Joyce opposes to the negative skepticism of mockery the positive doubt of 
imaginative possibility. Both [Joyce and Nietzsche] sought to redeem the world of 
becoming and the creative activity it demands from the moribund reification of 
128 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorality, ed. by Keith Ansell Pearson, 
trans. by Carol Diethe (Cambridge and New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 1- 128. 
129 Lee Spinks, Friedrich Nietzsche (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pps. 6, 
57-73. 
130 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil (New York: Random House, 1966), pps. 
208,209. 
13 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorality, pp. 162-163; and Deleuze, 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, passim. 
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dogmatic thought - philosophical, religious, and political - and the meager, make- 
believe experience it fosters. They wanted to discredit static, universal forms and to 
reanimate the play of appearances of style ... to affirm the 
life-process itself. 132 
In Deleuzian terms Joyce was well aware that '[t]he world is the set of symptoms whose 
illness merges with man', and his works 'then appear as an enterprise of health', (ECC 
3) and he implicitly agrees with Deleuze's ethico-political point of view. (ECC 4) 
Jung, a deeply religious man, was well aware of the underpinning religiosity of 
both his analytic psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as the Protestant 
rationale of science in its entirety, the Enlightenment project, and the humanism which 
it spawned. He states that: 
We always think that Christianity consists in a particular confession of faith, and in 
belonging to a Church. No, Christianity is our world. Everything we think is the 
fruit of ... the Christian Middle Ages. Our whole science, everything that passes 
through our head, has inevitably gone through this history. It lives in us and has left 
its stamp upon us... The whole character of our mentality, the way we look at 
things, is also the result of the Christian Middle Ages; whether we know it or not ... The age of rational enlightenment has eradicated nothing. Even our method of 
rational enlightenment is Christian. The Christian Weltanschauung ... 
does not 
allow of any further rationalisation; it is something that has happened, that is 
present. We are inevitably stamped as Christians. 133 
Although Jung's views are limited by their Eurocentricity they can nevertheless be 
easily extended to large parts of the global scenario where monotheistic religions hold 
sway. Whatever criticisms both Joyce and Deleuze have of Jung, he is surely right on 
the vital issue of the continuing moralistic influence of monotheism on a diversity of 
world cultures. However, Hardt and Negri in their discussion of current Islamic and 
Christian fundamentalisms 134 see their resistance to the forces of globalisation as all 
important and designate them approvingly as postmodern projects. They fail to see how 
132 Joseph Valente, 'Beyond Truth and Freedom: The New Faith of Joyce and 
Nietzsche', James Joyce Quarterly, 25.1 (Fall, 1987), 87-105 (pp. 88-89). 
133 Carl Gustav Jung, Psychological Reflections (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), Cý Z-: ) 
pp. 341-342. 
134 Hardt and Negri. Empire, pp. 145-150. 
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they privilege morality over ethics. Nietzsche, in addressing the judgemental morality 
of Christianity, and seeing it as extending to liberal humanism under capitalism, puts it 
more succinctly: '[t]hey have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling 
all the more to Christian morality'. 135 He argues that we need to recognise and turn 
away from the moral and societal 'illness' engendered by Christianity which Jung 
diagnoses although he does not see Christianity in the same negative terms as 
Nietzsche. 
Even though Victorian patriarchal morality stemming from the masculine God of 
Judaeo-Christianity may be perceived to be on the wane as the influence of institutional 
religion continues to decline and women, through liberal feminism, continue to gain 
more equal economic rights, this does not alter the underpinning moralistic 
' oedipalised' scenario. It fails to take into account that we are all, men and women 
alike, constructed within the capitalist hegemony which does not differ in fundamentals 
from Joyce's time as Jung's diagnosis shows. Whether we are governed and constituted 
by the old religion - as fully fifty per cent of the USA's citizenry apparently still believe 
- or by the forces of secular liberal humanism and capitalist individualism, they cannot 
finally be distinguished from each other, a fact which the Christian Right's espousal of 
market economics in the USA nicely illustrates. We not only partake in but consist of 
capitalism's intensities engendered by Christianity. Nevertheless, the development of an 
all encompassing globalised capitalism, through its very fluidity, is paradoxically 
generating the possibility of resistance, as Hardt and Negri appreciate, through 'the 
lived experience of the global multitude'. 136 Interestingly they liken potential 
revolutionaries of today to Christians of the later Roman Empire and their inexorable 
hollowing out of the terrestrial order of things which resulted in a new, rejuvenating era 
of nomadic barbarian migrations and invasions. 
Joyce, I argue, goes beyond Jung' s 'symptomatology' to offer us that ethical 
'health' which Nietzsche and Deleuze spoke of. '[h]ealth as literature, as writing, 
135 Nietzsche, Twighlight of the MOW The Antichrist, p. 80. 
136 Hardt and Negri, Empire, pp. 210-211. 
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[which] consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the fabulating 
function to invent a people', (ECC 4) or as Joyce put it through Stephen: 'to forge in the 
smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race', which, given the heterogeneity 
of the Irish which Joyce celebrates in the Wake, extends the concept of 'race' to the 
'human race' as a whole. Such ethical statements bringing into play literature and 
authorship could take further, I believe, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the way in 
which the Deleuzoguattarian 'multitude' might be constructed. 
Several critics have noted Joyce's early interest in Nietzsche but then suggested 
that this waned in his later works. 137 Conversely, I argue that it will become apparent in 
this thesis that Joyce, in his mature use of Nietzsche in Uysses and Finnegans Wake, 
was also anticipating Deleuze in the latter's reworking of Nietzsche's 'eternal return' 
and his emphasis on 'symptomatology', processuality, style, affirmation and, like 
Bergson too, 'becomings' and the life-process itself in opposition to static or 
'molarised' thought and behaviour. 
137 Marvin Magalaner. Time ofApprenticeship: The Fiction of Young James Joyce 
(Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1959), p. 40. 
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Deleuze's Spinoza 
Another major source for Deleuze's 'symptomatology', and my reading of Joyce's 
ethics, is the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinoza attempts to find out how we can relate 
ourselves to a God whom he sees as encompassing the entirety of being. His monism 
then takes God to be a singular 'substance' which is both entirely self-generated and 
'absolutely infinite'. Such a 'substance' has unlimited attributes 'each of which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence'. God's 'divine nature' both determines and 
encompasses everything which exists. Spinoza's argument depends on the proposition 
that 'the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God'. This then allows 'certain and determinate' or finite 'modes' or 'modes of the 
attributes of God' to be established,, since it is 'the modes of thinking which make up 
the 'essence of man' and constitute 'the being of the human mind'. 138 Deleuze and 
Guattari's 'plane of immanence' derives from Spinoza's 'substance' but goes beyond it, 
'providing a ground from which idols have been cleared' (WIP 43). 
Joyce in his references to Spinoza always appears to place him in humorous 
contexts such as in Ulysses where Molly refers to Bloom's talk 'about Spinoza ... I 
smiled the best I could all in a swamp leaning forward as if I was interested'. (U 914) 
This contrasts with Bloom's earlier reference to the same event when he '[t]old her 
what Spinoza says in that book of poor papa's. Hypnotised, listening'. (U 367) In the 
Wake Spinoza appears as a medical problem in 'chronic spinosis', (FW 150.7-8) and is 
aligned with the brothers Grimm as a spinner of fairy tales for bed-time in 'spinooze', 
(FW 414.7-16) and finally as a vegetable or even an ass 'same hue of boiled spinasses'. 
(FW 611.36) 
Deleuze, seemingly contrariwise, reserves his highest admiration for Spinoza's 
Ethics. (WIP 59-60) However, Joyce, in implicitly contrasting the body (which in a 
Deleuzian reading must also be extended to the body politic and the textual body) and 
bodily activities through medical problems, bodies in bed, and Molly's menstruation 
138 Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. By G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), passim. 
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with Bloom's over-intellectualisation of Spinoza, indicates that he is closer to 
Spinoza's, and Deleuze's thought, than is Bloom. Spinoza's 'parallelism' is founded on 
the argument that mind and body cannot be separated. They constantly interact and the 
mind certainly does not govern the body nor is it distinct from this, (S 18) as Joyce's 
depiction of Bloom himself clearly indicates. 
Deleuze holds that the most original contribution of his second doctoral thesis (EP) 
is its analysis of the composition of finite 'modes' in Spinoza. His modal analysis 
concludes that Spinoza is offering us both a clinical diagnosis of the passive state of 
human bondage as well as a treatment for this passivity, through thought 'becoming- 
active'. in pursuit of an 'ethical task'. This revolutionary move of Spinoza shifts the 
traditional emphasis in philosophy from its age-old concern with Aristotelian morality, 
and its concentration on the realisation of man's supposed 'essence' as a rational 
animal, to an ethics whereby a person is defined not by what they are or should be in 
principle (their essence), but by what they can do, what they are capable of. (S 23) This 
is also a political question as philosophy now needs to establish what conditions allow a 
person's and a community's capacities to be best effectuated. I suggest that Joyce also 
made the same journey from the Aristotelian/ Thomist judgemental morality - 
particularly shown through Stephen in Chapter Three, Section Two of A Portrait in the 
Retreat sermons, if we can equate Joyce's and Stephen's experience of a Jesuit 
education - to an emphasis on life and ethics through Wakean 'affeets'. 
Despite Joyce's seeming trivialisation of Spinoza this central concern of Deleuze's 
understanding of him shows, I believe, that they are at one in this, witness the 'affect' of 
Joyce's bringing into the reader's consciousness the limitations placed on the lives of 
his characters in Dubliners, through the strictures imposed by the colonial socius. Such 
strictures result in personality deformations and indicate the need for remedial action as 
already noted. One can see clearly how this ontological question forms the basis for the 
ethico-political philosophy developed by Deleuze with Guattari in their later 
collaboration, as it does I believe that of Joyce. Thus, as Foucault notes of Deleuze and 
Guattari: 
... the major enemy, 
the strategic adversary is fascism ... And not only 
historical 
fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini - which was able to mobilize and use 
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the desire of the masses so effectively - but also the fascism in us all, in our heads 
and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire 
the very thing that dominates and exploits us. I would say that Anti-Oedipus ... 
is a 
book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long 
time. 1 39 
I believe that this Spinozist 'anti-fascist' ethico-political outlook also applies to 
Joyce's work as a whole. To take only two small examples, when the Citizen in the 
'Cyclops' episode of Ulysses is advocating a return to the greatness of yesteryear he 
recalls a glowing Irish past in terms of commerce, trade, expertise and the domination 
of the Irish over the other nations (U 423-425). This precisely echoes the way in which 
commercial colonial exploitation had elevated British power over Ireland and reduced it 
to such dire straits. His bombastic talk is offered as an over-compensation for such 
deprivation but it paradoxically insists on the maintenance of the very system which 
caused it. His thought is fascistic and 'reterritorialising' and Joyce expects us to 
c symptomatologically' grasp this through his ironic 'affects'. 
Earlier,, in 'Ivyday in the Committee Room', Henchy argues in a muddle-headed 
way that Ireland needs to obtain British capital and the increased commodification 
which it offers in order to obtain release from the very colonial exploitation which he is 
turning to. Rather than challenge this argument and set against it the independence 
which Parnell held out for - and whose views they are supposedly gathered together to 
propagate - Crofton agrees with Henchy. This blatant sell-out to their exploiters is not 
picked up by the rest of the party workers whose only concern is to consume their 
Guinness and escape into semi-drunken oblivion rather than address their real problems. 
Lyons even suggests in this very gathering that Parnell was not 'a fit man to lead us' 
and unlike Dante in A Portrait, is not even challenged. Yet, King Edward the Seventh, 
with all of his known adulteries is to be accepted as 'just an ordinary knockabout like 
you and me ... a good sportsman'. 
All of this is ironically advocated at the very heart of 
the Nationalist camp as they accept the 'fascism' of the oppressor, and capitalism's 
139 Michel Foucault, 'Preface', in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. xiii. 
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oedipal 'reterritorialisations', rather than mateh it with any new thought of what they 
might aehieve. 
Thus, Joyce brings his ethico-political work to a head in the Wake - for instance he 
explicitly uses Bergson against the fascistic and capitalistic 'dime-cash' (FW 149.17) 
philosophy of Wyndham Lewis. Whereas in Dubliners and Ulysses the modem is 
equated with images of the city and the metropolis and at least implicitly all of the 
unrealised potentialities of capitalism, in the Wake Joyce 'symptomatologically' 
engages with those repressive energies of capitalism and the State/ Church, which 
falsely equate such plenitude with happiness, by depicting,, exaggerating and 
undermining the over-stimulation it engenders. Even more so than Ulysses as 
cosmopolis, a book which contains everything and undermines the premises and 
promises of capitalist modernity, the Wake goes straight to the heart of both colonial 
and post-colonial mastery and extends in its 'symptomatological' analysis to the global 
capitalism which has now overtaken us. Not only does it diagnose and expose the 
incestuous desiring forces entrapped in the nuclear family of modernity with all of its 
societal consequences, but it is written in and yet against the hegemonic English 
language. Deleuze and Guattari point out that it demolishes this, in terms of both 
lexicality and meaning, through its exotic and portmanteau words. It does this not by 
denying meaning but by opening up meaning to a vast range of 'multiplicities' 
unconstrained by any control, other than Joyce's implicit anti-hegemonic direction. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari fail to point out that such 'multiplicities' do not 
spring solely from portmanteau and esoteric words, but also from an extended lexis of 
puns, anagrams such as Chapelizod, lipograms like 'Lps', the frequent transposition of 
letters or sounds in words as metathesis, and single, double and triple acrostics, and 
things do not even stop there. Wakean lexis is coupled with an aberrant syntax only 
springing in part from the employment of such words. Residual syntactical shapes 
themselves are employed by Joyce in order to apparently make for intelligibility whilst 
creating ambiguity and violating grammatical structures. Moreover, if one looks at the 
larger issue of the Wake's structure and the letter within it, which Deleuze and Guattari 
read as a 'microcosm' of the book, one needs to ask what is its precise relationship to 
the Wake as a whole? Is it synecdochic, paradigmatic, or representative? Nothing is 
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certain. In employing such a vast range of 'multiplicities' the Wake not only denies 
fascism's unitary understanding but renounces any such element in the ethico-political 
approach it offers. In so doing it joyfully destroys the authority and hegemony of the 
Symbolic order without taking on its systemic fascistic underpinnings, and as such is 
truly creative and 'deterritoriali sing". 
Here, I need to stress that as with Joyce, Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and 
A Thousand Plateaus, their 'only overtly political texts', 140 are more concerned about 
ethical implications than in offering us a political programme with its inevitable 
fascistic implications. (AO 380) For them, ethics is solely concerned with the 
production of new creative lines of life. Paradoxically, perhaps, the species formation 
which this inevitably involves results in the loss of much of that vital essence which is 
life itself. The only political programme which they might offer in these circumstances 
is one which constantly allows for new life to emerge, and enhances it in all of its 
potentiality, rather than focusing solely on humanity. To set out a political agenda from 
such a standpoint is clearly very difficult if not impossible. If one privileges the 'gene 
pool' in its entirety over the human in order to give presently 'actualised' life forms, in 
all of their variety, maximum opportunities to reproduce and further entrench 
themselves, one needs to ask if this would hinder the emergence of new life forms and 
what, in any case, this would mean in terms of practical politics and the human. Would 
this entail ensuring that the living viruses known to be a direct threat to humanity - such 
as the expected mutation of the 'chicken flu' virus with a human influenza virus liable 
to lead to a global 'pandemic' - be allowed to do so rather than attempting to prevent 
this from happening or wiping it out if it did? 
Yet, human life itself is implicitly privileged in Deleuze's thought through its lone 
ability to think creatively and develop new concepts, and this may seem to answer the 
question. Nevertheless, the dilemma remains, and Deleuze and Guattari writing together 
never directly address the problem, even though when writing later Guattari and Negri 
140 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 1. 
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evidently think primarily in terms of the human. 14 1 Thus, I believe that Hardt and 
Negri's attempt in Empire to develop the political thought derived from A Thousand 
Plateaus cannot be legitimately criticised on these grounds, as SlavqJ Z'iz'ek, despite his 
initial praise of their work, finally attempts to do by stating that '[fln their socio- 
economic analysis there is simply a lack of concrete, precise insight which is concealed 
in the Deleuzean jargon of 'multiplicity', 'deterritorialization', etc. 142 
Deleuze and Guattari's ethico-political conception stems as much from Spinoza 
and Nietzsche as it does from Bergsonian vitalism. The productivity involved here 
results not in a new subject but rather in a subject as a 'work of art'. (N 92) What is 
produced through such an art of living is an 'individuation' involving and evolving 
through weak and strong intensities and active and passive 'affects' enabled by a field 
of physical forces. 2iZ'ek's need for a political agenda based on 'concrete, precise 
insight' - presumably with its concrete, precise subjects - cannot be accommodated 
here without negating the very idea of the change, difference and ultimate impossibility 
of forecasting the future and the unknown forms, including that of a different humanity, 
which new life forms will take according to Deleuze and Guattari. 
Thus, for them the human 'subject' as it now appears to us may well be completely 
stripped of both interiority and identity and transformed into 'an event of individuation'. 
Such a self would only exist as a 'mode of intensity', (N 98-99) never as a personal 
subject. (AO 18) The danger involved in such a process when encountered in current 
'actualised' existence lived within our common-sense capitalist world, is that of 
succumbing and becoming a burned out case, 'a schizophrenic', rather than making use 
of 'the schizophrenic process' by extracting some surplus value from its productivity 
and fecundity, so as to both temporarily 'become imperceptible' oneself, and pass 
something on to the collectivity. 
14 1 Felix Guattari,, and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us. - New Spaces of Liberty, New 
Lines ofAlliance, trans. by Michael Ryan (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990). 
142 Zi2ek, 'Empire', in Siiddeutsche Zeitung. 
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Hardt and Negri note that Jh]ere is where the primary site of struggle seems to 
emerge, on the terrain of the production and regulation of subjectivity" 143 when '[t]he 
multitude has internalized the lack of place and fixed time ... The coming 
imperial 
universe, blind to meaning, is filled by the multifarious totality of the production of [a 
new] subjectivity. ). 144 Nevertheless, whereas Ziz'ek argues that Hardt and Negri are too 
Deleuzian in taking this approach, I believe that in concentrating solely on the human 
rather than prioritising 'life' in both its existing and, more importantly potential non- 
human and post-human forms, they may not be Deleuzian enough. It is essential to 
stress the importance of all life as the ethical basis of Deleuze and Guattari's ethico- 
political approach, and to realise this by coming to politics via literature and the arts if 
one is to more closely align one's thought with theirs. Deleuze states explicitly for the 
author that '[y]ou write [ethically] with a view to an unborn people that doesn't yet 
have a language', (N 143) nor, one might add, a recognizably human form or 
subjectivity. By repeatedly linking the Wake to the concept of 'chaos' and 'the eternal 
return' as Joyce's 'chaosmosis' [1.1,2.4,8.1], and as such 'a single and same 
affirmation', Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari indicate the significant position which it 
occupies for a radical ethics through a re-enchantment of an aesthetic which could allow 
the creation of a new sense of being and harmony in the world. 145 
Human harmony is always associated with 'the multitude' and communal 
experience, by Deleuze and Guattari. This concept consequently owes a great deal to 
Spinoza's 'substance', for it is in Spinoza's Political Treatise that the multitude 
becomes 'a productive essence'. 146 Thus, rather than the Marxist proletariat contesting 
the future it is: 'the multitude of poor people, [who] have eaten up and digested the 
multitude of proletarians [who do SO]. ) 147 
143 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 321. 
144 lbid, p. 380. 
145 Guattari, Chaosmosis, pps. 20,99-118. 
146 Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: constituent power and the modern state, trans. by 
Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 216. 
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Joyce and the ethico-politics of community 
Like that of Nietzsche, Joyce's aesthetic and ethical stance may not always seem to 
accord with this communal view especially if we attribute some well known statements 
made by Stephen Dedalus to the young Joyce as his straightforward fictional alter ego: 
'The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above 
his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails' 
(P. 215). and couple this with other statements by Joyce such as: 
No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true or the good unless he abhors the 
multitude; and the artist, though he may employ the crowd, is very careful to isolate 
himself.. If the artist courts the favour of the multitude he cannot escape the 
contagion of its fetichism [sic] and deliberate self-deception, and if he joins in a 
popular movement he does so at his own risk. (CW 69,7 1) 
In particular, when we recall Deleuze and Guattari's 'political' texts, (AO,. TP) 
specifically aimed at both political fascism and the fascism in all of our heads, Joyce's 
rebuttal of his brother StaniSlaus's concerns about the growth of fascism in Italy: 'Don't 
talk to me about politics; I am only interested in style', 148 hardly seems to accord with 
their views. Yet, Joyce's views on politics, as on other matters, mutated over time, and 
since the 1980s there have been many major studies 149 which clearly belie Joyce's 
statement to his brother about his lack of interest in, or his turning away from, 
politiCS. 150 This leads Vincent Cheng to argue that the excessive interest which many 
Joycean critics have shown in his stylistic experiments not only ignores his 'manifestly 
political content and ideological discourse', but leads to an appropriation and 
recuperation of the 'bitter resentment against the imperiums of State, Church, and 
147 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 15 8. 
148 Richard Ellmann, James Joyce, rev. edn (New York, Oxford, Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. xix. 
149These include: Dominic Manganiello, Joyce's Politics (London: Routledge, 1980); 
Trevor L. Williams, Reading Joyce Politically (Gainseville: University Press of 
Florida), and Cheryl Herr. Joyce's Anatomy of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1986); as well as numerous book chapters, articles and lectures given by these 
and many other authors. 
150 Seamus Deane, Celtic Revivals (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), p. 92. 
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Academy' of an Irish-Catholic colonial writer by these forces. 151 This denigration of 
Joyce's stylistic experiments is, I fear, rather like throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. From a Deleuzian angle it is from the creative interaction between Joyce's 
stylistic experiments and his 'political content and ideological discourse' that his ethico- 
political outlook springs. Such writerly productivity takes place in 'the middle' for 
Deleuze. This is a concept which will be further explained below. 
I agree with Seamus Deane that Joyce's works rather than maintaining a division 
between the artist and the collectivity of which he is an inevitable part, aim to both raise 
and ethically explore 'the question of how the individual subject can be envisaged in 
relation to its community, its past history, and a possible future'. 152 This is especially so, 
of course, if one reads this in terms of the Deleuzian subject as a coalescence of shifting 
forces, intensities, and 'becomings' rather than as 'actualised' unified subjects. 
Therefore, although Joyce was evidently 'a product of colonial Ireland ... and wrote out 
of that formation', 153 1 must disagree with Cheng 154 insofar as he implies that Joyce's 
ethico-political stance can and should be limited to such a reading and be effectively 
divorced from his aesthetics and particularly his latter day style, or 'nonstyle' as 
Deleuze puts it [3.2], in the Wake. 
Joyce, I believe, through the book's 'rhizomatic' style ultimately like Faulkner 
'becomes black'(TP 292) or 'minoritarian'. This takes his work well beyond his native 
Ireland and its people - whilst using their plight as illustrative - to all 'minoritarian' 
151 Vincent Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Etnpire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 2. 
152 Seamus Deane, 'Introduction, in Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, and Edward 
Said, Nationalism Colonialism and Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1990), p. 4. 
153 Francis Mulhem, 'English Reading', in Nation and Narration, ed. by Homi Bhabha 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p. 260. 
154 Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Empire, p. 2. 
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communities who live outside the hegemonic symbolic order and, as 'subaltems', 
155 
lack a voice. In this connection, Hardt and Negri note that '[n]o one is powerless; even 
the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the "immaterial labour" that 
produces "total social capital". In their statements on this 'multitude' they conclude that 
'[t]he poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World 
Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this'. 156 Joyce, I argue, provides the 
subaltems with a necessary voice. 
Vincent Cheng is not wrong of course and his insights are illuminating, but if we 
take a Deleuzian perspective they are somewhat limiting. Nevertheless he is certainly 
not alone in taking this stance and Boheem-Saaf in Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the 
Trauma of History, offers us a not dissimilar view as she bases Joyce's works and 
particularly the Wake in his and the community's loss of the Irish language. To limit 
Joyce to Irishness, Irish history and language, and the viewpoints of the petite 
bourgeoise and working class of Dublin at the turn of the century is, I believe, to do him 
a great disservice. This is a fundamental issue which I will continue to explore below. 
According to Deleuze although this ethical task which I attribute to Joyce is 
translatable into everyday terms by the sad or joyful perceptions of life which we hold, 
these must not be seen as offering new polar oppositions. Thus, Joyce like Deleuze, I 
argue, is always concerned to work from 'the middle', or 'the fold', (FLB) the 
connecting 'ands' rather than linguistic operations of identity: 'thinking with AND 
instead of thinking IS, instead of thinkingfor IS'. 157 Significantly, Rose and O'Hanlon 
note that Joyce 'never uses the format "either/ or" but always the "and"" !1 
158 a fact which 
155 Antonio Gramsci, Selectionsftom the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 52; 
Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies; and particularly Spivak, 'Can the subaltern speak? 
Speculations on widow sacrifice' and 'Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography', p-205- 
156 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 230. 
157 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 57. 
158 Danis Rose, and John O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake': A Guide to the 
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I believe both Cheng and Boheemen-Saaf, amongst other Joycean critics, might well 
note. Deleuze holds that our sad perceptions diminish not only our individual power, 
but the power of all life because we are bound up with life in all of its fonns. Sad 
perceptions isolate, joyful ones allow us to conjoin with others. This is both an ethical 
and a political stance. 
Deleuze's ethical approach means seeing evil not as located within irredeemable 
individuals, but rather recognising that the desires and investments which turn life 
against itself in such people or groups are also present in ourselves and as such must be 
addressed by us. In no sense does this allow us to condone the forces designated as evil, 
but it does show us that we too are not exempt from such forces. Thus, the people 
categorized as evil are to be seen as composed of images and investments which are 
never simply theirs and never entirely other than ourselves. We are always in 'the 
middle'. Each of us is made up of impersonal forces through which our individual 
characters are effected, and 'symptomatology' is the ethical rather than moral diagnosis 
of such a collection of investments. 
Throughout Joyce's work it is evident that he makes no opposition, except perhaps 
ironically between 'joy' and 'sadness' which always modulate in his oeuvre. Although 
ultimately his works offer us a joyful affirmation of life. It is this which makes him a 
great author in Deleuze's eyes, and also allows him to be read 'symptomatologically' 
and productively in ethico-political terms. It will be implicit in much of what I argue 
that, far from moralising, Joyce like Deleuze indicates the inhuman powers which 
produce sadness and sets against these the forces of life-enhancing humour by 'offering 
a chance for the reader to laugh too - at notions of readers, authors, texts, and 
interpretations', 159 as well as the inhuman powers which constitute them and so much of 
modem life. 
Ararrative (New York: Garland, 1982), p. xvi. 
159 Conley, I "Oh me none onsens! "', p. 246. 
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If one takes a single example from the Wake to illustrate this, the conflict between 
the brothers Shaun and Shem which has simmered throughout the first five chapters 
comes to a boil in Chapter 1.6. The Shem-Shaun bi-polarity is built into the narrative 
structure of the chapter as this takes the form of a quiz contest in which Shem asks all 
but one of the questions and Shaun gives most of the answers. There are twelve 
questions in all and the chapter ends with the shortest question and answer: '12. Sacer 
esto? / Answer: Semus sumus! ' (FW 168.13-14). The Latin sacer means both 'sacred' 
and 'accursed', and Shaun's question seems to ask whether Shem will be scapegoated. 
The answer which Joyce gives, here as elsewhere, is that Shem is not alone as both 
brothers share in the same nature, and by implication each and everyone is Shem. This 
becomes evident during Chapter 1.7, where Shaun repeatedly tries to increase the 
distance between himself and his twin, and Shem answers him by trying to embrace his 
brother in order to assuage his fears and effect a union between them. I argue, in 
Chapters Four and Five that this conflict can only be ended through the intensities of 
'Issyness' acting in their relationship through the 'middle'. 
I have previously looked at 'becomings' in general and specifically the initiating 
'becomings' of 'becoming-woman' symbiotically linked to 'becoming-girl'. I would 
now like to briefly explore the ultimate state of 'becoming' which all other 'becomings' 
move towards. In reading great works like Joyce's Ulysses and Finnegans Wake we 
may 'become-imperceptible' - Deleuze's ultimate aim for us as individuals and as a 
people (TP 279) - not by making moral judgements, but by entering into their 
experiences and becoming more aware of the forces of life and death from which such 
judgements of good and evil are derived. However, we can never remain 
'imperceptible' as such. It is not something that can be achieved once and for all. It is a 
'becoming', not a being. It is the challenge of freedom and ethics: of opening ourselves 
to the life that passes through us, rather than obJ1ectifying that life in advance through a 
moral system of good and evil. 
We might compare this to Stephen Dedalus's aesthetic theory in A Portrait, which 
to some extent may reflect the earlier Joyce's views. Stephen opines that art can be 
divided into three forms: the lyrical, the epical, and the dramatic. The lyrical form is the 
direct expression of emotion. In the epical form the artist allows his personality to pass 
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into the narration itself. However, in the dramatic form vitality belongs to the characters 
themselves and by entering into their experiences the artist's creative involvement 
becomes completely impersonal, as indeed should that of the reader. The Joycean/ 
Dedalian artist, somewhat like God himself, becomes detached from his creation 
C paring his fingernails', yet as material being, from a Deleuzian perspective, the artist 
unlike a transcendent God, remains immanent within his work as he 'becomes 
imperceptible'. The later Lacan too came to recognize this when he designated Joyce as 
'sinthome'; as a self-creation existing only through and because of his writing as 
symptom. 
What Foucault called the 'author function' 160 is not applicable to Joyce's works: 
... the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by 
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in short, by which one 
impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to 
presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, 
in reality we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion. 161 
Joyce's works simply refuse to function in this reductive manner. For Deleuze too, the 
proper name 'Joyce' does not refer to a particular person as an author but to a regime of 
signs or 'affects', a particular multiplicity or assemblage. This feature of Deleuzian 
philosophy has particular resonance when one comes to address those Joycean critics 
who persist in reading the Wake psychoanalytically as in some way revelatory of 
Joyce's personal biography. Deleuze speaks of Spinoza's philosophy or Joyce's works 
in much the same way as he would speak of the Richter scale in seismology or 
Alzheimer's disease in medicine. For him Joyce's late works in particular are to be seen 
as a mode of individuation which is always impersonal. Deleuze echoes Foucault's 
characterisation of the early scientific text here as Foucault notes that in the seventeenth 
or eighteenth century scientific discourses began to be received for themselves: 
160 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author? ', in The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to 
Foucault's Thought. ed. by Paul Rabinow (London and New York: Penguin Books. 
199 1), pp. 10 1- 120. 
161 Ibid. p. 119. 
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... in the anonymity of an established or always redemonstrable truth; 
[it was not] 
the reference to the individual who produced them [which] stood as their guarantee. 
The author function faded away, and the inventor's name served only to christen a 
theorem, proposition, particular effect, property, body, group of elements, or 
pathological syndrome. By the same token, literary discourses came to be accepted 
only when endowed with the author function. 162 
I believe that Deleuze and Foucault would be at one in their denial of the author 
function in Joyce's work, had the latter ever addressed it, and that they are joined at 
this point by the later Lacan who regards Joyce's perpetual writing not only as the 
necessary act required to ward off a psychopathological syndrome but one which 
releases the joy of 'feminine jouissance', and as such, in Deleuzian terms, is supremely 
ethical. 
"2 lbid, p. 109. 
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Part 3. Deleuze and Guattari's 'schizoanalysis' 
One cannot easily separate Deleuzian philosophy from Deleuzoguattarian 
4 schizoanalysis' or 'rhizomatics' and many of the concepts making up 'schizoanalysis' 
have already been introduced or mentioned. What remains is to specify the specific 
'tools' which 'schizoanalysis' employs. In sum , 'schizoanalysis' consists of a two-fold 
task: first find the 'BwO', then map the lines which cut across it. 
The Body without Organs and 'schizoanalysis' 
It is the 'BwO' and the lines of intensity which criss-cross it that Deleuze and 
Guattari look for in 'schizoanalysis' rather than the 'actualised' body which stems from 
it, or its psychic counterpart in the case of psychoanalysis. The 'BwO' helps to explain 
the 'machinic' relationship between things within a Deleuzian 'rhizomatic' cartography. 
The 'BwO' takes the 'actualised' body, whether that of an animal, human, social or 
political formation such as the 'multitude', or text, as a limit or a tendency. This body is 
recognised in the 'BwO' not as a corporeal or textual element but rather in terms of its 
constituent forces as a set of variously informed 'durational' 'speeds' and life-giving 
'intensities' which 'know only relations of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, 
between unformed, or relatively unformed, elements, molecules or particles borne away 
by fluxes'. 163 In this it owes a great deal to the Stoic 'theory of bodies' (L 4). 
The 'BwO' is located on the 'plane of immanence' which for purposes of 
convenience and clarity can be related to the Bergsonian 'virtual'. Just as connected 
'BwOs' are themselves simply 'becomings', the 'plane of immanence' in its entirety is 
nothing more than a 'plane of becoming' itself. Hardt and Negri refer to the 'plane of 
immanence' as a 'plane of forces of the desire and cooperation of the multitude'. 164 
Unfortunately, this elides the distinction between the 'plane of immanence' and the 
'BwO'. What Deleuze and Guattari consider to be specific to the 'production' and 
163 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 92. 
164 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 20 1. 
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'becomings' of 'BwOsI, which distinguish them from the 'plane of immanence' in 
general, can be best seen by some definitions which they give us: jit is that which] 
serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire'; (AO 
11) jit is] the field of the immanence of desire'. (TP 154) One's 'BwO is said to be 
"desire" 
... that which one desires and by which one desires', and 'there is desire 
whenever there is the constitution of a BwO under one relation or another'. (TP 165) 
Thus conceived 'desire' is both entirely productive and strictly impersonal. 
In following Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri highlight the importance of the 
desire 'of the multitude of mobile and flexible workers' who are socially diffused 
throughout the global 'Empire' of capitalism in its latest phase. 1 65 They place such 
desire at the heart of the current - or as I would see it 'potential' - social revolution 
'because desire has no limit and (since the desire to exist and the desire to produce are 
one and the same thing) life can be continuously, freely, and equally enjoyed and 
reproduced'. 166 The 'multitude' is here implicitly conceived not as an 'actual' collection 
of diverse peoples but as the constituent desiring forces which make up its 'BwO'. 
Elizabeth Grosz has summarized the Deleuzian concept of 'BwOs', as the location 
of desire, interacting on, and largely constituting the 'plane of immanence' as: 
the body before and in excess of the coalescence of its intensities and their 
sedimentation into meaningful, functional, organised, transcendent totalities ... a 
point or process to which all bodies, through their stratifications, tend; a becoming 
that resists the processes of ... organisation according to the three great strata or identities it opposes: the union of the organism, the unification of the subject, and 
the structure of significance 167 . 
165 Hardt and Negi, Empire, p. 209. 
166 lbid, p. 349. 
167 Elizabeth Grosz, 'A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics', in Gilles 
Deleuze and the Theater ofPhilosophy, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas, and Dorothea 
Olkowski, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 187-210 (p. 207). 
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As 'actualised' beings consisting of corporeal bodies, we are located on an adjacent 
plane, 'the plane of organisation', governed by these three great strata of identities: 
biological evolution and 'the union of the organism', social patriarchy and 'the 
unification of the subject', morality and the 'structure of significance', all concerned to 
limit and restrict or deny life as impersonal desire. The theorisation of the denial of 
desire can be traced back to the thought of Plato and extends throughout the 
postmodernist/ post-structuralist thought of Lyotard, Lacan, and Derrida where it 
appears as 'the void', 'lack', 'loss' or 'lapsus'. Consequently this thinking continues to 
pervade our thought processes today; as, despite being constituted by desiring 
intensities stemming from a 'BwO', we are by and large unaware of the vast range of 
intense and productive forces available to us from that source. Unable, because of the 
exigencies of everyday life, to perceive directly the intensive 'multiplicities' populating 
the 'plane of immanence', we may nevertheless receive them indirectly - though no 
less intensively - as the living forces making up the different 'affects', which works of 
art and literature draw on and enable us to recreate and incorporate as our own emotions 
and sensations, when we are not shielded from these by the Lawrentian 'umbrella'. 
Thus, 'schizoanalysis', incorporating 'symptomatology', takes the 'actualised' 
organic and non-organic forms of our everyday lives and attempts to work back to the 
pure flux of life forces from which they coalesce through 'their' respective 'BwOs'. 
(We need to understand too that 'BwOs' strictly speaking do not 'belong' to anyone or 
anything, they are no more than impersonal forces and connectivities). When addressing 
the textual body and its constituent 'BwO', Deleuze and Guattari use the phrases 'the 
first' and 'the second plane of writing'. The first plane can be regarded as a facet of 'the 
plane of organization' and 'the second plane of writing' as an aspect of 'the plane of 
immanence' or 'the virtual'. Consequently, as with the 'plane of organisation' and 'the 
plane of inunanence', for Deleuze and Guattari there is: 
a clear distinction between two planes of Writing: a ... plan(e) that organizes and 
develops forms (genres, themes, motifs) and assigns and develops subjects 
(personages, characters, feelings) [the 'plane of organisation']; and an altogether 
different plane [a sub-set of the 'plane of immanence'] that liberates the particles of 
an anonymous matter, allowing them to communicate through the 'envelope' of 
forms and subjects, retaining between them only relations of movement and rest, 
speed and slowness, floating affects ... 
forms develop and subjects form (on the 
plan[e] of organization-development) as a function of a plane that can only be 
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inferred. [Here] there are only speeds and slownesses between unformed elements, 
and affects between nonsubjectified powers. (TP 267-268) 
In elaborating on 'schizoanalytic' procedure in my readings of Joyce's works, the 
'BwO', epitomising impersonal desire, will be taken as the intensive reality of the body 
of the text which consistently diagnoses social reality and its capture and channelling of 
such desire, whilst at the same time offering an alternative 'line of flight'. 
'Actualised' bodies., whether organic or textual, simply consist of lines rather than 
points: lines of flow, lines of longitude and latitude. Thus, the 'actualised' body can be 
regarded as a cartography and it is these mappings to which we must turn in tracing the 
activities of their constituent 'BwOs'. I will attempt to draw these lines out from the 
body of the text. Thus, 'rhizomatic' or 'schizoanalytic' procedure is concerned to infer 
and chart as far as possible the lines zig-zagging across the smooth surface of the 
'BwO' in order to produce a diagram of the relative intensities populating it. 
Ian Buchanan 168 believes that it is in their examination of the novella, 169 that 
Deleuze and Guattari 'come as near as they ever do to providing a set of procedural 
notes for the technique of analysing such lines'. 170 He points out that they find three 
types of line: the 'line of segmentarity', the 'line of molecularity', and the 'line of 
flight'. In fact, Deleuze in a collaborative text 171 provides us with much more concrete 
information as he delineates the three categories which allow us to function as 
individuals or groups, and he argues that as 'singularities', we are entirely composed by 
such a series of lines. 
168 Ian Buchanan,, 'Hitchcock's The Birds', lecture at 'Immanent Choreographies: 
Deleuze and the Neo-Aesthetic Conference', Tate Modem, London, 22 September, 
2001. [ýný: jtqgteq-or ALmo 
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169 A Thousand Plateaus, Chapter 8 '1874: Three Novellas, or "What Happened"'. 
170 Ian Buchanan, 'Hitchcock's The Birds'. 
17 1 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues. 
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Thus, the 'plane of organisation' is the 'actual' area of our lives through which we 
are structured into behavioural roles, through moralities and principles. Here we have 
the rigid 'line of segmentarity' or 'molar line' where things have specific values and a 
specific place. It is a rigid, structured, and fixed line which divides, orders, hierarchizes, 
and regulates social relations through binary codes, creating the oppositions between 
sexes, classes,, and races,, and dividing the real into subjects and objects. We use this 
line as a foundation to give our lives consistency and meaning. The 'line of 
segmentarity' is a stratifying line which controls identity and functions according to a 
law of conjugality. Elements such as personal identity, family, class, religion, the law, 
the state, gender and sexuality are regimes of this line. Here one's parts fit together, 
they conjugate. We are 'oedipalised' and interpellated on this plane as Joyce clearly 
delineates in Dubliners. 
Simultaneously, but in contrast, we have the 'line of molecularity' or 
'molecularisation', which veers away from the strict rigidity of the 'molar line'. This is 
a more fluid line, which forms connections and relations beyond the rigidity of the 
molar line. It maps processes of 'becoming', change, movement, and reorganization. 
Whilst it is not in itself revolutionary, it nevertheless accounts for both sociopolitical 
and micro 'becomings', demassifying 'molar segmentations', and creating cracks 
between segments so that something may pass between them. 'Molecular lines' make 
detours, 'they sketch out rises and falls; but they are no less precise for all this, they 
even direct irreversible processes' 172 . However, the movements which they engender 
are on 'the plane of immanence' and as such below the threshold of our normal 
perception. These lines manifest themselves as barely perceptible fissures and flaws, or 
secret lines of disorientation: 'all those red raddled obeli cayennepeppercast over the 
text, calling unnecessary attention to errors, omissions, repetitions and misaligmuents' 
(FW 120.14-16) does not simply apply to the 'Tunc' page of the Book of Kells, as it 
aptly describes them. Here, rather than clearly defined parts fitting together 
mechanically in sequence, one only has lacunae and discontinuities. The 'line of 
molecularity' comes into play through the unsettling 'affects' which Joyce also calls up t: p 
172 1 bid, p. 124. 
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in Dubliners, and all of his later works. I will argue later that the 'molecular' line is 
Bloom's line. Flieger summarises the distinction between the two lines as follows: 
To put it simply, the molar register concerns whole organisms, subjects, forms, and 
their interaction,, including social action; while the molecular register considers 
non-subjective being on the level of chemical and physical reactions, intensities, in 
a radically material 'micropolitics'. 173 
'[M]an is the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular', (TP 
292) and we are engaged in a constant tug-of-war between processual 'becomings' and 
'molarised Being' even though this may not be consciously evident to us most of the 
time. Unfortunately our 'molecular' attempts at 'becoming other' are largely thwarted 
and recuperated through the patriarchal forces of the capitalist socius working on a 
6molar line'. Nevertheless,, it is important to understand that the 'molar' and the 
(molecular' lines are not irreconcilable polar opposities. The distinction between them 
is qualitative rather than quantitative. Massive 'molarity' can never completely swamp 
the 'molecular' line and its potential 'becomings', because the latter creates a path 
which traverses and destabilises the former. It enables energy seepage to take place 
within and through all 'molar' unities. As John Marks puts it, '[t]he molecular is rather 
a potential within the molar', 174 however,, its potential is to subvert or betray the molar 
entity and give us greater life. Such betrayals, unlike those of Proust's 'world of love' 
which return us to patriarchal recuperation, are characteristic of the Deleuzian 'war 
machine' and 'nomad'. (TP 351-423) They undermine patriarchy and oedipalised 
identity, and Joyce through Molly brings them into play, as I will show in Chapter Two. 
Whereas the 'molar' line implies arborescence, organisation, bipolarity, and 
hierarchy, the 'molecular' line entails 'rhizomatic' potentiality, and 'becoming'. The 
4molar' line is particular to the 'plane of organisation' where desire or libidinal energies 
becomes viscous or even solidified into transcendental signifiers tending to restrict the 
flow and production of both meaning and use. On the other hand the 'molecular' line, 
173 Jerry Aline Flieger, 'Becoming-woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular 
Identification', in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, ed. by Ian Buchanan and Claire 
Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 38-63 (p. 41). 
174 Marks, Gilles Deleuze, pp. 10 1- 102. 
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characteristic of the 'plane of immanence' and hence the 'BwO', ensures that desire or 
life moves freely in unstructured', 'rhizomatic' flows. Consequently, as will become 
evident in Chapter Two, even Bloom's 'empty BwO' allows for some molecular 
movement. Joyce's portrayal of Bloom, I will show, simply highlights and takes to the 
limit the conflictual tendency universal to us all in capitalist modernity and 
postmodernity. 
Finally, Deleuze gives us the 'line of flight', or the 'nomadic line'. This 
revolutionary line characterises the 'becomings' of the 'plane of immanence'. Flieger 
notes that 'becoming is a process, a line of flight between states which displaces and 
disorients subjects and identities' 
175 
, and ' "becoming" as a line of flight, moving 
176 towards excess, other, exteriority' . However, like the 'line of molecularity', it too 
operates alongside the 'plane of organisation' in a molecular coagulation melding and in 
collusion with it. Yet, the 'line of flight' enables a move away from both the 
'segmentarity' of the 'molar' and the 'evanescence' of the 'molecular lines' into areas 
of change, difference, experimentation and renewal. 
Deleuze and Guattari bring together the productive 'middle', 'becomings', and the 
'line of flight': 
A becoming is always in the middle, one can only get it by the middle. A becoming 
is neither one nor two [points], nor the relation of the two, it is the in-between, the 
border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both. (TP 293) 
It is also the 'event' which best illustrates the Deleuzian concept that allows time to 
take off on a new path 'as new lines of time or "lines of flight"'. Consequently, it is on 
this line,, Deleuze suggests, that we move away from fixed positions to overcome our 
human perceptions and its limitations. Through this line we are enabled to become more 
than our human selves and expand to our highest powers as we are involved in the 
previously hidden potentialities and 'becomings' of life itself. The 'line of flight' is the 
175 Flieger, 'Becoming-woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification', p. 43. 
176 lbid, p. 47. 
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line of creativity, volition, excitement, and flight. It is the line of 'rhizomatic' or 
4 schizoanalytic' processuality and 'becomings'. This line offers life, at the cost of a 
complete transformation through difference. 
Conversely, as its mutations and differences produce not just the progression of 
history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and 'monstrous' births, it is also the line 
of danger and risk, loss and possible annihilation. It is the line which in collision with 
the 'line of segmentarity' or 'molarity', operating in conjunction with the 'line of 
molecularity', threatens us with black holes and oblivion often resulting in the burned 
out case of clinical schizophrenia. I argue that this is Joyce's creative line, and it is on 
this line that his greatest works are located. Joyce according to Mercanton states: 'that 
book [Ulysses] was a terrible risk. A transparent line separates it from madness'. 177 it 
may well be that Lucia, Joyce's daughter, attempting to emulate her father and 
encouraged by him to do so, fell into the black hole which his creativity allowed him to 
avoid, albeit at considerable cost. Nevertheless, in our later Deleuzian reading of the 
Wake, I argue that any attribution of the text as a more or less disguised representation 
of Lucia's troubled life 178 or other aspects of Joyce's personal life, 179 is completely 
beside the point as I read it in terms of the 'second plane of writing'. Deleuze describes 
the attraction of this line as 'the most complex of all, the most tortuous: it is the line of 
gravity or velocity, the line of flight and of the greatest gradient', a line which has 
something mysterious about it, for, according to him, it is nothing other than the 
progression of the soul of the dancer. 180 
177 j. Mercanton, 'The Hours of Joyce', in Portraits of the Artist in Exile: Recollections 
of James Joyce by Europeans , ed. 
by Willard Potts (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1979), p-226. 
178 Helene Cixous, The Exiles ofJames Joyce, trans. by Sally Purcell (London: John 
Calder, 1976), p. 15. 
179 Margot Norris, Joyce's Web: The Social Unravelling ofModernism (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1992), p. 185. 
180 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 125. 
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It is through 'affect', as the crucial element in terms of 'becomings', that the 
creativity of Joyce's 'line of flight' comes into its own for his readers: 'literature as 
production, as operation of affect-producing machines' [3.3]. Thus, Michael Levenson 
writing about 'The Dead' in Joyce's Dubliners has said: 
Joyce himself, choosing exile, sought to escape exactly those forces, emanating 
from deep within the colonial state, that combine to break Gabriel Conroy. And yet, 
Joyce was not content merely to live outside the grip of his home colony, merely to 
escape the fatal tangle of political tension. Against the threat of being absorbed 
within a larger frame, he set out to contain the container, to swallow those who 
would swallow him in their contexts. The characteristic strategy of his work is to 
bring inside the fiction exactly those pressures that surround it in the living world. 
181 
As Deleuze would put it, Joyce 'tries to take hold of a force in order to make it [his] 
own'. (ECC 132) Levenson is here showing that Joyce's 'line of flight', encompassing 
the impersonal 'pressures' or forces of the socius - first instanced in Dubliners 
182 
- is 
not simply an attempt to escape, but a productive enterprise making these intensities 
available to us as 'affect% in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's belief that the 'line of 
flight' must offer a positive renewal within and not out of society. Joyce's action 
exemplifies this Deleuzoguattarian tenet: 
Good people say that we must not flee, that to escape is not good, that it isn't 
effective, and that one must work for reforms. But the revolutionary knows that 
escape is revolutionary ... provided one sweeps away the social cover on 
leaving. 
(A 0 277) 
This 'sweep[ing] away of the social cover' is both an ethical and a political response 
and lies at the heart of 'symptomatology' and Joyce's work. 
The passages which have been taken to suggest for Deleuze and Guattari that 
Joyce's work and in particular Finnegans Wake, do not ultimately offer us the liberatory 
181 Michael Levenson, 'Living History in the Dead, in'The Dead': Case Studies in 
Contemporary Criticism, ed. by Daniel R. Schwartz (Boston and New York: Bedford 
Books, 1994), p. 176. 
182 Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 
112-114. 
81 
potential of other authors, [5.1 ] coupled with the suggestion that the Wake might indeed 
be tied to a traditional view of the Viconian 'cyclic unity of the sentence, text or 
knowledge' of Bergsonian 'bare repetition' [6.1 ] has been the subject of over-much 
attention. I suggest that this is largely because A Thousand Plateaus and Ka/ka, rather 
than Difference and Repetition, Logic ofSense , or even What is Philosophy?, are much 
better known by literary critics, and the counter-balancing picture which the latter offer 
is consequently not taken into account by them. Nevertheless, these concerns need to be 
addressed. 
Timothy Murphy has summarised Deleuze and Guattari's apparently anti-Wakean 
view in these passages in terms of its 'deterritorialising' of the English language as only 
serving in the end to act as a second-order grid containing the text, with the circular 
structure of Finnegans Wake reflecting this. 183 One needs to ask whether this is a valid 
assessment of the book's supposedly underlying structure, and indeed whether it 
represents Deleuze and Guattari's considered view given their later statement. [8.1] In 
this connection it must be noted that Murphy has also taken a much more positive view 
of Finnegans Wake than that offered above, in which he takes a broader view of 
Deleuze's overall assessment of the Wake by linking it to earlier Deleuzian reading of 
Nietzsche's 'eternal return' as 'the seim anew' (FW 215.23). 184 In this more considered 
article he seems to regard the negative assessment of Deleuze and Guattari which he 
articulated in 'Only Intensities Subsist' as less than definitive of their overall 
appreciation of the Wake, although in neither case does he offer any explanation for 
their apparent volteface. 
One can set against Murphy's apparent equivocation Marie-Dominique Gamier's 
view that: 
183 Timothy S. Murphy, 'Only Intensities Subsist: Samuel Beckett's Nohow On'. in 
Deleuze and Literature, ed. by Ian Buchanan and John Marks (Edinburgh: 
Edinburg1h University Press, 2000), pp. 232-233. 
184 Timothy S. Murphy, 'The Eternal Return of "The seim aneVI': Joyce ýs Vico and 
Deleuze's Nietzsche', James Joyce Quarterly, 35.4 (1999), 715-735. 
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Deleuze and Guattari's misconception of Joyce ... has been detrimental to both fields, the critical and the philosophical. Joyce's words can easily be shown to be 
neither roots, nor entirely geared to a circular form. Deleuze and Guattari's 
conceptual machines need to be connected to micro-readings of the Joycean corpus, 
so far almost entirely subjugated to the dominant voices of post-Romantic, 
185 'Oedipean' criticism (i. e. one based on the concepts of loss, lack and lapsus). 
Gamier brings out the key point that there is a real need to engage in micro-readings of 
Joyce's corpus, and the Wake in particular, from a Deleuzian angle. 
As she points out., one cannot reduce the exotic and portmanteau words of the Wake 
to 'arborescent' roots as Deleuze well knew as early as 1968, as these give us 'a 
maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent series constitutive of the 
cosmos)', which bring 'into operation linguistic dark precursors ([the], esoteric words, 
portmanteau words) which rely upon no prior identity, which are above all not 
'identifiable ' in principle' [ 1.3 ]. 186 For as Katie Wales points out 'Wakese neologisms 
combine with established words to produce a new lexical currency with suggestive 
configurations of undertones, often working ... in cohesive chains'. 
187 Such a 'new 
lexical currency' 'rhizomatically' breaks with any 'arborescent' roots in the 
multiplicities and deliberate excess of meanings supplied, they are 'not "identifiable" in 
principle' as Deleuze himself stresses. Moreover, one must add to this new lexicality 
the disruptive influence of Wakean syntax. Unfortunately, I lack the space here to relate 
Wales's valid point to Deleuze's apparent volteface. I believe that it is not the Wake 
itself which Deleuze and Guattari attack but the meanings and problematic that their 
peer group, including Sollers and Lacan, impose upon it which they reject. k 
185 Gamier, 'The lapse and the lap: Joyce with Deleuze', pp. 98-99. 
186 My italics. 
187 Katie Wales, The Language ofJames Joyce (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 
1992), p. 154. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that Deleuze and Guattari conceive Joyce's works as those of a great 
'symptomatologist', and his late works as epiphanic 'events' which allow readers to 
experience the 'affects' capable of setting in train the 'rhizomatic/ schizoanalytic' 
process which may result in the ethical prospect of 'a people to come' as 'multitude'. 
Yet, I believe that Deleuze and Guattari themselves have fallen short in their 
appreciation of the Wake's full radical potentiality as I will argue later in the thesis. I 
have also argued that Hardt and Negri's ground breaking Deleuzoguattarian analysis of 
global capitalism would greatly benefit from taking into account Joyce's work and the 
Wake in particular. In order to set the scene for my exploration of the Wake, I will first 
continue with a 'symptomatological' analysis of Joyce's earlier works coupled with 
Ulysses in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 11 
In this chapter I will be making a 'symptomatological' assessment of our 
problematic situation in modernity through the masochism of Bloom in Ulysses which, I 
will argue, is a further development by Joyce of the societal 'paralysis' that he 
diagnoses in both Dubliners and A Portrait. Unlike Hardt and Negri, who appear to 
assign a discrete structure to global capitalism in Empire, I believe that strong 
recuperative ('reterritorialising') forces, forming a continuum with earlier phases, 
persist in its current phase. If this is the case it is necessary to address rather than simply 
gloss over them. Consequently, in my opinion, Joyce's 'symptomatological' diagnoses 
are as pertinent and valuable today as they were when he wrote them. 
In concentrating on the largely negative view of society which Joyce presents us 
with in Hysses and his earlier works, prior to its 'symptomatological' culmination in 
the Wake, which then allows its much more positive 'deterritorialising' 'affects' to 
break through, I want to relate his work as a whole to the Deleuzian concept of 'the dark 
precursor'. Deleuze brings this concept into play somewhat narrowly in his comments 
on the Wake's 'cosmic letter' by referring to its esoteric and portmanteau words as 0' dark 
precursor' whose resonating series result in the 'epiphany'[1.3] with the Wake 
conceived of by Deleuze as an 'epiphanic machine'. However, I think that the concept 
can be applied more widely to Joyce's work. 
The phrase 'the dark precursors' (les sombres precurseurs) refers to the ominous 
meteorological signs that foreshadow a coming storm. Deleuze develops the concept in 
Difference and Repetition where he states that: 
Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an 
invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but 
in reverse, as though intagliated. Likewise, every system contains its dark precursor 
which ensures the communication of peripheral series. ... it is the in-itself of 
difference ... which relates heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate 
things. (DR 119-120) 
I regard the Wake as the thunderbolt of 'creative destruction' which clears the way for a 
proper appreciation of the ethical potentiality of literature. Uysses and its predecessors 
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determine its path in advance but in reverse through their necessarily negative 
4 SYMPtomatological' diagnoses. 
In order to arrive at a 'symptomatological' assessment of Oysses I will attempt to 
move the focus from the narrative, plot and 'character' of Bloom - necessarily 
conceived by Joyce on the 'first plane of writing' - to the impersonal lines, forces and 
intensities making up capitalism's 'BwO', which I argue that Joyce intuitively drew on 
to produce his portrait of Bloom. It is largely through narrative, plot and 'character' that 
such lines and forces are made available at least in the earlier episodes of Ulysses and in 
the preceding works. As the two planes of writing overlap and interact, it will 
necessarily be the case that the 'first plane of writing' features strongly in my 
assessment. However, by bringing into play 'the second plane of writing' in this chapter 
I attempt to take a clinical look at Ulysses as a societal diagnosis. This will offer an 
initial 'schizoanalysis' of Joyce's works which will establish a basis for further 
exploration in my later chapters on the Wake. 
After an introductory statement on what I mean by societal masochism, I will start 
with the experience of minor characters who appear in both Dubliners and Ulysses 
which will help bring together the societal paralysis depicted in the former work with 
the more complex diagnosis of social masochism more fully delineated through Bloom. 
It will also be necessary to bring into play the institutional sadism depicted in A Portrait 
which is then both contested by and reclaimed through Bloom's masochism in Oysses. 
I will then move through a consideration of Deleuze's theorisations on societal 
masochism and its 'affects', as it impacts upon and forms the 'characters' in L/lysses, to 
Molly's attempt to use masochism, so conceived, to create an ethical 'line of flight'. 
Although the contradictory nature of Molly's makeup, itself necessarily contaminated 
by masochism, prevents this from being fully realised, its potentiality for achieving a 
'line of flight' is adumbrated. I conclude that such 'lines of flight' are better realised in 
the Wake. 
As Richard Brown writes, Joyce quite deliberately: 
... 
drew on a huge variety of sources for his presentation of Bloomian sexuality and 
the traces of different, potentially conflicting, kinds of discourses on the question 
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are woven into the book so that we feel that the history and literature, as well as the 
phenomenon of masochism have been presented toUS. 
188 
Evidently, Joyce went to an enormous amount of trouble in order to present a full and 
authentic picture of masochism to the 'normal' reader through Bloom, whatever risks 
this may appear to offer for her alienation from him and her consequent withdrawal of 
sympathy. 
A number of writers including Frances Restuccia and in particular David Cotter' 89 
have stressed the autobiographical element in Joyce's writing as his letters apparently 
attest to strong masochistic inclinations. 190 Cotter therefore begins his thesis from the 
assumption that 'sexual masochism runs like a core through the center of Joyce, and is 
the impetus of his writing' 191 and, despite admitting that 'masochism does not wholly 
account for Joycean sexuality', 192 unabashedly concludes with the statement that 'the 
centrality of this masochism [leads] to Joyce's confessions'. 193 He argues in effect that 
Joyce's psychopathology over-rode any other authorial considerations as he 
obsessively, and meticulously, depicted it in great detail through Bloom and Stephen in 
Ulysses, and indeed throughout all of his other works. 
188 Richard Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 88. 
189 Frances L. Restuccia, 'Molly in Furs: Deleuzian/ Masochian Masochism in the 
Writing of James Joyce', Novel (Winter, 1985), 101-116, and Joyce and the Law of the 
Father (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), passim; David Cotter, 
"'I Say! Look what he's doing": Shame, Secrecy, and Exposure in Joyce', Joyce 2000, 
The Right to Write, XVII International Jaynes Joyce Symposium (London, 24-30 June, 
2000), James Joyce and the Perverse Ideal (New York and London: Routledge, 2003). 
190 James Joyce, Selected Letters ofJames Joyce, ed. by Richard Ellmann (London: 
Faber, 1975), pp. 5-6,172,189. 
191 David Cotter, James Joyce and the Perverse Ideal, p. 1. 
192 IbU p. 221. 
193 lbid, p. 222. 
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This may or may not be the case for, as Brown notes, Joyce's 'writing never 
becomes confessional ... Its 
dominant mode remains parodic'. 194 Insofar as this is so it is 
a parody of our societal situation today, just as it was then of 1904 Dublin, for as 
Deleuze averred masochistic rituals consist of the undermining by parody of social 
constructs of identity. Whatever the psychological truth or otherwise of the masochism 
of Joyce, Cotter's thesis holds no interest for 'schizoanalysis', despite his claimed 
reliance on Deleuzian philosophy,, because in Deleuze's thought the writer should not 
be viewed as a patient but as a physician who makes a diagnosis of the world. (ECC 53) 
Furthermore, I wish to argue that it is precisely because of his masochism that 
'Bloom retains his precarious normality throughout', 195 and more importantly his 
implicit appeal for the 'normal' reader. Brown believes that '... it is the new onanistic 
concept of sexuality that saves him in the reader's eyes, permitting, even requiring, a 
degree of "perversity" in order to guarantee the "normality" of his deviation from the 
narrow traditional ideal'. 196 Be that as it may, he rightly concludes that we retain 'our 
sympathy with Bloom's character and actions'. 197 Whatever reasons are advanced for 
retaining our sympathy for and identification with Bloom, and these may go well 
beyond masturbation to include, for example, his fair-mindedness, common sense and 
sympathy with the underdog, I argue that it is the inbuilt societal masochism 'affecting' 
and effecting us all which keeps us 'onside' with Bloom, and it is this that ensures that 
we are always aware that he is somehow fundamentally like us. Simply put, it is this 
awareness of being like us which, I believe, is signified, rather than being put at risk by 
his masochism. For as Eugene Holland has written: 
... not 
just as a consumer but also as a citizen, the subject within liberal- 
democratic capitalism is thoroughly enmeshed in structures where nearly every 
(apparent) act of self-constitution, of self-affirmation, or even of self-defense 
194 Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality, pp. 87-88. 
195 fbid, p-88. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
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turns out to strengthen the powers of capital or the state over that subject - 
turns out, in other words, to (also) be an act of masochism, in the properly 
socio-historical, Masochian sense of the term. 198 
By stressing the powers of the state over the subject, Holland brings out the 
ultimately recuperative, 'molar' or 'reterritoriali sing' aspect of capitalism, our 
victimization, and the difficulties involved in making productive changes. However, 
Holland's stress on masochistic 'molarising' tends to make it indistinguishable from 
6paralysis' in its societal 'affects'. Consequently, I believe that he fails to stress 
sufficiently the subversive aspect which is constitutive of masochism on its 'molecular 
line', a subversiveness which Bloom's masochism forcefully brings into play. For, as 
we have noted above the 'molecular line' when it comes into play in conjunction with 
the 'molar line' allows detours which 'even direct irreversible processes'. 199 
As a precursor to the exploration of Bloom's and our masochism in modemity, I 
would first like to focus on the forces which constitute some minor Joycean characters 
to show how Joyce is gradually moving us from the diagnosis of societal 'paralysis' and 
victimization in Dubliners to the more profound awareness of the complex masochism 
portrayed through his central character Bloom. 
In 'symptomatological' terms there are very many occasions in Joyce's works 
when he shows us that the 'paralysis' of Ireland is due to the 'molar' intensities 
coalescing in 'the socius' which then 'actualise' historically through the collaboration 
of the Roman Catholic Church and the colonising English State. This has occurred at 
least from the time of the occupation of Ireland by Henry 11 who obtained a Papal Bull 
and the blessing of Pope Adrian to justify his invasion of Ireland. Hence, Stephen's 'I 
am the servant of two masters ... ' (U 
24) in the 'Telemachus' episode of (flysses, and 
198 Personal correspondence. (Eugene W. Holland is the author of Baudelaire and 
Schizoanalj; sis: The Sociopoetics of Modernism (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Deleuze and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipus': 
Introduction to schizoanalysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). 
199 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues. p. 124. 
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Joyce's: 'Ireland my first and only love/ Where Christ and Caesar go hand in glove. 200 
One can quite reasonably, I suggest, read Stephen's statement as anticipating 
Althusser's recasting of Marx' s 'false consciousness', 
201 
as our being 'hailed' or 
'interpellated' into identity as unwilling servants. Stephen is effectively stating that our 
very identies are constituted by hierarchic capitalistic forces, I suggest, which poses the 
greatest problem and dilemma for him and for us today despite the changed status of 
capitalism from imperialistic to global. Permanent and radical change for us requires a 
radical and ethical change of the social order rather than bi-Polar moral reversals, and 
this is not automatically available. 
Jan Ford reminds us that: 
In 'The Boarding House', we have a version of Joyce's outrage at lifelong 
entrapment based on succumbing to the passing desire of the moment. But Polly is 
as much the victim of her own sexual desire as is Bob Doran; both are being 
manipulated by Mother/ Society: 'The pleasure of love lasts but a fleeting but the 
pledges of life outlusts a lifetime'. (FW 444.24-25)202 
However, I believe that Ford is mistaken if she directly equates 'Mother' with societal 
authority. 'Mother', as 'outlaw', can do no more than gain temporary access to the role 
of patriarchal authority of the Symbolic order as both Kristeva, 203 in general terms, and 
Joyce here through Polly's mother, show. (U 682-684) Clearly, the Church is a very 
important, or possibly the most important, element in ensuring this ethical paralysis 
through its often hypocritical morality. 
Mrs Mooney in 'The Boarding House' is able to divest herself of a husband, whom 
she and society regard as no more than an encumbrance, set up and run effectively a 
200 James Joyce, Gasftom a Burner: A broadside in verse (Trieste: James Joyce, 1912). 
20 1 Althusser, For Marx, passim. 
202 Jan Ford, 'James Joyce and Those (K)nights of "Ruful Continence", in The Seventh 
of Joyce, ed. by Benard Benstock, p. 243. 
203 Julia Kristeva, The Powers ofRorror: An Essay in Abjection, trans. by Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), passim. 
90 
boarding house, and shrewdly encourage the liaison between her wayward daughter 
Polly and the eligible Bob Doran, by not only not preventing but even helping to ensure 
that Polly become pregnant by him, in order to insist that he marry her. Thus, in 
Dubliners, despite his evident reluctance, Mrs Mooney is enabled to ride roughshod 
over Bob Doran's clear objections to marriage by exploiting his weak position at work, 
implicitly threatening him with dismissal - as 'she had all the weight of social opinion 
on her side' - and finally and quite unscrupulously threatening to useforce majeur, in 
the shape of her violent son Jack, to bring this about. Nevertheless, she is enabled by the 
priest to leave her husband in the first instance, and it is only by the moral threat of 
instant dismissal from the 'great Catholic wine merchant's office', where Bob had 
laboured for thirteen years to establish himself, that this can be brought about. Mrs 
Mooney has effected a temporary bi-polar reversal of the social order but this does not 
alter its patriarchal structure, constituted through 'molarising' forces, in fact it merely 
confirms it. 
In order to gain ascendancy, in the 'Boarding House', Mrs Mooney literally plays 
her cards right, but these are only the societally controlling cards of the Roman Catholic 
Church through whose moral forces she is momentarily empowered. It is the 
hypocritical, prying, morality of the Church which backs Doran into a comer: 'the priest 
had drawn out every ridiculous detail of the affair and in the end had so magnified his 
sin that he was almost thankful at being afforded a loophole of reparation', just as the 
dismissal from the wine merchants is threatened through Catholic morality rather than 
Doran's failure to perform his job well. Ultimately, despite Margot Norris's arguments, 
which on occasion seem to offer her agency: 'the Mooney's have "cirust", that is, a bold 
and vulgar audacity in the way they play their games and in the way they use bourgeois 
morality for their own purposes and designs'; 204 it is not Mrs Mooney but the 
controlling forces of the patriarchal authority of the Church's underpinning discourse 
which ensures her 'successes', and I believe that these forces reassert themselves in 
Ulysses, but this time to her disadvantage. Moreover, Colin MacCabe observes that 
even in 'The Boarding House': 
204 Margot Norris, 'Narrative Bread Pudding', in Suspicious Reading ofJoyce Is 
'Dubliners' (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 93-108 (p. 107). 
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Mrs Mooney, the mother, is not allowed to speak for herself because the 
[patriarchal] narrative immediately fixes her for the reader. It is information shared 
between reader and text that enables the narrative to pronounce that 'she dealt with 
moral problems as a cleaver deals with meat'. This direction on how to understand 
Mrs Mooney is guaranteed by the reference in the simile back to the butcher's shop 
where Mrs Mooney started her career. In its use of information already given to 
make a judgement on a character, the text elaborates a common strategy of classic 
realism, the knowledge shared by narrative and reader places them in a dominating 
position vis-a-vis the characters and their discourses. 205 
It is not the characters but the always already established force of the narrative 
discourse which determines the 'molar' process and its outcomes, including the 
'paralysis' of Bob Doran which working through us determines our reading. Mrs 
Mooney, as Joyce ironically indicates in his choice of surname, is as dominant as the 
moon in the night sky outshining all of the other stars and seemingly in total control of 
the heavens in 'The Boarding House'. However, the feminine moon does not generate 
her own heat and light, she merely reflects that of the masculine and temporarily hidden 
sun. When it appears and makes this plain the moon pales into insignificance and then 
disappears. 
Bob Doran has been sadistically disempowered by a dominatrix in the form of Mrs 
Mooney, but he differs from Bloom in the 'Circe' episode in his reluctance to enter into 
an implicit contractual relationship with her and be dispossessed of his masculine 
empowerment, and as such offers us a half-way house between paralysis and Bloomian 
masochism in Ulysses. His plight, I argue, is a very instructive precursor to that of 
Bloom and the transition from societal paralysis to societal masochism which Joyce 
now diagnoses. This can be seen in the 'Cyclops' episode of Ulysses where Joyce 
exposes the reaction of his drinking companions to the grief displayed by Bob Doran on 
learning of the sudden death of Paddy Dignam. (U 390-391) 
Here we see Bob Doran, worse (or possibly better) for drink, with all of his 
defences down - in vino veritas - expressing his innermost and hitherto repressed 
205 MacCabe, James Jo ce and the Revolution of the Word, p. 54. y 
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feelings for a newly deceased drinking companion. The differences or 'intensities' of 
the 'BwO' or 'abstract machine' assert themselves: 'the pure abstract machine of a 
twilight state' has taken over. (TP 169) It 'crops up when you least expect it, at a chance 
juncture, when you are falling asleep, in a twilight state, hallucinating (TP 168- 
169) or drunk. It is at this juncture that 'the real' intrudes into symbolically ordered 
reality, which then breaks down as reality collapses into it. (For Deleuze and Guattari, 
unlike the early Lacan for whom the real was impossible, 206 there is of course no 
distinction to be drawn between 'the real' and reality, and they explicitly state in 
contradistinction to Lacan that Jt1he real is not impossible'. (AO 27)) What has 
happened here is that for Bob Doran the 'abstract machine' has simply brought into play 
a new power of consistency. He has been invaded by the forces of 'his' fully real but 
never 'actual' 'BwO' as this is the precise point where the 'abstract machine' suddenly 
changes in kind. 207 Albeit temporarily he is no longer governed solely by a paralysing 
g molar line' but - through these changes in the 'abstract machine' - simultaneously by a 
'molecular' one veering away from the strict rigidity of the 'molar line' mapping 
potential micro-becomings. I 
His outburst earns him immediate condemnation and marginalisation by the 
embarrassed working-class narrator, captured by, constructed through, and 
spokesperson for the 'molar' forces and low-grade 'intensities' constituting Dublin's 
'socius'. Consequently, Doran is dismissed as the 'lowest blackguard in Dublin when 
he's under the influence'. In their 'common-sense' terms, viewed more sympathetically, 
he might be seen as being in shock and possibly beginning the mouming process for a 
close friend, but such a 'common-sense' response is denied to the narrator who as 
spokesperson for the group one might have thought would have some sympathy for 
Dignam's sudden and early death himself Why is Doran dealt with so savagely? He has 
committed the first and unpardonable transgression here by overtly challenging the 
goodness of Christ and with it the Catholic Church (one of the two masters which 
Stephen Dedalus -'signatures of all things I am here to read'(U 45 )- has already 
206 Jacques Lacan, Teut-etre a Vincennes', Ornicar?, I (1975), p. 15. 
207 Buchanan. "Hitchcock's The Birds'. 
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pointed out paralyses Ireland), and the underpinning moral order of Dublin's social 
order. 
Alf, posited as a 'good' character, willing to uphold the status quo of the male 
homosocial group, yet caught in a difficult situation implicitly having to defend the 
patriarchal anchorage of the Roman Catholic religion., but not able to go too far in its 
defence, as superficial blasphemy and denigration of the clergy are integral to the mores 
of such men in public house gatherings, resorts to an attempted riposte by undermining 
the seriousness of the offence. He asks a question, but couches it in such a way that the 
whole situation can be easily retrieved, by saying 'I beg your parsnips', rather than 
seriously challenging Doran with a straightforward question. It is now up to Bob Doran 
to make the next move in this social game and shamefacedly back down. After all we 
were informed in 'The Boarding House' that he had not only confessed to the priest but 
also in an apparent acceptance of Catholicism now regularly 'attended to his religious 
duties", despite his earlier 'freethinking'. Nevertheless, he does not back down, or in 
Deleuzoguattarian terms the changed status of his 'BwO' will not allow him to do so. 
Alf again tries unsuccessftilly 'to pass it off, but the consistency of the new 'abstract 
machine' of Bob Doran is insistent. 
The proprietor of the pub, an integral institution in patriarchal working-class 
Dublin, then adds his weight to Alf s implicit defence of the system by stating that this 
is 'a respectable licensed premises' and thus further marginalises Bob as not 
respectable/ lacking in respect, just as it places the public house as an adjunct of the 
Church and respectability. We not only have the 'molar' line holding everyone in place 
in the social order being fully displayed on the 'plane of organisation' here, but also its 
complementary but deviant 'line of molecularity' which in its discontinuity and 
disorientation problematises the 'molar' line without being able to fully subvert it. The 
unfortunate Bob Doran is hardly in a position to take advantage of the 'line of flight' 
which this 'molecular' intrusion of 'the real' into reality momentarily offers him. 
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The failure of anyone in the pub to show the slightest empathy with Bob Doran in 
his confused display of grief for 'Willy' Dignam is perhaps the most striking feature of 
this episode. As a 'man', one is not allowed to show compassion, leave alone passion, 
for another man even (perhaps particularly) if the recently deceased has been a close 
and accepted member of the group who has, according to Bloom, drunk himself to death 
in your company and impoverished his family in the process - even to the point of 
getting out of his deathbed, demanding his boots and staggering to the top of the stairs 
in order to join his erstwhile companions at the pub and in consequence suffering a fatal 
heart attack. Protestations of male companionship are shown to be completely hollow 
here, the separateness of the 'clean and proper [male] self 208 must be maintained at all 
costs, as must the consistency of the repressive 'molar line'. Is it not also possible that 
Doran's earlier freethinking, and his outspoken denial of God's existence, also played 
its part in the lack of compassion of his fellow drinkers and allowed for and even 
necessitated the narrator's attack? 
Doran then starts to weep. This display of the 'feminine' is of course totally 
unacceptable and another major breach of male etiquette. His grief is immediately 
denigrated as 'snivelling' by the incredulous narrator, 'doing the weeps about Paddy 
Dignam, true as you're there', a truly womanly thing to do. That any 'man' in the 
assembly might start to weep for Dignam is immediately refuted by the use of the 
ubiquitous working-class masculine swearword 'bloody' coupled with a ploddingly 
obvious irony as the 'tear is bloody near your eye'. 
Moreover,, the narrator, as masculinity's spokesman, is by no means finished. A 
complete dismantling of Doran is called for such has been the enormity of his utterance 
and display of emotion. Consequently, the working class male narrator as defender of 
the Symbolic order gets down to business. He characteristically turns his wrath onto the 
abject female wife as daughter of her mother. Both are women outside of the law and 
inevitably for the patriarchal order they are therefore the real cause of the difficulty. 
208 Kristeva, The Powers of Horror, passim. 
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(This patriarchal way of thinking is applied elsewhere to the Irish problematic as a 
whole whereby, 'a dishonoured wife, says the citizen, that's what's the cause of all our 
misfortunes'. (U 420 ) First it is the turn of the wife and daughter, as whore, 'the little 
sleepwalking bitch he married ... at two in the morning without a stitch on her, exposing 
her person, open to all comers, fair field and no favour'. Here one recalls Polly's 
provocative song in 'The Boarding House': ' I'm a ... naughty girl ... you know that I 
aml, together with the comment of one of the music-hall artistes who had 'made a 
rather free allusion to Polly'. 
Then it is the turn of the mother, who 'kept a kip in Hardwicke street', she is 
revealed, as Bloom threatens to reveal Bella Cohen in the Circe' episode of Uysses, as 
no more than a Madam who keeps a brothel, pimps for her daughter, and as such is 
socially unacceptable. Rather than working for Mrs Mooney the law of patriarchy is 
now turned against her. Given that '[a]ll of the resident young men spoke of her as The 
Madam', in 'The Boarding House', Mrs Mooney has already been at least implicitly 
typecast, and the narrator in 'Cyclops' is simply confirming and using this: '[a]nd the 
old prostitute of a mother procuring rooms to street couples'. Rather than focusing on 
Bob Doran's lack of 'respectability', the narrator as spokesman for patriarchy, is seen to 
turn the tables on Mrs Mooney herself as lacking in respectability and the real cause of 
Doran's homosocial marginalisation. 
Here, Ford's equation of 'Mother' with 'Society' is shown to be only tenuous as the 
symbolic order reasserts itself and indicates Mrs Mooney's true position as patriarchal 
puppet. The unacceptable abject women are blamed as they clearly lie behind Bob 
Doran's outburst and suspiciously - to the assembled men - implicit homosexual 
attachment in his 'extravagant' claims for Paddy Dignam as a drinking companion who 
was 'the noblest, the truest ... poor 
little Willy, poor little Paddy Dignam'. These are 
terms better reserved by even more 'respectable' church-going citizens, than those in 
the public house, for Christ himself Though here again we have the homosexual 
ambiguity of a bloodied, abject, Jesus on the cross being seen as the 'proper' obýject of 
desire. For, despite the channelling of desire to the abject woman/ wife and mother 
through Christianity, Jesus as idealised object of desire standing behind this remains 
stubbornly male. 
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This brief episode throws a clear light upon Dublin's male pub culture through a 
superb piece of artistry. Even then though Joyce does not allow us to see this as merely 
a localised, sordid yet limited, working-class episode. He rounds it off by bringing in 
the 'high style' frequently used throughout the 'Cyclops' episode to link this snippet's 
transgressive elements with high culture and the society as a whole by having another, 
this time an 'educated', narrator inteýect and remark with equal irony, 'And mournful 
and with a heavy heart he bewept the extinction of that beam of heaven'. This is how 
Bob Doran's grief and micro-political rebellion is viewed by rich and poor, educated 
and uneducated, alike in a hegemonic patriarchal society which immediately attempts to 
snuff it out as quickly and brutally as possible denying him and themselves any 
opportunity of not just a 'line of flight' in 'becoming woman' but any line of 
(molecular' deviance from the 'molar line' of the Symbolic order. Can one really argue, 
as Hardt and Negri implicitly do, that such a scenario and such attitudes belong to an 
earlier phase of capitalism and cannot have their counterpart in our globalised world? 
By revealing this and its threatening abJJect elements here as elsewhere, Joyce 
subverts the very basis of that patriarchally gendered society time and time again, as 
Christine Froulapoints out. 209 He shows us through the crushing response which Bob 
Doran's attempted 'line of flight' receives that such a 'line' is possible for his readers 
and Joyce does this by 'symptomatologically' 'sweep[ing] away the social cover on 
leaving'. (AO 277) 1 argue that Joyce here moves us beyond that patriarchal discourse 
by which readers were captured in 'The Boarding House' as we completely lose 
sympathy with the controlling discourse of the narrator and his cronies. Through the 
paralysing forces composing this discourse Joyce has provided us with the insight that 
what is holding the oedipalising homosocial order in place is precisely that 
homosexuality which it consciously rejects through homophobia. I will explore this 
further below. 
209 Christine Froula, Modernism's Body: Sex, Culture and Joyce (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). p. 28. 
97 
Were we to take the same line of argument as Hardt and Negri or Haines in 
'Telemachus' we might easily explain or dismiss Bob Doran's societal 'paralysis' by 
locating it in and blaming it on bygone imperial capitalist history (U 24) which is best 
forgotten. Haines is able to do this by conveniently setting aside the fact that colonial 
occupation and exploitation is still in place at the time when he is speaking and that he 
is personally reaping the benefits of such exploitation, as he is 'bursting with money 
and indigestion'(U 2) through inherited, ill-gotten, wealth as Mulligan informs us that 
Jh] is old fellow made his tin by selling j alap to Zulus or some bloody swindle or other'. 
(U 6) Contrary to any such conclusion, Joyce through his invocation of masochism goes 
beyond any presumed 'localised' paralysis, and certainly beyond individual 
psychopathology or even 'self-hood', as it is a major constituent of everyone in colonial 
and post-colonial society - still located in capitalism - yesterday, today and even 
tomorrow. 
Joyce implicitly shows us in his highlighting of Bloom's masochism that we are all 
not simply paralysed by the outside forces of the capitalist 'socius' emanating from the 
'plane of immanence', operating in a state of Marxist 'false consciousness', but are 
actually masochistically constituted as subjects through its intensive forces and as such 
divided. We constantly shore up societal 'always already' givens on a paralysing 
4molar' line as if the forces which constitute them somehow make us unique self- 
possesed individuals whilst - from time to time in an uncomfortable half-awareness that 
this is simply not the case - attempting to subvert them and our 'selves' on a 
4molecular' line by becoming other, as we have seen happens to even such societally 
victimised characters as Bob Doran. 
Bloom as masochist both embodies his own relative economic disempowerment 
and feminisation as a 'foreigner' and Jew in the racist sub-culture of Dublin and Ireland 
whilst ironically and 'symptomatologically' embodying and diagnosing the very 
feminisation and disempowerment of the Celtic/ Irish males, subject to the patriarchal 
control of British imperialism, 
210 who surround him and project their ferninisation and 
210 Matthew Arnold, On the Study of Celtic Literature (Port Washington: Kennikat, 
1905), passim. 
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economic disempowerment onto him as sacrificial victim. Whereas Hardt and Negri 
strongly advocate the abolition of all immigration controls by calling for 'papiers pour 
tous! ', I would argue that this can only result in the new 'foreigners' receiving the same 
treatment as Bloom, unless economic change is accompanied by a major ethical change. 
Daniel Dervin points out that Bloom's masochism is also an attempt to resolve the 
guilt which he feels over his father's suicide, 211 and I believe that this too can be related 
to the disempowerment of both Jews and Celts in Ireland under patriarchy, and, one 
might add, the subaltern 'multitude' of today's 'turbo-capitalism'. To take only one 
example from Ulysses, Bloom's masochistic negativism is shown in his futile attempt 
to assuage the Citizen, his chief tormentor in the 'Cyclops' episode, by joining those 
who fulsomely compliment him on his past athletic prowess, praise which even the 
narrator of the episode will not join in. (U 410) Such servility merely acts as a cue for 
the citizen to further vilify Bloom and merely intensifies his contempt for him - 
contempt which Bloom in his masochistic bind may well be seeking, of course, as I will 
show. 
Bloom's Jewishness is evidently crucial to his scapegoating and Frances Limberger 
locates the peculiar figuration of the Jewish male as different and feminised according 
to Catholic tradition. 212 This tradition, known as 'the blood libel', states that Jewish 
blood must flow for ever on the anniversary of Christ's death as the Jews as a race are 
held to be responsible for the death of the Saviour. Consequently, it was believed that 
not only the Jewish female but also the Jewish male menstruates, and was therefore 
feminine, or as the citizen implied in the 'Cyclops' episode, a 'pishogue' or 'half and 
half, (U 416) neither unitary male nor oedipalised female. The narrator of this episode 
expressed it even more bluntly, with regard to Bloom, as 'one of those mixed middlings 
21 1 Daniel Dervin, 'Bloom Again: Questions of Aggression and Psychoanalytic 
Reconstruction'. American Imago 47 (Fall-Winter 1990), 249-269. 
212 Frances Limberger, 'Why Leopold Bloom menstruates, Part 1: Blood Curse', 
Bloomsday 100,19 th International James Joyce Symposium (Dublin, 12-19 June, 
2004). 
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he is. Lying up in the hotel Pisser was telling me once a month with headache like a 
totty with her courses'. (U 439) Joyce can even be held to be making the same point 
more lightheartedly when he relates the difficulty which Bloom's bleeding 
haemorrhoids periodically cause him: jh]ope its not too big bring on the piles again'. 
(U 84) Even his masturbation is used in the 'Ithaca' episode to underline the point of 
sexual ambiguity: '[b]ecause of the surety of the sense of touch in his firm full 
masculine feminine passive active hand'. (U 788) 
There is little evidence that in today's 'turbo capitalism' anti-semitism has 
disappeared, in fact it can be argued that it has become more diffuse and widespread. 
For example the Israelis themselves may have allowed such 'fascism in their heads', 
implicitly inherited from the anti-semitism of the Nazis, to be absorbed by them and 
redirected against the disempowered and feminised Palestinians whilst regarding any 
criticism of their policies as anti-semitic. Thus, Haggai Matar, an Israeli activist himself, 
has said that: 
Today militarisation and racism among the Jewish population have reached fascist 
level. The repression of critical thinking, the total acceptance of the occupation's 
crimes, the idolisation of the army and the gradual acceptance of 'ethnic cleansing' 
[of the Palestinian population] - all of these constitute only a part of society's 
collapse. 213 
In addition to the social alienation with which Bloom is burdened - as a Jew in 
Ireland, with all of the feelings of impotence this engenders - and an almost inevitable 
identification with the aggressor, it appears that his choice of effective impotence 
through masochism is a means of distancing himself from Molly's suffering at the loss 
of Rudy, linked to the unwarranted responsibility, guilt and shame he feels at this loss. 
Such a 'failure' to produce a male successor can be taken to indicate social 
disempowerment, particularly with someone who has had a Jewish upbringing. This 
strategy of impotence, both attested to and belied by his masturbation which was 
regarded as a sinful perversion in Catholicism, allows him to maintain a distant asexual 
desire for Molly, whilst giving his need to humiliate himself free play by ensuring her 
freedom to chose other sexual partners. Yet, despite the empathy with women's 
213 Peretz Kidron, ed., Refiisenik!: Israel's Soldiers of'Conscience (London: Zed Books, 
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suffering which he evidently feels, in yet another Joycean irony, we are told in 
'Penelope' that Molly may now have a far more robust attitude to Rudy's death than 
Bloom credits her with. She may, in fact, have simply got over it. 
Bloom, however, may think that the only way to alleviate what he still regards as 
his wife's suffering is to give her the masculine role of sadistic dominatrix in order that 
he and not she will suffer for the guilt he feels and thus give credence to his adoption of 
a masochistic stance. It would seem that since the death of his son Rudy and the guilt 
which this has engendered in him, Bloom can only relate sexually to Molly if he 
positions her in the extreme masculine dominatrix role, and that as soon as the 
sympathy which he feels for her as wife and mother returns, as in the first few pages of 
'Calypso', the loss of the child intrudes and he loses his sexual desire for her. However, 
I must point out that any psychological speculation or interpretation, no matter how 
'insightful', takes me away from a focus on the Ulyssean 'characters' in terms of their 
societally formative forces on 'the second plane of writing'. 
In his commitment to a guilt-ridden, punishment-seeking,, masochism it might be 
added that the scenario featuring his and Martha Clifford's letters, in 'Lotus Eaters', 
potentially gives us a latent, if aborted, asexual masochistic episode as we wonder here 
just what Bloom has asked Martha to do in order to earn the epithet 'naughty boy', the 
repeated promise of punishment and her refusal to accept that other wor(I)d. Perhaps 
Bloom's reason for not pursuing this relationship further is that there is no 'strong- 
membered' male available in this scenario before whom he can both humiliate himself 
and then masochistically control through his own abasement. 
Masochism works indirectly through education, insinuation and manipulation. It 
implicitly sets up and relies upon an unwritten contract. The idea behind the masochist's 
contract is that pleasure is postponed in order to prolong the positive, immanent process 
of desire. 214 However, such postponed pleasure is rarely if ever attained. As with Bloom 
2004), p-98. 
214 Deleu7e, 'D6sir et plaisir', p. 64. 
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and Bella Cohen, its failure frequently results in the masochist abandoning his strategy 
and resorting to a degree of verbal or actual violence turned against the contractual 
partner, echoing that which he had sought from her previously, and returning him to the 
sadistic forces which he has constructed to constitute her. Ironically it is often the 
display of excessive sadistic violence by the partner which causes the contractual 
breakdown. However, even if this does not occur, as the sadist by definition does not 
honour contracts, any masochist faces inevitable ritualistic failure. 
Bloom,, in an implicit contractual arrangement, was constantly trying to educate 
Molly and, as she well knew, he manipulated her and her sexual situations to meet his 
own needs: 'the way he plots and plans everything out'. (U 910) According to Molly, he 
had sent Milly to Mullingar so that the coast was clear for her adulterous affair with 
Boylan, an affair which she believed that he had not only encouraged but deliberately 
set up and effectively choreographed. However, Molly is complicit in this cover-up as 
she doesn't want Milly to witness an affair which she has already decided that she 
wants to take place. Furthermore, Bloom was not only concerned about her 
understanding, vocabulary and pronunciation of foreign words such as 
(metempsychosis' (U 79,804) and 'voglio' (U 77) but in educating/ inducting her into 
masochism. He attempts to do this through introducing her to such books as Ruby: The 
Pride of the Ring - with its 'Fierce Italian with a carriage whip', (U 77) although he 
would no doubt wish the gender roles to be reversed - Sweets of Sin, (U 304) James 
Lovebirch's Fair Tyrants with 'the part about where she hangs him up out of a hook 
with a cord flagellate', (U 890) Sacher-Masoch's Tales of the Ghetto, (U 302) and of 
course - rather than buying her 'wondrous gowns and costliest frillies' (U 303,372) - 
he rather parsimoniously purchases garters for her and Boylan/ Raoul. (U 888-889) In 
the 'Ithaca' episode Bloom extends this educative control through an extraordinary 
range of requirements including 'the clandestine satisfaction of erotic irritation in 
masculine brothels'. (U 803) 
Sacher-Masoch's central point in many of his stories is that only after a dominatrix 
has contractually acted with appropriate ritualised cruelty, with respect to the 
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masochistic male, can it be declared that she has 'made him a man". Thus in Masoch"s 
The Divorced Woman, the heroine complains that 'Julian's ideal was a cruel woman, a 
woman like Catherine the Great'. (M 21) Through such submissive ordeals the male 
masochist has sought a ritual rebirth, in which the father is denied a role in his new 
identity: 
... what is beaten, foresworn and sacrificed, what is ritually expiated, is the father's likeness, the genital sexuality inherited from the father . ... This 
is the real 
'Apostasy'. To become a man is to be reborn from the woman alone, to undergo a 
second birth. (M 100) 
According to Deleuze, (M 94) the masochistic contract generates a type of law 
which leads straight into ritual. The masochist is obsessed and ritualistic activity is 
essential to him, since it epitomizes the world of fantasy and draws on the forces of the 
'BwO", whilst prolonging the positive, immanent process of desire. 215 Nevertheless, 
reliance on ritual demands cooperation from all participants in the masochist's dramatic 
enactments and this cooperation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Three main types of 
rite occur in Masoch's novels: hunting rites, agricultural rites and rites of regeneration 
and rebirth. The coexistence and interaction of these three rites sum up the mythical 
complex of masochism. Deleuze states that we find it again and again, variously 
embodied throughout the work of Masoch. (M 94) The last would appear to be the 
essential rite in which the other two culminate and from which they derive their 
function in the totality of the myth. It is this rebirth which Bloom strives for through the 
mythical body of Molly: the rebirth of his lost son Rudy, the rebirth of his sexual 
relationship with Molly, his own rebirth, and the rebirth of Ireland. Yet such a revolt is 
in the end a fantasy as Bloom can gain from his ritualised masochistic endeavours, only 
temporary relief and a false sense of self. In its emphasis on rebirth it resembles the 
4resurrection' central to Christian belief and the ritualistic Mariolatry of the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
Whereas there is widespread if not universal attachment to myths of rebirth in 
different cultures, Christianity and masochistic ritual share the commonality of re-birth 
215 Deleuze. 'D6sir et plaisir', p. 64. 
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without the father's involvement or even presence. In Christianity, God keeps a safe 
distance from the 'sinful' scene sending the Paraclete as 'helper' - as the name implies 
in Greek - or even substitute for God in the insemination process. As Mulligan puts it: 
'My mother's ajew, myfather's a bird, (U 22) similarly the father in masochistic ritual 
is entirely expunged from the scene. This contrasts greatly with Greek or even Hindu 
mythology where Krishna, as the incarnation of Vishnu, descends to earth and wreaks 
sexual havoc amongst the cow-girls by inseminating them by the score. 
In a typical double irony, Joyce deploys Tom Keman, Martin Cunningham's 
alcoholic Roman Catholic convert, to set the scene which shows that whilst Bloom 
succumbs without question to the rituals of masochism he sees clearly through the 
transcendent hollowness of the Church's rituals which entrap his fellow citizens: 
Mr Kernan said with solemnity: 
-I am the resurrection and the life. That touches a man's inmost heart. 
-It does, Mr Bloom said. 
Your heart perhaps but what price the fellow in the six feet by two with his toes to 
the daisies? No touching that. Seat of the affections. Broken heart. A pump after 
all, pumping thousands of gallons of blood every day. One fine day it gets bunged 
up and there you are. Lots of them lying around here: lungs, hearts, livers. Old 
rusty pumps: damn the thing else. The resurrection and the life. Once you are dead 
you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking them all up out of their graves. Come 
forth, Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then every 
fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest of his traps. Find 
damn all of himself that morning. (U 133) 
Bloom is however too obsessively focused on his own and other masochistic rebirths 
and its supposed attaim-nent through its ritual to appreciate how similar are these to the 
Christian preoccupation with rebirth, new life, and resurrection, allied to the Church's 
ritualistic control. Yet the forces which constitute the societal controls of Roman 
Catholicism are also evinced through Bloom's masochistic rituals and the belief which 
underpins them. This shows that Bloom's masochism is not only implicitly aligned 
with, but is actually constituted by. the very same hegemonic controlling forces which 
make up Roman Catholicism and it is thus recoupable by such forces for capitalism. It 
is not only Bloom who is so constituted, or his Irish Catholic peer group, but all of us in 
capitalist society today. 
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The shame and humiliation which cuckolding brings about on its masochistic 
perpetrator is both an essential feature of the masochistic contract and its central ritual. 
Cuckolding offers the key to the ritualised scenarios Bloom devises in 'Circe' as the 
degradation which it affords him both highlights and exacerbates his shame and loss of 
face. Viewed from the wider social angle the situations the masochist devises are made 
deliberately unpalatable to the oedipalised heterosexual, as the main objective is to 
make his witnesses/ readers uncomfortable and dislocate their sense of self. The success 
of the masochistic ritual depends upon both the spectators' laughter directed at the 
masochist and, more importantly, the implicitly undermining of their own gendered 
identities. When this is achieved the masochist has accomplished his aims and has 
exercised a subtle control throughout the scenarios enacted. I suggest that, as readers of 
Ulysses, Bloom's deliberate subversion of his own masculinity problematises our own 
previously unquestioned securities and gendered identities. The world as it is presented 
to us by Bloom, we are forced to acknowledge, is our own world. 
Bloom is actually very upset at the prospect of Boylan's cuckolding, witness his 
state of mind at the end of 'Lestrygonians' where he goes out of his way to avoid 
coming face to face with Boylan rather than confronting him. Bloom says, 'Won't look. 
Wine in my face. Why did I? Too heady. Yes, it is. The walk. Not see. Get on' and his 
heart pounds. (U 234) The contrast here with his bravery, even foolhardiness at the end 
of the 'Cyclops' episode is marked and points to the need for masochistic sexual 
debasement which in 'Circe' results in his politely thanking Boylan for allowing him to 
apply his 'eye to the keyhole and play with yourself while I just go through her a few 
times'. (U 670) He even couples this with a further request for degradation in first 
thanking Boylan and then asking 'May I bring two men chums to witness the deed and 
take a snapshot'. (U 670) 
Many Joycean critics will point out that this is pure fantasy of ambiguous origin 
and that both Molly and Boylan as well as Bloom himself are here nothing more than 
fantasies and that the whole scenario cannot be taken seriously. From a Deleuzian 
viewpoint things cannot be dismissed, downgraded, or simply laughed off in this way. 
Everything is real, everything is immanent for Deleuze. These fantasies, just as much as 
Stephen Dedalus's insight into the controlling forces of the Roman Catholic Church 
105 
allied to the British imperialist state, are 'symptomatologically' diagnosing the social 
order, and indeed taking Stephen's diagnosis further. The 'Circe' episode, in marked 
contrast to that of 'Penelope", shows Bloom in complete control of the script through 
his debasement. Here, his ritualised casting of himself, Boylan and Molly in theatrically 
enacted adultery, in which he dances attendance on Boylan - and the opportunity for 
absolute degradation which this offers - affords him that mental and physical torture 
which he craves, giving him some release from guilt and sexual tension; but it also, and 
more importantly, convincingly points to that masochistic enmeshment in capitalism's 
structures which Holland has referred to. 
As with Bloom in 'Circe' the willing servitude in Venus in Furs which Severin 
demonstrates in the rituals he devises is there in order to intensify his shame through his 
worship of Wanda as masterful torturess. These masochistic rituals may appear to make 
Severin insignificant, but he is actually the focus of attention holding in place, 
controlling and directing the ritual, as Molly has herself recognized with respect to 
Bloom. This ritual includes organizing one's own cuckolding whilst railing against it. 
Thus Mackey's naive assumption in his book Chaos Theory and James Joyce's 
Everyman, shared no doubt by many a reader, that Bloom wishes to replace Rudy with 
Stephen, as adopted son within a reconstituted nuclear family, is problematised by his 
own troubled statement: jh]aving asked Stephen if he is willing to stay over for the 
night, having offered an enticing view of Molly's appeal, Bloom can't help but wonder 
, 1111 -) 
216 
about the impasse her attraction might create . Even 
his humiliation at the hands of 
Boylan appears not to be enough for Bloom, and Stephen may well be the next 'mark' 
for him as he persists in seeking yet further humiliation. Nevertheless, Mackey's 
assumption that Bloom wishes to re-establish a nuclear family has wider implications as 
I will show. Moreover, with Bloom and Stephen, as putative father and son, one sees 
the homoerotic investment of the social order manifesting itself in a different form 
through the 'mother'/ female. 
216 PR Mackey, Chaos Theory and James Joyce's Everyman (Gainseville: Universitv 
Press of Florida. 1999), p. 197. 
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Clearly what is of interest for Deleuze in Sacher-Masoch's novels is his delineation 
of societal masochism as a response to Hapsburg and Ottoman imperialism. (M 26) 
Masoch describes the disempowerment of 'the minorities of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire [and] the role of women in the agricultural communes of the steppe, religious 
sects ... and in panslavism'; (DR 114) '[h]is work is deeply influenced by the problems 
of nationalities, minority groups and revolutionary movements in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, hence his Galician, Jewish, Hungarian, Prussian tales'. (M 9) In novels such as 
The Judith of Bialopol, Masoch depicts 'a woman patriot, [who] in order to save her 
town, asks to be brought before the Turks, surrenders her husband to them as a slave 
and gives herself to the Pasha'. (M 26) Bloom, presumably, could ask for nothing more 
given his obsession with the Orient. (U 72-73) Rather than giving a name to a perverse 
psychological condition Deleuze insists that Masoch's importance lies in his 
contributions to the development of the novel which now needs to be read in the light of 
its world-historical dimension and its diagnostic 'affects'. He argues that Masoch 
brought into focus the previously silent voices of the minorities of the Austro- 
Hungarian empire, rather like Kafka, and he pays particular attention to the resistance of 
women within these groups as a minority within minorities. Deleuze contrasts Masoch 
as a sophisticated and perceptive novelist with the crudities of de Sade: jt1he aesthetic 
and dramatic suspense of Masoch contrasts with the mechanical, cumulative repetition 
of Sade'. (M 34) Such Sadean repetitions seem to suggest the 'bare repetitions' of 
Bergson's continuous present, and the 'plane of organisation' rather than the implied 
drawing of Masoch on the 'whole' time of the past or 'duration', and 'the plane of 
immanence'. 
Deleuze situates socially and historically masochistic practices as acts of ethico- 
political resistance, no matter how ultimately ineffective they might turn out to be. (TP 
155) In so doing Deleuze argues that Sacho-Masoch restores to their historical situation 
social acts of resistance which from a narrow psychoanalytic perspective can only 
appear as the psychopathological symptoms of disturbed individuals. It is, of course, 
argued here that in employing similar tactics Joyce does the same in his depiction of the 
Irish Jew Bloom located in a colonial Ireland ruled by Church and State, thus 
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highlighting the often conflicting forces of the 'molar' and 'molecular' lines which 
compose us all. Whilst Hardt and Negri celebrate the 'primacy of resistance 217 to 
global capitalism even if it stems from radical Islamic fundamentalism resulting in 
death for suicide bombers and victims alike - and as such is profoundly anti-Deleuzian 
as it emphasises death over life and a supposedly transcendent martyrdom in heaven as 
a reward for the perpetrators - they do not seem to appreciate that masochism which 
offers the most common form of resistance in the Western world is recoupable on its 
molar line through capitalism's 'reterritorialising' forces. 
Both Joyce and Deleuze appreciate that masochism is a response and an attempt to 
counteract sadism. In societal terms they both appear to agree on and highlight the 
significance of the powerful apparatuses of Church and State whose sadistic forces not 
only bring into play subversive masochistic activity as a countervailing rebellion, but 
actually and perhaps paradoxically constitute, negate and attempt to reclaim it. Deleuze 
shows this through his analysis of Masoch's work, and Joyce gives us many early 
instances of the means whereby the Church exercises sadistic control at the micro level. 
Thus, in A Portrait, Stephen's unjust pandying is carried out by an evidently sadistic 
Father Dolan. Moreover, Stephen's courageous attempt to challenge this injustice is 
defeated by the complicity not only of Fathers Conmee and Dolan, but also that of his 
own father in casually relating his and their betrayal to Stephen as if it were of no 
account. Joyce shows us that the negative forces of the Church, working through priests 
and docile fathers, deal with all such naYve challenges with impunity. Stephen's 
willingness to accept the pain of pandying and to run the gauntlet of a potentially 
painful rebuff from a hypocritical authority in which he trusts, and has been 
contractually committed to by his father, unwittingly places him in the role of 
masochistic victim. WUlst his attempted rebellion brings into play the 'molecular line' 
available to the masochist, the passive acceptance of the betrayals of his 'fathers' when 
he his made aware of this reconstitutes him on the dominant 'molar' line of the 
masochist. 
217 Hardt and Negi, Multitude, pp. 64-69; and Empire, pps. xvi, 211-212. 
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Father Dolan's sadism indicates that such priests have a key systemic role in the 
Church's exercise of power; for,, in exercising his sadistic control Dolan breaks the 
unwritten contract of fairness and reciprocity binding student and teacher together. 
Furthermore, he may well not seek to root out activities like 'smugging', but rather 
covertly encourage them in order to ensure further opportunities for the exercise of the 
Church's power. In this instance as with the sadism displayed by the priest at the 
Catholic retreat 218 we can clearly see, as Deleuze claims, that 'sadism is institutional'. 
(M 134) It is against this repressive background and Stephen's childish attempt to 
overcome it that Joyce, I believe, took his previous societal examination a step further 
by portraying his main character Bloom in Ulysses as strongly masochistic and as such 
offering a more sophisticated, if ultimately nullified, challenge to Church and State than 
simply depicting the paralysis they engender. 
Deleuze in Logic ofSense notes that: 
... the voyeur [undergoes] a more intense participation than if he had himself 
experienced these passions, the double or the reflection of which he now surveys in 
the faces of others. This is the case in Klossowski's works, when Octave 
establishes the law of hospitality according to which he 'gives' his wife Roberte to 
the guests. (this strange theme of theft and gift, it will be recalled, appears also in 
Joyce's Exiles) [2.6] 
and Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus add that: 
Desire knows nothing of exchange, it knows only theft and gift, at times the one 
within the other under the effect of a primary homosexuality. Thus the 
antiexchangist amorous machine encountered by Joyce in Exiles' [4.2]. 
These quotations can be seen to relate not simply to Klossowski's works, or Joyce's 
Exiles, but equally if not more so to Bloom in Ulysses. Certainly the homosexual 
reference about Bloom which Mulligan makes is unmistakeable: '[t]he wandering jew 
... Did you see 
his eye? He looked upon you to lust after you. I fear thee, ancient 
mariner. 0, Kinch, thou art in peril. Get thee a breechpad'. (U 279) However, Marilyn 
218 Earlier still in Dubliners we can see the parallels between Father Flynn and the 
'queer old josser' in 'An Encounter'. Here too the passionate emphasis of the latter on 
the whipping of young boys anticipates and forms a link with the sadistic Father Dolan 
of A Portrait. 
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French has designated Mulligan himself as having homosexual designs on Stephen 
Dedalus and such statements are seen, by her, as a disguised projection of his own 
desires, 219 which accords with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's view of patriarchal society as 
I will show. 
In the Deleuzian diagnosis of 'primary homosexuality', through his 'gift' of Molly 
to Boylan, and later attempted gift of her to Stephen, as well as his imploring 
'strongmembered males' to use her in the 'Circe' episode, I argue that there is a direct 
link with the 'molarising' forces constituting the homosocial order and its underpinning 
homosexuality in 'oedipalised' modernity, and that Joyce uses Bloom's masochistic 
voyeurism to exemplify and, as I hope to show, to challenge this. Here I am relying, not 
simply on Deleuze, but to a large extent on the powerful argument of Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick. Whatever additional reasons there may have been for the savage treatment 
meeted out to Bob Doran above, the uneasy relationship between repressed 
homosexuality - expressed through homophobia - and the homosocial order which 
Sedgwick pinpoints, is the motivating force for his narratorial denigration. 
Sedgwick brings together homosexuality, homosociability and homophobia in a 
powerful explanatory model in the introduction to her readings of Alfred Lord 
Tennyson, and Charles Dickens. 220 She convincingly argues that the price paid for a 
hegemonic patriarchal homosociability with its implicit homosexual underpinning is a 
rigidly enforced homophobia. Sedgwick notes that male-male desire is legitimated on a 
homosocial basis and that this allows the privileges accorded to males to be maintained 
in a patriarchal society. 22 1 However, homosociability is regulated and policed by 
homophobia and misogyny. Furthermore, in her understanding, heterosexual marriage 
retains its importance because of the social stigma attached to male-male eroticism, it Z-: ) 
219 Marilyn French, The Book as World (London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
p. 49. 
220 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Betiveen Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial 
Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
221 Ibid. pp. 1-27. 
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acts as a buttress against the revelation of such forces by helping to maintain social 
norms. Nevertheless,, the instability of a social order which privileges male-male 
relationships, dependent upon 'a primary homosexuality' which the patriarchal 
fellowship must itself condemn and refute, is self-evident as the treatment accorded to 
Doran attests. 
Sedgwick is also cited by Margot Norris in her analysis of 'A Painful Case' in 
Dubliners. 222 Norris gives a double reading of the narrative in the light of the two great 
sex scandals which dominated the headlines at the time. The first was that of Parnell's 
adultery with Kitty O'Shea and she reads it as Joyce's ironic comment on what happens 
to both Mrs Sinico and Duffy when the latter behaves 'properly', in the way that Dante 
O'Riordan and the priests would expect him to behave, and the dire consequences this 
has for the refusal of desire. Norris then turns to the Oscar Wilde case and to what she 
then argues is Duff-y's latent homosexuality which will not allow him to consummate 
his relationship with Mrs Sinico. She particularly relies on the lines 'Love between man 
and man is impossible because there must not be sexual intercourse and friendship 
between man and woman is impossible because there must be sexual intercourse', and 
Duffy's patronising of the 'dull eatery in St George's Street' where 'he felt himself safe 
from the society of Dublin's gilded youth'. Sedgwick's comments on Wilde's Dorian 
4ý 223 Gray,, as having a thematically full "homosexual" meanmg are used by Norris to 
underpin her argument. According to this reading it is the stigma of 'homosexuality', 
involving criminalisation at that time, that Duffy seeks to avoid. Consequently, he 
cannot afford to reveal himself, in the way that Bob Doran has inadvertently revealed 
himself, and in doing so disclose the hidden homosexual forces binding together the 
homosocial group in the pub, policed by a rabid homophobia. One might see too a faint 
foreshadowing of Bloom's cuckolding in Captain Sinico's evident willingness to leave 
his wife alone for long periods with another man. 
222 Margot Norris, 'Shocking the Reader in a Painful Case', in Suspicious Reading of 
Joyce's 'Dubliners', pp. 158-17 1. 
223 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), p. 165. 
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I would like to add to Sedgwick's diagnosis that, viewed in terms of 'the second 
plane of writing', it is the channelling of impersonal desiring forces through 
capitalism's 'oedipalising' tendencies which accounts for this 'primary homosexuality' 
according to Deleuze and Guattari. As I hope to show in Chapter Four, the distortion of 
desire in modernity is accomplished for men through a castrating pincer movement in 
which the forces of firee flowing desire are first captured in the nuclear family as an 
institution which then channels such masculine desire incestuously to the mother and 
sister and finally imposes a taboo on its realization. The crippling effects of this are then 
carried forward into the homosocial relationship and the objectification and denigration 
of all women under the aegis of a repressed but ever present 'primary' homosexuality 
and consequent misogyny. Joyce carries this 'symptomatological' diagnosis of the 
modem capitalist socius beyond the individual and social 'paralysis' endemic at the turn 
of the twentieth century in Dublin through societal masochism in Bloom, and indicates 
how patriarchy is held in place by homophobia constituted in the nuclear family 
situation. 
Bloom's avoidance of carnal intercourse with his wife or other women forms part 
of the same masochistic constellation as his cuckolding. His sexual arousal is kept 
distinct from any feeling of love or sympathy. This is also indicated in the 'Nausicaa' 
episode where, as he implies, had he known of Gerty's lameness it would have been 
impossible for him to desire her sexually, to masturbate and ejaculate. Whenever he 
empathises with women and their suffering such empathy kills his desire. Yet, unlike 
Boylan, he cannot help relating sympathetically to women's suffering, as his concern 
for Mrs Purefoy in the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode demonstrates. Consequently, only by 
elevating women into the 'masculine' position of strength and power can he become 
sexually aroused. This adds further weight to both Sedgwick's argument and Deleuze's 
point about the male masochist's *primary homosexuality' [4.2]. 
Bloom's 'masculine' women range from the 'slavey' with the crooked skirt who 
whacks the carpet when cleaning it, to Bella/ Bello and the upper-class women who 
bestride their horses and ride and drink like men. Thus, in 'Circe' Bloom seems to have 
yearned for prolonged degrading cruelty at the hands of three upper-class women: Mrs. 
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Yelverton Barry, Mrs. Bellingham, Mrs. Mervyn Talboys. (U 591-593) Mrs. 
Bellingham claims that Bloom addressed her 'with fulsome compliments as a Venus in 
furs', (U 592) which of course shows Joyce's awareness of Sacher-Masoch's Venus in 
Furs. (One can also see an echo of this reading in Giacomo Joyce with a 'pale face 
surrounded by heavy odorous furs. Her movements are shy and nervous. She uses 
quizzingglasses'. 224 Mrs Bellingham too wore both furs and quizzing glasses. ) All three 
ladies testify that Bloom implored them 'to chastise him as he richly deserves, to 
bestride and ride him, to give him a most vicious horsewhipping'. (U 593) However, 
Bloom confesses that he 'meant only the spanking idea. Avarm tingling glow without 
effusion. Refined birching to stimulate the circulation'. (U 593-594) Setting aside the 
humour this accords with Richard Baumeister's account of authentic masochistic ritual 
whereby: 
masochists desire pain in small, very carefully measured doses[they typically] 
seek pain without injury. In a sense masochists fictionalize pain ... Masochists do not want to be hanned. They want safe pain. 225 
Despite seeking degradation at the hands of a dominatrix they wish to retain control of 
the situation. 
When Bloom becomes Bella/Bello's 'bondslave', and she/he takes sadistic control 
and grinds her/his heel into Bloom's neck, then grabs his/her hair violently and drags 
him/her forward whilst squatting on his/her face, and finally whilst stubbing out a cigar 
in Bloom's ear and bestriding him, hurtfully squeezes his/her testicles, she has gone too 
far and Bloom is enraged. Bella/Bello has gone beyond the always implicit threat which 
Wanda posed for Severin in Venus in Furs, when she said, 'beware, I might grow to 
enjoy [inflicting cruelty]. (M 2 1) She/ he has broken a cardinal rule of the unwritten, but 
as Bloom believes implicitly understood, contract: Jy]ou have broken the spell. The last 
straw' (U 661) he says - this is 'the spell' cast through fantasised ritual activity - and he 
proceeds to hurl insults at her as he demands that she '[flool someone else not me'. (U 
224 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. 1. 
225 R. F. Baumeister, Masochism and the Seýf (Hillside: Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates, 
1989), pp. 13-14. 
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662) This again reflects on our condition in modernity. We both tolerate and seek some 
pain because of the feelings of guilt and shame imposed on us through our Christian/ 
liberal-humanist consciences but we threaten to revolt if this becomes too great. We will 
contribute generously to Tsunami relief funds and respond with alacrity to Live8's aims 
to abolish world poverty, just as long as they don't impinge on our own consumer- 
driven life styles too much and cause too much pain. 
Through the complex forces which constitute Bloom as masochist he attempts a 
subversive resistance and control not by asserting his masculinity but by parodying that 
masculinity and taking the judgement of his peers to excessive lengths by refuting and 
degrading that unified masculinity which neither his Irish compatriots nor ultimately the 
British imperial state will allow him (and one must add them). In Deleuzoguattarian 
terms this may be regarded as the initial autopoietic move to 'becoming woman'. 
Unfortunately this is not the case. Constituted as masochist by the very forces which 
ensure his domination such a perverse rebellion ends in inevitable failure as he is 
recuperated by these constituting forces. It is the very coldness and calculation which 
goes into the masochistic act which militates against its success. Molly observes of 
Bloom 'living with him so cold'. (U 925) Such coldness and calculation (U 910) are 
irretrievably linked to the exploitative 'molar' forces of capitalism. As Eugene Holland 
has said such masochistic forces capture and constitute everyone in the capitalist socius 
as one sees with Boylan and the Citizen. 
In his deliberate choice of Boylan, whom he regards as 'the worst man in Dublin' 
(U 115) as his cuckolder, we see a parody of that one-dimensional 'hyper- 
masculinity'((I 923-924) for which the colonialised Irish male constantly strives 226 but 
which he fails to attain. Boylan himself, as much as the Nationalist Citizen whom Joyce 
satirises so effectively in the 'Cyclops' episode, (U 382-383) is no more than a pawn in 
the sadistic game which the British state is playing with Ireland. Boylan, the Citizen, 
and all of their Irish compatriots, male and female alike, are part of that 
226 Douglas Hyde, 'The Necessity for De-Anglicising Ireland', in Language, Lore and 
Lyrics (Blackrock: Irish Academic Press, 1986), pp. 153-70. 
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6 symptomato logical' masochism which epitomises colonial Ireland. Thus, despite his 
massive genitals, and 'the poking and rooting and ploughing he had up in [Molly]' (U 
913), Boylan lacks 'spunk' (U 877) and fails to father a child on Molly. Yet, those Irish 
men who have fathered many children in 'holy wedlock', such as Simon Dedalus or 
Theodore Purefoy, are not exempt from the same dehumanising forces stemming from 
the capitalist 'socius', indeed their subjection to the marital demands of their respective 
churches exemplifies this as their womenfolk are ground into the dust through excessive 
child bearing and the former, at least, impoverishes his over-large family rather than 
providing for them. This epitomises the Irish male's conflictual status under 
imperialism as the play on the word 'spunk' in Boylan's case also indicates a lack of 
courage. Despite the striving for hyper-masculinity 227 they are textually depicted by 
Joyce as impotent and feminised as is Bloom their effective exemplar. 
Thus, Boylan portrayed as an Edwardian 'masher', in a vain attempt to have 
everything his own way, twice loses out on Bloom's 'throwaway'. He first does this 
through his conventional wisdom preferring the 'favourite' to Bloom's 'outsider'. Then 
by his self-satisfied patriarchal disregard of a woman's feelings he 'throws away' any 
prospect of receiving Molly's love, and incidentally any prospect of 'becoming woman' 
himself. Consequently, he unwittingly takes on a bit part in Bloom's script which 
simply indicates that he is masochistically entrapped as just another pawn in the culture 
of a colonial power, despite his complacent failure to recognise this. Boylan, depicted as 
no more than a gigantic 'one-eyed' penis, shares his one-eyed identity with the 
Cyclopean Citizen. 
Boylan is represented as apolitical but in the Citizen's previous athletic prowess (U 
410) and ironic giganticism (U 382) now reduced by his excessive drinking to the 
physical status of someone with the medical condition of 'dropsy', (U 444) we have a 
near match. Now the Citizen in his oedemised impotence is 'all wind and piss' as he 
' waddle[s] to the door puffing and blowing'. (U 425) Drinking has given the Citizen the 
morbid 'feminine' fluidity which in his one-eyed identity as hyper-masculine he refuses 
227 Ibid. 
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to accept. The forces of societal masochism bodied forth by Joyce through Bloom 
which eschews patriarchal masculinity and attempts to replace it with a forceful 
femininity simply highlights this refusal. 
As the Citizen seeks to avenge the 'insult' which Bloom has given to the Roman 
Catholic God and Christ by 'contaminating' them with Jewishness, and thereby 
feminising them even further, he picks up a weapon. It is not 'a couched spear of 
acuminated granite' (U 383) or even 'a mighty cudgel fashioned out of paleolithic 
stone', (U 3 84) but a Jacob's biscuit tin. (U 445) This tin was made in Britain as were 
the biscuits it formerly contained. It epitomises the exploitative importation of British 
goods into the Irish market. It shows that the citizen despite his protests is totally 
dependent on and subsumed by colonialism and capitalism. He is so imbued with the 
fascistic values of the conqueror that he has no native weaponry left. In a typically 
ironic Joycean twist it seems apparent too that the biscuit manufacturers were probably 
Jewish. 
Even 'the famous old Irish red wolfJog setter formerly known by the sobriquet of 
Garryowen and recently rechristened by his large circle of friends and acquaintances 
Owen Garry' (U 403) which almost attacks the narrator, and would 'tear [Bloom] limb 
from limb'(U 448) if it could only catch him, is domesticated in the next episode - 
during Gerty MacDowell's encounter with Bloom - to 'grandpapa Giltrap's lovely dog 
Garryowen that almost talked, it was so human'. (U 458) Thereby subduing, and 
anthropomorphizing, not only the national dog's savagery but also domesticating the 
nationalist citizen as 'grandpapa Giltrap' within an 'oedipalised' capitalist family circle. 
All of the homosocial group which surround Bloom in their attempts to divert 
attention from their predicament whether through drink, gambling, Nationalist boasting 
and fantasy, blaming the foreigner or Jew, the female betrayer and adulteress, or as with 
Boylan his diversionary cuckoldry, only temporarily displace the problem. They are all 
implicitly addressing 'the (non)-being of a persistent question to which the cosmic 
'Yes' of Mrs Bloom corresponds, without being a response, since it alone adequately 
occupies and fills that space'[1.3]. We see the implicit parallels which Joyce draws 
between Bloom inviting the foreigner and 'usurper' Boylan into the intimacies of his 
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wife's bed and home reflected in the citizen's remarks, '[t]he strangers, says the citizen. 
Our own fault. We let them come in. We brought them'. He recognises the genesis of 
the problem, then illogically turns this against the Jew and the female other: 'The 
adulteress and her paramour brought the Saxon robbers here ... a dishonoured wife, says 
the citizen, that's what's the cause of all our misfortunes', (U 420) in an acceptance of 
imperialist patriarchal misogyny. Joyce gives him the deeply ironic line: 'Raimeis, says 
the citizen. There's no-one as blind as the fellow that won't see'. (U 423) 
Both the Citizen and his nationalist cohort oppose force to force '[w]e'll put force 
against force, says the citizen', (U 427) in a 'bare repetition' of the same. An ironically 
named John Wyse advises Bloom who complains of persecution and injustice to do the 
same, '[r]ight ... Stand up to it then with force like men'. (U 432) Bloom equates force 
with hatred and turns back to its bipolar opposite by offering 'love' - monopolised by 
institutional Christianity - as the only conceivable alternative in another 'bare 
repetition'. Deleuze points out in Proust and Signs that Proust regards this 'world of 
love' as fundamentally defective as it is characterised by betrayal. Joyce, too, 
immediately satirises Bloom's statement, (U 433) as it implicitly returns him and us to 
the institutional religion of Roman Catholicism which is in cahoots with British 
colonialism and state capitalism. 
It is necessary to stress that in advocating love, Bloom's love is a masochistic 
version which is used by the masochist as a major means of establishing and 
maintaining control, as of course it is by the Church. An injunction to love is not love 
itself, a thought of love is not a loving thought. Bloom's call for love epitomises the 
Church's fascistic method of control. Both the citizen's and Bloom's responses are seen 
as complicit with the 'always already' givens, bipolarities and 'bare repetitions' of a 
continuous present dominated and determined by the forces which 'masochistically' 
constitute Christian morality, colonialism, and capitalism on a conflictual 'molar' line: 
'love or hatred are no longer sentiments but affects [which] traverse the body like 
arrows, they are arms of war. ' (TP 356) As indeed the early twenty first century 
continues to show us as the remaining super-power lovingly offers freedom and 
democracy through war to an embattled people in Iraq, forgetting the words of the 
American officer in the Vietnam war who declared that 'in order to save this village it 
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was necessary to destroy it'. A different ethical position would stress new thought and 
'affects' through 'desire' and life itself rather than the failed simplistic bipolar moral 
responses dredged up as the only alternatives: '[k]nowing how to love ... means 
extracting ... the flows, the n sexes that constitute the girl of that sexuality'. (TP 277) 
This attempt to elide the problem is epitomised through Bloom in the 'Sirens' 
episode with its deliberate use of linguistic excess and musicality as Karen Lawrence 
points out: 'the play of language is in fact, a kind of linguistic diversion from the main 
event of the day, which occurs offstage: Molly's adultery with Boylan'. 228 Andrew 
Warren shows Bloom becoming pleasantly distracted in this episode despite the 
frequent reminders of his pending cuckolding which he both seeks and abhors. Warren 
argues convincingly that: 
the episode's simultaneous obsession with and distraction from Molly's infidelity 
parallels a similar obsession with and distraction from the realities of British 
Colonial Rule. The musical diversion not only distracts Bloom from his own 
loneliness and the usurpation of his house and bed, but the musicality also distracts 
229 him (and reader, and narrative) from the usurpation of Ireland by the British . 
Bloom fails to address the problem appropriately, as he neither turns to new conceptual 
thought nor to new 'affects'. For, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, 'there are other 
ways, other procedures than masochism, and certainly better ones'. (TP 15) 
Joyce offers precisely that different ethical response in the 'Sirens' episode itself 
which is overlooked by both Lawrence and Warren both of whom see the episode as a 
'diversion'. As Joseph Valente shows the barmaids initially break through and subvert 
from within the controlling patriarchal order no matter if this control is wrested back 
from them well before the episode ends. 230 Joyce is able to portray women as socially 
oppressed and sexually exploited, but he also creates a space of resistance where the 
228Karen Lawrence, The Odyssey ofStyle in Uysses (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 198 1), p. 99. 
229 Andrew Warren, 'How to Listen for Sirens% Bloomsday 100,1 gth International 
James Joyce Symposium (Dublin, 12-19 June, 2004). 
"' Valente, 'Who Made the Tune: Becoming-Woman in "Sirens"', 191-207. 
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6molecular' intensities of the siren song actually belongs to the Sirens before its 'molar' 
appropriation and recuperation by the males in the public house. Their 'song' brings 
about a series of overlapping becomings. There is the 'becoming laughter' of the 
'becoming language' of their 'becoming music' which in its 'girlish' intensity almost 
culminates in a 'becoming woman', (U 333-335) as they implicitly satirise colonialised 
masculinity by laughing at Bloom. Here, as in the 'Oxen' episode, as Froula points out, 
'Joyce's interpretation of his culture subverts the transferences of a traditional 
masculine perspective', 231 and undermines the Symbolic order at its root by the most 
powerful fonn of gender transgression and reveals the social law of gender for what it 
is: 
Joyce's modernist self-portraiture brings the repressed maternal substrate of 
masculine psychohistory to 'the light of day' - to consciousness and conscience in 
a way that is nothing short of revolutionary for the culture founded on its 
repression. 232 
Such an epiphanic revelation challenges the fraternal substrata on which the present 
homosocial order is based. Joyce in his use of masochism diagnoses this 
even more precisely than Froula allows by showing that even such 'molecular' 
subversion is entangled with its recuperation through the 'molar line' of the Symbolic 
order, and as such shows both the possibilities and difficulties in establishing and 
maintaining a viable 'line of flight'. It is through the intensities of Issy in the Wake as 
Joyce's ultimate siren and 'desiring machine' that a resolution to this problem 
is ultimately revealed. 
'Symptomatology' is the diagnosis of a coalescence of immanent external forces or 
investments which opens up the possibility of productive change in people and society, 
yet it is evident that Joyce's choice of Bloom as his protagonist emphasises the 
difficulties preventing such productivity; difficulties, I should add, which Hardt and 
Negri do not sufficiently take account of. Clearly as an Irish Jew located in a racist sub- 
23 1 Froula, Modernism's Body: Sex, Culture and Joyce, p. 28. 
232 lbid, p. 3. 
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section of society such productive 'outside' forces are in short supply. Yet, despite its 
weaknesses, Bloom's 'BwO' still allows some productive activity despite its 
'intensities' being 'turned down' to their lowest point and operating at almost zero 
degrees. 233 Bloom is constructed through the 'empty BwO' of a masochist which 
Deleuze and Guattari regard as being 'sewn up', 'smothered', filled only with what they 
call 'pain waves'. (TP 150,152,155-156) Such a 'BwO' allows only limited productivity 
as 'the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a "BwO" and bringing forth a 
plane of consistency of desire', (TP 155) as an essentially 'sad' construction. 
Nevertheless, with all of its limitations it works in part for Bloom as it does for us. 
Moreover, such productive forces as are available for him coalesce to give his 
masochism a distinctly subversive edge. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus stress the immense powers of 
'reterritorialization' and 'recoding' of capitalism when, after surging forward it reaches 
a limit - as 'the boom and the crash' - it then operates on a recuperative 'molar line'; 
they nevertheless acknowledge its enormous underlying 'rhizomatic' or 'schizophrenic' 
potential and hence ultimate 'lines of flight' which can in principle shatter and take us 
beyond capitalism and our current state. The personal difficulty is in setting in train and 
maintaining autopoietic becoming and the linked, over-arching, societal difficulty is in 
overcoming the economic limits which would allow us to move beyond capitalism. The 
textual Bloom frequently sets in train such 'becomings' on 'the second plane of 
writing', but through his heightened masochism is simply unable to maintain them. One 
can argue that the same is finally true of the barmaids in the 'Sirens' episode and even 
Molly herself. Although they move towards 'becoming woman' they are ultimately 
constituted through the patriarchal male gaze. The barmaids recognise themselves in 
terms of patriarchally unified and hence disempowered selves and acquiesce in their 
assigned roles. Miss Douce sadly notes Ja]ren't men frightful idiots? ' and Miss 
Kennedy rejoins '[i]t's them has the fine times'. (U 33 1) Molly, however, offers more 
resistance. 
233 Manuel De Landa, Lecture, at 'Immanent Choreographies: Deleuze and Neo- 
Aesthetics Conference' at Tate Modem on 22 September 2001. 
nodem/programmes/webcasting. htm 
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In addition to the 'molar' acceptance of societal 'givens' Joyce clearly shows us the 
masochistic 'molecular' subversiveness which is latent in every one of us through our 
potential questioning of and opposition to accepted societal mores. Although such 
masochistic subversion does not ultimately succeed in itself, it can nevertheless set in 
train a process which for example seems to briefly allow Molly in the 'Penelope' 
episode the opportunity to take liberatory advantage of Bloom's frustrated rebellion. 
Molly moves beyond the ultimately 'molarising' masochistic schema in which Bloom - 
and through him the State apparatuses in their recuperative strategy - seeks to enmesh 
her. She attempts to fly beyond their nets by using the 'molecular line' of discontinuity 
which Bloom's masochism brings into play, as this creates a space which allows her a 
limited subversive freedom. She is able to do this by recalling from the 'whole time' of 
her own 'duration' all of the things Bloom does not know and consequently cannot 
control. In the active joy which Molly displays we have the necessary conditions for her 
freedom to be established through a 'line of flight'. This active joy is shown through her 
recollection of her own and Milly's 'girlhood' - 'Molly. Milly. Same thing watered 
down' (U III)- for the 'molecular woman is the girl'. (TP 276) Nevertheless, Molly's 
identification with Milly and her joy in recollecting her own girlhood are tempered by 
envy and an awareness of her own ageing and fading charms. So her excitement and 
forward looking thrust are inflected by an element of sad resignation which finally 
works against her establishing a 'line of flight'. 
As with Molly's envy, although Bloom is aware that Milly is '[a] wild piece of 
goods. Her slim legs running up the staircase', (U 81) 'the girl as fugitive being', (TP 
28 1) he is unable to use or control such joyful 'movement' which from his perspective 
4 cannot be [fully] perceived' because it 'can occur only by means of affect, passion, in a 
becoming that is the girl', (TP 28 1) instead he is reduced to a passive contemplation and 
a reliance on 'destiny'. (U 8 1) A destiny which has already deprived him of a son and 
probably in part engendered the negativities of his constructing 'BwO'. Nevertheless, 
although Bloom cannot connect with this, in such moments when he fondly remembers 
'Silly Milly', and quotes 'poor old professor Goodwin's' ditty, (U 75) and the 
'becoming-cat'. 'becoming-horse', 'becoming-animal' which Milly offers him, (U 813) 
this indicates his depleted, yet still potentially productive, empathy with the intensities 
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of the 'girl'. (In this connection, Richard Ellmann notes in Giacomo Joyce that 'the 
fillyfoall, "equine portrait", of the Oxen in the Sun episode, gradually turns into 
Millicent Bloom'. 234 ) The 'girl' does not always handle him so kindly however as in the 
'Sirens' episode where at least through the narrator he is equated by Miss Douce and 
Miss Kennedy with the old fogey in Boyd's, and indeed all of mankind, (U 248) and 
later he is left to wistfully note 'a dusty seascape' with ja] lovely girl, her veil awave 
upon the headland wind around her'. (U 260) It is from such weakened positive forces 
that his subversive actions stem even if, from such potentially epiphanic moments, it 
cannot result in an autopoietic 'becoming-woman". As with his failure to connect 
sexually with Molly, his isolated masturbation with Gerty and his unconsummated 
relationship with Martha Clifford, Bloom hints at sexual interest in his daughter without 
realising it. 
This potentially incestuous relationship is carried forward in a different guise by 
Joyce in the Wake, not in terms of 'actual' consummation but in its realisation of and 
challenge to the forces constituting the patriarchal nuclear family in modernity and its 
incestuous underpinning conceived on 'the second plane of writing'. Thus, Hardt and 
Negri correctly point out that whilst 
decreasing proportions of the U. S. population are involved in the nuclear family ... 
One should not think that the crisis of the nuclear family has brought a decline in 
the forces of patriarchy. On the contrary, discourses and practices of 'family 
values' seem to be everywhere across the social field. ... 
One is always still in the 
family 
... the 
function of the institution is both more intensive and extensive. The 
institution work(s) even though [it is] breaking down - and perhaps all the better 
the more [it] breaks down. 235 
We are all constituted through these continuing Christian (or monotheistic, if one is 
including Jewish or Muslim populations) 'family values' and the limitations which they 
impose on potentially free-flowing desiring forces. 
In the 'Calypso' episode Bloom is affected by a dark cloud which slowly covers the 
sun as Jewish images of the desert, the dead sea, the plagues, the cities of the plain. the 
234 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. xxxii. 
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desolation of a captive, then a scattered people, crowd into his mind. At the same time. 
an old hag crossing the street clutching 'a noggin bottle by the neck', (U 73) strengthens 
the affect of barrenness, bringing about images of age and death: 'an old woman's: the 
grey sunken cunt of the world. Desolation. Grey horror seared his flesh', and 'Cold oils 
slid along his veins, chilling his blood : age crusting him with a salt cloak'. But the 
landscape changes once more, bringing out life-giving invisible forces and this 
immediately affects Bloom's mood 'Quick warm sunlight came running from Berkeley 
Road, swiftly, in slim sandals, along the brightening footpath. Runs, she runs to meet 
me, a girl with gold hair on the wind', (U 74) offering him the opportunity to 'become- 
woman' through 'becoming-girl'. But he turns away from this and even in 'Circe', 
despite proclaiming that '0,1 so want to be a mother' and giving birth to 'eight male 
yellow and white children, (U 614) he does not 'become-woman' but rather remains a 
masochist's parody of a woman. 
Yet, I believe that Joyce intuitively appreciates that such masochistic 'molecular 
lines' can fragment, at least temporarily, the 'molar segmentations' of Church/ State 
colonialism and capitalism. It can create cracks between its segments so that something 
productive may pass between them through 'the middle'. Consequently in Uysses it is 
not Bloom but Molly who perhaps gains most from his masochistic strategy. Whereas, 
according to Holland, capitalism would appear to leave the citizen only the fleeting 
power of micro-resistance available through masochistic strategies, such a depressing 
scenario always resulting in failure, this outcome is not inevitable for those who both 
resist its negative force and use its 'molecularity' productively as Molly attempts to do. 
Despite its failings, Deleuze holds that masochism dismantles the constructed individual 
identity and as such is potentially productive. For this reason,, he believes that 
masochism is ethically and politically potent and serves liberty, because it 'at least 
temporarily' dismantles the socially constructed self within a capitalist society. 
However, it is the fleetingness of its true resistance which places a question mark 
against it. Clearly, masochism's very existence is dependent upon societal constructs, is 
brought into play by them, and ultimately allows its resistance to be recaptured. Yet, 
213 5 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 197. 
123 
some instances of the socially constructed identities which masochism temporarily 
dismantles include gender - what a man or woman 'should' be - and the patriarchal 
beliefs that a woman's sexual desire should be solely focussed on her husband, that her 
body belongs to and is in fact his property. Masochistic rituals consist of the 
undermining by parody of such social constructs of identity. 
Critics such as Suzette Henke and Kaja Silverman make perceptive observations on 
masochism and its relationship to our society in general, but in contradistinction to 
Holland, they appear to give insufficient weight to the fact that the masochistic rebellion 
against sadistic societal overcodings is constituted and thus recoupable by the 
paralysing forces of capitalism. This, as Holland recognizes, is because masochism's 
negative controlling aspect is made up in large part of forces similar if not identical to 
those which constitute the repressive aspects of capitalism on its 'molar', 
4reterritorialising line'. WUlst Henke notes that Bloom is 'imaginatively colluding in 
the subversion of marital stability by up-ending traditional expectations and putting his 
own phallic powers deliberately under erasure'; 236 and Silverman too, argues more 
generally that masochism 'works insistently to negate personal power and privilege', 237 
1 believe that they do not take sufficiently into account this underlying recuperative 
aspect. 
Although their observations are in tune with one aspect of Deleuze's appreciation 
of Masochian subtlety in both advocating and simultaneously undermining the contract, 
(M 13) and incidentally diagnosing the marriage contract in particular as the foundation 
of the nuclear family and contemporary society's 'family values', this does not 
complete the Deleuzian picture. These understandings of masochism's subversive 
qualities fail to recognise the coldness and control which has to be exercised by the 
masochist in order to achieve his or her ends. Such coldness is 'sad' and life-denying, 
236 Suzette Henke, James Joyce and the Politics ofDesire (New York: Routledge, 
1990), P. 119. 
237 Ka a Silverman, Male Sub ectivity at the Margins (New York: Routledge, 1992), 
p. 21 0. 
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consequently in broader terms it can only offer a partially successful rebellion against 
the sadistic control of the State, because both types of control emphasise stasis and stem 
from the same conglomeration of negative forces. 
Of all the characters in Uysses perhaps Molly comes nearest to establishing a 'line 
of flight'. She undoubtedly encourages and enjoys Boylan's sexual attentions, as Bloom 
in 'Circe' intends, but she takes this on her own terms and does not like or accept his 
crassness as we see in 'Penelope'. At the beginning of the final sentence in Penelope 
she calls Boylan an 'ignoramous' (U 924) who fails to ask permission and consequently 
doesn't know his proper place: 'standing out that vulgar way in the half of a shirt they 
wear to be admired'. (U 924) Yet, she acknowledges that she is 'a little like that dirty 
bitch in that Spanish photo he [Bloom] has', (U 892) and she uses Boylan to satisfy her 
own desires. Even if we believe that she protests too much at this point and that rather 
than being offended by Boylan's rough treatment she may - because of her excessive 
denials - actually appreciate being slapped on the backside, she is nevertheless upset 
by his failure to admire her. Despite the much more positive 'intensities' which stem 
from 'her' 'BwO', as opposed to those constituting Bloom, the masochism which goes 
to make up even the most robust person under capitalism may be seen here as 
re-surfacing. 
Joyce has earlier subtly informed us that such slaps indicate commodification and 
ownership within capitalist society, in tune with the 'molar line' of masochism, when he 
mentions in 'Calypso' that the breeders in the cattle market slapped 'a palm on a 
ripemeated hindquarter', (U 71) and again in 'Wandering Rocks' where Ned Lambert 
slaps 'a piebald haunch'. (U 297) Yet, there is little doubt that in stating 'thats no way 
for him' (presumably, to behave), and 'sure you might as well be in bed with what with 
a lion', (U 924) she has been both surprised and disappointed by Boylan's sheer 
brutishness, complete self-absorption, lack of even moderately good manners, any 
consideration for her feelings and his total unwillingness or inability to indulge in 
sweet-talk. He reveals his complete assimilation by the 'molar line' and a consequent 
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capitulation to capitalist mores by only being able to treat her as a commodity. 
Nevertheless, she anxiously looks forward to his further promised visit. 
This critical assessment of Boylan is immediately followed in the text by her 
positive reference to Bloom in 'God Im sure hed have something better to say for 
himself an old Lion would'. (U 924) It would seem that of the two she might actually 
prefer Bloom's amatory attentions, had they been as available as they once were, which 
indeed Wanda would those of Severin in Venus in Furs. A point which is given greater 
credibility in Molly's later statement in 'Penelope' that Bloom truly understands women 
and a woman's body: 'I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman 
is'. (U 932) Bloom's 'molecular' potential for 'becoming woman' is highlighted and 
this contrasts with Boylan and the other men she has known who are 'all mad to get in 
there ... you'd think they could never get far enough up and then theyre done with you'. 
(U 902) Such conventional men, constructed almost entirely from the 'molar lines' 
which constitute patriarchal modernity, take no account of women's needs but are only 
concerned to satisfy their own desires. 
The recuperative 'molar line' of Bloom's masochistic fetishism remains dominant 
throughout Ulysses, and drives Molly in the 'Penelope' episode to make the exasperated 
remark that if he persists in only wanting to kiss her bottom then she'll force him to 
stick his tongue '7 miles up my hole as hes there my brown part', (U 929) for which she 
will charge him either a pound or a pound and a half. In both instances we are reminded 
of the status patriarchal society consigns women to as they are forced to trade sex 
directly for money or possible longer term financial reward without their partners 
having to give a thought to their emotional needs. Molly's reaction shows that even she 
cannot finally escape the 'masochistic nets' of Patriarchy. As Stephen observes in 
Stephen Hero: 
A woman's body is a corporal asset of the State: if she traffic with it she must sell it 
either as a harlot or as a married woman or as a working celibate or as a mistress. 
But a woman is (incidentally) a human being: and a human being's love and 
freedom is not a spiritual asset of the State. ... A 
human being can exert freedom to 
produce or to accept, or love to procreate or to satisfy. Love gives and freedom 
takes. (SH202-203) 
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Yet, even in denigrating her husband, and reducing their sexual encounters to that 
of a prostitute and her client, and instancing her avarice, Molly would like to get Bloom 
to penetrate her in some way. No doubt this is why, in part, despite his unfeeling 
crudity, she still wonders if Boylan will come again at four next Monday as he has 
promised. After ten years of non-penetrative sex it seems that Molly is very similarly 
placed to Wanda. Severin uses the love Wanda feels for him to manipulate and instruct 
her in how to torture him. The same is equally true of Bloom. 
Molly's resistance is akin to that shown in Sacho-Masoch's novels by the 
disempowered women of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and has a 
masochistic edge. In calling for resistance as the 'key to every active political position' 
in the new world of global capitalism, 238 as 'the political aim of being-against is always 
to subvert the power of imperial sovereignty', 239Hardt and Negri regard resistance as 
4prefigur[ing] an alternative global society'. 240 As argued above, however, if this is a 
masochistic resistance it will be recuperated by the very powers which constitute global 
capital. The forces of masochistic 'reterritorialisation' which reclaim Molly need to be 
taken account of by Hardt and Negri. It is the case that Molly's micro-political 
resistance only becomes apparent in the final episode when she is given agency and a 
voice. Then we are at last made aware that she is both inside and outside of Bloom's 
masochistic ritual operating in 'the middle', and like Masoch contesting the sensible 
world from within as she occupies '... a curious interworld, in which bodies and words, 
things and ideas interpenetrate and the traditional demarcations between the physical 
241 
and the metaphysical become blurred' . 
238 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 21 1. 
239 lbid, p. 212. 
240 lbid, p-xvi. 
24 1 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 54. 
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Unlike Bloom's construction of Bella/Bello as dominatrix in the 'Circe' episode, in 
'Penelope' Molly resists his attempts to place her in this role. This rejection takes a 
number of forms. Thus, she explicitly rejects Bloom's choice of reading matter: 'theres 
nothing for a woman in all that invention made up'. (U 890) Moreover, Bloom himself 
is prone to over-estimating his success in his educational endeavours with Molly. For 
instance in 'The Sirens' episode he claims that he held her 'hypnotized listening' (U 
367) by his talk on Spinoza, but we leam in 'Penelope' that far from any interest in 
what he was trying to teach her, she was only aware of sitting in a 'swamp' as her 
menstrual period had just started. (U 914) Here Joyce ironically opposes the intensities 
of 'molecular lines' of the constituent 'BwO' which compose Molly, through her 
actualised corporeal bodily functions, to the 'molar' lines constituting Bloom's 
attempted masochistic indoctrination. 
We learn from Molly that Bloom, despite an attempt to gain total control, knows 
little of her girlhood and the Gibraltar days and nights shared with Mulvey and of 
Stanhope which she deliberately keeps hidden from him. Yet, she has undermined her 
own resistance for she must have told him of the former at least, as in the 'Ithica' 
episode Bloom, briefly concerned about Milly's paternity, remarks on 'lieutenant 
Mulvey, British Navy', in this connection. (U 812) Molly's resistance to Bloom's 
demands inflected with a degree of 'sad' resentment is also seen in such remarks as 'Im 
to be slooching around down in the kitchen to get his lordship his breakfast while he lies 
rolled up like a mummy will I indeed', (U 926) and more generally expressing her 
awareness of women's powerlessness and confinement in patriarchal society, she 
remarks that men can 'pick and choose what they please ... 
but were to be always 
chained up', (U 924) echoing the remarks of the barmaids in the 'Sirens' episode (U 
33 1) but attempting to move beyond them. 
We see in sentence two of 'Penelope' that she is prepared to show Bloom the spot 
where Bartell d'Arcy kissed her on the choir-stairs not simply to shock Bloom, but to 
demonstrate to us that Bloom doesn't know or control everything about her life. (U 882) 
Crucially, she also states that 'theyre not going to be chaining me up no damn fear once 
I start I tell you (U 924) Nevertheless she is entrapped by being financially reliant 
on either Bloom or Boylan. Yet, Molly's insight into Bloom's perversely manipulative 
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tendencies give her a degree of freedom which she uses. After all it is not an 'empty 
BwO' which works through Molly. It may well be that the only immediate object of 
desire available to her is Boylan, but she uses him in a far more liberatory way than he 
her, and as Balazs suggests 242 she maintains her concern for Bloom despite everything, 
whereas Boylan cares for no one but himself. 
Although Molly is implicated in Bloom's plans she resists the cold controlling 
forces constituting his 'molar line', in the 'Penelope' episode, and privileges the 
desiring intensities which stem from the full 'BwO'. Thus, in the fmal sentence of 
'Penelope', going beyond the 'oedipalisations' of both Boylan and Bloom, whilst using 
the latter's 'molecular line', she becomes momentarily in Joyce's words 'Prehuman and 
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presumably posthuman. (LI 180) Molly imagines being picked up by strange men: a 
sailor, a gypsy, or even a murderer (U 925) in language which 'becomes' more and 
more a 'line of flight' as she contests the claims of patriarchal society through husband 
and lovers and merges 'molecularly' with such nomadic outsiders as her conventional 
bodily identity slips away. Yet, whilst moving towards such new 'becomings', Molly is 
always drawn back into Dublin's masochistic social order as her monologue shows. 
Deleuze and Guattari ask us jh]ow to become a nomad and an immigrant and a 
gypsy in relation to one's own language? ' and they answer for Joyce, Molly and 
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perhaps us., 'steal the baby from the crib [become-child], walk the tightrope'. This is 
'the tightrope' of the 'line of flight' and in its 'becoming child/ becoming girl', 'become 
woman' one must not fall off and succumb to 'molarising' pressures. Molly is finally 
presented by Joyce as almost accomplishing this as her final 'yeses' relate to and 
encompass those men who live nomadically and outside of the identity imposed by the 
sadistic constraints of Church and State power. She has become aware of a 'nomadic 
line' of escape and, as Grosz indicates, 'a nomadic line, gives a line of becoming 
242 Thomas P. Balazs,, 'Recognizing Masochism: Psychoanalysis and the Politics of 
Sexual Submission in Ulysses', in Joyce Studies Annual 2002, ed. by Thomas F. Staley 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), p. 18 5. 
243 Deleuze, and Guattari, Ka)ka, p. 19. 
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imperceptible, which disaggregates the molar structure' . 
244Yet, she cannot fully escape 
the masochism which constitutes everyone in the social order, and Joyce's success in 
creating her as 'embedded' character exemplifies this. However much Joyce has sought 
to represent his Penelope as beyond the human, he has 'actualised' her too thoroughly 
for this. 
244 Elizabeth Grosz, 'A thousand tiny sexes: Feminism and rhizornatics", pp. 203-204. 
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Conclusion 
245 In his essay 'Nomadic Thought" Deleuze shows that the history of sedentary 
peoples, from the earliest despotic states to modem liberal democracies, has been 
constituted by a discourse of sovereignty, hierarchy, and arborescence, imbricated with 
sadistic institutional control. From Plato onwards traditional philosopic discourse has 
thus not only been concerned with clear cut identity, the unified subject, and 
instrumental rationality, but it has also been closely allied with contracts, institutions 
and the administration of law. The latter,, as I have shown, also closely concern 
masochism which, despite its resistant 'molecularity', is inevitably returned to the 
recuperative 'reterritorialising' forces of modernity and capitalism which actually 
constitute 'masochism'. However, Joyce through Molly indicates the 'lines of flight' 
which are available to us in capitalist modernity, although she does not ultimately 
accomplish this transformation. 
Furthermore, Joyce through Bloom offers a profound diagnosis of pervasive 
societal masochism under capitalism by going beyond simple 'molarising' paralysis 
and, in the 'Penelope' episode, allowing new liberatory potentialities, or 'lines of 
flight", to emerge via masochism's 'molecular' line. Thus, Molly is depicted in 
Penelope as achieving a degree of freedom rather than becoming the ritualised corporeal 
body of 'Circe' which Bloom's masochistic enactment seeks. Yet, she does not achieve 
full freedom despite bringing into play the 'nomadic'. Molly is constrained by 
masochism and finally has not 'nomadically' wandered far enough. It is only in the 
Wake that Joyce shows us the full potential of his liberatory writing. Here, it is Issy who 
finally holds the key. As Hardt and Negri put it in terms of the 'multitude': 'nomad 
singularity is the most creative force and the omnilateral movement of its desire is itself 
the coming liberation'. 246 
245 Gilles Deleuze, 'Nomadic Thought', in The New Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by David CO 
B. Allison (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992) pp. 142-9 (pp. 148-149). 
246 Hardt and Negri. Empire, p. 363. 
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Chapter III 
In this chapter I will introduce the concept of the Deleuzian 'epiphanic machine' as 
its 'affects' appear from Joyce's use in the Wake of a wide range of lexical and syntactic 
devices including portmanteau words. This will result in an emphasis on the 'molecular' 
movement, 'deterritorialisations' and 'lines of flight' available to us in the capitalist 
4 socius' in a movement away from the 'molar' 'reterritorialising' forces which have 
tended to dominate my analyses in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, in addressing 
earlier overly optimistic readings of 'Two Gallants', 'A Painful Case' and 'The Dead' 
from Dubliners, in terms of the epiphany - due in large part to an incomplete 
understanding of 'duration' from which their epiphanies spring - it will be necessary to 
offer an interpretation more in keeping with Joyce's presentation of the stories. I will 
also suggest that a Deleuzian understanding of the epiphany, as part of his Bergsonism, 
allows for a better critique of Dubliners and the later works than does that of those 
critics who take a more traditional view of Joyce's epiphany. However, I will be 
concerned here with Stephen Hero and A Portrait only insofar as they offer an 
introduction to the epiphany. 
Deleuze and Guattari regard great books as entirely 'machinic'. They are not 
primarily concerned with a book's 'meaning' but rather its functioning as 'a little 
machine'. (TP 4) By casting the epiphany in open 'machinic' and temporal terms, rather 
than a closed mechanical system, Deleuze sheds a completely different and more 
revealing light on the centrality of this phenomenon in Joyce's work than have Joycean 
critics who have previously engaged with its occurrence. This is because whilst the 
epiphany is an unstable concept for Deleuze [a]centred on difference, movement, and 
change, he reads it in terms of 'duration'. Such a reading implicitly brings into play 
Bergsonian philosophy and, as I indicated in Chapter One, I will show in the present 
chapter how Deleuze both uses and radically recasts Bergsonian 'duration', and with it 
an understanding of the epiphany. 
In the following two chapters I will feature Issy as epiphanic 'desiring machine' 
and 'becoming-girl' and form a 'rhizomatic' link with the epiphanic 'bird-girl' of A 
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Portrait. This will emphasise the Wake's 'machinic function' rather than its 'meaning'. 
By addressing the epiphany 'machinically', I will be bringing into play Deleuze's 
g second plane of writing'. This will take us beyond the delineation of character, plot, 
narrative, or authorial biographic features supposedly subsumed in the text, to the 
positive 'singularities', 'investments', 'intensities', 'lines' and 'becomings' drawn from 
'duration'. In short, the Joycean epiphany, as understood by Deleuze, allows the 
productive impersonal desiring forces of the Wakean 'BwO' conceived in terms of the 
capitalist outside to emerge and take centre stage. 
This approach to the Wake is 'minoritarian', and sets it at odds with many Joycean 
critics such as Patrick McCarthy who concludes that the Wake is 'not a revolutionary 
volume that might destroy literature as we know it', 247 and John Gordon's belief that the 
Wake 'takes place chronologically, according to a fixed set of temporal and spatial 
coordinates, with certain identifiable characters and stage properties' 248 including 'a 
specific family at the centre of the book [which] has certain identifiably derivative 
affinities with Joyce's family 249 
Thus, despite Joyce's well known interest in recording the minutae of 1904 Dublin 
life and cartography in Ulysses, I will not be addressing his 'realism' on the 'first plane 
of writing', but rather the productive 'intensities' with which it is conjoined on the 
(second plane of writing' in the Wake. This plane in its 'becomings': 'dissolves forms 
and persons and gives rise to movements, speeds, delays, and affects, as if as the 
narrative progressed something were escaping from impalpable matter'. (TP 268) Such 
an 'escape' characterises 'becomings' as epiphanic 'lines of flight'. When I address the 
Wake it is precisely the 'liberat[ion of] the particles of an anonymous matter' (TP 267- 
268) released from the letter, and Issy's version of it in particular, (FW 279FI) rather 
than the Wakean 'envelope' which contains it (FW 109) that I will be concerned with. 
247 McCarthy. 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 626. 
248 John S. Gordon, 'Interview', The Abiko Annual with James Jo ce Finnegans Wake Y 
Studies. No. 21, ed. by Tatsuo Harnada, (Tokyo: Abiko Press, 2002), 63-67 (p. 63). 
249 lbid, p. 64. 
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The 'second plane of writing' is just a 'plane of becomings' consisting of 'floating 
affects, so that the plane itself is perceived at the same time as it allows us to perceive 
the imperceptible'. (TP 267) It is the site of textual 'BwOs' and it extracts and abstracts 
'intensities' from the movement of the 'virtual open whole' of duration. (C] 59) The 
6 second plane of writing' constructs a reality of a different order. Joyce's intuitive 
access to it can be seen in Bergsonian terms as complementing and completing his 
intellectual understanding: 
Consciousness, in man, is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it 
seems to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite 
directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, 
intellect goes in the inverse direction, and this finds itself naturally in accordance 
with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in 
which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development. 250 
The 'affects' which Joyce intuitively creates are culled from the intensities of the 
'BwO'. These 'affects' enable access to the powerful nonorganic and intensive vitality 
which pervades all of great literature conceived in minoritarian terms. 
'Becoming-girl' is the primary 'block of becoming' which gives us the 'thisness' 
or haecceity of Joyce's epiphany: '[t]he girl is ... defined 
by a relation of movement and 
rest, speed and slownesses, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: 
haecceity'. (TP 276-277) It is highly significant for my reading of not just the Wake - 
determined as an 'epiphanic-machine'- but also for Ulysses and all of Joyce's earlier 
works which feature epiphanies. One sees the significance of this 'block of becoming' 
for Stephen/Joyce by turning to the last pages of Chapter Four of A Portrait, where the 
'bird-girl' epiphany is located. 
Significantly, this is preceded by a 'dark precursor' when the banter of his 
schoolmates playing on his Ancient Greek name - 'Here comes The Dedalus! ... Bous 
Stephanoumenos! Bous Stephaneforus! ... Stephanos Dedalos! Bous 
Stephanoumenos! 
250 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 291. 
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Bow Stephaneforos! ' - precipitates a vision of Icarus as the masculine 'fabulous 
artificer ... a winged form 
flying above the waves and slowly climbing the air'. This 
'hawk-like man flying sunwards above the sea' is immediately known to be 'a prophecy 
of the end he had been born to serve and had been following through the mists of 
childhood and boyhood, a symbol of the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the 
sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being'. The 'dark 
precursor' foreshadowing the 'bird-girl' epiphanic 'event' appears in reverse or 
intagliated as his 'line of flight' is momentarily linked to Icarus and the masculine and 
as such 'majoritarian' literature. Yet, in his transcendent 'soaring sunward' the 
masculine hubris and subsequent 'reterritorialising' fall awaiting him is foreshadowed. 
He is not rooted to the earth nor cognisant of the personal and social circumstances and 
difficulties which surround him and have first to be overcome. Not only do we have the 
fall into reality depicted in the diary which follows at the end of the book, but this is 
carried through into the 'Telemachus' episode of Uysses where the telegram telling him 
of his mother's mortal illness calls him back to Dublin, home and 'actuality'. This 
apparent escape from the legendary labyrinth does not succeed and Stephen/ Joyce as 
writer does not completely accomplish this even in Hysses as I have attempted to show 
in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, Stephen has changed. The 'dark precursor' 
reveals him at the point of giving up any idea of pursuing the priesthood as a career and 
instead aspiring to that of a writer. Stephen has taken the initial autopoietic step by 
deciding to attend university. 
However it is only when the 'bird girl' appears that the transcendent masculine 
'dark precursor' is displaced and gives way to a truly epiphanic moment. At this point 
the forces of the 'real, or 'virtual% have completely broken through and taken over 
Stephen's consciousness and language. A radical change has taken place in his intuitive 
understanding through a change in the 'abstract machine'. Whilst nothing in the 
external world has changed for Stephen, everything has in fact changed. Following on 
this momentous decision his muse has appeared. 'The crack' through which the real 
explodes into reality has opened up. (TP 198-200) Furthermore, in this vivid evocation 
we see that Joyce's language gives us meaning as connection and function through a 
repetition which adds nothing of outward significance to his original expression. Here, 
the inside and outside of the planes of 'immanence' and 'organisation' come together as 
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'affect': '[h]er bosom was as a bird's, soft and slight, slight and soft as the breast of 
some dark-plumaged dove. ' Time for Stephen has changed to that of 'duration' and to 
think in such terms is to think 'beyond the human condition'251 and to go beyond 
language because '[i]ntuition presupposes duration, it consists in thinking in terms of 
duration', 252 Deleuze and Guattari would see the repetition in the passage not as a 
chiasmus but instead meaning as 'machinic' connection and function. 
Here, in a Deleuzian reading, we are not concerned with Plato's ideal forms as pure 
universals abstracted from the material world's detritus but rather the reverse. We have 
a meeting of strata previously kept apart by rational thought: '[w]hen we speak of 
abstract machines, by "abstract" we can also understand "extract" in the sense of 
extracting. They are montages capable of relating all the heterogeneous levels that they 
traverse'. 253 There is a moment of 'claritas' of pure revelation extracted from the forces 
of the 'virtual' yet conjoined with and consisting of the 'reality' of the material world 
which surrounds Stephen. Despite his aestheticism, his description shows that the Ibird- 
girl' is rooted in reality. Her body is prominently figured. She has 'long slender bare 
legs', '[h]er thighs ... were 
bared almost to the hips', 'her bosom' and 'long fair hair', 
'her face'. 'cheek', and 'her foot' all were featured, together with her clothes 'the white 
fringes of her drawers', and '[h]er slate blue skirts'. Her body gives us the textual body 
of Joyce's future texts culminating in the 'BwO' of the Wake. 
In this enormously productive epiphany from A Portrait, which is fundamental to 
my reading of the Wake, we already see 'girlness' offering a yet further strand in this 
'block of becoming': the productivity of 'becoming-animal' through 'becoming-bird', 
as 'the power of literature itself. the power to see differently by tearing perception from 
its human home', (TP 243,245; N 137; ECC, Chapter 10) and 'transform oneself in 
perceiving difference' (TP 243) through those 'transversal becomings' which the writer 
251 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. by M. L. Andison (Totowa, New Jersey: 
Littlefield, Adams, 1965), pps. 50,193. 
252 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 
25 3 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 35. 
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'becoming-animal'. or the 'becoming-writer' of the animal allows. According to 
Deleuze we are here released from our moorings, in our own and even wider human 
concerns, to the freedom of the productive immanent outside as we take on new 
perceptions and new worlds through difference and realize a new 'sense' of consistency 
offered by Joyce's text. Even the 'becoming-animal of the human' (TP 277) must be 
preceded by the rhizomatic connections established through the 'block of becoming' 
which is 'the girl'. This is 'becoming-girl' as the productive 'fold' or 'middle', as 
haecceity or epiphany, just as 'the production of molecular woman is the girl herself'. 
(TP 277) 
I believe that Joyce drew on, reworked in Uysses, and developed enormously in 
the Wake, the earlier intuitive epiphanic 'affects' which he had previously given us. 
This is not to imply that these later works contain no new epiphanies operating through 
portmanteau words or other structural, lexical or syntactic means. Every time that they 
bring into play new 'affects' by tapping into the hidden forces constituting the 'whole 
past', as the second synthesis of time; or produce something radically new through the 
difference of the 'eternal return' and the third synthesis of time there is a new epiphanic 
moment brought about through Joyce's intuitive insight which, 'presupposes duration, it 
consists in thinking in terms of duration'. (B 3 1) It is 'the movement by which we 
emerge from our own duration ... [and] make use of [it] to affirm ... and recognize the 
existence of other durations'. (B 32-33) However, in my reading of the Wake, by 
following Joyce and 'disentangl[ing]' and 're-embod[ying]', as well as 'setting up a 
resonance between two obýj ects' [3.1 ]! p I find 'the bird girl' epiphany as 
it resonates with 
the preceding Icarian image to be the most productive of all of Joyce's epiphanies. 
Moreover, even the reworking of earlier epiphanies such as the 'bird-girl' gives us 
an 4etemal return' of the new and as such an original epiphanic moment in the sense of 
the Deleuzian 'simulacrum'[1.2] just as real and potentially productive as the supposed 
original. In arriving at this view Deleuze had reworked the Ancient philosophies of 
Epicurus and Lucretius. (L 266-279) His view is quite unlike the loss of the real 
instanced by the better known Baudrillardian ' simulacrurn' where all references to the 
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forces of production, 'affect, history, etc., are lost 254 through 'bare repetition', as is the 
potentiality of any positive ethico-political involvement. 255 Reading the Wake in terms 
of Deleuzian simulacra allows us to see the newness and authenticity of every epiphanic 
'becoming' in the Wake. 
'Duration' 
As indicated in Chapter One there are some important differences between 
Bergsonian 'duration' and that of Deleuze of which I now need to take account. I need 
to engage with the similarities and differences between Bergson's and Deleuze's 
If 256 understanding of 'duration', as 'time conceived purely in tenns of life' itse , 
in order 
to relate the outcome to my later readings of the Wake. I need to see if a different 
understanding of 'duration' developed by Deleuze, though still based in Bergsonism, 
allows us to relate better Joyce's 'epiphanic machine' to the 'desire' which many critics 
have read into Joyce's works as simply depicting human sexual desire. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that impersonal desire is a much wider concept than this. Hardt and 
Negri, for example, in following their understanding, note in political terms that 'desire 
has no limit (since the desire to exist and the desire to produce are one and the same 
thing) because life can be continuously, freely, and equally enjoyed and reproduced'. 257 
1 am not arguing that human sexual desire is not depicted, or that it is not a significant 
feature of the Wake, but I am arguing for its reading as an impersonal transformative 
force. This is because 'sexuality any sexuality is a becoming-woman in other words a 
girl'. (TP277) Thus, Shari Benstock points out that '[w]hile sex seems to be at the 
center of what the Wake is all about,, it is a subject that is constantly eluded and elided 
254 Jean Baudrillard,, Selected Writings (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), p. 125. 
255 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 28. 
256 Philip Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion: The Price OfPiety (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002), P. 162. 
257 Hardt and Negri, Empire. p. 349. 
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with multiple linguistic and semantic delays'. 258 Joyce is less concerned here, I suggest, 
with the representation of sexual acts than with the impersonal intensities which 
constitute them extra-linguistically. 
Bergson and Deleuze have very different approaches to the relationship between 
'duration' as the time of 'the virtual' and 'the actual' in the creation of an 'event' such 
as the epiphany. Bergson was concerned to bring these much closer together and even 
to unify 'the actual' and 'the virtual' in order to increase the range of possibilities open 
to human evolutionary development. Reacting against but greatly influenced by 
Darwinism, he focused much more than has Deleuze, even in his 'political' works with 
Guattari,, on mankind's rootedness in everyday existence and the unthinking habits of 
mind which such utility necessitates; thereby, as he believed, preventing us from 
obtaining a wider vision and greater evolutionary potentialities. Bergson's main concern 
was to point out how mankind might get out of an evolutionary rut by seeking 
experience beyond our utilitarian concerns and obtaining, 'properly human 
experience' 259 which he held would give us new potentials of energy and new 
opportunities for evolutionary development. Here Bergson's perfectionism and residual 
humanism are foregrounded as he undoubtedly focuses on the 'plane of organisation' 
rather than the 'plane of immanence', and in doing so gives particular weight to 'the 
process of differenciation'. (DR Chapters 2,3,4) 
Deleuze on the other hand is unwilling to limit his philosophy to the human and 
distances himself somewhat from Bergson in this regard. His thought constantly strives 
to exceed the human, to go beyond humanity as such, although we need to stress that his 
remains a philosophy of immanence and materialism and that he completely eschews 
the transcendent. We have already noted that his concepts 'becoming-woman/ 
becoming-girl' are not concerned with individualised humans as such, or even humanity 
258 Shari Benstock, 'Sexuality and Survival in "Finnegans Wake"', in The Seventh of 
Joyce ed. by Bernard Benstock (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 249. 
259 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memorj), trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer (NewYork: Zone Books, 1988), p. 184. (My italics for emphasis) 
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itself, but are to be seen as constellations of forces constituted by lines of varying 
'intensities' working through 'BwOs' located on 'the plane of immanence' and. in their 
insistence on 'new life', making an ethical statement. It is precisely this which 
distinguishes Deleuzian philosophy from that of Bergson and may also problematise the 
political philosophy of Hardt and Negri's Empire, despite the latter's claimed 
indebtedness to A Thousand Plateaus,, and their willingness to accept a new communal 
subjectivity. 
Going beyond Bergson and the human Deleuze targets such 'becomings' which 
consist of interacting intensities, as in 'becoming-animal' for example where 'the 
human being does not become animal in reality, but there is nevertheless a reality of the 
becoming-animal of the human being'. (TP 253) Deleuze is always attempting to think 
beyond the human condition, and in the process he draws on Spinoza's philosophy. His 
focus is not primarily on extending mankind's perception or 'affectivity'/feelings in 'the 
actual' on the 'plane of organisation', but in enlarging awareness of 'the virtual' itself 
with all of its hidden potentialities emitted through the 'intensities' which give rise to 
humanity. He asks questions such as 'what is the relation of the writing machine ... to 
becomings-animal? ', (TP 243) questions which either would not occur to Bergson or 
which he would regard as irrelevant. 
For Deleuze,, as for Spinoza, the human is neither fixed in its form nor determined 
in its function, as an imperium in imperio, but open to an 'affective becoming' with 
nonhuman or extrahuman 'BwOs' or assemblages, and indeed other unknown forces 
with which it is capable of evolving within a play of chance and necessity. As Hardt and 
Negri260 note, 'Donna Haraway carries on Spinoza's project [of asserting that the laws 
governing human nature do not differ from those of nature as a whole, by] breaking 
down the barriers we pose among the human, the animal, and the machine'. 261 These 
260 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 91. 
26 1 Donna Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- 
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century', in Simians, Cyborgs and Women (London: 
Free Association Books, 199 1). pp. 149-247. An even more fantastic contraption, 
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forces, Deleuze holds, are capable of yielding a practically unlimited diversity of 
combinations. (F 131) Joyce of course anticipates him. In the 'Penelope' episode of 
Ulysses his intention is to present Molly as 'prehuman and presumably posthuman', (LI 
180) unfortunately as I have pointed out above he is so successful in depicting Molly as 
'embedded' character on the 'first plane of writing' that he has 'actualised' her too 
thoroughly. However, in the Wake one has humans 'machinically' transformed by and 
connected to all of their recent inventions as 'extrahuman assemblages'. (FW 309.14- 
22) Whereas Deleuze would accept Bergson's understanding of 'the event', and of 
course the Wake as such an 'event', he would thus ask us to go much further beyond 
Bergson's conception of 'duration'. He states that '[t]he event does not relate the lived 
to a transcendent subject = Self, but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey 
of a field without subject'. (WIP 4 8) Of course to read the Wake as Deleuzian 'event', 'a 
field without [a] subject' has enormous implications for both Joycean criticism and one 
must add Hardt and Negri's theorisations. Ansel] Pearson argues that: 
Deleuze construes a 'nonpsychological life ... the nonorganic 
life that grips the 
world and renders it acentred and rhizomatic, existing not only beyond the sphere 
of Darwinian adaptation but also beyond the realm of Bergsonian durie and 
creative evolution. 262 
This statement, whilst it makes the central point very well, tends to separate too 
drastically Bergson from Deleuze. Bergson himself has stated that 'philosophy should 
be an effort to go beyond the human', 263 and Deleuze has said of Bergson that: 
Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly human wisdom 
and equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman 
similar to Joyce's 'high fidelity daildialler' which I would see, unlike Victor Tausk, as 
the 'machinic' inventions of those caught in the clinical schizophrenic bind seeking to 
regain their 'lines of flight' is described in his book, 'The Origin of the "Influencing 
Machine" in Schizophrenia', in The Psychoanalytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential 
Papers with Critical Introductions, ed. by Robert Fliess (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1949) pp. 31-64. 
262 Ansell Pearson, 'Pure reserve: Deleuze, philosophy, and immanence', in Deleuze 
and Religion, ed. by Mary Bryden (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 141 - 
155, (p. 149). 
263 Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp. 216-217. 
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(durations which are inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human 
condition: This is the meaning of [his] philosophy. (B 28) 
Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari evidently accept Bergsonian 'duration' and build on it: 
we consider Bergson to be of major importance ... Beginning in Time and Free Will, he presents duration as a type of multiplicity opposed to metric multiplicity or 
the multiplicity of magnitude. Duration is in no way indivisible, but is that which 
cannot be divided without changing in nature at each division. (TP 483) 
and in commenting on what would seem to be the 'duration' of a human life and then 
bringing into play 'lines of longitude' and 'latitude', 'haecceities', and the speeds and 
slownesses of other 'life forms' within a set of 'durations': 
You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed 
particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a 
season, a year, a life (regardless of its duration) -a climate, a wind, a fog, a 
swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can 
reach it. (TP 262) 
Thus,, Deleuze retains, extends and intensifies rather than sidelines or negates Bergson's 
'duration'. 
Furthermore, as I will argue below, the Wake takes Bergsonian 'duration'l in its 
conception of the epiphanic 'event', further in order to encompass the whole of life 
itself conceived as 'the nonorganic life that grips the world and renders it acentred and 
rhizomatic'. Joyce does this by bringing into play 'zones of indiscernibility and 
undecidability', which give us the 'variations, modulations, intermezzi, [and] 
singularities of a new infinite order', (TP 158) and in doing so the Wake exists within an 
extended understanding of and emphasis on 'duration'. It also accomodates Deleuze's 
understanding of Nietzsche's 'active nihilism' which, as we observed at the outset, 
gives enormous creative potentialities through the 'transvaluation of all values', 264 
bringing into play 'a dangerous freedom 265 epitomized in the Wake's use of 'creative 
destruction" and its absolute newness. As such Joyce like Deleuze thinks 'beyond the 
264 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorality, pp. 162-163. 
265 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pps. 208,209. 
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human', and this is nowhere more evident than in the revelations which he characterises 
as epiphanies. 
The epiphanic 'event' as the radically new only appears according to Bergson and 
Deleuze when the temporality of 'duration' opens, or is opened up. The Wake as 'event' 
is thus a creation made available through an opening in 'duration', a gap prised open by 
Joyce's insistent inventiveness and intuitive creativity. Such an 'event' is not 
preexistent to its actualisation no matter how many precursors we, or for that matter 
Joyce, might seem to offer. This is because 'the event' which only emerges out of 
'duration' is simply 'pure invention 266 and nothing else. The 'pure freedom' which 
such invention offers is necessarily without any prior determinants. 
266 Ibid. p. 22. 
143 
Joycean criticism 
Richard Brown's valid point about the way in which some Joycean critics. in 
addressing the epiphany, managed to side-line Joycean criticism for many years as an 
entirely esoteric pursuit needs to be taken into account here. Noting that the 'bad start' 
made by Joycean criticism 'had not necessarily improved', Brown writing in the mid- 
1980s was able to claim of such Joyceans as William Schutte 267 that their criticism 
'suffered from isolation, developing a partly autonomous language and field of 
268 
reference dominated by certain almost 'talismanic "Joycean" terms like "epiphany"' . 
Possibly the Joycean scholar who has most concerned himself with epiphanies is 
Morris Beja 269 who together with other critics such as Theodore Spencer 270 has shown 
us the extraordinary broadening out which occurs through an appreciation of the 
immensity of the past which both Ulysses and the Wake afford, with critics such as 
Spencer arguing that the latter offers us 'an epiphany of all of human history'. (SH 22) 
We can relate this insight to the 'whole past' of the Bergsonian second synthesis of 
time. However, Bej a would undoubtedly disagree with the Deleuzian proposition that 
either Ulysses or the Wake might be 'epiphanic events' in themselves: 
... 
it has been fashionable to speak of one or anoiher of his entire works as 'an' 
epiphany. Such statements are extravagant and pointless at best, and at worst 
misleading and distorting. Works of art, to be sure, often 'reveal' things; but they 
are no more epiphanies by virtue of that fact alone than is the Encyclopaedia 
Brilannica. If an epiphany is 'sudden, ' as it is, then works as long as the average 
short story - and certainly any novel - simply cannot 'be' epiphanies, for they 
cannot be 'experienced' or apprehended immediately. ... while a painted mimetic 
record of a frozen moment may perhaps be called 'an' epiphany, in regard to a 
novel the most one can say is that at the end a general recollection of all that has 
267 William M. Schutte, Joyce and Shakespeare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
195 7), pp. 1- 17. 
268 Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality, p. 2. 
269 Morris Bej a, 'Epiphany and Epiphanies', in A Companion to Joyce Studies, Zack 
Bowen and James P. Carens eds., Chapter 15, pp. 707-726; and Epiphany in the Modern 
Novel (London: Peter Owen, 197 1). 
270 Theodore Spencer, 'Introduction, in Stephen Hero. 
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been read may lead up to a sudden revelation - but that is a momentary experience 271 
not to be confused with all the time one has spent on the book . 
Here Beja is at odds with such critics as John Orr 272 who argues for the 'epiphanotis 
novel'. Yet, despite being unique immediately apprehended revelations, Beja also took 
the view that Joyce used his earlier epiphanies over and over again in his later works. 
One can both agree and use his insight if we consider such repetition in terms of the 
Deleuzian 'simulacrum' whereby every copy is an original including the original itself. 
BeJa noted forty distinct epiphanies throughout Joyce's work tracing their 'appearance 
or reflection' in Stephen Hero, A Portrait, Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. He also agreed 
that 'as Irene Hendry Chayes 273 suggested, the stories in Dubliners ... are related in 
method and objectives to epiphany', 274 and 'the works in this collection represent a new 
type of story which seems written almost in order to provide an introduction and 
background to an epiphany', 275 although he does not expand on this. 
Bqja points out that jc]ritics of Joyce have differed - sometimes enormously - in 
their interpretation of epiphany, but almost all have agreed on its profound importance 
in Joyce's aesthetics and fiction'. 276 Later he argues that the epiphany: 
... 
is not merely an intense moment of emotion or a sudden feeling of exhilaration, 
it is a sudden spiritual 'manifestation. ' Something is revealed, there is a feeling of 
new knowledge gained instantaneously and apparently irrationally. ... 
[which] may 
become positively cosmic in its reference, as in 'the night of the Apophanypes' in 
277 Finnegans Wake . 
27 1 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, pp. 73-74. 
272 John Orr, The Making of the Twentieth-Century Novel: Lawrence, Joyce, Faulkner 
and beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), passim. 
273 Irene Hendry [Chayes], 'Joyce's Epiphanies', Sewanee Review, 54 (Surnmer, 1946), 
pps. 452,454. 
274 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 20. 
275 lbid, p. 94. 
276 lbid, p. 84, n. 8. 
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Yet, he fails to pursue this further despite his claim that Joyce used his earlier 
epiphanies again and again. Beia sees only two 'similarities' to epiphanies, in the Wake. 
which appear in either A Portrait or its predecessor Stephen Hero, together with 'the 
epiphanic phrase' from Ulysses, 'she comes at night', which he sees as being reflected 
in 'all that I might have been of you meant to becoming. 11 . 
bewailing like a man that 
innocence which I could not defend like a woman'. (FW 193.36-194.2)278 
From my viewpoint, and even from his own, this seems to be extremely odd. For 
instance if we take Deleuze and Guattari's view of the Wake as 'epiphanic machine', 
through its haeccity, and 'the girl': 'proceed[ing] not by subjectivity but by haecceity, 
pure haecceity', (TP271) we can see that the epiphanic 'bird-girl' of A Portrait -a 
precursor of Issy as I argue - in her 'gently stirring the water with her foot hither and 
thither', is clearly recalled in the Wake's 'hitherandthithering waters'. (FW 216-4) 
Whilst the 'bird girl' is only stirring the waters gently and this image is transfigured by 
the flood of waters which is Anna Livia as the Liffey, water is the essential common 
creative element involved. This might well be read as the dynamic 'becoming-girl' of 
Anna Livia, conceived as the fluidity of 'becoming-woman', to give only one instance 
of Joyce's reworking of a key epiphanic moment which BeJa, despite his meticulous' 
attention to the text apparently ignores. Clive Hart 279 may well object to my designation 
of such reworkings as new epiphanies in themselves preferring to see these in terms of 
motifs or themes. Although it is the case that thematic elements can be drawn out from 
the epiphanies, from a Deleuzian perspective this approach tends to elide 'difference', 
according to Deleuze's understanding of 'simulacra', by implicitly seeing them in terms 
of originals and copies, rather than being completely new in themselves. Furthermore, 
the 'hitherandthithering waters' quotation which closes 1.8 leads directly into 11.1 and 
the further extension of Joyce's 'epiphanic machine' through what initially appears to 
be nothing other than a trivial children's game, but which in effect gives us an entire 
277 Beja, 'Epiphany and Epiphanies', p. 726. 
278 Ibid, p. 710. 
279 Clive Hart, Structure and Moti in Tinnegans Wake'(London: Faber, 1962), p. 80. ff 
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( symptomatology' and diagnosis of modernity as the lines which compose it pervade 
the text, as I will argue in Chapter Four. Moreover, ALP/ Issy are ftulher conjoined here 
as ALP is also the old form of Izod/ Issy, the bride elect in the game, 280 and their 
4 multiplicities' the rainbow girls 'bright elects, consentconsorted' (FW 239.28) echo 
and reinvent the 'bird-girl' epiphany. 
In his assessment of Joyce's novels, BeJa's omissions of epiphanic 'affects' and 
'becomings' in the Wake may be due to his belief, that the book 'is a ... well, a 
281 
something else', in other words not a 'modem novel' . Consequently, his considered 
statement that Bloom's epiphany, at the end of the 'Circe' episode (U 702-703) in 
Ulysses, is the 'most effective moment of vision in all of Joyce', fails to mention that 'a 
fairy boy of eleven ... 
kidnapped' has clear echoes in the Prankquean episode of the 
Wake (FW 21-23) in a tale probably patterned on just such an epiphanic fairy story. 282 
This, I believe, indicates the limitations of his assessment. 
We surely need to ask why Beja and the Joycean critics who have taken their lead 
from him, despite their meticulous readings and attention to detail, cannot see the Wake 
in terms of an 'epiphanic machine'. Perhaps the key lies in his and their identification of 
the epiphany with isolated moments as 'a frozen tableau'. 283 In his near immersion in 
the 'woolf pack' formed by Thomas Woolfe and Virginia Woolf, (TP 192-207)284 Beja 
appears to prefer such frozen 'moments of revelation' which 'are probably more 
frequent in the works of Thomas Wolfe than any other novelist'; although they are 
shown as appearing frequently enough in Virginia Woolf s work. Thus, in The Waves 
280 Sheldon Brivic, Joyce's Waking Women: An Introduction to Tinnegans Wake' 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 11. 
28 1 Be . a, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 95. j 
282 j. Mitchell Morse,, 'On Teaching Finnegans Wake', in Twelve and a till : essays on Y 
the occasion o the 25th anniversary of 'Finnegans Wake', ed. by J. P. Dalton, and Clive ýf 
Hart (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), pp. 65 -7 1. 
283 Be . a, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 23. j 
284 Deleuze and Guattari, 'One or Several WolvesT 
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we have a revealing example, quoted by Beja, showing us that when Bernard seems to 
be about to merge with the outside, in an autopoietic step of 'becoming-imperceptible', 
as he 'suddenly feels himself being annihilated and becoming part of the "unfeeling 
universe"% he draws back rather than commit himself, and he 'pulls himself together' 
(as masculine unified self). He: 
... notices an expression in his hairdresser's face: 'It is thus I am recalled. (For I am 
no mystic; something always plucks at me - curiosity, envy, admiration, interest in 
hairdressers and the like bring me to the surface) . 
285 
and he returns to the 'actual' world of hairdressers., and everyday emotions whilst 
dismissing such becomings as mystical. 
This unwillingness to proceed with the processuality of 'becoming part of the 
"unfeeling universe"', characterises Beja's attitude too, I suggest, and restricts him to 
regarding the epiphany as an intense but isolated moment, as did Stephen. Beja is not 
alone in this as Theodore Spencer also believes that Joyce's epiphanies rely upon 'an 
unmoving moment of time [which] still remains essentially static'. 286 We need to recall 
here that it is Joyce's intuition which grants us his epiphanies. To think intuitively, in 
terms of epiphanies is to enter into 'duration' through change, movement, and different 
speeds: 'pure relation of speed and slowness, and nothing else'. According to Deleuze, 
there could be nothing static or isolated about epiphanic 'essences' stemming from 
'duration'. Even 'if Joyce too begins by seeking the secret of epiphanies within the 
object, first within significant contents or ideal significations, then in the subjective 
experience of an aesthete'[3. I], and initially sees this as a 'frozen moment': 
By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity 
of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself He believed that 
it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing 
that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. (SH 188) 
and as with the Ballast Office clock: 
285 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 123. 
286 Spencer, 'Introduction' to Ste hen Hero. P 
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I will pass it time after time, allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it. It is only 
an item in the catalogue of Dublin's street furniture. Then all at once I see it and 
know at once what it is: epiphany. ... 
Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the 
gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exactfocus. The 
moment thefocus is reached the object is epiphanised, (SH 189)287 
in Dubliners he is already parodying and bringing down to earth the aesthete Stephen's 
thoughts about the epiphany. Thus, in 'Two Gallants', Lenehan, awaiting Corley's 
return, skips into the road to see the clock of Trinity College at the beginning of the 
evening, then notes the time by the clock of the College of Surgeons whilst he and 
Corley both recall the latter's picking up of a girl under Waterhouse's clock. Joyce 
ironically emphasises movement and change in association with these clocks rather than 
the stasis of a specific moment with the Ballast Office clock, and he associates this not 
with a transcendent 'spiritual' and aesthetic moment but with the grubby goings on of a 
back street Lothario who, as we come to learn later in Ulysses is reduced to begging 
money from Stephen in order to survive. Just as Joyce has brought the Icarian 'hawk 
man" crashing to earth, through the embodied 'bird-girl', so here he brings the 
aestheticised epiphany down to earth through the realities depicted in the 'Two 
Gallants'. He does this again with 'A Painful Case'. However, it is in his final story in 
Dubliners that Joyce truly takes leave of his initial conception of the epiphany as a 
'frozen moment' as I will show. Thus, Deleuze implicitly notes of Joyce's development 
through incremental repetition, from Stephen Hero to A Portrait and back to Dubliners 
then forward through Ulysses and the Wake, that '[i]t is only when the significant 
contents and the ideal significations have collapsed and given way to a multiplicity of 
fragments, to chaos - but in addition, the subjective forms to a chaotic and multiple 
impersonal reality - that the work of art assumes its full meaning' [3.1 ]. 
'Duration',, as we have learned from Bergson, works in corýjunction with the 
6virtual' potentialities or 'intensities', from which the human intellect normally takes 
only spatialised slices, including concepts such as clock-time. (B 22) Such spatialised 
time-slices are rather like the individual still photographs which when moved rapidly in 
sequence through a projector give us the impression of lifelike movement. (CI) Taken 
287 My italiCS 
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individually they remain static, and it is this stasis with which our rational intellects feel 
most comfortable. Such static conceptualisations are not wrong, they are simply limited, 
as Bergson discovers: 
For we contrive to find resemblances between things in spite of their diversity, and 
to take a stable view of them in spite of their instability in this way we obtain ideas 
which we can control. ) whereas the actual things may elude our grasp. 
288 
Deleuze holds with Bergson that these static slices of time represent only one half 
of reality, but it is this half with which our common sense reason and the entirety of 
science constantly work. (B 116) BeJa's and his followers identification of the epiphany 
with 'a frozen tableau' appears to indicate that he and they may have been intellectually 
seduced by such rational/ scientific approaches into just such a static view of time with 
the epiphany consequently being seen as akin to the photographic still. Matthew Hyland 
notes that '[m]otion, as Bergson showed, is indivisible, and and what is continuously 
transformed is the very relation between subject and objecV. 289 Joyce, I believe, finally 
came to realize the epiphany as the 'variable essence of things', (B 34) characterised by 
constant movement and change, as he re-works them in the Wake. As we learn from 
Deleuze, the Joycean epiphany consists of 'the amplitude of a forced movement which 
sweeps aside and overruns the series' [1.3]. This 'movement, like the girl as a fugitive 
being, cannot be perceived'. (TP 28 1) 1 would therefore both differ from and agree with 
Brown that whilst earlier critics were correct in highlighting the concept of epiphany 
they were woefully wrong in their understanding of its place in 'duration'. 
Beja regarded both the Wake and Dubliners as beyond his remit as he was 
particularly concerned with the modem novel. I will be implicitly criticising his failure 
to address Wakean epiphanies in the next two chapters and have already looked at 
several epiphanies in Ulysses in the preceding chapter. However, it has been difficult to 
find a Joycean critic who takes his general approach and addresses Dubliners in terms 
288Henri Bergson, The Two Sources ofWoralhýv and Religion (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 242. 
289 Matthew Hyland, 'Continuous crisis. Historical action and and passion in Antonio 
Negri's Insurgencies', Radical Philosophy, 112 (March/ April 2002) 31-37 (p. 36) 
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of 'duration' and the 'Bejain' understanding of the epiphany. Mary Ann Gillies 290 most 
nearly fits these requirements. Both Beja and Gillies in their understanding of the 
epiphany fail to see that 'duration' from which it stems is not limited to the 
psychological. Like other critics, such as Theodore Spencer - who in his 'Introduction' 
to the first edition of Stephen Hero states that Dubliners is a series of epiphanies 
describing apparently trivial but actually crucial and revealing moments in the 
psychology and lives of different characters - they both stop short in their appreciation 
of Bergson's philosophic and Joyce's writerly development. Thus, like Beja and 
Spencer, Gillies restricts 'duration' to psychological experience and consequently sees 
the epiphany in these terms, thereby failing to take account of the strength of the 
(reterritorialising' negative forces also emanating from the 'plane of immanence' which 
both form and assail the characters 'actualised' in Dubliners. 
In effect Gillies fails to come to terms with the particular socio-historical situation 
of the Dublin 'socius' constrained by the capitalistic imperialism of that time. Such 
'idealism' exactly makes Brown's point that the decontextualisatiOn and foregrounding 
of the epiphany leads to an esoteric and isolated pursuit. It clearly takes it away from a 
Deleuzian materialistic understanding. Deleuze shows that Bergson's thought 'evolved 
from the beginning to the end of his work', and 'duration' comes to be seen less and 
less reducible to something solely psychological as it appears in Time and Free Will, 291 
and forms a new ontology, as the 'variable essence of things', 'immanent to the 
universe', by the time he works through Matter and Memory, 292 and reaches Creative 
Evolution. 293 The result is that Bergson eventually gives us the true material ontology of 
'becomings'. (B 34) 
290 Mary Ann Gillies, Henri Bergson and British Modernism (Montreal & Kingston, 
London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University, 1996). 
29 1 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Wilk An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness,, trans. by F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1910), 
passim. 
292 Bergson, Matter and Memory, passim. 
293 Bergson, Creative Evolution, passim. 
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Even Gillies's own analysis shows that the attempts of the individuals depicted to 
realize freedom, growth and 'become-different' frequently do not succeed. This was 
surely Joyce's point. The restrictions which the imperial capitalist 'socius' imposes 
upon them actively work against such potential liberations, as he well knew. Gillies 
believes that the fifteen stories that make up Dubliners are important because they are 
centrally structured around epiphanies in the lives of ordinary Dubliners. However, she 
differs from Beja in this one respect as he focuses on the trivialities which foreshadow 
an epiphany and to this extent relies on Stephen's remark in Stephen Hero '[t]his 
triviality made him think of collecting many such moments together in a book of 
epiphanies. '(SH 216,218) Gillies argues contrariwise that Joyce's epiphanies illustrate 
the extraordinary moments with which each life is filled, and show how such moments 
both encapsulate and define lives. The implied optimism of Gillies's statement, that 
'[i]n these, a Bergsonian-like involuntary memory brings about a sudden insight into 
life, thereby prompting the main characters to change their manner of life'), 294 must 
however be set against Joyce's purpose in Dubliners of showing the forces of paralysis 
which grip its inhabitants, making such life-changing possibilities far more difficult to 
realise than Gillies allows. 
'A Painful Case' shows personal memory being deployed in several different ways 
resulting in several epiphanies, according to Gillies. Initially, Mr Duffy's life is given 
through a straightforward narration. Intimate details of his habits, career, education, and 
personality are set out. Then an incident which involves his memory of events buried in 
the past are recalled, as the central moment of the narrative arrives. Some months after 
the termination of an affair with Mrs Sinico, which ended when she expressed a desire 
to become his mistress,, Duffy came across a paragraph in the newspaper relating the 
circumstances of her death. The article upsets him and initiates a prolonged reflection 
about their relationship: 'As the light failed and his memory began to wander he thought 
294 Gillies, Henri Bergson and British Modernism, p. 13 7. 
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her hand touched his. The shock which had first attacked his stomach was now 
attacking his nerves'. (D 116) 
According to Gillies these memories and the images of their past life provoked by 
the article prompt Duffy to re-evaluate his life and actions, and he realizes that his life 
has been empty and futile, and that she was the only thing to have brought him j oy. In 
his despair, he felt 'that he was alone'. For Gillies this moment became a significant 
epiphany. She argues that the chance nature of such devastating recollections mirrors 
Joyce's assertion about the nature of the epiphany as 'a sudden spiritual manifestation' 
- for, despite Duffy's attempt to ignore or forestall the consequences of the memories, 
they take over his present life in much the same way that Bergson, on her interpretation, 
says that recollection does. The complexity of his epiphany and the resultant impact on 
his life depend, for Gillies, on Duffy having a personal memory which functions in 
precisely the way that involuntary memory is held to do. Yet, Duffy's recollections of 
Mrs Sinico are tempered by the circumstances surrounding them as Gillies admits. 
Joyce is beginning to ironise his earlier conception of the epiphany as 'a sudden 
spiritual manifestation' and 'frozen moment in time' by bringing into play all the 
movements and 'intensities' of the real world which go to make them up. For instance 
the movement of the train and Mrs Sinico's suicide as well as Duff-y's night time 
wanderings and ruminations are foregrounded here in order to problematise the 
epiphany as a 'frozen moment'. Moreover, in no sense is Duffy shown to have 
experienced the intensive life-enhancing affirmative intensities which accompany or 
compose an epiphany. His moralising guilt over Mrs Sinico's death results in a distorted 
memory of their relationship, one based on his fear that his actions led to her apparent 
suicide. Duffy remains entrapped in a sub ectivity and life-style which is largely 
constructed by the negative forces of capitalistic modernity which he hardly seems 
capable of combatting. At no point in the story does he experience the ethical joy which 
accompanies life giving intensities as Stephen has with the 'bird-girl "epiphany. 
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'The Dead' is the longest, most complex, and most critically acclaimed story in 
Dubliners. Gillies argues that it contains many elements that Joyce was later to use in 
more extended works, as well as a very good example of a personal memory based 
central moment. Here, a life changing epiphany occurs after the evening's 
entertainment, she claims, when Gabriel and Gretta have retired to their hotel room. 
Unlike Gabriel,, flushed by the success of the party, Gretta is quiet and withdrawn. She 
finally explains the reason for her mood, thereby undergoing a moment of such 
emotional distress that Gabriel is startled out of his complacency into self-reflection. 
Gretta's is the original epiphany. She has heard a familiar song that has revived the 
memory of her first love, Michael Furey, who died, she believes, because of his great 
love for her. This recollection affects her deeply and in turn prompts her husband 
Gabriel, to examine his own past and present. 
Gillies believes that Gretta's epiphany causes Gabriel to experience one himself 
She argues that this is both a Proustian method of recollection - as a recollection 
brought to present life prompts another - as well as also being Bergsonian, because it 
shows how memory impinges on present life which is, in turn, altered by this event. 
However, Deleuze understands Proust's A la recherche A temps perdu as a 
'symptomatology' of various worlds of signs indicating underlying forces which 
mobilize the involuntary and ontological unconscious. These worlds include those of 
love, the social world, the material world, and the world of literature and art - which he 
notes that Proust sees as transforming all of the others. (PS 26-102) The world of love 
according to Proust, Deleuze argues, is characterised by insincerity and betrayal and, I 
suggest, Gillies's invocation of Proust rather than substantiating Furey's absolute 
commitment throws doubt upon it. 
Thus, even if Michael Furey's death was not caused by his trip to Gretta's home 
during a storm, Gretta, possibly disappointed in her marriage to Gabriel, because it 
lacks the great passion she thought love entailed, may choose to explain Michael's 
death as a result of his love for her. Be that as it may, the events of the past assume a 
295 lbid, p. 223 
154 
significance that may in fact be distorted but they force both Gretta and Gabriel to 
reassess their present lives according to Gillies. She appears to imply a future 'happy 
outcome' through such problematization and reflection which for her suggests a new 
beginning, but Joyce's depiction of the negative forces at work in the Dublin of that era 
might seem to indicate otherwise; these forces would of course include the 'world' of 
love, not simply characterised by betrayal alone but by the recuperative forces of 
Christianity. 
Gillies fails to appreciate that in epiphanic terms the importance of 'The Dead' is 
that it is the story in which Joyce finally turns away from seeing the epiphany as a 
'frozen moment' which he now appears to regard as the aesthetic misconception of his 
younger self. He takes further his ironic re-working of the Ballast Office clock of 
Stephen Hero in 'Two Gallants', and his ironic problematisation of the epiphany in 'A 
Painful Case% to show that the frozen isolated aesthetic moment of his original 
understanding of the epiphany was far too narrowly conceived. The epiphany is 
composed of all the material forces of the universe, including its reception into 
consciousness, which stem from the 'virtual', or Lawrentian 'chaos'. Movement, 
change and difference are intimately involved and as Joyce went on to show in the 
Wake, and Deleuze remarked it 'releas[es] the precious image from the natural 
conditions that determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the chosen artistic conditions' 
[3.1]. 
Thus, Gabriel, in the 'Distant Music' passage, first sees Gretta in aesthetic terms 
and then through Gretta's revelations is forced to take account of all that has gone on 
before and the immanent realities which account for her pensive pose. Gabriel has to 
learn, as Joyce has learned, that behind the epiphanic moment there is a material history 
with which it is inextricably intertwined. This cannot be encapsulated in a 'freeze 
frame' it is rather an ongoing moving picture or cinematic experience involving not 
only past experiences but the challenges and activities involving the present and future. 
Thus, this final story in Dubliners shows Joyce entering into his mature style(s) as he 
leaves behind his earlier aestheticism and reaches out for a more grounded viewpoint. 
Dubliners preceded A Portrait in publication terms and unless we see Joyce operating 
in 'duration' rather than linear clock-time this argument would appear to make little 
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sense. The question would remain, 'how could he problematise a position which he had 
not yet adopted? ' Only, I suggest, by working backwards and forwards through 
incremental repetition in 'duration' as the time of life. Dubliners was being written in 
clock-time well before A Portrait was undertaken, but Joyce was working 
simultaneously on Dubliners and Stephen Hero in 1904. Although the first version of 
Dubliners was sent to Grant Richards in 1905 well before A Portrait first appeared in 
published form in 1914, it wasn't until 1907 that Joyce wrote 'The Dead'. The 
following year he abandoned Stephen Hero and began recasting it as A Portrait. Then in 
1914 when Dubliners was finally published so A Portrait began serial publication in the 
Egoist. Joyce was probably playing dialectically with the idea of the epiphany 
throughout this period, both putting it forward as an aesthetic concept and ironically 
undermining it at the same time. From A Portrait on the Joycean epiphany is 
continuously interwoven with movements, nodes, dynamic concepts, and is more 
detached from the character's subjectivity, except when it is being parodied. 
To be fair to Gillies it is certainly the case that some stories do end with a kind of 
revelation in which as Connor puts it 'the reader shares the moment of enlargement of 
consciousness of character'. 296 Thus, at the end of 'Araby' the disappointed boy who 
has been deceived and diminished by the tawdry glamour of the bazaar sees himself 'as 
a creature driven and derided by vanity: and my eyes burned with anguish and anger', 
(D 20) but this is hardly a Bergsonian epiphany by Gillies's standards. Moreover, as 
Connor points out, 'in most other cases, there is no such congruence between the 
perceptions of character and reader', rather 'most of the stories end with anticlimax, 
incompleteness, or even concealment'. 297 In 'Clay' for instance Maria seems to be 
completely unaware of the limitations which her life in the Dublin of that epoch has 
placed on it, and in this I would argue she is not unlike a member of the 'poor' yet to be 
constituted within Hardt and Negri's 'multitude'. Nevertheless, Joyce makes evident the 
296 Steven Connor, James Joyce (Plymouth: Northcote House with The British Council, 
1996), p. 13. 
297 Ibid. 
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forces which 'congeal, to form her problematic situation thereby offering the reader the 
necessary insights to go beyond this. 
Beja acknowledges the difficulty of giving a clear definition of epiphanies, but then 
attempts to do so - whilst acknowledging that both Stephen and Joyce go 'beyond [any] 
definition [as Stephen has stated] "to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing 
that they are the most delicate and evanescent of moments". ý298 Therefore, from both a 
Joycean and a Deleuzian point of view we need to be wary of this move, and it is worth 
recalling here too Lacan's 'pas a lire', 299 which indicates that Joyce's writing cannot be 
interpreted within a psychoanalytic critical context. As Budgen states, Joyce wanted his 
readers 'to understand always through suggestion rather than direct statement', 300 and 
although Bej a pays particular attention to the way in which Stephen describes 
epiphanies in Stephen Hero, he sees this as at best 'helpful but not all sufficient ... vague 
and general as they are' 301 and he immediately seeks greater clarity. 
It is not this supposed vagueness which commends them to a Deleuzian reading. In 
fact Deleuze too, following Bergson closely, 302 regards such Joycean intuition, which 
gives us his 'epiphanic machine', as a precise instrument which turns intellect and lived 
experience away from simply noticing utility and survival, towards the very conditions 
and intensities which allow such experience to take place (B 115-116): 
Intuition is the method of Bergsonism. Intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, 
nor a disorderly sympathy, but ... one of the most 
fully developed methods in 
298 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 79. 
299 Luke Thurston,, "Writing the Symptom: Lacan's Joycean Knot' (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury, October 1997), p. vii. 
300 Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Allaking of 'b7ysses'and other writings (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21. 
30 1 Bej a, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 15. 
302 Henri Bergson, 'Philosophical Intuition: A Lecture given at the Philosophical 
Congress in Bologna, April I Oth 1911', in Key Writings, eds Keith Ansell Pearson and 
John Mullarkey (New York and London: Continuum, 22002), pp. 233-247. 
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philosophy. It has its strict rules ... which 
Bergson calls 'precision' in philosophy. 
(B 13) 
These rules are then sets out by Deleuze in considerable detail. Intuition is not itself 
'duration' for either Deleuze or Bergson, but rather 'presupposes duration,. 303 It is 'the 
movement by which we emerge from our own duration' and 'make use of our own 
duration to affirm ... and recognize the existence of other durations', passing 'beyond 
both idealism and realism in the process'. (B 33) 
Beja's approach immediately reductively 'actualises' it to fon-n a 'badly analysed 
composite' which contaminates true time, as 'duration', implicitly acting in 
unconstrained 'smooth space', with the severely restricted 'striated space' of 'clock- 
time'. (TP 352) Effectively it confuses differences in kind with differences of degree. (B 
17-18) Despite this, we have Beja's 'general working definition' as: 
a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from some object, scene, event, or 
memorable phase of the mind - the manifestation being out of proportion to the 
significance or strictly logical relevance of whatever produces it. 304 
which he has further dissected into: 
... two major types: what I call the 'retrospective' epiphany, and that of 'the past 
recaptured. ' The retrospective epiphany is one in which an event arouses no special 
impression when it occurs, but produces a sudden sensation of new awareness 
when it is recalled at some future time. I shall discuss such moments of delayed 
revelation when we come to both Joyce and Thomas Wolfe. Discussion of 
experiences involving the actual recapture of the past, as opposed to its mere 
recollection, is best postponed until the section on Marcel Proust in my second 
chapter. 305 
Immediately we see in this 'clarification' with its conflation of Joyce's and Thomas 
Wolfe's epiphanies and separation of Joycean and Proustian ones a division which 
Deleuze [3.1, note] does not make. 
303 lbid, p. 13. 
304 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 18. 
305 lbid, p. 15. 
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Beja, like Gillies, is relegating Joycean epiphanies to the status of personal memory 
and 'mere' recollection, and as such depriving them of any sense of 'becoming', whilst 
granting Proustian epiphanies access to the ontological 'whole' past of the 'virtual' 
from which all 'becomings' must stem. However, Deleuze is far more concerned with 
the 'univocity' which Joyce and Proust share - although this 'univocity' will of course 
be expressed through difference - rather than any division between the two; they each 
make evident those conditions which allow living experience to take place. Deleuze 
points out that when we: 
... compare the Proustian conception of the image with ... Joyce's epiphany ... [t]he following features seem to be shared: image as autonomous link between two 
concrete objects insofar as they are different (image, concrete equation); style, as 
multiplicity of viewpoints toward the same object and exchange of viewpoints 
toward several objects; language, as integrating and comprehending its own 
variations constitutive of a universal history and making each fragment speak 
according to its own voice; literature as production, as operation of affect- 
producing machines; explication, not as didactic intention but as technique of 
envelopment and development; writing as ideogrammatic method (with which 
Proust allies himself on several occasions). [3.3] 
Beja, however, falling foul of his overly clear distinctions, is 'never absolutely 
certain whether Stephen actually recaptures the past [like Proust], or whether he simply 
recalls it, even during his visions in the Night-town episode of Ulysses. ' Eventually, he 
simply leaves this in abeyance and goes on to argue that: 
far more important in Joyce's fiction ... are what I call retrospective epiphanies, 
those occasions when an event seems trivial while it occurs and assumes 
importance only long after it has passed. ... one 
day, even if many years later, it is 
remembered and produces a revelation - but only in retrospect. 
306 
In contrast to BeJa, Hugh Kenner 307 argues strongly for the relationship of 
subjective perception and objective revelation in the Joycean epiphany. It seems to me 
that Deleuze would come down strongly in favour of Kenner's implicitly topological 
approach here, working through the 'middle', though he might well disagree with 
306 lbid, p. 77 
307 Hugh Kenner, Dublin's Joyce (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). 
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Kenner's assumption that the treatment of aesthetics in A Portrait is ironic 308 [2.3]. 
Kenner had stated that 'it is things which achieve epiphany under the artist's alchemical 
power, and not his own soul which he manifests -- -', 
309 and 'it is radically impossible to 
understand what Joyce is talking about from the standpoint of the post-Kantian 
conviction that the mind imposes intelligibility upon things'. 3 10 This too is very much in 
line with Bergson's thinking on intuition 311 springing from an immanent 'outside'. a 
possibility which Kant would have denied. As Kenner appreciates, Kant's thinking 
remains a rational 'psychologism', 312 as noted above, and Deleuze 313 accepts Bergson's 
move from the conception of 'duration' as purely human and restricted to our 
consciousness to granting it a reality encompassing all the forces composing organic 
and inorganic matter, including mind and consciousness. Beja, on the other hand, argues 
that: 
Although such an epiphany would arise from the perception of something external., 
Joyce's emphasis is generally on the perceiving consciousness, the subject who 
actively adjusts his 'spiritual' vision to focus on the object, which in turn 'is 
epiphanised. ' Realizing this point helps us to understand Joyce's attitude toward 
epiphany, which is related to his whole view of the act of perception and 
consequently to his aesthetic theory. His stress on the perceiver is in line ... with 
the general development in epistemology from an emphasis on the object that 
reveals itself, fundamentally through God's grace, to an emphasis on the role of 
manIs mind and imagination: from revelation by the object to insight on the part of 
the subject. For Joyce to have given the primary role to something outside man's 
consciousness would have involved him in metaphysical problems which he avoids. 
314 
308 Ibid, p. 13 7. 
309 lbid, p. 14 1. 
310 lbid, p. 13 8. 
31 1 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 291. 
312 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by D. Cairns (The 
Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1969), passim. Philip Turetzky, Time (London: Routledge, 
1998), pp. 212-214. 
313 Also see Philip Turetzky, Time, pp. 212-214. 
314 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 77. (My italics for emphasis) 
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Yet, Bej a concedes that Joyce's 
language is occasionally ambiguous, and there are a few expressions in Stephen's 
exposition of aesthetics - at one point he mentions that "the object achieves its 
epiphany" - which in themselves might lead one to suppose that Stephen regards 
epiphany as a nonsubjective phenomenon. 315 
However, Beja does not see it this way arguing that: 
The tendency to focus on the object stems partially, I think, from a misleading 
concentration on some vague implications in Stephen's general aesthetic theory, 
when it is more worthwhile to look at his actual epiphanies. There is not one in 
which the 'otherness' of the object is as significant as the revelation produced in 
the perceiver. When, in the Portrait, Stephen sees an inscription of the wordfoetus, 
he does not learn a thing about the carving, but a good deal about himself and his 
place in the world. Later in the novel he sees the wading girl, and what he and the 
reader learn about her does not have nearly the significance of what they learn 
about Stephen. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely and would only 
demonstrate Joyce's full awareness of what Proust's Marcel realizes even as he 
tastes the madeleine dipped in tea: 'It is plain that the object of my quest, the truth, 
lies not in the cup but in myself (Swann's Way, 1 : 34). 316 
Contrariwise, it is precisely in such a major epiphany as the 'bird girl' that Joyce 
may be seen as deploying and reworking, throughout Uysses and the Wake, this image 
as a 'block of becoming': 'the girl' as epiphanic producer of 'becoming woman' as she 
appears in 'simulacra' throughout Joyce's works. Using a non-Deleuzian terminology 
she can be seen as Joyce's constant creative 'muse'. Moreover., it seems that having 
divided Joycean and Proustian epiphanies, Beja needs to bring them together here in 
order to make his point. 
Conclusion 
The problems and weaknesses in some Joycean critics understanding of the 
epiphany have been addressed and an alternative understanding has been advanced. I 
now need to move to readings of the Wake in order to see if this Deleuzian alternative is 
valid. 
315 fbid, pp. 77-78. 
316 lbid, p. 78. 
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Chapter IV 
In the next two chapters, where I address the Wake, I intend to develop the insights 
provided in the previous chapter. I will take the earlier Deleuzian understanding of the 
epiphany constructed through portmanteau words and combine it with the later 
Deleuzoguattarian conception of 'becoming girl/ becoming woman' through Issy. as 
well as some of the other lexical, syntactic, and structural usages which Deleuze and 
Guattari ignore. In the first place I believe that a more complete understanding of 
Joyce's works seen from a 'symptomatological' Deleuzian perspective can be gained by 
focusing on Issy in the Wake. Secondly, however, it will be argued that by reading Issy 
in relation to Anna Livia - because 'becoming woman or the molecular woman is the 
girl herself, (TP 276-277) or as Joyce may have put it 'the way to daughter led through 
mother, the way to mother through daughter'(U 815) - that the productivity of the 
reading will be substantially increased. Of course the Wakean 'affects' which I hold that 
Joyce creates through Issy occur either through or in con unction with the words and 
syntax which compose 'her' as text. 
I will focus my readings of Issy on two areas of the book where 'she' appears 
prominently. In this chapter I will look at The Mime of Mick Nick, and the Maggies 
(FW 219.18-252.2 1) and in Chapter Five I will examine in detail Issy's 'music' or 'love 
letter'. (FW 279H) Throughout both chapters I will attempt to present Issy in 
Deleuzoguattarian terms as a crucial, but misunderstood, node in what can be seen as 
the 'rhizomatic assemblage' or 'network' which constitutes the 'epiphanic machine' of 
the Wake. I argue that 'she' is more than simply a textual presence which calls into 
question our traditional concepts of character through the activity of portmanteau 
words, although 'she' is certainly that too. Issy, I believe, is not to be conceived of as 
either unified textual character on 'the first plane of writing' - and certainly not on 'the 
plane of organisation' as Lucia Joyce - but as the intensities of the 'desiring machine' 
offering readers a 'line of flight'. Issy conceived as 'desiring machine' is not to be 
thought of in terms of internal mechanisms, but only as operational (dis)connections, 
(AO 36) for 'there is only desire and the social, and nothing else'. (AO 29) Desire, as the 
Wake's 'Body without Organs', 'continually dismantle[s] the organism, causing 
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asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate'. (TP 4) Issy, conceived as 
such disruptive desire in my reading, operates through 'the middle', and is located on 
'the second plane of writing'. 
Derek Attridge points out the need for a different criticism from that offered by 
standard readings of the Wake when he argues that: 
[w]hen the Wake is welcomed, it is often by means of a gesture that simultaneously 
incapacitates it, either by placing it in a sealed-off category (the impenetrable and 
inexpressible world of the dream), or by subjecting it to the same interpretative 
mechanisms that are applied to all literary texts, as if it were no different: the 
elucidation of an 'intention' (aided by draft material and biography), the analysis of 
'characters% the tracing of 'plot', the elaboration of 'themes', the tracking down of 
'allusions', the identification of 'autobiographical references', in sum, the whole 
panoply of modern professional criticism. 317 
He strongly implies that the Wake needs to be read differently by critics and that the 
Wake resists such readings or attempted 'reterritorialisations'. Marie-Dominique 
Gamier, from a Deleuzian viewpoint, concurs and even goes beyond Attridge. 318 In my 
focus on Issy, I accept both Attridge's and Gamier's strictures and requirements, as I 
believe that Deleuze and Guattari's quotation from D. H. Lawrence's 'Chaos in Poetry' 
states poetically Joyce's achievement in the Wake. (WIP 203-204)319 
Consequently, it is not the Husserlian phenomenology of 'communication' and 
'meaning' which I will be looking for through Issy but Deleuzoguattarian 'function' and 
'affect'. From such an angle, I believe that Hardt and Negri's reliance on 'the 
communication among singularities [which] emerges through the collaborative social 
process of production', 320 available via cyberspace, may not be sufficient in itself to 
ensure that '[t]hese singularities act in common and thus form a new race, that is, a 
politically coordinated subjectivity that the multitude produces [when] a new humanity 
317 Attridge, Peculiar Language, p. 209. 
318 Gamier, 'The lapse and the lap: Joyce with Deleuze', p. 99. 
319 See pp. 47-48 above. 
3-10 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 204. 
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will result'. 321 What is also needed according to Deleuze and Guattari is 'the 
deterritorialization. speed of the affect', (TP 356) in order to 'uproot one from 
humanity', (TP 240) for as Deleuze states 'the affect is the "new" and new affects are 
ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art'. (C] 98-99) Read as function and 
'affect' Issy can give a clear indication of what is missing from Hardt and Negri's 
analysis. 
In any Deleuzian critique it is necessary to take into account contemporary societal 
'events' and their 'affects'. It is widely held that depite his wanderings Joyce never left 
Dublin. In looking at the social conditions which the book is held to diagnose from such 
a perspective one needs to start from here, although Joyce's Dublin represents all 
modem cities. Deleuze and Guattari of course see the contemporary in terms of the 
problematics posed by the 'reterritorialisations' of capitalism, and Joyce has been 
shown above to explore and diagnose these in Ireland and elsewhere, first through 
societal paralysis and then through Bloomian masochism. 
The societal problems epitomised through Bloom relate to patriarchy's weakened 
nil, ability to contain the dilemmas it poses through the impersonal forces of desire at 
certain historical moments in modernity. Joyce's early writings, extending we are told 
from his first poem as a child, through Dubliners and A Portrait to Ulysses, can be seen 
to focus on one historical moment in which these problematics of the intensities of 
desire were historically highlighted: Parnell and the reactions to his adultery which split 
down the middle both Irish opinion and the Nationalist movement - itself deeply 
implicated in Church and State repression of desire. Whereas such new Irish women as 
the fictional Miss Ivors , in 'The Dead', 
had helped create Parnell and consequently 
wished to maintain him in position, his libidinal 'splitting' encouraged them to betray 
him as they too echoed the recuperative forces of Church and State. Dante Riordan in A 
Portrait, though hardly a new Irish woman, profoundly illustrates this repressive 
tendency. 
321 lbid, pp. 355-356. 
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From a Deleuzogiiattarian angle too one needs to take into account that the Wake 
was written between two world wars and, read 'symptomatologically', the effects and 
'affects' of this historical placement necessarily resonate throughout the text. During the 
First World War the soldiers fighting in the trenches, and afterwards those on the 'home 
front'. realised that they had been lied to by their leaders and patriarchal values came to 
be seen as little more than a sham. (A prescient Stephen in the 'Aeolus' episode of 
Ulysses voiced this awareness even though the words, ironically, were spoken by the 
'oedipalised', sentimental, would-be Irish revolutionaries against the hegemonic control 
of England and the English language: 'Noble words coming. Look out', expressing 
values which he was aware were already 'gone with the wind'. (U 180-181)) 
Questioned from all sides, the repressions expressed through 'noble words' weakened, 
and the impersonal desiring forces - stemming from the ontological unconscious or 
'BwO' - surfaced once more as the patriarchal Symbolic order was no longer able to 
contain them. In formal terms one might see this as suffragettism, the Women's 
Movement, and the clamour for votes for women. This., however, is to 'oedipalise' such 
unpredictable libidinal forces, as their 'affects' went much further than this. 
The underlying question was 'how could the daughters of the new twentieth 
century cope with this new fault line, and the opportunities and dangers it offered? '. In 
Ulysses, Molly's adultery encouraged by Bloom can be seen as both reflecting in 
reverse the problem forced upon the Irish nation as a result of Pamell's sexual 
indiscretion and pointing the way to a feminist consciousness. Both Parnell's and 
Molly's indiscretions expose the split caused by a weakened patriarchy no longer able 
to contain adequately free-flowing desire. In Molly's reversal we are shown that this 
problem is finally brought to a head through the female. The Wake takes this 
problematic situation further with Issy epitomising and highlighting uncontainable 
desiring forces, constituted by patriarchy as 'other' and consequently female. 
The historical moment, when Joyce was writing the Wake, was that of the roaring 
twenties, the jazz age, with the advent of the flapper set against the background of 
looming economic and international political crises which witnessed the Wall Street 
crash and a bankrupted and a resentful Germany about to slough off an imposed 
democracy and embrace either Communism or Nazism during the early 1930s. These 
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were problems which would ultimately culminate in The Second World War. Again, we 
see, highlighted by Joyce, the split caused by the release of these impersonal desiring 
forces on the bourgeois young women of the time, through a capitalist formation no 
longer able to adequately contain them. 
Many young women such as Peggy Guggenheim, are instanced by Carol Loeb 
Shloss in her biography of Lucia Joyce 322 who, gaining their freedom in a release from 
patriarchal repression, initially seem to take control of their own lives and engage in 
'free love', whilst never making any lasting contractual relationships with the feckless 
young men - who were equally concerned to have a good time - frequently become 
pregnant and have many abortions, marry and divorce often, then become clinically 
depressed and threaten or actually attempt suicide and, if they survive such attempts, 
then spend considerable time in mental hospitals in a belated patriarchal effort to 're- 
oedipalise' them. Whilst such difficulties may seem to afflict a particular class and 
expatriate culture only, there is substantial evidence to show that this problem was 
widespread throughout the Western social order. The first lines of Issy's letter in the 
Wake may reflect this general malaise '... With all these gelded ewes jilting about and 
the thrills and ills of laylock blossoms ... I was thinking 
fairly killing times of putting an 
end to myself and my malody'. (FW 279F 1.1 -2) This will be discussed in the following 
chapter. It is the failure of a weakened patriarchy to contain the impersonal forces of 
desire and their effects on a generation of young women and men, which these lines 
signify, I argue, rather then a personal cri de coeur of one such young woman: Lucia 
Joyce. 
Despite the above analysis, I need to stress that linking Dubliners, A Portrait, 
Ulysses and the Wake, to particular historical moments does not mean that they are 
contained and explained by or through these times. The Wake, in particular, is an open 
text and speaks to everyone today and tomorrow whatever the particular historical 
circumstances capitalism brings about. Because of its productive desiring 
'multiplicities' it cannot be 'oedipally' fixed and 'molarised' in clock-time, nor given 
322 Carol Loeb Shloss, Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake (London and New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2003), passim. 
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cmeaning' through always already available formulations. Similarly, I believe that it is 
precisely the inability of the capitalist social order to maintain its hold on productive 
desire which gives Hardt and Negri, who make this a central plank of their argument in 
Empire and Multitude, such potential importance in changed circumstances. Yet, the 
Wake both pre-dates and goes beyond Empire, I would argue, in its bringing into focus 
productive desire which it does through Issy. 
Although I am writing on Joyce and Deleuze my attribution of a multiplicity of 
Deleuzian concepts to Issy in this and the following chapter is not a Joycean attempt to 
have it both - or indeed many - ways at the same time, but rather to take advantage of 
my earlier definition of the Deleuzian concept. At the outset of Chapter One, I defined 
the Deleuzian philosophic concept not in terms of the logic of exclusive disjunction, but 
rather as one determined by context and difference: 'pure and simple variations ordered 
according to their neighbourhood'. (WIP 19) In setting out there the links which the 
'line of flight' has to 'affect', 'the middle', the 'event', and most significantly 
'becomings' and the 'BwO' as pivotal concepts, it seems to me that all of the concepts 
which I use with Issy can be regarded as variations or expansions of 'her' as 'desiring 
machine' and the process of 'becoming girl' as 'she' appears in a variety of contexts 
within the text. Consequently, Issy can never be pinned down as textual character or 
unified subject or person. One can know 'her' only through textual 'affects'. Thus, 
despite the weight of critical opinion which avers that Joyce's guilty association with 
Lucia is directly or indirectly depicted in and fundamental to our understanding of the 
Wake,, by reading Issy on the 'second plane of writing', I wish to go beyond this critical 
consensus and with it an entire understanding of the Wake itself. 
Even those critics who have attempted Deleuzian readings of the Wake have not 
made explicit the critical feature of the 'second plane of writing' in their analyses, and 
consequently I believe that they have not been able to bring out the importance of 
Joyce's epiphanic 'bird-girl' muse or her appearances 'anew! throughout Joyce's entire 
corpus as Deleuzian 'simulacrum'. In particular no one has made the 'rhizomatic' link 
between 'her' earlier appearances and 'her' final significant and culminatory 
appearance in the Wake as Issy. and Joyce's consequent highlighting of the forces of 
impersonal desire in the Wake. As Deleuze points out of the portmanteau words which 
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constitute Issy and the Wake: jb]etween these basic series.. a sort of internal resonance 
is produced; and this resonance induces a forced movement, which goes beyond the 
series themselves. These are the characteristics of the simulacrum, when it breaks its 
chains and rises to the surface: it then affirms its phantasmatic power, that is, its 
repressed power' [2.3]. In my reading of the Wake it is Issy who/which releases this 
repressed power as 'bird girl' simulacrum. 
From the standpoint of traditional Wake criticism, the first question to be asked 
must be: given the major figures of HCE and ALP, who have been read as representing 
male and female principles, encompassing all of the minor ones, 323 and that Adaline 
Glasheen needs over three hundred double-column pages to list and identify the 
characters,, real and fictitious who appear or are mentioned in the Wake, 324 why should I 
focus on Issy in this chapter? Even if one limits the cast to five main 'characters'(H. C. 
Earwicker, his wife Anna Livia, their twin sons Shem and Shaun, and the daughter Issy) 
this choice still seems quite arbitrary. However, as has been indicated above, I intend to 
read Issy not as a 'character' on 'the first plane of writing' but rather as 'desiring 
machine' offering a 'line of flight' on the 'second plane'. I believe that Joyce's 
statement that there is 'no connection between the people in Uysses and the people in 
Work in Progress. There are in a way no characters 325 together with the assurance 
which he gave to Eugene Jolas that '[t]ime and the river and the mountain are the real 
326 heroes of my book' , allows 
for this approach. Furthermore, in stressing the textuality 
of Issy and the other 'characters' one needs to take into account Derek Attridge's 
comment on characters in the Wake: 
323 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 564. 
324 Adaline Glasheen, Third Census of 'Finnegans Wake'. - An Index of Character's and 
their Roles (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977), 
passim. 
325 Ellmann, James Joyce, pp. 695-6. 
326 lbid, p. 565. 
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One possibility is to turn for assistance to the other meaning of the word character: 
a written sign. ... 
by allowing the two senses to overlap (which, in spite of their 
sharing a single signifier, our discursive habits usually prevent), by insisting that 
every time the term character is used to mean an 'assemblage of consistent 
personal qualities' it should be thickened and coloured by the sense of character as 
'arbitrary sign in a conventional, historically determined system', we may be able 
to talk about characters in a novel without subscribing to the ideological premises 
which habitually underpin such discussions. And this, of course, is just what Joyce 
does: it is only in this double sense that we can legitimately talk of HCE and ALP 
as Icharacters' in Finnegans Wake: they are persons only insofar as they are at the 
same time letters scattered across the text. 327 
and one might add Issy not simply as the daughter of HCE, or even a disguised 
representation of Lucia Joyce, but rather 'the dotter of his eyes'. (FW 3 72.03) 
Richard Brown's comment of two decades ago that 'it has seemed easier to account 
for items in Joyce's texts through an investigation of their similarity to events in his life, 
than to ask questions about the relevance of such items to contemporary issues', 328 
329 
seems to be as true today as it was then when David Wright , 
for example, writing at 
the same time as Brown, observed of the Wake, that: 
[T]hroughout Joyce) s work,, the traits in question clearly derive from his own, 
focusing on autobiographical characterisation can show that for all its oddity, the 
Wake treats some of the same concerns as Joyce's earlier works. 330 
Yet, as Wright himself notes '[c]haracterisation in the Wake can become bewilderingly 
fluid and difficult to define', 331 which is not surprising given Joyce's assertion that there 
327 Derek Attridge, Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory and History (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 54-55. 
328 Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality, p. 2. 
329 David G. Wright, Characters of Joyce (Dublin and Totowa, N. J.: Gill and 
Macmillan, and Barnes and Noble, 1983). 
330 Ibid, p. 105. 
331 lbid, p. 104. 
169 
are 'in a way no characters' in the Wake, unless one is talking of character as written 
sign. 332 
Who or what then is Issy? Critics' views range from either ignoring Issy 
333 or 
acknowledging 'her' existence with a certain perplexity 334 - which generally 
incorporates a belief that, whilst initially conceived by Joyce as a major character, 
Issy's importance was downgraded later and so she only appears by default in the 
published tCXt335 - to a belief that Issy is more easily explained than the other characters 
in the Wake, 336 often leading to a straightforward association of Issy with Lucia Joyce 337 
as 'her psychical counterpart in real life', 338 and thus a clinical schizophrenic. 339 Very 
many feminist critics link Issy and Lucia directly, 340 not least Hel&ne Cixous 341 Who 
332 1 do not wish to denigrate or ignore the excellent work done by Andrew Norris in 
'The Search for Character in Finnegans Wake'(unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Leeds, School of English, 1992). His highly intelligent and subtle analysis shows that 
it is possible to convincingly draw out characters from the Wake. Nevertheless, from a 
Deleuzian viewpoint I am more concerned with the Wake as offering, not a more or less 
disguised set of characters 'actualised' through the 'first plane of writing', but the lines, 
forces and intensities derived from the 'second plane of writing' which constitute all 
characters in capitalist modernity. This is how I interpret Joyce's 'in a way there are no 
characters' in the Wake. 
333 Beja, Epiphany in the Modern Novel, p. 95. 
334 Bonnie Kirne Scott, Joyce and Feminism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984), p. 184. 
335 David Hayman, I Think Her Pretty: Reflections of the Familiar in Joyce's 
Notebook VI. B. 5', Joyce Studies Annual I (1990), 43-60 (pp. 50-5 1). 
336 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 568. 
337 Bonnie Kime Scott, James Joyce (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities 
Press International,, 1987), p. 126. 
338 Laurent Milesi, 'Toward a Female Grammar of Sexuality: The De/Recomposition of 
"Storiella as she is syung", Modern Fiction Studies 35.3 (Autumn 1989), p. 579. 
339 Margaret McBride,, 'Finnegans Wake: The Issue of Issy's Schizophrenia', Jojýce 
Studies Annual., VII (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1966), 145-175 
340 Shari Benstock, 'The Genuine Christine: Psychodynamics of Issy, in Women in 
Joyce, ed. by S. A. Henke and Elaine Unkeless (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
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suggests that the 'profound relationship' of Joyce and Lucia, to quote Jung, 
342 went 
beyond the usual love of a father for his daughter and developed into an incestuous one. 
Cixous speaks of 'this ardcnt and guilty father', 343 whose guilt is indirectly depicted in 
the Wake through the crimes of Earwicker. However, Shloss, who has written the most 
recent and certainly the most meticulously researched biography of Lucia to date, 
believes that there is insufficient evidence to come to, a definitive conclusion on 'the 
hoary head of incest for which there is no historical evidence'. 344 1 believe that this 
whole approach shows the pervasive 'oedipalising' forces of traditional criticism at 
work in even one of the best attested feminist theorists. 
Such an approach has been surprisingly summarised in Margot Norris's blunt 
assertion that Joyce simply took his everyday experiences and transcribed them 
indirectly into the Wake, although in fairness one must add that she does not make a 
direct reference to Joyce and Lucia's supposed incestuous relationship. Nevertheless, in 
noting 'the depressing circumstances of Joyce's life', Norris believes of 11.1, that this 
... can 
be recognized in transcribed form in the children's chapter: Joyce's 
worsening eye problem becomes Glugg's inability to see and determine colours; 
the unintelligibility of Lucia's worsening madness becomes the enigma of female 
1980), pp. 169-195; 'Nightletters: Woman's Writing in the Wake', in Critical Essays on 
dames Joyce, ed. by Bernard Benstock (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985)' pp. 221-233; 
and'Apostrophizing Finnegans Wake', in Textualizing the Feminine: On the Limits of 
Genre (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 49-85. Margaret C. 
Solomon, Eternal Geomater: The Sexual Universe of 'Finnegans Wake' (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 21 --3 3 0. Patrick McGee, Telling the Other: 
The Question of Value in Modern and Postcolonial Writing (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), pp. 81-93. 
341 C ixous, The Exiles ofJames Joyce, pp. 105 -106 and Chapter 6. 
342 Ellmann papers at the University of Tulsa, Number 152, Jung, from interview notes 
with Richard Ellmann (see Fordham, 'James Joyce's Finnegans Wake and Lucia 
Joyce's Breakdown', p. 56). 
343 Cixous, The Exiles of'James Joyce, p. 15. 
344 Shloss, Lucia Joyce, p. 443. 
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nature and desire encoded in the heliotropic riddle; Joyce's dental pain becomes 
little Glugg's tummy ache. 345 
This sits rather oddly with her assertion that 'Finnegans Wake might be said to be 
"about" not being certain what it is about: its subject is the nature of indeterminacy 
itSCIf. 346 DcsPitc her 'decentred subject'. 
347 
evidently for Norris as for the others, Issy 
is Lucia Joyce, whatever her other uncertainties about the Wake. 
Nevertheless, even if one were to take Norris's biographical or Jung's 
psychoanalytical approach to Joyce's work, it seems evident that such lines as '[t]hose 
quiet cold fingers have touched the pages, foul and fair, on which my shame shall glow 
for ever. Quiet and cold and pure fingers. Have they never erred? ', 348 do not refer to 
Lucia as Issy but to one or more of Joyce's pupils in Trieste, and such 'pupil-teachers 
erringnesses' (FW 279F1.4-5) might well be seen in these terms. Yet, Jung in focusing 
on Lucia as Joyce's 'femme inspiratrice [or] his anima' 349 finds Lucia to be directly 
implicated in both Ulysses and the Wake. Other Joyce critics, not easily characterised as 
feminist or working within a psychoanalytic frame, apparently accept the Lucia/ Issy 
connection. These range from Adaline Glasheen who wrote that 'Joyce observed his 
daughter's madness with care and interest and wrote about it with great power and bad 
taste', 350 to Finn Fordham's observation twenty years later that Lucia's dance 'becomes 
a metaphor for the book itself. 351 
345 Norris, Joyce's Web, p. 185. 
346 Margot Norris, 'Finnegans Wake', in The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, 
ed. by Derek Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 162. 
347 Norris, The Decentered Universe, passim. 
348 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. 13. 
349 Jung used Aristotle's terminology in the latter"s Physics, De anima (On the Souo, he 
believed that the anima was the inner feminine part (or soul) of the male personality. 
350 Glasheen, Third Census of 'Finnegans Wake', p. 149. 
35 1 Finn Fordham, 'Finnegans Wake and the Dance, Abiko Quarterly with James Joyce 
Studies 9 (1997-1998), 12. 
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Moreover, there have been a considerable number of novelists, short story writers, 
poets, and playwrights over the years who have made Lucia Joyce and her relationship 
to the work of her father"' the subject of their endeavours, and Michael Hastings is 
only the latest of them at the time of writing. In the notes to his Play Calico he states 
unequivocally that Joyce's incestuous relationship with Lucia was the unacknowledged 
cause of Lucia's schizophrenia, guiltily reflected by Joyce in the Wake, as he holds that 
'[n]obody will deny that this book is about incest with [his] daughter'. 353 As noted 
above Shloss is more circumspect arguing that there is insufficient evidence for such a 
conclusion although the possibility of incest with her brother Giorgio is raised by Shloss 
as she asks 'why was the ten-year-old Lucia ... sleeping in the same bed with her 
sexually self-conscious brother? -) . 
354 
Whatever their views, and whatever their doubts, I believe that they all attempt to 
read Issy in commonsensical terms as 'a character' located on 'the first plane of 
writing'. In doing this they may, I suspect, have been somewhat misled by Joyce 
himself in his mischievous reference to 'the charictures in the drame! '. (FW 302.31-32) 
These 'charictures% I believe, are less characters than Joycean caricatures, or Deleuzian 
352 The following are only some of these fictionalised accounts of the supposed Lucia/ 
Joyce/ Wake biographical connections given by Shloss, Lucia Joyce, p. 520, n. 4.: 
Samuel Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women (London: Calder Publications, 
1993); Alison Leslie Gold, The Clairvoyant: The Imagined Life of Lucia Joyce (New 
York: Hyperion Books, 1992); Frances Benn Hall, 'Lucia', in Ezra's Nohfor Willie and 
Other Plays (Lenox, Mass.: Mountain Press, 1996); Aimee Houser, 'Lucia's 
Commitment: A Poem Based on Brenda Maddox's Nora% James Joyce Literary 
Supplement (Spring, 1997); Lynne Kaufman, Speaking in Tongues: a Play (San Diego, 
Calif.: North Coast Repertory Theatre, April-May 1991); Joyce Carol Oates, 'Daisy', in 
Major American Short Stories, ed. by A. Walton Litz (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980); Hedy Weiss, dreaming lucia: a play (Chicago, Ill.: AthenaeumTheatre, 
April 1995). 
353 Michael Hastings, 'A Note about Calico', in Programme Notes to 'Calico' (London: 
Duke of York's Theatre, March 2004), p. 3; and Calico (London: Oberon Books, 2004), 
pp. 5-13. 
354 Shloss, Lucia Joyce, p. 72. 
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mappings of forces, whose immanent relations constitute the Wakean machine as I hope 
to show. As Foucault put it in his essay on Deleuze, 'univocity' is 'the principal 
condition which permits difference to escape the domination of identity', 355 and Deleuze 
himself states unequivocally that such 'difference must be articulation and connection 
in itself; it must relate dýf , 
ferent to dffi p 
. 
Terent without any mediation whatsoever by the 
identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed'. (DR 117) It is precisely this 
difference of articulation and 'rhizomatic' connection which characterises Issy and 
distinguishes her from Lucia's schizophrenic disconnections. 
Given the above conspectus of critical opinion, it appears that in the main Joycean 
critics seem to largely ignore the 'second plane of writing', or textual 'plane of 
immanence' - where I believe we should locate the intensities of Issy - in order to 
arborescently 'root' 'reterritorialize' and 'oedipalise' her, as a more or less disguised 
depiction of Joyce's 'schizophrenic' daughter Lucia. To some degree, they may all be 
regarded as attempting to entrap the book in Joyce's immediate everyday concerns, or at 
least a generalised Freudian 'familial' representation. Even Christine van Boheemen- 
Saaf, whom one would expect to be exempt from this 'oedipalising' approach in her 
attempt to move away from Joyce's family situation through an alternative historicist 
line, seems to fall into the same trap. She finds only loss and 'mourning' pervading a 
text unable to speak the past or properly engage with the present. Boheemen-Saaf "sadly 
bemoans 'the lack of interiority of discourse' following on from the loss of a 'coherent 
selfliood'. 356 Such assertions, in their implicit reliance on the 'lack' and loss of 
masculinist unitary identity imposed through the 'feminisation' of Celtic Ireland 
through colonial patriarchy, 357 return her argument to the 'molar line' of modernist 
recuperation epitomised by the 'oedipalised' readings of Issy as Lucia. It is perhaps 
significant that Boheemen-Saaf has stated that 'the simplest way of describing her book 
Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History' is as 'a study in the informative 
355 Foucault, 'Theatrum philosophicum', p. 172. 
356 Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History, p. 2. 
357 Amold, On the Study ofCeltic Literature. p. 91. 
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presence of what Freud calls the "death-instinct"', 358 whilst Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to the 'ridiculous death instinct' invoked by Freud. (TP 155) Consequently, I argue, 
from a Deleuzian standpoint, that whatever its other merits, her critique is unable to 
trace 'the curve of the present that goes towards the future announced by the new 
assemblage of Life that appears on the horizon ), 359 which I believe that Issy as 'girl' 
offers us in the Wakean assemblage. 
From a Bergsonian/ Deleuzian angle the works cited above limit Joyce's work to 
the 'bare repetitions' of the 'continuous present' and consequently, as I argue on their 
behalf, a restrictive reading of the Wake. Do such negative understandings differ at all 
from the lack and losses instanced in Baudrillard's version of 'simulacra"'? 360 Nietzsche,, 
Bergson, Deleuze, Hardt and Negri, and particularly Guattari writing alone all roundly 
condemn such life-denying negativities: 'the perpetual ruminations over the "death of' 
this, and the "end" of that'. 361 
Stephen, of course, projects a certain negativity throughout Ulysses, and I would 
separate his youthful epiphanic 'writerliness' from that of Joyce's later understanding of 
the epiphany in the Wake for, as Deleuze comments, the writer 'and the reader in his 
wake, is the one who "disentangles" and "re-embodies"' such experiences [3.1 ] as 'the 
incredible feeling of an unknown Nature--aff-ect'. (TP 240) Such an 'affect': 'is not a 
personal feeling [but] the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into 
upheaval and makes it reel. ... the violence of these animal sequences, uproot one 
from 
humanity'. (TP 240) Stephen's 'bird-girl' appears differently throughout Joyce's later 
work whilst always signifying new life and hope as she 'uproot[s] one from humanity'. 
Thus, in Ulysses after we have had the life-denying experience of Bloom during the 
358 Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma ofHistory, p. 1. 
359Gregg Lambert, 'On the Uses and Abuses of Literature for Life'. in Deleuze and 
Literature, ed. by Ian Buchanan, and John Marks, p. 15 5. 
360 Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p. 125, Simulations, p. 28. 
36 1 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 99-118. 
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cloud sequence in 'The Calypso' episode, the epiphanic 'girl', in a life-giving 
'becoming sun' returns differently. (U 74) Deleuze and Guattari have said of 'the girl': 
'[w]hat is a girl? ... individuation ... proceed[ing] not 
by subjectivity but by haecceity, 
pure haecceity. "Fugitive being" ... pure relation of speed and slowness, and nothing 
else'. (TP 271) '[H]aecceity' itself is the 'thisness' or 'it' of an 'event 362 - an ý'event' 
such as the 'bird girl' epiphany, or the Wakean 'assemblage' or 'epiphanic machine' in 
its totality - with its entire capacity to 'affect' or infect us as readers. 'Pure haecceity' 
is: 
a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing or 
substance. ... consist[ing] entirely of relations of movement and rest between 
molecules and particles, capacities to affect and be affected. (TP 261) 
'Pure haecceity' epitomises not only 'the girl' but pervades the Wake itself as 
epiphanic 'event'. This emphasis on 'haecceity' clearly reinforces the potential of a 
productive reading of Issy as 'the girl' crucial to the Wakean assemblage as 'epiphanic 
machine'. As such one needs to look at the impersonal intensities which make up 
textualised incest in the Wake in order to allow the text to free itself, and us, from the 
'oedipalising' recuperations through Joyce and Lucia's (supposedly) incestuous 
relationship in which many of the above critics would entrap it. VA-iilst the textual signs 
of both father-daughter and brother-sister incest undoubtedly exist in the Wake, 
Deleuze, following Chrysippus the Stoic, (L 130) sees such incest as a signifying 
relationship with 'a new discourse, a new logos animated with paradox and 
philosophical values and significations which are new': 
This is a reorientation of all thought and of what it means to think - there is no 
longer depth or height. ... It 
is always a matter of ... showing that the 
incorporeal is 
not high above (en hauteur), but is rather at the surface, ... the superficial ... par 
excellence, ... not 
Essence but Event. (L 130) 
Issy as the intensities of 'the girl' as 'she' or 'it' is implicated or involved in every 
aspect of the text including incestual encounters. As Glasheen states 'every is is Issy', 363 
362 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 65. 
363 Glasheen, Third Census of Tinnegans Wake ', pps. 13 8,18 1. 
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and one might add that so is every 'and' as she constantly works through the textual 
middle as 'desiring machine'. So, just as 'her' symbiotic relationship as 'girl' depends 
on 'becoming woman', as 'the girl is the "becoming woman" of each sex',. (TP 277) one 
can trace 'her' not only through the obvious symbiotic relationship with Anna Livia, but 
in the 'becoming woman' of Shem and Shaun as they merge in deliquescent identity, 
and even as the major force ensuring the repeated failures of HCE to maintain his 
unified patriarchal self, and his consequent though resisted movement towards 
'becoming woman'. 
As Luce Irigaray points out, the 'woman-thing' opposes patriarchal oneness 
through 'speak[ing] "fluid"', for jf1luid ... 
is, by nature, unstable. Unless it is 
subordinated to geometrism'. 364 In addition to the 'line of flight' and the creative flight 
offered by the 'bird-girl' of A Portrait there is a substantial 'rhizomatic' link between 
her as evidently 'a strange and beautiful seabird' with legs 'delicate as a crane's [with] 
an emerald trail of seaweed% and the fluidity of ALP as river, HCE as the sea (as well 
as the mountain) and Issy as the rain cloud Nuvoletta in the Wake. This watery link also 
extends to Uysses, itself based on Odysseus's voyage and adventures, where Gibraltar 
as a rock set in the sea figures prominently and such figures as Mulvey and for that 
matter the one-legged sailor whom Molly throws a coin to, as well as Murphy the sailor 
in 'Eumaeus', not forgetting the bar-maid Sirens, all play their part in this link. As for 
the problem of 'geometrism' one recalls that it is rather unsuccessfully related to the 
fluidity of ALP. (FW 283.32-284.4; 286.21-30) The geometry problem has been seen in 
11.2 as the heroic (Viconian) quest for knowledge, 365 yet this is a quest for 'meaning' 
rather than 'function' which,, we note later, results in 'the Fall' from the Garden of 
Eden. 
Issy, as 'line of flight', is 'desiring machine', the vital impetus or elan vital of the 
Wake's dynamic, and as such, I believe, has something crucial to add to Hardt and 
364 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. by Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19 8 5), pp. II 1- 12. 
365 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', pp. 606-607. 
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Negri's theorisations. I would argue that they need to go beyond the 4communicationý 
of cyberspace as liberatory device to address the 'oedipalising' forces of the 
monotheistic religions and the consequent nuclear family which form a cornerstone of 
many Third World peoples' subjectivities; peoples whom they seek to radicalize as 'the 
multitude' of globalised capitalism. I will argue in the next chapter that in Issy 1) s 
so-called 'love letter to her teacher' the impersonal forces of desire are brought to the 
fore and it is such free-flowing desire which needs to be released and brought into play 
in order to bring about Hardt and Negri's revolution. 
Our oedipalised nuclear family relationships in modernity are seen by Deleuze and 
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, in opposition to much psychoanalysis, to be historically 
specific and engendered by capitalism rather than being a universal given. Moreover, 
such 'oedipalisations' are not to be seen as limited to the neurotic individuals in our 
society but rather to characterise everyone. In their argument, not only is the institution 
of the nuclear family the creation and bastion of capitalism, but it is constituted by 
incestuous desire and its fixed subjectivities are maintained by the incest-taboo at the 
heart of its oedipalising structure. Because the incest-taboo always already exists in 
modernity and bails us into identity, 366 amorphous free flowing desire is captured and 
'docile subjects supposedly discover what they desire at the same time that they 
discover they cannot have it'. 367 
In this way desire is initially isolated from the rest of society and restricted to the 
nuclear family. Oedipal incest has both captured desire and forbidden it and in doing so 
become the false representation of desire itself. The nuclear family consequently seems 
to have been 'fabricated to meet the requirements of [the capitalist] social formation' as 
it internalises prohibitive authority ensuring submission as docile subjects to the father, 
the boss, the law, the state, religion, the homosocial order with its accompanying 
homophobia and misogyny, advertising, consumption, and capital in general. The 
incest-taboo is then the moral means whereby subjectivity, the properly socialised 
366 Althusser, For Marx, p. 233. 
367 Holland, Deleu-7e and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipus', p. 37. 
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citizen, the nuclear family and capitalism itself are held in place. Even though the 
nuclear family as an institution is in crisis in global capitalism, its fragmentation and 
dispersal as 'family values' ensures that it is more pervasive and powerful than ever 
before, as Hardt and Negri point OUt. 368 In this, I believe one can problematise their 
assumption in Empire that there is a clean break between imperial and global capitalism 
particularly as they rely heavily on the communicative aspects of the internet and 
television to bring resistance to this about. One can argue that much of the internet and 
most of television through its advertising content is set up to continue the formation of 
its users or viewers as implicit members of a nuclear family and 'oedipalised' 
consumers through the channelling of desire. 
Freud, himself, in accepting the prohibition against incest and the renunciation of 
primordial desire argued that the incest taboo is the crucible in which both human 
subjectivity and culture are formed. The 'apology for incest' (L 130) to which Deleuze 
referred above is concerned to free desire from such capture in capitalist modernity. I 
argue that Joyce turns to such an apologia in Finnegans Wake, and in doing so takes 
even further the 'symptomatological' diagnosis of societal ills as 'paralysis' in 
Dubliners and 'masochism' in Ulysses, which I argue are direct outcomes of the 
incestuous distortions of desire. Joyce does this in the main, I believe, by addressing 
and challenging the problem of the incest-taboo and the opportunities afforded thereby 
through Issy/ Maggie. 
Desire captured by incest and then forbidden by the incest-taboo simply masks and 
falsifies its potentialities. Deleuze and Guattari note that 'incest with the sister', and one 
might add daughter., is '... the intensive model of incest' itself (AO 159) Sons, however, 
are not left out of the equation for Ji]t is by using the girl ... by pointing to [her] as the 
object of his desire that ... a 
dominant [oedipalised] history is fabricated for him'. (TP 
276) As Deleuze has earlier stated, here 
we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary 
upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which 
speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with 
masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters. (DR 10) 
368Hardt and Negri. Empire, p. 197 
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Joyce may be regarded as addressing this issue in the Wakean playlet 'The Mirne of 
Mick Nick and the Maggies'. In 'The Mime' Joyce gives Issy the part of Izod, the 
sexual prize for her brother Glugg/ Shem, with his twin Chuff/ Shaun waiting 
lecherously for her in the wings. Joyce presents us with a masked version of Issy in the 
role of Izod as the intensities of the girlish 'object of desire' undergirding the incestuous 
family relationships. For, as HCE quickly becomes aware, the playlet depicts his own 
incestuous urges as the boys in their final fight 'adumbrace a pattern of somebody else 
or other'. (FW 220.15-16) Insofar as HCE is 'Here Comes Everybody' then, we have 
Issy as Izod, embodying the, captured 'desiring forces' which underpin the nuclear 
family in modernity, with Glugg/ Shem's inability to complete the game epitomising 
the incest-taboo. 
This can be seen from a Deleuzian angle as the Izodian mask which capitalism 
imposes and fixes on the mother and daughter/sister in the nuclear family as the father's 
and brothers's overly restricted 'objects of desire'; as ji]t is not via a flow of shit [as 
money] or a wave of incest that Oedipus arrives, but via the decoded flows of capital'. 
(AO 267) Incestuous desire derives from the constitutive forces of capitalism. Of course 
in this claustrophobic channelling of desire within the nuclear family, father-son and 
son-son incestuous desire is also created. The roots of the homosocial order with its 
attendant homophobia are laid down in this way. I have already instanced this through 
Stephen-Bloom and Bob Doran in tIlysses., and in the Wake we have the Noah-Ham 
relationship. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 'incest with the sister [is]... 
the intensive model of incest'. This is because 'the girl's becoming is stolen first 
[through capitalism's recuperative strategy] the boy's turn come next'. (TP 276) Izod 
then in 'the Mime' is the captured 'oedipalised' representation of desire, an 'actualised' 
mask which must be recognised and set aside as Joyce, I believe, fully appreciated. 
However, even in 'the Mime' the intensive forces of desire, as 'line of flight', which 
compose Issy are also made available to us through the colour heliotrope as I will argue 
later. 
The forces of this impersonal desire are given even more prominence I believe in 
Issy's so called love letter to 'her' teacher (FW 279F. 1-37) which I will explore in the 
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next chapter. Through the exotic and portmanteau words which 'she' brings to the text, 
one sees connections with other peoples and other times bringing into play life's 
multiple possibilities, even though they can also be read as giving the reductive 
incestuous modernist longings for brother and father. In using such portmanteaux, I 
argue, Issy is brought fully into play by Joyce as the hidden potentialities or 'virtual' 
intensities which make up both the Wakean text and desire as life itself and as such 
'she' or 'it', as 'desiring machine', undermines and gives an alternative to the 
incestuous entrapment of desire in the nuclear family of modernity. 
Deleuze argues that although desire has been captured by incest and the incest- 
taboo in modem society, in reality it cannot be reduced to sexual relations between 
bodies or people. (L 2 10) He describes a desire that produces and exceeds bodies. There 
is a flow of life or desire which passes through and constitutes bodies whether organic 
or textual. For him, and I would argue Joyce, desire is a principle of creativity, 
invention, and possibility. As free-floating libido, desire cannot be attached to a 
character, and crucially in this connection David Hayman 369 notes Joyce's statement of 
Issy's relationship to ALP in his 1923 ur-workbook for the Wake (Notebook VI. B. 3): 
'Mum-letterwriter. Is-her libido ... the Beyond (The James Joyce Archive 29.241)'. 
Barbara Kennedy reminds us that 'Deleuze writes that the beyond of becoming-woman 
is becoming-girl' '370 and one 
knows that the libido is simply impersonal sexualised 
energy according to both Freud 37 1 and Lacan 372 and a fundamental part of the id. As 
Deleuze and Guattari said of the id: 
369 David Hayman, The 'Wake' in Transit (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1990), p. 112. 
370 Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics ofSensation (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2002), p. 19 1, n. 10. 
371 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, Anna Freud, et al., vol. XVIII 
(London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953-65), p. 90. 
372 Jaques Lacan, The Seminar. Book I Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54, trans. 
with notes by John Forrester (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), pp. 119-120. 
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It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and 
starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever 
said the id. Everywhere it is machines - real ones, not figurative ones: machines 
driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the 
necessary couplings and connections. (AO 1) 
Perhaps we have here in Joyce's note the kernel of his id-eology: Issy as id-entity, or 
more precisely the 'non-entity' of the Deleuzian 'desiring machine', as an arrangement 
of heterogeneous elements or 'haecceity'. Issy as 'the It with an itch in it',, (FW 268.04) 
the formative force of the 'It girl' of the 1920s, and ALP as 'mum' the letter writer, as 
Clive Hart has shown, 373 embodying the Wake microcosmically. 
In her concluding monologue, ALP's 'becoming-imperceptible' as she merges with 
the sea and is replaced by Issy, 'Now a younger's there', (FW 627.6) can be seen to 
reveal the excess and hidden 'potentialities' available to the 'actualised' figures of 
'mum' and us whatever the fears she expresses. In a sense this extends the conception 
of the Kristevan 'abject' where everything unacceptable to pristine unitary patriarchy is 
symbolised in the concept of 'mother', as potential destabiliser of the Symbolic order. 374 
As such, Issy's survival as cloud and water (FW 159.6-18) as ALP's replacement, is 
not only pre-personal but even pre-human. Thus, Stephen Dedalus in his encounter with 
the epiphanic 'bird girl' becomes aware of 'the slow drifting clouds ... a 
host of nomads 
on the march' offering him, in conjunction with the girl, a 'line of flight': 
Her nakedness yielded to him, radiant, warm, odorous and lavishlimbed, enfolded 
him like a shining cloud, enfolded him like water with a liquid life: and like a cloud 
of vapour or like waters circurnfluent in space the liquid letters of speech, symbols 
of the element of mystery, flowed forth over his brain. 375 
The 'bird-girl' is a water-bird with water as an additional 'rhizomatic' link 
characterising ALP and Issy, as the rain cloud Nuvoletta and 'her' divergent selves as 
Rainbow girls, just as the cloud offers a link with flight. 
373 Hart, Structure and Motif, pp. 202-8. 
374 Kristeva, The Powers of Horror, passim. 
375 Richard Ellmann, '. Notes', in Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. xxxv. 
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Issy., as Izod, has been looked at somewhat negatively above in my initial reading 
of the playlet in order to highlight Joyce's completion of his 'symptomatological' 
diagnosis, and mount a further challenge to State/ Religion and capitalist hegemony,, 
through a revelation of the fundamental formative influence of the incest-taboo. 
However, I did not stress in this analysis the objective of the game which involves 
Shem-Glugg's guessing the heliotrope colour of Issy's underwear which, I argue, can 
give us a better picture of Issy's potential as the 'girl' and 'line of flight'. It would 
surely be mad, perverse, too vulgar, or at least crude to suggest that the best way to get 
into the Wake is through Issy's drawers! Yet, we need to note that in one version of 
Issy's letter, the one to Jaun/Shaun, (FW 457-461) we have both the drawers of 
'drawhwer nearest' (FW 457.26) together with the implicit winning of the girl, 
underpinned by Stephen's ecstatic encounter with the 'bird-girl' in A Portrait where 
'the white fringes of her drawers were like feathering of soft white down'. Moreover, 0 
Hehir informs us that 'diawher', as 'dearbhrathair' pronounced 'draher' means 'brother' 
in Gaelic. 376 Here the impersonal 'model intensities' of brother-sister incest are being 
underlined I would argue through the fetishisation of the drawers. Furthermore, this 
offers a link with the societal masochism Joyce depicts in Uysses, through Bloom and 
his obsession with Molly's underwear: 'begging me to give him a tiny bit cut off my 
drawers'. (U 882) Deleuze notes that fetishistic desire is the process of disavowal 
central to masochism. (M 3 0,110) 
Yet, it is not the fetishism of Bloom's obsession with such underwear which most 
concerns me here, nor the 'rhizomatic' link with the epiphanic 'bird-girl', but rather the 
colour of heliotrope which pervades and even constitutes Issy throughout the Wake, for 
Joyce tells us that Glugg 'must fand for himself by gazework what their colours wear as 
they are all showen drawens up'. (FW 224.26-27)377 It is this fact which I believe that 
Deleuzian readers of Joyce need to concentrate on. In this colour, I argue, one has the 
376 Brendan 0 Hehir, A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake'(Berkeley, Calif: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 247. 
"' My italics. 
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means of seeing Issy released from her masked Izodian self of masculine 'object of 
desire' on a 'molar' line. Interestingly in this connection Saint Patrick, ('Sarne Patholic* 
(FW 611.10)) as the personification of Roman Catholicism in Ireland, and Bishop 
Berkeley ('pidginfella Bilkilly-Belkelly (FW 611.27)) debate whether white light, as 
unity (and the unity of the Catholic Church), or colour as difference, as 'Archdruid' 
Berkeley argued, better represent the 'true inwardness of reality'. (FW 611.21) It is of 
course as difficult to separate the colour from the material as it is to separate the smile 
from the Carrollian cat, or white light (of Issy) into all the colours of the rainbow (as 
Issyian Rainbow girls) but the 'molecular line' allows us to do so, and both Deleuze and 
Joyce I believe argue for colour and difference 'in trues coloribus resplendent'. (FW 
611.22-23) For, as Atherton notes, in his 'complication' of unitary white light, Joyce 
drew on the philosophy of Bruno. 378 [1.41 
Joyce, by stressing the impersonal intensities of colour as a central motif, I argue, 
moves the focus from fetishised sexual desire to the forces constituting the 'virtuality' 
of impersonal desire as 'life' itself, of which 'actualised' human sexual desire in any of 
its forms is only one manifestation. He indicates this change of emphasis in the 
following terms: 
The scheme of the piece ... is the game we used to call Angels and Devils or 
colours. The Angels, girls, are grouped behind the Angel, Shawn, and the Devil has 
to come over three times and ask for a colour. If the colour he asks for has been 
chosen by any girl she has to run and he tries to catch her. As far as I have written 
he has come twice and been twice baffled. (LI 295) 
It is the colour rather than the fetishised knickers which Joyce draws attention to as the 
object of the game, even though it has become embroiled in sexual intrigue. 
The colour is of course 'heliotrope' which Glugg fails to guess, even when 
reluctantly aided by the rainbow girls, who actually support his rival Chuff, and offer 
anagrams to supposedly help him: '0 theoperil! Ethiaop lore, the poor lie'. (FW 
223.28) The question central to the game remains unanswered by Glugg. In fact the 
familial game itself must remain incomplete as it epitomises the incest-taboo, and one 
378 Atherton, The Books at the Wake. pp. 36-37. 
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recalls Deleuze's observations that it is 'the method of questions-problems by means of 
which Joyce animates his work' [1.4], which is 'not the non-being of the negative but 
the (non)-being of a persistent question' [1.3]. To which, I believe, Glugg's incorrect 
guesses 'correspond, without being a response, since [they] alone occupy and fill that 
space' [1.3], a textual space which Joyce has deliberately opened up: '[w]hen the h, 
who the hu, how the hue, where the huer? '. (FW 257.34-35) 1 will examine this 
effective non-response below. It is the 'virtual' impersonal intensities which make up 
desire through the stammered colour, or 'hue', as offering a 'line of flight', rather than 
the 'oedipalising' familial forces which entrap and constantly 'reterritorialise' us within 
the capitalist nexus which are of significance here. 
If one takes the colour itself, one recalls that Clytie, the water nymph in Ovid's 
Metamorphoses, 379 died for love of Apollo the sun god who rejected her in favour of 
Leucoth6e, and she decayed or was transformed into the flower heliotrope. Clytie 
betrayed Apollo's adultery with Leucoth6e to her father, who trapped them in bed with 
his finely spun nets, thus reasserting patriarchal power and confining Clytie to the 
'abjection'/ madness of the female in such an arrangement. Thus, Thomas Hood in his 
poem 'Flowers' alludes to Clytie: 'I will not have the mad Clytie/ whose head is always 
turned by the sun'. 380 Hood is emphasising the movement of the flower. This is a 
tropism which brings into play Issy's move to the sun as Nuvoletta, the cloud girl, 
which would result in a rainbow and the Rainbow girls, bringing to the fore again the 
debate between Bishop Berkeley and Saint Patrick on white light and the spectrum. (FW 
611) The themes of infatuation and the delirium of unquenched desire, betrayal - which 
as we will see characterises the 'nomadic' 'war machine' - adultery, madness, and 
'machinic disconnections' are all directly or indirectly linked to this colour in the 
Victorian 'language of flowers'. 381 Untrammelled desire temporarily released from its 
379 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. by Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington and London: 
Indiana University Press, 1955), Book IV, Sections 8 and 9. 
380 Thomas Hood, Selected Poems (London: Penguin, 2003). 
38 ' Anon, The Language ofFlowers: being a lexicon of the sentiments assigned to 
flowers, plants, ftuits, and roots (Edinburgh: Patton and Ritchie, 1849); Vernon 
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patriarchal channelling and repressions in the historical moment of the 1920s through 
the 'flapper generation' with its incumbent 'madnesses', nevertheless shook off for a 
time the symbolic 'father who trapped them in bed with his finely spun nets'. Joyce 
seems to have equated 'girlness' with flowers in Giacomo Joyce: '[h]er body has no 
smell: an odourless flower' and ja] flower given by her to my daughter. Frail gift, frail 
382 giver, frail blue-veined child" As Richard Ellmann notes, 'Joyce wrote of the same 
incident in "A Flower Given to My Daughter", a poem dated "Trieste, 1913". A "frail 
pallor" is also characteristic of Stephen's girl in A Portrait'. 383 
Throughout Ulysses, as Restuccia notes, 'flowers are virtually ubiquitous' and she 
links them with women's blood as Joyce's 'secular eucharistic signs': 
They are established as synecdoches of women: in 'Douce Lydia. Bronze and rose', 
(rose' is a sort of badge of Lydia Douce's identity; and Molly states outright of 
herself, 'I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in my hair', and of 
women in general, 'we are flowers all'. This metonymy ramifies. If flowers/women 
hold sacramental value, Henry Flower, the Rose of Castile, Boylan's carnation, in 
sum, the entire linguistic floral world of Ulysses gains sacramental significance. 384 
Here, I believe, Restuccia is in some danger of viewing women/ flowers from an 
'oedipalising' perspective, a problem which re-occurs in her attempt to show the 
ubiquity of 'eucharistic signs' in Ulysses, no matter how 'secular' her designation of 
these attempts claim to be. In the Wake, if not in U1 ses or Giacomo Joyce, Joyce bids Ys 
us concentrate on the abstracted colour, I suggest, rather than its manifestation in the 
form of a flower/ woman, although we might read 'roses' as synonymous with 
menstruation and the consequent 'leakages' which constitute the 'line of flight 1385 and 
thus one's 'becoming woman'. 
Coleman, ed., The Language ofFlowers (Barnstaple: Chilton Designs, [ 1852], 
reprinted 1996). 
382 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. 3. 
383 Ibid. p. 13. 
384 Restuccia, Joyce and the Law of the Father, p. 82. 
385 Brian Massumi, 'Introduction', in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 
xvi. 
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Deleuze comments: 
... the colour-Image does not refer to a particular object, but absorbs all that it can: it is the power which seizes all that happens within its range, or the quality 
common to completely different objects. There is a symbolism of colours, but it 
does not consist in a correspondence between a colour and an affect ... Colour is on the contrary the affect itseýf, the virtual con unction of all the objects which it picks 
up. (C] 118)386 
Similarly, Stephen Dedalus after his encounter with the 'bird-girl' sees a new world 
opening before him at the end of Chapter Four in the epiphanic colour and form of a 
flower: 
A world, a glimmer or a flower? Glimmering and trembling, trembling and 
unfolding, a breaking light, an opening flower, it spread in endless succession to 
itself, breaking in full crimson and unfolding and fading to palest rose, leaf by leaf 
and wave of light by wave of light, flooding all the heavens with its soft flushes, 
every flush deeper than the other. 
Such 'soft flushes' resonate with the girl's 'faint flame trembl[ing] on her cheek', and 
her 'affect' on Stephen as '[h]is cheeks were aflame'. Moreover, the watery image 
called up by 'breaking' (as breakers), 'wave', both repeated twice, and 'flooding' with 
it's T echoing through 'soft flushes' and 'flush' and the sound of the water lapping 
through the 's's' is significant, not only because she is a 'water-bird' but for the 
resonance and connectivity this has with water throughout Uysses and the Wake. 
Deleuze has likened Joyce to Proust [3.3] and in Issy's heliotropically hued 
knickers we might well see yet another connection between the two. In A la recherche 
A temps perdu we are given a crucial insight into 'duration' and involuntary memory 
through a line from Chateaubriand's Mimoires d'Outre-tombe: 387 
A sweet and subtle scent of heliotrope was exhaled by a little patch of beans that 
were in flower; it was brought to us not by a breeze from our own country but by a 
386 My italics. 
387 Franýois Rene de Chateaubriand, An Autobiography: a translation of 'Alimoires 
d'Outre-tombe' (London: Simms & McIntyre, 1849). 
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wild Newfoundland wind, unrelated to the exiled plant, without sympathy of shared 
memory or pleasure. 388 
As Ronald Bogue observes, '[heliotrope] is an anomolous part that connects other parts, 
without pertaining to a whole'. 389 Such (dis)connectivity instances, I believe, Issy as the 
Wake's primary 'block of becoming', acting as a machinic connectivity working 
through cuts and breaks, whereas for Proust it works synaesthetically. As Deleuze 
points out for Proust this is: 'an anomalous associative chain only unified by a creative 
point of view, which itself plays the role of anomalous part in the ensemble. (PS 102) 
Here, I suggest, we can link Issy as the anomalous part in the Wakean ensemble through 
'her' colour . 
In connection with Proust, Bogue states, 'that which puts the subject and the 
heliotrope in contact with one another is without relation to the plant -a wind from a 
New World'. 390 bringing the scent of heliotrope. By relating the wind to Issy, as 
productive 'middle', we can see that the 'line of flight' which constitutes 'her' through 
the colour heliotrope, breaks the patriarchal relationship between femininity and Nature 
and Issy's recuperation into an 'oedipalised' feminine representation through plants, 
fruit, trees, and flowers: 
I soared from the peach and Missmolly showed her pear too ... Whet the 
bee as to 
deflowret greendy grassies yellowhorse ... twigs too 
is nil, tricks trees makes nix. ... 
Quicken,, aspen; ash and yew, willow, broom with oak for you. (FW 360.28- 
361.8)391 
Millie/ 'Missmolly'/ Issy is nothing other than impersonal intensive desiring forces, 
unencumbered by the usual oedipalising trappings of 'femininity,. Such a series of 
'machinic' breaks aligns with Brown's observation that despite a degree of 
388 Marcel Proust, A la recherche A temps perdu, 4 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1987-1989), 
vol. 3, p. 959. 
389 Bogue, Deleuze on Literature. p. 48. 
390 lbid, pp. 47-48. 
391 1 owe this extract and the highlighting of plants/ trees to Katie Wales, The Language 
ofdames Joyce, p. 149. 
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conventionality in the consistent identifications between girls and the days of the 
month, girls and flowers, women and rivers, men and buildings,, and so on, whereby the 
world is pressed into gender in Joyce's works, there is also a considerable amount of 
intentional disruption of sexual identifications in the Wake. 392 
Thus, although one could focus on Issy and plants, or colours and the language of 
flowers, from a Deleuzian point of view we must appreciate that colour is affect itself, 
(C] 118) and one recalls that: 
The affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individual State of things: it is 
none the less singular, and can enter into singular combinations and conjunctions 
with other affects. ... this 
is why the affect is the 'new' and new affects are 
ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art. (C] 98-99) 
It is, I argue, the disrupting fragmentation which Issy as 'affect' causes which leads to 
the explosion of identities in the Wake. For, as Colebrook notes: 
If affect is not the perception of something by an organising observer, but the 
presentation of a force of something to-be-perceived from points beyond our own, 
then affect opens the line of time to disruption, giving an "untimely" time or a time 
393 "out of joint"'. 
Consequently, we as readers are drawn into the future 'untimely' time of 'duration' and 
obtain,, like Glugg at the point of heliotropic revelation, an epiphanic 'affect' as the 
ceternal return' of the new, and a disruption or fragmentation of our subjectivity as it 
'extracts' for us 'a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations' through Joyce's 
implicit emphasis on 'heliotrope' in the game/ play. 
Yet, one needs to ask why Glugg does not go beyond the incest taboo and win Issy 
as sexual prize. Here, I suggest, one needs to take into account Roland McHugh's gloss 
of 'glugger' as Hiberno-English for an unhatched egg, 
394 and his suggestion that Glugg 
392 Brown. James Joyce and Sexuality, p. 100. 
393 Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, p. 61. 
394 Roland McHugh Annotations to Tinnegans Wake' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Cý ý 
University Press, 1991). p. 220. 
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395 like Stephen/ Joyce adopts a strategy of 'silence exile and cunning' . In the *series' of 
'eggburst, eggblend, eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can', (FW614.32-33) one can discern 
in the Joycean egg the reworking of a Viconian structure for the Wake with all of its 
creative potential. In the unhatched egg, we have an indication of 'birth' as the 
characteristic institution of the divine age, "marriage' as indicative of the heroic age, the 
'burial' of the civic age, and finally the ricorso as 'rebirth' through 'the eternal return' 
of the new. (This of course is writ large in the Wake with Earwicker as Humpty Dumpty 
perched on the wall of wedlock who nevertheless had a great fall. He then fragmented 
and was buried throughout the text, but, in his earlier manifestation at least, he 
attempted to rise again and was transmogrified. ) Glugg is the 'eggscumudderher-in- 
chaff, (FW 240.15) and ultimately he commands Chuff and the Rainbow girls. 
Moreover, as twins 'the j imminies' have seemingly enjoyed incestuous sexual relations 
with their sister. (FW 22.24-26) Why then does he deliberately fail to guess the answer? 
In Shem's taking the part of 'Glugg' I argue that we can see his relationship to Issy 
in a new light. In retaining its potentialities and refusal to take on organized fonn, the 
egg signifies 'pure intensities', and multiple 'lines of flight'. Deleuze and Guattari 
diagrammatically represent 'The Dogon Egg and the Distribution of Intensities' at the 
head of their Chapter 6 'November 28,1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body 
without Organs? '(TP 149) and they go on to: 
treat the BwO as the full egg before the extension of the organism and the 
organization of the organs, before the formation of the strata; as the intense egg 
defined by axes and vectors ... 
by dynamic tendencies involving energy 
transformation and kinematic movements involving group displacement, by 
migrations: all independent of accessory forms because the organs appear and 
function here only as pure intensities. ... The tantric egg. (TP 149) 
and 'tantric' relates to the sacred writings of Hinduism and Buddhism. The relationship 
between Glugg and Issy can be conceived, I argue, as the epiphanic forces which when 
released from the 'BwO' constitute the 'sacred' writing of the letter and the Wake itself. 
395 lbid, p. 228. 
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Joyce in a typical reversal makes this plain by linking Issy's drawers directly with 
words (drows) through the anagram 'a drows er' in '0 Evol, kool in the salg and ees 
how Dozi pits what a drows er'. (FW 262F. 2) Without Issy/ Izod's words/ drawers 
providing the intensive 'middle' or 'desiring machine' neither the letter nor the Wake 
could exist. Furthermore, not only is '[t]he intense egg' as epiphanic 'affect' pervasive 
of the Wake, insofar as there are clear links between the egg and HCE through Humpty 
Dumpty and his fall resulting in his loss of reputation, and fragments of the former's 
name and identity which then pervade the entire text; (FW 45.14; FW 47.26-29) but the 
'farcical' 'whale's egg', 'forced' with the fat meat of 'pemmican' (possibly indicating 
and incorporating Uysses through its connection with 'the home' both without 
(Bloom's) and with (Boylan's) 'potted meat') is widely taken as a description of the 
Wake itself requiring particular readerly attributes: 
very like a whale's egg farced with pemmican as were it sentenced to be nuzzled 
over a full trillion times for ever and a night till his noddle sink or swim by that 
ideal reader suffering from an ideal insomnia. (FW 120-11.14) 
Nevertheless, in the potential freedom which Issy as 'the girl' and 'line of flight' 
offers, Joyce is always aware of the immense oppositional powers of modernity which 
aim to prevent this 'deterritorialisation' happening. Thus, John Gordon notes the effect 
of institutionalised religion as an integral aspect of the State/capitalist formation in 
Issy's letter to their captive representative the priest Jaun/ Shaun, as it recaptures the 
sexual energy of the id: 
Issy's concluding 'ah AA ah' (FW 461.32) is probably the sound of a woman's 
orgasm and certainly the enthusiastic response of someone being taught how to 
'tumble', (FW 461.3 1) but Shaun's emphatic 'MEN! ' (FW 461.3 3) converts it into 
the conclusion of a prayer-lid clamped on libido at the last minute. 396 
Joyce highlights this through the masculine symbolic order of modernity instanced in 
Shaun's 'Men'. Deleuze and Guattari also point out that je]very time desire is 
betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it'. (TP 154) 
396 John S. Gordon, Tinnegans Wake': A Plot Summaty (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 233. 
191 
Yet, although Issy's 'line of flight' appears to have been recuperated at the end of 
'her' interjection in Jaun's serinonising, this interjection may be better seen as an aside 
to 'her' main contribution to the letter (FW 279F I) where such controlling forces are 
overcome, as I will show in the next chapter. There are strong indications of a direct 
link between the two 'letters'. For instance 'her' 'interjection' here includes four 
crossed kisses, 'XXXX' (FW 45 8.3) as we would find at the end of such a letter, and the 
phrase 'with my fondest' (FW 458.2) echoes the first 'relatively lucid version of the 
missive' to quote McCarthy, 397 as does 'must now close it with fondest'. (FW I 11.16- 
17) Furthermore, 'her' 'gift of memento nosepaper' (FW 457.34) can be read either as a 
tissue, handkerchief, notepaper, newspaper or, I would argue, the letter itself . 
398 For, 
not only is Issy not repressed or in human terms deflated by Jaun, as the very epitome of 
hypocritical moralising directed against 'her', but Joyce is able to bring 'her' 'girlish' 
intensities ever more into play at FW 279F 1. 
Adaline Glashen has established a textual identity with Issy and Anna Livia 
Plurabelle through the sharing of the syllable 'belle' in Plurabelle and Isabel399 , and one 
recalls that ALP, who is responsible for the final version of the letter, can be regarded as 
both producing and being produced by Issy. (TP 276) This double productive 
'becoming' is highlighted at the very 'end' of the Wake when the patriarchal father/ 
HCE as sea reclaims ALP the river; yet 'she' is reconstituted or resurrected as 
'Nuvoletta'/Issy, her other and younger 'self to restart or continue the life process in an 
4eternal return' of difference, just as the reader is enjoined to start the book again at the 
'beginning', through Issy/ALP, with the process of 'riverrun'. Consequently, Issy as 
ALP or ALP as Issy work together in the 'different' processual riverrun. HCE, seen as 
4 male principle' 400 and from this perspective as State/ religious/ capitalist recuperation - 
at that definitive moment - is overcome, despite HCE becoming 'her' 'cold mad father. 
397 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 578. 
398 Rose, and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', pp. 232-233. 
399 Glasheen, Third Census of 'Finnegans Wake', p. 13 8. 
400 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake' , p. 564. 
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my cold mad feary father'. (FW 628.1-2) Yet, Issy conjoins productively with HCE 
even here as she asks him to 'Carry me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fairý. 
(FW 628.8-9) 
ALP like her husband HCE is an abstract force frequently known only by her 
initials, or by some Joycean distortion of her ftill name Anna Livia Plurabelle as: 'Apud 
libertinam parvulam', (FW 7.23), 'appy, leppy and playable' (FW 41.23), 'Amnis 
Limina Permanent' (FW 153.2) 'anny livving plusquebelle', (FW 327.6) 'Appia Lippia 
Pluviabilla', (FW 548.6) and 'Alma Luvia, Pollabella'. (FW 619.16) She exists only 
through fragmentation and difference in the text and as such can be read as the product 
of the Issyian 'desiring machine'. Whatever we make of this, and we may well be 'lost 
in the bush', (FW 112.3) it must be admitted that it is largely a female affair and Joyce's 
cmistresspiece' as he remarked himself, (LI 206) as not only does Alp[h], 'the sacred 
river% run 'past Eve and Adam's' instead of Adam and Eve's Church in Chapelizod at 
the book's 'beginning', (FW 03.1) but Joyce assures us that '[flemelles will be 
preadaminant' (FW 617.23-24) throughout. Thus, the dam, dames and demoiselle not 
only precede Adam, but are stubbornly resolute or adamant, and even untameable or 
adamantine. They evidently constitute the book in the sense of ALP/ Issy's 'girlish' 
'intensities' and 'becomings' - coupled with HCE's failure through his obvious 
'abjection' 401 to maintain a patriarchal identity and the 'male principle'. 
Moreover, Issy as ALP's elan vital and the book's primary 'block of becoming' 
enables ALP to become Shem in a 'machinic' connection, just as Shem/ Joyce by using 
401 In The Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection, Julia Kristeva argues that all fonns 
of fixed identity, whether those of individuals or groups, have their basis in symbolic 
castration and projection. Coinciding with the discovery of sexual difference, repressed 
parts of the self experienced as vulnerable and 'feminine' (as a result of symbolic 
castration in the Oedipal crisis), are projected onto those who are different, who then, as 
a result of their victimisation, free their oppressor of this 'femininity' which cannot be 
acknowledged as belonging to the self. Thus, Kristeva argues that the 'abject' 
constitutes anything that is excluded from fixed identity and the symbolic order and this 
excluded other is constituted as feminine lack. Deleuze reads this negative patriarchal 
assessment of feminine lack in positive terms offering the prospect of 'becoming- 
woman. 
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the alphabet/ALP-hab(i)t,, 'becomes writer' and 'becomes animal' by the same token. 
Shaun in his opposition to Shem ensures that they respectively become the Mookse and 
the Gripes, (FW 1.6) Tristopher and Hilary, (FW 11.1) Chuff and Glugg, (FW 11.1) Kev 
and Dolph, (FW 11.2) the Ondt and the Gracehoper, (FW 111.1) Jaun and Dave, (FW 
111.2) Kevin and Jerry, (FW 111.4) and Saint Patrick and the Archdruid Berkeley, (FW 
IV) and yet they paradoxically merge in a riot of 'becoming others' as they both 'affirm 
and complicate all the series at once'[1.4]. Here, Joyce's intuitive insight also brings 
into play the twin motif which Deleuze argues is not a polarization but rather gives us 
the 'in-between'. 'fold' or 'middle', allowing for a passage 'between two things ... the 
twins are masters of flows, their passage, their alternation and their disjunction', (ECC 
47-48) which clearly enhances the figuration of Issy as the productive 'in-between' of 
their appearance and difference in the Wake. 
Thus, Issy as productive 'middle' allows ALP, like Shem and Shaun and many 
other supposed 'characters' in the Wake to constantly fragment and merge as no more 
than aspects of each other. 0 Hehir even indicates that HCE and ALP 'share a certain 
identity': 
... the 
Irish word alp (olp) means, among other things, a hump. ... 
The word alp 
actually means a short, thick, heavy bit of almost anything: a material substance, 
solid or liquid; speech; sound; action; work. Therefore, depending on its use, it may 
be translated 'hum '),, it is clear that ALP is merely another name for HCE - at least 
some of the time. 4 
T2 
Furthermore, although ALP is a river in English the Alps are mountains, and HCE as 
Porter as 'port' is himself liquid (the alcoholic drink), the left-hand side looking forward 
of a ship, an harbour for ships, and like a river a porter 'transports'. Yet again, both 
ALP as 'hump' and HCE as 'humpty dumpty' are fragmented throughout the text as 
Issy works between them. Deleuze would argue that they become 'terms' or 'proper 
names' only at the point of this disappearance or 'deterritorialisation'. In the main, they 
appear to offer us 'lines of becoming' rather than the 'end-points' of actualised 
'characters' and., it seems to me, that here the 'deliquesence of identity' characterising 
'becomings' both continues and goes well beyond the 'molecular' mergings of Molly 
402 Brendan 0 Hehir, A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake, p. 390. 
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and Milly in Ulysses, as we see in the 'becomings-imperceptible' of the washerwomen 
at the end of 1.8. 
By drawing on the propensities of 'betrayal' or subversion which Issy as nomadic 
(war machine' provides, Joyce, through ALP contests and subverts the unified 
patriarchal identity for which her husband HCE constantly but unsuccessfully strives. In 
Multitude, Hardt and Negri argue that 'War is no longer at the disposal of political 
powers. It defines the foundation of political systems' for it 'is becoming the primary 
organising principal of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises'. 403 
Perpetual warfare is now the means of maintaining capitalist world order and social 
hierarchy. War has become a form of rule which not only controls the population but 
produces and reproduces all aspects of social life in global capitalism today. Yet, 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the subversive 'nomadic' aspect of the 'war machine' 
and its propensity for betrayal rather than support of patriarchy and the State. (TP 351- 
423) Issy acting in this capacity betrays and undermines patriarchy whether seen in the 
guise of Jaun/ Shaun or HCE and, in doing so, Joyce, I believe, comments prophetically 
through Issy on the weaknesses of the global capitalist 'socius', and the potentialities of 
the forces constituting 'the multitude'. I will examine this relationship further in the 
next chapter. As Irigaray might put it, whilst HCE (and the globalised socius) is always 
seeking to fulfill man's fantasy of 'the eternal return of sameness', 
404 it is the 'fluidity' 
of Issy/ALP which undermines his endeavour. Even in his final manifestation as 
patriarchal father he can only manifest this through the fluidity of the sea. A gullible 
HCE is 'gulled' by the very 'gulls' (FW 628.13) which circling overhead are the 'bird- 
girl' and Issy 'herself. 
HCE struggles throughout the text to maintain his identity as unified patriarchal 
monolith. Yet, his identity, like that of ALP, is being constantly fragmented as it 
mutates into other becomings as Joyce rings the changes on his initials: 'Haroun tý t: ) rý 
403 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 13. 
404 Irigaray. Speculum oj'the Other Woman, p. 342. 
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Childeric Eggeberth', (FW 4.32) 'Hag Chivychas Eve', (FW 3 0.14) 'He Can Explain', 
(FW 105.14) 'Hear! Calls! Everywhair! ', (FW 108.23) 'Hwang Chang evelytime'. (FW 
13 0.3 5) 'H. C. E. has a codfisck ee', (FW 19 8.8 -9) 'economy, chemistry, humanity', (FW 
3 06.14-15) 'Howe cools Eavybrolly! ', (FW 315.20) 'hash-say-ugh', (FW 407.3 0) and 
'hardest crux ever'. (FW 623.33-34) Such 'multiplicities' allow for an extraordinary 
range of connections through the 'rhizomatic' conjunction 'AND... AND ... AND', 
405 
not only in the Wake or in Joyce's earlier work but the world and cosmos itself [1.3/ 
1.4]. As Rose and O'Hanlon put it, Joyce 'never uses the format "either/ or" but always 
the "and"'. 406 This 'and' works here, I would add, through the 'rhizomatic' 
intermediary of Issy as connective 'middle' and the primary 'block of becoming'. 
Thus HCE as 'economy, chemistry, humanity' (FW 3 06.14-15) is generally linked 
with the rational scientific outlook of modem man and specifically with Bloom's 
scientific and humanitarian outlook, whilst the statement that 'H. C. E. has a codfisck ee' 
(FW 198.8-9) goes even further by clearly associating HCE with the Bloom of the 
'Cyclops episode' where we have the narrator's repeated references to his 'codfisck ee': 
'with his cod's eye counting up all the guts of the fish' (U 3 84) and as 'old cod's eye'. 
(U 408) Harry Blamires holds that Bloom unlike the Cyclopian one-eyed citizen is thus 
linked by extension to God's charitable two-eyed view. 407 However,, Blamires fails to 
spot that Bloom is himself one-eyed in these references, as is HCE and God by 
extension. Joyce may well be commenting here on the shortcomings of the patriarchal 
monotheistic god not on his supposedly charitable two-eyed view. The link with Bloom 
implicates HCE in the societal masochism which I have attributed to him in Chapter 
Two, and as such his universality as 'Here Comes Everybody'. (FW 32.18-19) In this 
regard one can also see HCE's confession to the Cad in masochistic terms, (FW 35 -3 6) 
and Issy's implicit involvement. HCE may appear to be about to 'become bird' as 'hulm 
405 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 57. 
406 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. xvi. 
407 Harry Blamires, The New Bloomsday Book. - A Guide through Ulysses (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 120. 
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(FW 3 78.4-5) and in Deleuzian terms able to take a 'line of flight' culms evurdyburdy'. 
particularly as 'Hery Crass Evohodie' (FW 546.10-11) seems to open up the second and 
third orders of time through the latin 'crass'(tomorrow) and 'hodie' (today) but this 
phrase can also be read in English as bringing him down to earth through its reference 
to his 'crassness'. The Wake further compounds this by linking him to Persse O'Reilly 
through the satirical ballad which treats the latter as a universal scapegoat, and as such 
offers another link to Bloom. Joyce permutates his initials to give us 'ech', (FW 264.3) 
and also substitutes aK for the C, as in 'Hek', (FW 199.24) fragmenting him further by 
bringing him into the Gaelic/ Celtic split of the Irish language. 
This linguistic split, which I will detail below, is more often denoted as the P/Q 
split. Here, these initials might be taken as bringing into play the Issyian figure of the 
Prankquean, (FW 21-23) with HCE transformed into Jarl van Hoother. Here, van 
Hoother/ HCE, as majoritarian protestant conqueror, informs the minoritarian 
prankquean/ Issy, that she must 'shut up shop, dappy'. (FW 23.5) He then seeks to 
enforce his will with a God-like thunder word as 'the hearsomeness of the burger 
felicitates the whole of the polis' - with 'polis' as both 'the police' and (Ancient Greek 
City) 'State' receiving the felicitations or congratulations of the bourgeoisie. 
Nevertheless,, fluidity supervenes, as the Prankquean flows in and out of his solid 
patriarchal castle, and steals and transforms his children, thus undermining and 
fragmenting his authority. As a result 'they all drank free', (FW 23.7-8) because 'that 
was the first peace of illiteratise porthery in all the flamend floody flatuous world'. (FW 
23.9-10) Just like poetry or more mundanely a pot of porter, the Prankquean flows all 
round the fixities and solidity of van Hoother who can only respond to her fluidity with 
the speech of the patriarch: his own 'solid' shit. Consequently, she operates in the 
c smooth space' of 'duration', whereas he is 'striated' or constipated in clock-time. This 
is a constipation which Bloom in Uysses manages to avoid, (U 83-84 ) as he unlike van 
Hoother has some access to the 'molecular' line, as well as the jakes'. 
Thus,, not only is HCE dispersed everywhere throughout the text like ALP but he 
appears in one fragmented form or another in sections where there appears to be no 
obvious reason for his appearance, washed up like flotsam and jetsam. His potential 
processuality of 'becomings other' continues through his close association with a 
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variety of other 'characters' not only Jarl van Hoother, but also the Festy King, the 
Norwegian Captain, and the Russian General who may all be seen as his doubles. 
Nevertheless, throughout all such potentially changed and changing identities HCE is 
always working against this trend and striving, no matter how unsuccessfully, as with 
van Hoother, to retain his false sense of identity through masculine unity and his 'clean 
and proper' self. His early appearance as Finnegan laid out at his wake or simply as a 
giant stretched across the landscape indicates his presence and pervasiveness throughout 
the text. (FW 3.18-24) 
Although this is only the result of his fall and fragmentation, like Humpty Dumpty, 
(FW 45.14; FW 47.26-29) it is brought about through his relationship to Issyian figures. 
There is some connection here to the laughably overdrawn giant citizen whom Joyce 
depicts in the 'Cyclops' episode of Ulysses, (U 3 82) generally contrasted, by Joycean 
critics, in his one-eyed nationalism with Bloom's supposedly balanced two-eyed vision, 
but actually symbiotic with the latter's masochistic outlook. HCE, by attempting to 
attain such a gigantic one-eyed status, despite or because of his guilt and self-doubt, 
unsuccessfully strains throughout the Wake to attain what is in any case an impossible 
patriarchal unity, and in so doing he merely acts as a foil for ALP/ Issy's fragmenting 
subversion. 
At the outset of Chapter 1.5 we have a long list of possible titles for Anna Livia's 
'untitled mamafesta memorialising the Mosthighest', (FW 104-7) and we find that 
HCE's name is proposed as an alternative title to the 'untitled mamafesta'-l as 'Arcs in 
His Ceiling'. (FW 104.13) One interpretation of this would be that his brain was 
malfunctioning, or that he was obsessed with sex and the arcs of ALP's body in the 
ýgeometer' problem which enclose the ovoidal womb. Yet again, 'the arkway of his 
three shuttoned castles', (FW 22.33-4) from which Jan van Hoother/ HCE emerges, 
would indicate his continuing attempt to obtain/ maintain a unified patriarchal position, 
and impose his magisterial will on his female 'subjects'. However, another 
interpretation might imply transcendent sainthood - the link to St. Joan of Arc with 'her 
abstract line of flight, her molecular production, her indifferences to memory, her non- 
figurative of desire. Joan of Arc? (TP 277) If this is the case HCE is immediately 
brought down to earth as any such sanctification is immediately nullified in the 
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'becoming-animal' association of 'For Ark, see Zoo', and he moves from the beginning 
to the end of the alphabet without achieving his aim. This invalidating of his patriarchal 
status and identity is confirmed in a reading of 'Arcs in His Ceiling' as the French, 
carcs-en-ciel' as rainbows, and hence Issy as the Maggies/ Rainbow girls's fragmenting 
intervention. It is then completely negated as 'nonoun as Husband, where he loses his 
very status in the linguistic Symbolic order. One can only hope that 'He Can Explain' 
(FW 105.14) for as we are told, at the very beginning of Chapter 1.5, all of this takes 
place in 'disjointed times', (FW 104-05) which I argue indicates the Nietzschean 
(eternal return' of difference as the 'time out of joint' set in Deleuzian 'duration'. 
Consequently there is HeCitEncy, and HCE as indeterminate subject for - despite her 
inconsistency with Issy as Lucia - as Norris said of the Wake in general, 'its subject is 
the nature of indetenninacy itself. 408 Thus, Joyce undermines the patriarchal Symbolic 
order and nuclear family through ALP's, HCE's and the twins involvement with Issy. 
I have tried to show that the 'desiring machine' which is Issy not only interacts 
with but even produces ALP, HCE, and their 'sons', through cuts, breaks, 
fragmentations and epiphanic connective relationships. As textual presence, I have 
argued, 'she' completely undermines our traditional conception of character. As an 
exemplar of the Deleuzoguattarian 'nomadic war machine' Issyian betrayals of 
patriarchy may well illustrate the problematics of global capitalism's attempt to shore 
up its system through perpetual warfare. 
408 Margot Norris. 'Finnegans Wake', p. 162. 
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Chapter V 
In this chapter I will continue to show, through a reading of the footnote at FW 
279FI, that 'Issyness' or 'girlness' - conceived in terrns of the Deleuzoguattarian 'girl' 
and the epiphanic Joycean 'bird girl' - is not only a pervasive feature of Wakean 
textuality, but is also one of its fundamental liberatory dynamics and indeed a 
motivating force in all of Joyce's writing. Here, too, Issy conceived as the Wakean 
'desiring machine' through whom/which the impersonal intensities of sexuality and 
gender are abstractly embodied, is inflected in the different stylistic registers which 
Joyce adopts in both the letter in general and in the Wake itself. 
The scandalous, seductive, enticing, inviting, flirtatious nature of this footnote, I 
argue - '[s]he was flirtsome then and she's fluttersome yet' (FW 28.15) - makes even 
clearer the textual 'affects' of the Wake which Joyce achieves in part through his use of 
portmanteau words, conceived as epiphanic in the Deleuzian sense of the term. 
Moreover, the 'fluttersome' in this phrase again brings into play the 'bird-girl' epiphany 
of A Portrait, and can also be linked to the 'the bird as event'. (WIP 21) 1 continue to 
argue in this chapter that the instabilities of meaning which the reader is consequently 
asked to produce by Joyce extend beyond the Wake itself, unden-nining and potentially 
recasting English literature per se, in order both to challenge the basic assumptions and 
very meaning of our life under capitalist modernity, yesterday, today, and tomorrow, 
and to suggest a 'self-less' ethico-Political alternative. As such, I believe, Joyce's work 
in its 'affects' may be identified with the ethico-political approach of Deleuze and 
Deleuze and Guattari, and consequently has lessons for Hardt and Negri. 
Whilst this footnote is not to be reductively conceived as 'the key' to the Wake in 
its highlighting of 'Issyness', as Issy pervades the Wake in its entirety as a force charged 
with ethico-political potential, it evidently gives Issy a voice and is therefore a 
significant 'node' in the 'rhizomatic assemblage' or Wakean 'epiphanic machine'. In 
making this claim I can draw some support from Marian Eide who has said that the 
'love letter at the heart of Finnegans Wake, is the appropriate genre for ethical writing. 
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It takes up no place, always being in circulation, addressed to, responsive to, 
another'. 
409 
The significance of Issyness, as the differences of Wakean textuality in all of its 
fickle, yet inviting, flirtatiousness, fully revealed in FW 279F 1, lies in seeing the book 
as Issyian 'desiring machine' working through its questioning and problematisation of 
meaning, gender, and identity with the epiphanic 'girl' as its symbolic locus. Moreover, 
the temptations and flirtatiousness of Issy/ Maggy have already been seen to be crucial 
to the major theme of HCE's failure to retain an unsullied masculine identity through 
his, and one should add our, 'Fall' into Original Sin: 'and wasn't that very both of them, 
the saucicissters ... meeting waters most improper (peepette) ballround the garden, 
trickle trickle trickle triss, please, miman, may I go flirting? '. (FW 96.12) Once again 
'fluidity' links the 'bird-girl' of A Portrait to ALP, HCE (as sea), and the twins via Issy 
operating through 'the middle'. As flirtatious 'girl' of sexuality, Issy offers the means 
of release from this constraining patriarchal identity. 
The Wake might be conceived as a Deleuzian monstrous 'girl child 410 fathered by 
Joyce on the masters of English literature whose writing styles he parodies so 
effectively in the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode in Ulysses. I have argued above that the 
4great literature' which they are jointly held to constitute can paradoxically only be such 
when it is read as 4minor literature'. Only then can its subversive and liberatory 'affects' 
be realised. I believe that the academy rather than reading such works in this way tends 
to stress the very features which maintain the traditional thinking and morality of liberal 
humanism's accession to Christianity in its pious underpinning of our capitalist society. 
Joyce in the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode is parodying the literary styles which go to make 
up 'great literature', and revealing them as no more than aspects of 'the first plane of 
writing' which are still being used to negate their primary revolutionary 'affects' 
stemming from the 'second plane'. 
409 Marian Eide, Ethical Joyce (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 146. 
4 10 Deleuze, 'I have nothing to admit', p- 112. 
201 
Whereas both Deleuze and Joyce parody earlier 'writers, I believe that it is only 
Joyce, of the two, who in the Wake rewrites and parodies his own earlier efforts going 
beyond them and the whole of established English literature in the process. Deleuze is 
correct in pointing out that Joyce's use of portmanteau words epitomises the linguistic 
instabilities and the sexually capricious nature of Wakean language, and its capacity to 
'affect' us, although he does not appear to take into account the other equally important 
structural and linguistic devices Joyce uses to accomplish this. These 'affects' I 
associate with the Deleuzoguattarian 'child' synonymous with the 'girl', as Deleuze and 
Guattari tell us that 'becoming itself is a child or a girl'. (TP 277) Yet, Issy's 'girtness' 
extends through difference Deleuze's emphasis on Joyce's esoteric and portmanteau 
words as the sole source of the epiphanic and provides the means whereby all of the 
Wakean letter's divergent 'cosmic series' are brought into play through Joyce's 
' chaosmosis'. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze says of Joyce's work as a whole that it draws 
'together a maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent series constitutive 
of the cosmos) by bringing into operation linguistic dark precursors (here, esoteric 
words, portmanteau words)' [1.3]. Whilst there are a substantial number of words which 
may be conceived of as esoteric to a French or English reader in Dubliners ('gnomon', 
'simony'), A Portrait ('haha', 'suck', 'pandybat', 'drisheens, 'tundish', 'foetus', etc. ), 
and Ulysses, as Deleuze explicitly states [2.1], 1 suggest that his somewhat restricted 
understanding of the Wake as an 'epiphanic machine' can only be justified through his 
highlighting of the importance of portmanteau words as many of these so-called 
'esoteric' words would not be esoteric to a Dubliner at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and may not be so even today. More importantly, he does not bring into the 
'epiphanic machine' assemblage vital missing 'components' such as Joyce's 
employment of a wide range of verbal inventions in a lexis extending way beyond 
esoteric words to include puns, anagrams, lipography, metathesis and aberrant syntax, 
or even his own concepts of the 'desiring machine' and 'becoming-girl'. All of these 
add to and multiply Wakean 'affects' and in sum nullify Deleuze and Guattari's later 
objections that finally esoteric and portmanteau words 'only posit a cyclic unity of the 
sentence, text, or knowledge'[6.1 ]. 
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Yet, Deleuze when speaking of 'newness' through 'the eternal return' of difference, 
and relating this to understanding of the 'simulacrum', notes of the epiphany that: 
The identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent series defined by 
esoteric words, just as the identity of the reading subject is dissolved into the 
decentred circles of possible multiple readings. Nothing, however, is lost; each 
series exists only by virtue of the return of the others. Everything has become 
simulacrum, for by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but 
rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged 
and overturned [1.2]. 
This is even more true of portmanteau words and the variety of other lexical and 
grammatical devices, as well as the crucial 'affects' of 'becoming-girl', which Joyce 
brings into play by drawing into and complicating all of the heterogeneous series 
constitutive of the cosmos,, and it is these in sum which give us Joyce's 'machine for 
producing epiphanies' [3.1]. Joyce states in Stephen Hero that 'the soul of the 
commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems ... radiant. The object 
achieves its epiphany', (SH 218) and he fmds a particularly 'radiant' example of this in 
A Portrait where the 'bird-girl' is an object constituting the means and process of his 
future writing. Such radiance does not set this moment apart from the difference, 
movement and change which, I have argued, characterises Deleuze's understanding of 
the Joycean epiphany, but rather brings it into play. 
Deleuze points out that Joyce begins by seeking the secret of epiphanies within the 
object and then through his subjective experience as an aesthete, but that neither are 
sufficient in themselves to give us his 'epiphanic machine'. It is only when both the 
object and the subjective forms have given way to a multiplicity of fragments, as a 
chaotic and multiple impersonal reality, that Joyce is able to give us the full meaning of 
the Wake as it functions for us. Despite not mentioning Issy I find it difficult to see this 
4 multiplicity of fragments' as not referring to the 'affects' which 'she' creates. For me it 
is the fragmentation offered by Issy which is key to my understanding. Yet, there is no 
'true' meaning to the Wake, according to Deleuze, except in its offering us the prospect 
of new 'becomings'. No matter how insightful the labours of such scholars as Patrick 
McCarthy and John Gordon may be they cannot give us a supposedly 'true' meaning of 
the Wake. 
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Joyce's meticulous construction of the book deliberately contests any unitary 
meaning. My epiphanic exemplar of the 'bird-girl' must then be reconceived in terms of 
a process of change, 'a multiplicity of fragments ... a chaotic and multiple 
impersonal 
reality' [3.1]. The static being of the patriarchal order is thus contested through the 
I girlish' instabilities of language and meaning which in their impact on the reader 
undermines all of majoritarian literature and, indeed, the Symbolic order itself. Thus, 
Joyce, through Shern in his contest with Shakespeare ('shaggspick, other Shakhisbeard', 
(IFW 177.32)) claims that he will wipe (spoken) English off the face of the earth: if his 
'lankalivline lasted he would wipe alley english spooker, multaphoniaksically spuking, 
off the face of the erse', (FW 178.5-7) just as he wipes his arse, and Ireland of its 
contamination. Moreover, the faecality which is being cleansed extends to the capitalist 
socius through money as shit and capitalism's ultimate dependence on the language of 
the patriarchal symbolic order. Even if conceived as comically hyperbolic Shem's 
statement cannot be dismissed on these grounds as Deleuze and Guattari hold that there 
are no contradictions, apparent or real, only different degrees of humour. (AO 68) 
The importance of the letter is made apparent both through its frequent 
reappearances and its pervasive quality., as it is referred to in nearly every chapter of the 
(FW 3.1) Wake. Clive Hart notes that the very first word of the Wake. 'riverrun', 
suggests the 'Reverend' of the final version of the letter. (FW 615.12)41 1 Nevertheless, 
there are crucial differences between the words, ' and 
between the versions of the letter in 
its various appearances, which I will explore in more detail below. The difference 
between FW 279FI and FW 615.12 lies in the former offering a more significant 
location of the characteristic subversive instabilities of the Wake. 
We are informed that we must 'cling to it as with drowning hands". (FW 119.3) The 
frequency of its appearance is matched only by its metamorphoses since it always 
arrives in a different form. Bernard Benstock argues that its significance exists both on 
the literal and allegorical levels, although each is a manifestation of history: 'personal, 
41 1 Hart, Structure and Motif in Tinnegans Wake', p. 200. 
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political, and romantic'. 412 Patrick McCarthy informs us that it appears as a satirical 
ballad, a telegram, a newspaper story, a movie script, a radio show, a last will and 
testament, a form, a passionate love letter, an anonymous letter to the editor, a Punic 
admiralty report, and that it is even given a religious twist as it becomes a pastoral letter 
to be read at Sunday mass. 413 
Deleuze treats the letter as somehow symbolic of, or as acting as a general motif or 
paradigm for the Wake as a whole. The very lack of identity in the portmanteau word, 
which he highlights, allows the letter as a microcosm of the Wake to induce identity in 
the book as a whole. [1.3] This is the identity of difference, and it is this extreme 
difference which characterises the Wake beyond any other book. Once again we can 
equate such difference to life itself in a Deleuzian understanding. Through these 'dark 
precursors' which constitute both the letter and the book the positive powers or 
affirmations of life are made manifest in our 'becomings'. (TP 296) 
It is clearly important, if one is arguing for the significance of Issy through her 
contribution to the letter, to establish that Joyce was intending to give 'her' a voice at 
FW 279F L McCarthy argues that, given the diversity of the letter, we may be dealing 
not with one letter, but with several distinct documents each authored by a different 
414 character and concerned with a different subject . In fact, McCarthy even speculates 
that it might be reasonable to regard Issy's 'love letter to her teacher' (FW 27911) as he 
defines it, as existing quite apart from the main letter itself, although he eventually 
concedes that all letters are ultimately variant forms of the same archetypal document. 
What he does not do is question this as a letter. Certainly FW 279. F I gives Issy 'voice' 
and, even though the footnote contains few if any of the identifying characteristics of a 
normal letter, it is this voice which resonates throughout both the letter as a whole and 
the Wake itself. 
412 Bernard Benstock, Joyce-Again's Wake (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1982), p. 9. 
413 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 576. 
414 lbid, pp. 559-632. 
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If one takes into account other footnotes in this chapter, such as those at FW 261 FI 
and FW 293 F2, one can see that they both connect with FW 279F I and substantiate my 
assertion that Issyness gives us the scandalous, though often childlike, seductive, 
enticing, flirtatious textual 'affects' of the Wake. They can be read as fragments of 
Issy's letter. Whilst McCarthy notes that 'Issy finally seizes her chance to speak at FW 
45 7-46 Y). when Shaun/Jaun or Juan (FW 461.3 1) at last allows her to, this too appears 
to be a fragment of Issy's letter. Thus, at FW 458.2-3 there is the phrase 'with my 
fondest' followed by four crossed kisses. Finally the beginning of FW 279FI, with its 
introductory 'come' and the prayer like end as 'Amurn' is coupled with a final 
postscript which also indicates that this passage is a kind of letter. 
Benstock offers a completely contrasting view to that of McCarthy by arguing that 
the entire letter has been written by Issy and is far more homogeneous than the latter 
allows. 415 He comes to Issy via Maggy/ Maggie, being particularly concerned to 
establish that 'Maggie is ISSY, 416 rather than Anna Livia, as Edmund Wilson,, had 
assumed . 
417 He notes that the name Maggie most often appears in 'the all-important 
letter which has been dug up from the midden heap by the neighbour's hen'. Benstock 
believes that the final form of the letter (FW 615-19) allows 'Anna Livia [to] vindicate 
the archetypal man H. C. E., and the letter serves like those of Paul and Peter in the New 
Testament to deify the Son of Man'; arguments which my thesis contests. Nevertheless, 
like Glasheen, Benstock notes that in this context Maggie is seen in her role as Mary 
Magdalene, and her two personalities, before and after salvation, which he then relates 
to the split personalities of Issy. 
415 Benstock, Joyce-Again's Wake, pp. 7-1 0. 
416 Ibid, p. 10. 
417 Edmund Wilson, 'H. C. Earwricker and Family', New Republic (June 20,193 9), 203 - 
6; and 'The Dream of H. C. Earwicker', New Republic (July 12,1939), 270-74. 
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Despite the final version of the letter being signed by 'Alma Luvia, Pollabella', 
(FW 619-16) Benstock concludes that since the letter-writer is Issy - which quite 
contradicts his earlier assertions that Shem was the writer, and that one (stolen) version 
was written by Shaun - it is at this stage that Maggie is most important. Without taking 
into account the 'fluidic' relationship which I have tried to establish between ALP and 
Issy, through 'becoming woman/ becoming girl', Benstock's statement, without further 
evidence, is hardly acceptable. Yet, he closes his argument with an attempt to establish 
that Maggie is Issy, rather than Anna Livia, stating that: 
it is apparent that the Maggie of the Wake is not mother but daughter, except in the 
flashbacks when A. L. P. remembers herself as her young self- 'just a young thin 
pale soft shy slim slip of a thing then' (FW 202.27) and 'Just a whisk brisk sly spry 
spink spank sprint of a thing theresomere'. (FW 627.4-5) 
Finally he agrees with Glasheen that 'the "Maggies" of 'The Mime qf Mick Nick and 
the Maggies'(FW 215-59) are the plural fonn of Issy, and are the temptresses who lurk 
throughout, especially as the Raven and the Dove, the "Magdalenes ... ; and he refers us 
to the Sally-Christine split personality 418 found in Morton Prince's The Dissociation of 
a Personality. 419 
Despite its evident flaws and contentious statements, Benstock's emphasis on Issy/ 
Maggy as the letter writer, I suggest, gives us the means to examine in 
Deleuzoguattarian terms the more concise letter which McCarthy, Hayman, and Rose 
and O'Hanlon from very different viewpoints accept that Issy 'writes' at FW 279F. I. 
Moreover,, Benstock's argument also appears to indicate 'her' pervasiveness throughout 
the other versions of the letter. David Hayman quotes Joyce to show that Issy's letter is 
best regarded as 'the juvcinile version of the "Revered Letter"', (FW 615.12-619.16)420 
which appears to definitively contradict McCarthy's speculation about the Issy letter 
418 Benstock, Joyce-Again's Wake, pp. 8-10. 
419 Morton Prince, The Dissociation ofPersonality: a biographical study in abnormal 
psychology (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1905). 
420 David Hayman, ed., A First-Draft Version of Tinnegans Wake' (London Faber and 
Faber, 1963), p. 156. 
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possibly being distinct from the letter considered as a whole. As such, I believe that it 
may be regarded as the '-childish' or 'girlish' version of the older, final and 'womanly' 
version signed by Anna Livia as 'Alma Luvia, Pollabella' (FW 619.16) with all of its 
symbiotic productive potential. Despite the critics' differences of opinion - and even 
the possibility that it is not a letter at all - everyone would at least agree that Issy speaks 
in FW 279F. 1. 
Throughout Issy's letter there are various hints about its generic status. Although 
McCarthy refers to FW 279F. 1 as Issy's 'love letter to her teacher', Danis Rose and 
O'Hafflon regard it as 'Issy's musical letter', 421 even though they do not elaborate on 
their understanding. Just as Deleuze does not make a clear distinction between writers 
and philosophers, he also allows that painters, musicians and writers can produce 'the 
new' when they find an 'outside' to painting, music and writing, when 'the melodic line 
draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour, or the written line the articulated 
voice'. 422 This approach immediately problematises the letter's apparent focus on any 
4 actualised' love/sexuality, for music, like colour in 'The Mime', has both the capacity 
to bring into play the intensive forces of 'the virtual', and to release 'affects' which 
then, at least for a time, transport and constitute us afresh. We are not then solely 
concerned with the textual 'plane of organization' or 'first plane of writing', but more 
evidently with the 'beyond' of this through 'the second plane of writing'. As Bergson 
notes: 
Let the music express joy or grief, pity or love, every moment we are what it 
expresses. ... 
In point of fact it does not introduce these feelings into us; it 
introduces us into them, as passers-by are forced into a street dance. Thus do 
423 
pioneers in moralityproceed . 
Given the above mentioned distinctions between the two, it seems to me that 
Bergson has ethics rather than judgemental morality in mind when he writes this. I 
would argue that Joyce is precisely just such 'a pioneer' in ethics and desire rather than 
42 1 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 1. 
422 Deleuze and Pamet, Dialogues, p. 40. 
423 Bergson, The Two Sources of'Morality and Religion, p. 40. 
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in morality and that his intense interest in music may indeed confirm this. To take one 
well known example, as Blamires notes of the 'Sirens' episode of Ulysses: 
the episode contains two charming siren barmaids as well as much song,, and the 
style represents an elaborate attempt to imitate musical form in words. The musical 
devices parodied include: structural development of small figures and phrases; a 
continuous symphonic manipulation of sharply identifiable themes; the use of 
emphatic rhythmic figures and patterns; varied tonal contrasts; rich onomatopoeic 
orchestration which mimics the interplay of strings, brass and woodwind; repetition 
and partial repetition; echo and semi-echo; contrapuntal play of phrase against 
phrase; percussive explosions; recapitulations in different 'keys'; and so on. This 
technical experimentation apart, Joyce peppers the episode with lines and phrases 
taken from opera and operetta popular at the time, from Victorian and Edwardian 
drawing-room ballads, from music-hall favourites and from traditional songs. The 
introductory flourish has been said to represent the tuning up of an orchestra. It 
seems more sensible to regard it as an overture, for it lays before us, in concise 
form. many of the themes (fifty-seven, to be exact) to be fully and richly explored 
in the body of the episode. 424 
Throughout this episode Joyce evidently conceives music as an intensely erotic yet 
impersonal force. The music of Issy's letter resonates in the Wake with as much 
intensity as it does in Ulysses and A Portrait. For example, there are clear 'rhizomatic' 
connections with Wagner and the Wakean 'Tristan and Isolde' theme through Issy as 
Isolde. 
Furthermore, the problernatisation of Issy's letter as 'love letter' increases if one 
persists in McCarthy's reading of Issy 'who in the basic family situation is one person' 
and who then writes a 'love letter' to her teacher. I now intend to establish not so much 
whether the musical nature of this version of the letter can be 'proven' and set against 
McCarthy's reading of Issy, but whether the transforming intensities which compose 
music and the intensities of Issy as 'desiring machine' can analogically induce a change 
in our own ethical position. 
424 Blarnires, The New Bloomsday Book, p. 106. 
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Issy's letter at FW279FI 
I will read this footnote 'schizoanalytically' by focusing on the 'lines'. 'intensities' 
and 'becomings' which make up the Wake's 'BwO' conceived as Issyian 'desiring 
machine' on the 'second plane of writing'. I will pinpoint those features of FW 279F I 
which not only give a better understanding of the Wake in Deleuzian terms, but also 
emphasise its potential contribution to Hardt and Negri's theorisings in Empire and 
Multitude. In order to do this within the space available I will have to be selective. 
The scandalous 'affects' of playful seductiveness through the enticing, inviting 
textual body of Issy inflected through the strange instabilities of Wakean language are 
evident in the opening lines of the version of the letter at FW 279F 1. This is 
immediately apparent in the first sentence: 'Come, smooth of my slate, to the beat of 
my blosh. ' From a Deleuzian angle the word 'come' immediately beckons towards the 
processuality of 'becomings', as opposed to 'being', and indicates that the phrase stems 
from the 'second plane of writing'. The impersonal forces of the 'desiring machine' are 
immediately evident as '[c]ome' not only indicates both a lewd invitation and sexual 
orgasm, but it immediately goes beyond this through its musical 'intensities'. 'Come' 
signals musicality in its implicit reference to the many songs and hymns which begin 
with this word and which demand our attention and participation. Popular songs and 
hymns which spring to mind include 'Come into the garden Maude', and 'Come all ye 
faithful'. 'Come' is too a popular ballad opening which in its implicit offering of a 
concealed narrative can be read as referring to the concealed narratives of the Wake as a 
whole. Moreover, the insertion of 'beat' in the sentence offers a reference to both the 
rapid 'heartbeat' of love and the musical beating of time, a phrase which elsewhere in 
the Wake poses the question of capitalism's failure to work in 'duration' as the 'time of 
fife': why can't you beat time? (FW 419.8) 
The 'beat of my blosh' can be read as 'beating about the bush' rather than facing 
the issue. In Deleuzoguattarian terms this is the central ethical issue of freeing desire 
and subjectivity from the deadening recuperative forces of incestuous desire in which 
the nuclear family under capitalism and Christianity is entrapped. 'Oedipalised' desire 
ensures the formation of the 'so-called' unified subject and underpins the patriarchal 
designation of 'identity'. This is the significant ethical issue which the Hardt and 
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Negrian 'multitude' must address in order to obtain a 'new earth' through a new 
subjectivity. Thus, the phrase 'beat of my blosh' returns us to Issy"s 'bush' and 
immediately sets desire and life against the stultifying forces of modernity. 
The use of 'slate' by pupils in schools at that time, seems to justify McCarthy's 
suggestion that this is an alluring 'love letter' addressed by Issy to her teacher when one 
also takes into account the phrases 'pupil teacher's' and 'perfectionclass', (FW 
279FI. 4-5) but again it exceeds the personal. Issy as the Wakean 'desiring machine', 
where '[s]exuality, any sexuality, is a becoming-woman, in other words, a girl', (TP 
277) takes us through explicit sexual references to 'coming', 'slate' as 'slit', 425 and 
'blosh' as girlish blushing to exemplify the teasing flirtatiousness constitutive of the 
Deleuzian 'girl' as text. The Wake and the letter within it is figured as an act of creative 
destruction and as such 'slate' may be the act of 'wiping the slate clean', whether by 
ridding us of the majoritarian readings of Shakespeare and 'great literature' in general, 
or the English language as restrictive Symbolic order. Only then can a new writing be 
created which offers a new and different understanding. 
In fact the suggestion that 'smooth[ing] of my slate' implies 'wiping the slate 
clean' goes beyond even this by referring obliquely to the telling by Butt and Taff of 
Buckley's shooting of the Russian general after he has symbolically wiped himself on 
the turf of Ireland. (FW 335-355) In this story's emphasis on shooting those generals in 
the rear-end who have insulted and exploited Ireland it links us directly to the Duke of 
Wellington: 'Hit, hit, hit! This is the same white harse of the Willingdone, (FW 10.12- 
13) and again by implication to the history of colonialism and the patriarchal 
suppression through warfare of a people's desire for freedom. However, Joyce in the 
Wake heaps ridicule upon both the repression and the form which resistance to it takes. 
In its emphasis on masculine rear-ends, shit, guns and shooting this recalls John Wyse's 
injunction to Bloom to 'stand up to them like men' and points to the implicit 
425 Walter W. Skeat, The Concise Dictionary of English Etymology (Ware, Herts: 
Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1993). 
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homosexuality underpinning masculine identity constituted under patriarchy together 
with the resort to warfare dependent on its denial. 
We know that Stephen's 'bird-girl' in A Portrait implicitly teaches Stephen. She 
offers him a call to life and creativity. Blushing characterises both the girl and Stephen. 
In her case there is 'a faint flame [which] trembled on her cheek', whilst 'his cheeks 
were aflame', and 'his heart trembled' too as he 'becomes girl', 'becomes animal', 
'becomes writer' through his artistic muse. The phrase 'beat of my blosh' reminds us of 
this. Unlike Stephen's earlier encounter with the prostitute, in A Portrait, Stephen's 
muse, despite a certain sexual teasing, is still girlishly innocent. Now as Issy/ Maggy in 
the Wake who as 'Venus' is 'gigglibly tempatrix' (FW 79.18) and consequently giggly, 
glib, libidinal, empathetic yet tempting. 'She' offers temptation to pater, patriarchy and 
the Church of Patrick, as well as playing tricks with time. Such tricks include 
transporting us to 'duration' as the time of life rather than keeping us in capitalism's 
deadening clock-time. As 'Nuvoletta, a lass' and 'cloud girl' she also offers, in 'her' 
raindrops, to form a river of life, (FW159.6-18) and remains, somewhat ambiguously, 
both chaste and chased in 'perpetually chaste', (FW 606.1) amongst other things then, 
'she' is a 'virgin most prudent'. 426 In FW 279F I Issy/ Maggy takes on the attributes of 
both the prostitute and the 'bird girl' in A Portrait. Whereas they were previously kept 
separate in an implicit virgin/whore bi-polarisation, Issy's repeated confrontation of her 
dark mirror image brings them together: 'I know you are a viry vikid girl' (FW527.5) 
as 'she' says to her mirror image. All in all, Issy is immediately presented to us as 
Deleuzian 'girl'. 
The Issy letter can also be viewed as commenting on its historical circumstances. I 
argued above that it is the failure of a weakened patriarchy after the First World War to 
contain the impersonal forces of desire and their effects on the then contemporary youth 
during 'the jazz age' which made for considerable social instability; an instability 
which, of course, the letter reflects. Issy can be thought of as recognising this through 
such phrases as 'the thrills and ills of laylock blossoms'. (FW 279F 1.2) McHugh tells us 
426 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. 9. 
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starkly that 'laylock' equates to 'cunt' through the inversion of part of 'laycock', 427 as 
free love became the order of the day in the 1920s with women just as much as men 
able to take the sexual initiative without any long term commitment being at stake, they 
enjoyed both the 'thrills and ills' of these liasons. 
Nevertheless a vacuum in society had been created, through the loss of self- 
confident manhood occasioned by the terrible experiences of the Great War, which was 
carried forward into the post war years. Issy may be addressing this when she says 
'Don't be of red, you blanching mench! '. (FW 279FI. 30) Issy seems to be saying that 
the loss of an imposed identity is not something to be afraid of The phrase 'blanching 
mench' could contain the French for white and the German for men with both sets of 
men being ferninised through 'blanche'. Yet, Issy's 'beat of my blosh' as the blushing 
activity of the 'desiring machine' is not matched by the ashen faces of these 'blanching 
mench'. The entirely justified fears of the fighting men on both sides of the trenches 
were seen as a derogation of the heroism demanded of the men in uniform and a white 
feather (la plume blanche) was routinely issued to conscientious objectors and deserters 
on the Home Front in England and France. No doubt similar measures were taken in 
Germany. Certainly summary execution was often meted out to disserting soldiers who 
would now be seen as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder but were then 
regarded as cowards who were 'letting the side down'. One must also ask, in this 
connection, is 'blanching mench' a comment on the 'white men' of Europe dragging the 
entire world into a barbaric war as the culmination of historical conflict between 
Germans and French,, and does this phrase allude to the Deleuzian racist 'faciality' of 
White European Men as they impose capitalism on the world? I will bring both of these 
questions into play below. 
After the 'Great' War there could be no unquestioned assumption as to just what a 
gman' was, with all of its destabilising effects on patriarchy, and potential for new 
subjectivity. Similarly, in Multitude, Hardt and Negri's awareness that perpetual war is 
427 McHugh, Annotations to 'Finnegans Wake', p. 279. 
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being used strategically today, in order to maintain global capitalism's world order. 
social hierarchy and implicitly 'masochistic' subjectivity, is seen by them as being 
fundamentally flawed. It has similar 'deterritorialising' 'affects' on the participants and 
produces instabilities of desire in global-capitalism's 'Empire'. Issy as Isolde in the 
wake428 
, gives us just such an illustration of the instabilities engendered by desire and 
its potential for creating new subjectivities. In the lines '[t]his isabella I'm on knows the 
ruelles of the rut and she don't fear andy mandy', (FW 279F 1.30-3 1) both Tristan and 
Isolde know the rules 'of the rut'. that is the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in a 
patriarchal society attending his escorting of her to King Mark her betrothed. Both of 
course chose to ignore the rules as 'isabella'/ Isolde/ Issy at least 'doesn't fear any man' 
('she don't fear andy mandy') even presumably were she to die: 'andy mandy', for her 
new found but illicit love. We are also reminded that such a betrayal of king, husband 
and patriarchal rules may well be justified. The 'ruelles', 'rue elles' or rules may well 
suit the the ruler but not the 'rue[ing]' experienced by many married women whose 
husbands treat them badly: 'Your are me severe? Then rue'. (FW 279F 1.11) 1 will take 
up this issue below. 
In their disregard for and breaking of the rules of acceptable behaviour Tristan and 
Isolde not only bear comparison to Issy/ Maggy but to the Greek warrior Achilles and 
the Amazon Penthesilea who are taken as exemplars by Deleuze and Guattari for their 
twin concepts of 'the nomad' and the 'war machine' which have been briefly referred to 
above. The concepts of 'the war machine', and 'becoming-woman' and implicitly 
'becoming girl', are 'rhizomatically' connected at several points in Deleuze and 
Parnet's Dialogues and they receive detailed treatment in several sections of Deleuze 
and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. (TP 351-423) The 'war machine' is defined by 
Deleuze as: 
a linear assemblage which is constructed on lines of flight. In this sense, the war 
machine does not at all have war as its object; it has as its object a very special 
space,, smooth space, which it composes, occupies and propagates. Nomadism is 
precisely this combination 'war machine-smooth space'. ... A war machine tends to be revolutionary, or artistic, much more so than military. (N 33) 
428 Glasheen. Third Census, p. 13 8. 
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One should add that from the standpoint of the State in 'stratified space' the "war 
machine' is a potential source of betrayal and the individuals who compose it are 
traitors. 429 We can also relate 'Nomadism', a concept introduced in Chapter Two, to the 
4 active' mode of existence advocated by Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy of Morality, 
as the minoritarian becomings whose 'value is to trigger uncontrollable movements 
within the ma ority population'. 430 'Smooth space' can then be seen as the space of 
'duration' and 'becomings', flux, immense speeds, and metamorphosis, as opposed to 
'striated space', which is resistant to movement, stable, slow and clearly demarcated in 
clock-time. 
Issy is not only linked to Isolde but to the Amazons and hence Penthesilea in the 
final pages of the Wake where we are told that Issy is 'the wild Amazia, when she 
would seize to my other breast! And what is she weird, haughty Niluna, that she will 
snatch from my ownest hair! For 'tis they are the ston-nies. '( FW 627.28 -3 1) Issy is 
thus presented as 'becoming Amazon'. 'She' is in a symbiotic relationship with ALP 
whose 'other breast' presumably also makes 'her' Amazonian. We can connect this 
directly to the 'nomadic' Amazonian 'war machine' in A Thousand Plateaus, and the 
betrayals which characterize both this machine and indeed Issy/ ALP as free flowing 
desire undermining patriarchal convention. 
Deleuze and Guattari take Kleist's writings as an exemplar of the 'nomadic' 'war 
machine', (TP 33) and single out his drama Penthesilea for special attention. 431 This 
drama is concerned with warrior maidens, the Amazons, whose institutions 'are weak 
and their social structures unstable'. 432 Their ultimate aim is not to establish an 
429 Deleuze and Clair Pamet, Dialogues, p. 41. 
430 Smith, 'Introduction', in Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, p. x1iii. 
43 1 Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea, trans. by Humphrey Trevelyan, in The Classic 
Theatre. Vol. IL Five German Plays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), pp. 
313-419. 
432 Mathieu Carriere, Pour une litterature de guerre, Kleist, trans. by Martin Ziegler 
(Arles: Actes Sud, 1985), p. 82. 
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alternative State but rather to oppose and destroy the conquerors of their country. Whilst 
Kleist nevertheless believes that, ja] nation [has] arisen, a nation of women. ), 433 
Deleuze would no doubt quote Joyce with approval by seeing this so-called nation as a 
nonation', (FW 36.22) not as patriarchal state but as the coalescing intensities of a 
female nomadic horde. In Penthesilea as Bogue points out: 'the personal and political 
aspects of war are intertwined, the forces of affective intensities and physical violence 
meeting in unstable relations of love and combat'. 434 
In order to wage sporadic wars with surrounding tribes, and in the process 'become 
warrior% these 'maidens' cut off their left breasts so that they could better wield their 
weaponry of bows and arrows. It would appear that they were thus implicitly granted 
that masculine status of right-handedness whereas their previous status of female would 
have made this impossible as sinistrality better accords with a patriarchal view of their 
female otherness. However, from our Deleuzian perspective this self-mutilation can be 
perhaps better seen as positioning them in the productive 'middle' half way between 
women with and men without breasts. Yet, their intention in such battles was to capture 
the strongest and most virile men and return to their homeland to mate with them in 
order to breed and increase the Amazonians' fighting potential. It is for this reason that 
the Amazons descended on the combatants at Troy. 
These warrior maidens observed two rites both of which threatened to unleash 
uncontrollable forces. The first, known as 'The Feast of Flowering Virgins', 
inaugurated the hunt for men. The warrior-virgins were declared 'Brides of Mars', and 
'like the fiery hurricano's blast' they descended upon their prey. 435 The second rite, 
'The Feast of Roses' marked the return of the warrior-virgins, when their male captives 
- those selected for mating - were adomed with roses and invited to join in orgiastic 
pleasures with their conquerors. In the first ritual, an anonymous force of violence was 
433 
von Kleist, Penthesilea, p. 379. 
434 Bogue, Deleuze on Literature, p. 12 1. 
435 
von Kleist, Penthesilea, p. 383. 
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set loose, in the second, an equally anonymous impersonal desiring force was released. 
Interestingly enough this repositioned these most virile men as passive females 
bedecked with roses which signals menstruation. 
Both nomadic rituals were institutions that attempted to regulate 'deterritorializing' 
forces but they were constantly endangered because of the uncertainties of the control 
which they tried to impose as this frequently resulted in a collapse into unrestricted 
violence, anarchy and eroticism. There is a parallel here with the 'minoritarian' 
becomings which 'trigger uncontrollable movements within the maj ority population'. 436 
As Deleuze and Guattari state: 
The man of war [becomes] inseparable from the Amazons. The union of the girl 
and the man of war ... simultaneously produces the becoming-woman of the latter 
and the becoming-animal of the former, in a single 'block' in which the warrior in 
turn becomes animal by contagion with the girl at the same time as the girl 
becomes warrior by contagion with the animal. ... 
in an asymmetrical block of 
becoming 
... It 
is in the vestiges of a double war machine ... that Achilles and Penthesilea, the last man of war and the last queen of the girls, choose one another, 
Achilles in a becoming-woman, Penthesilea in a becoming-dog. (TP 278) 
We see here that 'contagion' of 'the girl' as 'block of becoming' which allows 
'becoming woman' and 'becoming animal' to take place. Deleuze and Guattari thus 
conceptualise the 'war machine' in Penthesilea as a metamorphic force which disrupts 
stable codes and social relations in complete opposition to the State, as it seems that 
Issy as 'girl' does throughout the Wake. Like Issy, as Maggies or rainbow girl multiples, 
(FW 226.21-227.18) the Amazons 'surg[e] forth like lightning, "between" the two 
States, the Greek and the Trojan. They sweep everything away in their Passage'. (TP 
355) These 'girls': 
do not belong to an age group, sex, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between 
orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in 
relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. (TP 277) 
436 Smith, 'Introduction', in Gilles Deleuze Essays Critical and Clinical, p. x1iii. 
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Hence, the warrior in her/ his betrayal of 'the world of dominant significations and the 
established order' is inevitably 'coded' or categorised as a traitor from an hegemonic 
State perspective. 437 
Deleuze and Guattari note that throughout Penthesilea, Achilles pursues 
Penthesilea and in doing so defies his commander and the Greek social order whilst in 
accepting his advances she too violates 'the collective law of her people, that law of the 
pack that forbids the "choice" of an enemy', (TP 355) and through her betrayal becomes 
'war machine' as much as through her fighting prowess. Issy too, when regarded as 
'war machine' betrays, for as writer of 'some anomorous letter, signed Toga Girilis', 
(FW 112.29-30) as Tindall notes, 'she is a tea-girl who, putting on a toga virilis, has 
taken man's place I, 438 as warrior. Furthermore, Issy as 'a tea-girl' not only offers us a 
shibboleth for love/ sexuality through 'wetting the tea', but also invokes the 
revolutionary opposition to the colonising State in the reference to the Boston Tea Party 
mentioned in the letter. 
As Deleuze and Guattari state of Penthesilea, 'Kleist marvellously explains how 
forms and persons are only appearances, produced by the displacement of a center of 
gravity on an abstract line, and by the conjunction of lines on a plane of immanence'. 
(TP268) Similarly, the Tristan and Iseult scenario in the Wake shows the 'war machine' 
not as a machine for war, but rather an agglomeration of free flowing desiring 
'intensities' oriented along a 'line of flight' and ranged against the repressive social 
machinery which configures or 'codifies' all processes and production within the 
extrinsic ends of a State operating along the single 'static' or 'molar' line of a unitary 
history. Issy as 'desiring machine' is both nomadic, 'molecular', and at the same time 
the 'war machine' as: 
the war machine ... seems to 
be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its 
sovereignty and prior to its law ... ,a celerity against gravity; secrecy against the 
public, a power against sovereignty, a machine against the apparatus. (TP 352) 
437 Deleuze and Clair Parnet, Dialogues, p. 41. 
438 William York Tindall, A Reader's Guide to 'Finnegans Wake'(New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 1969), p. 103. 
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The 'war machine' as a 'power against sovereignty' allows for 'the multitude' as 'a 
mode of social organisation that is not sovereign 439 as Hardt and Negri recognise, 
although they fail to fully appreciate that it tends to be artistic. (N 33) 
In reviewing Penthesilea, Deleuze takes from Bergson the idea that 'affects' are not 
internalised subjective states, but forces stemming from the 'outside': 
sentiments are torn from the interiority of a 'subject' so they may be violently 
projected into a milieu of pure exteriority that instills in them an incredible speed, a 
catapulting force: love or hatred are no longer sentiments but affects. These affects 
are so many instances of the becoming-woman, the becoming-animal of the warrior 
(bear, dogs). Affects traverse the body like arrows, they are arms of war. The 
deterritorialization speed of the affect. (TP 356) 
and we have already noted that such textual 'affects' constitute the 'intensities' which 
are Issy, conceived as 'desiring machine', and need to be accorded a greater place by 
Hardt and Negri in their understanding of how 'the multitude' can be formed. These 
'affects' result in the 'becoming warrior' of the 'war machine' and are thus conjoined 
with the 'becoming girl' of Issy as the dynamic of 'becoming woman' already 
conceived through epiphanic 'becomings'. 
By moving with the watery flow which characterises Issy/ALP, I have moved away 
. 
C-- 
- from reading the sentences at FW 279FI. 30-31 in straightforward historical terms as 
these elide the real significance of Issy. 'She' as the Wake's sexually capricious 
tendency both exceeds and inflects upon historical and current political scenarios. Thus, 
Issy has already indicated great fickleness in her desiring oscillations between Shem 
and Shaun in 'The Mime', as is the case elsewhere in the Wake. (FW 461.30-32) One 
may add that there is a 'rhizomatic' connection here with Molly in the 'Penelope' 
episode of Ulysses. Her use of ambiguous personal pronouns indicates her hesitation 
between Boylan and Bloom, interspersed with memories of Mulvey and Stanhope, 
which culminates, I have argued above, in her 'molecular' movement and attempted 
'line of flight' to 'nomadic' men. As Shloss notes of the Wake, 'the narration frequently 
439 1 lardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 208. 
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teases us about its own status as a book of "hides and hints and misses in prints", (FW 
20.10-11)' as meaning is elided through excess. Thus, whilst 0 Hehir argues that 
'cooledas' in 'cooledas as culcumbre' (FW 279FI. 27-28) relates to the Gaelic 'cAil- 
deas' as pretty headed girl, 440 one might equally well read it as the sexuality of 'the girl' 
through the juxtaposition of 'cul' as head and 'as' as bottom and still bring into play the 
phallic symbolism of the cucumber. It is the indeterminacy of Wakean textuality, read 
as constantly changing impersonal sexuality, and its implications through Issyian 
(misses in print[s]' which needs to be addressed. 
In support of Rose and O'Hanion's belief that this is 'Issy's musical letter', 441 
0 Hehir and Dillon relate 'malody' (FW 279FIA) to the Greek 'song' of mel6dia and 
the 'choice' which the Latin 'malo' offers. 442 Here Issy offers the reader a choice as 
'she' 'remembered all your pupil-teacher's erringnesses in perfection class', (FW 
279F. 4-5) as the way out of the societal impasse. This choice which Issy is offering 
readers, I believe,, allows 'erringnesses', or life-affirming differences, instanced 
throughout Wakean textuality/ sexuality, to be privileged and set against that deadening 
(perfection' which characterise the activities of a social system operating through a 
masculinized unitary identity and concerned always to ascertain the truth and then 
4 correct' everything else. Under the Christian code of conduct we are expected to strive 
for perfection in everything as Saint Matthew specifically enjoins us: 'be ye therefore 
perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect'. 443 In these life affirming 
4erringnesses' one again recalls Stephen's encounter with the 'bird-girl' and the 
productivity of ' becoming writer' by 'throw[ing] open before him in an instant of 
ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory', set against the constraints of a 
440 0 Hehir, A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', p. 145. 
44 1 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 1. 
442 Brendan 0 Hehir and John M. Dillon, A Classical Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake': A 
glossary of the Greek and Latin in the major works ofJoyce (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 247. 
443 Matthew, 4.48. 
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living death in Ireland: '[t]o live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of 
life! . 
444 
The death-dealing injunction to avoid all 'error', and consequently difference, is 
evident not just in school classes, working classes, or even the glass(es) in which Issy's 
scapegoated miffor image Maggie is routinely condemned, but throughout traditional 
literature and life itself under modernity. Hardt and Negri understand this for as they 
approvingly note with regard to Bakhtin's attack on Russian formalism, the then 
reigning tradition of literary criticism, he 'poses the aesthetic limits of formalism by 
demonstrating its immobility and lifeless circularity'. 445 The Roman Catholic negation 
of free-flowing desire, as an aspect of modemity's hegemonic 'reterritoriali sing' 
control, is well illustrated by Joyce, in A Portrait, when at the end of Chapter 3, section 
ii, Stephen confesses his sexual sins which 'trickled from his lips, one by one, trickled 
in shameful drops from his soul, festering and oozing like a sore, a squalid stream of 
vice. The last sins oozed forth, sluggish, filthy'; and the priest to whom he confesses 
condemns such 'fluid' activities as 'dishonourable and unmanly'. One is reminded here 
of the very similar treatment meted out to Bob Doran by the priest in 'A Boarding 
House', and HCE in his confession to the Cad. (FW 36-37) The priest may then 
implicitly offer Stephen a life of chastity as a member of the priesthood; or, as Doran 
was offered, the 'manly' sexual outlet of the so-called 'merried' state whereas Joyce 
offers, through Issy in the Wake, the joyful difference of free-flowing desire. 
Such scandalous 'effingnesses' allow for the contestation of the repressive forces of 
incest and the incest taboo, as the sole focus of desire, which constitute everyone born 
into a nuclear family - these forces I have argued being depicted through the masked 
Issy as Izod in 'the Mime' - and the emergence of the intense seductive melody of 
Issy's 'girlness' when released from the constraints of incestuous desire which, as 
Deleuze argues, offers some antidote for our condition in modernity. Thus, Deleuze and 
Guattari note that 'music' 'has always sent out lines of flight [as] "transformational 
444 My italics 
445 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 209. 
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multiplicities" overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it', (TP 11) for 
4musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is ... a rhizome'. (TP 12) 
Stephen/ Joyce at the moment of 'becoming writer' in A Portrait is assailed by 'a 
confused music within him as of memories and names which he was almost conscious 
of but could not capture even for an instant'. He hears 'from each receding trail of 
nebulous music ... always one 
longdrawn calling note ... A voice from beyond the world 
was calling' him. Similarly in conjoining the 'bird girl' with the Deleuzian 'becoming 
girl', one might read Issy's malody/ melody as 'a line of flight [the process of 
becoming] between states which displace and disorient subjects and identities ... a 
line of 
flight, moving towards excess, otherness, exteriority', 446 and as such offering a 
furtherance of 'life' itself, through Wakean textual 'flightiness'. 
I have already brought into play the line '[y]our are me severe? Then rue' (FW 
279F 1.11) which, according to McHugh, relates to two songs: 'A Married Woman's 
Lament' containing the lines 'you use me severe', and 'The Sorrow of Marriage' with 
its phrase 'thein rue'. 'Rue' is of course one of the names of the teenage Rainbow Girls 
(FW 227.14) and indicative of subversion and disruption. Moreover, the theme of the 
failure of the institution of conventional Christian marriage as 'a newfolly' is continued 
in the following statement 'My intended, Jr, who I'm throne away on, (here he inst, my 
lifstack, a newfolly likon)', (FW 2 79F 1.11- 12) with its ironic reference to 'thrown' as 
both the iconic throne of a queen offered in the romantic view of marriage - with the 
woman placed on a pedestal as subservient 'Virgin' Mary - and the lavatory as 'throne, 
where 'woman' conceived in masculinist terms as the re ected waste 447 of urine and 
faeces are flushed away. Such women are indeed 'thrown away' unless they can be 
severe(d) from their partners, a conclusion which Roman Catholicism still cannot 
countenance. 
446 Flieger, 'Becoming-woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification', pps. 
43,47. 
447 Kristeva, The Powers oj-Horror, passim. 
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I believe that it is 'the girl's' powerftil (a)sexual appeal which contends with the 
patriarchal tendency to 'throw away' women/ wives in such Issyian statements as 'I can 
live simply and solely for my wonderful kinkless and its loops of loveliness. When I 
throw away my rollets there's rings for all. '. (FW 458.31-32) Here, Issy contests this 
'throwing away' of women/ wives. 'She' can be read here as referring to the sexual 
appeal of girl's hair in 'kinkless' and 'loops', with the latter also drawing in female 
contraception through the 'coil' as 'loop', as well as the right to make her own decisions 
as to whether conception may or will not take place. Issy is here, in her reply to Shaun/ 
Jaun as the priestly representative of patriarchy, stating that she will not wait demurely 
for him whilst he is away. By emphasising promiscuity through giving 'rings for all', 
and thus taking on agency, Issy is saying that the female in general can 'throw away' 
the domestication of 'rollets' or hair curlers and the constraints of marriage to just one 
man as his sole property to do with as he will. 
Furthermore, by relating Issy to Alice in Alice in Wonderland, which Joyce so 
frequently does, (FW 279FI. 3) he ensures that we read Issy/ Alice as contesting and 
rebutting the 'throne' and the authority of the King and Queen of Hearts. This is made 
doubly clear by Carroll as in a final confrontation between the Queen and Alice, the 
Queen of Hearts' command '[o]ff with her head', gains no support as '[n]obody 
moved'. whereas Alice's exclamation that '[y]ou're nothing but a pack of cards! ', 
exposes the Queen, her consort and even her subjects as disempowered. Symbolically, 
kingship or queenship also represents adulthood. Alice's (and Issy's) victory can be 
taken here as the victory of the 'girl' or 'child' over adulthood and ultimately the 
'arborescence' of Royal rule and the patriarchal order. Likewise, Stephen in A Portrait, 
at the transformational moment of encounter with his artistic muse 'happy and near to 
the wild heart of life', becomes aware of 'figures of children and girls and voices 
childish and girlish in the air'. I will address the issue of the Deleuzian 'child' below. 
Issy says that 'Nature tells everybody about but I learned all the runes of the gamest 
game ever from my old nourse Asa. A most adventuring trot is her and she vicking well 
knowed them all heartswise and fourwords'. (FW 279F 1.19-2 1) 'Nature tells everybody 
about' seems to relate straightforwardly enough to 'spring has sprung', (FW 279F 1.17) 
but Issy seems to immediately countermand it by an imposition of the cultural on the 
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natural: 'but I learned all the runes of the gamest game ever from my old nourse Asa 
No doubt becoming in the process a 'gigglibly tempatrix'. (FW 79.18) 'Rue' is 
contained in the word 'runes' and Issy may be obliquely commenting on the song 'The 
Sorrow of Marriage' which McHugh cites with its phrase 'then rue'. McHugh 448 tells us 
that 'nari' in 'they're nary nay of my day'(FW 279F 1.16) is Scandinavian for wife and 
this too may relate to the trials and tribulations of Christian marriage and the nuclear 
family adumbrated above. It seems evident that 'nari' is an harbinger of things to come 
in the Issyian letter as 'she' makes frequent reference to Scandinavia, the Danes, 
Vikings and Norse gods, runes, folktales or legends, throughout its latter part. This 
could indicate that having learned of the sadnesses of the modem 'marriage game' from 
her Scandinavian nurse, the 'desiring machine' of Issyness avoids such entrapment. Of 
course this nurse, if female, must be equated to some extent with 'Mother Nature' in 
patriarchal discourse. However, Christiani informs us that it was Odin who invented and 
taught 'runes', and here Asa, meaning 'of the gods', 449 may refer to him in a typical 
Joycean reversal. 
Nevertheless, it seems that Issy is pointing out that things have to be learned rather 
than acted upon instinctively and that marriage is not an inevitability. In fact we are told 
by David Hayman that the first-draft version read 'I learned all the values of the gamest 
game ever from my old nourse Asa', 450 which infers an ethical dimension. Atherton in 
line with Christiani tells us that "'Asa" is frequently used as the English for the Norse 
word for gods'. 45 1 However, McHugh states that 'Asa' is equivalent to 'Ase', Peer 
Gynt's mother. 452 We know too that the Vikings (vicking) were great adventurers: 'A 
most adventuring trot is her', and whilst the 'trot' may well refer to globe-trotting - or 
448 McHugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 279. 
449 ChriStiani, Scandinavian Elements of Tinnegans Wake', p. 150. 
450 Hayman, ed., A First-Draji Version oj*'Finnegans Wake', p. 157. (My italics) 
45 1 Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 22 1. 
452 McHugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 279. 
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even Leon Trotsky who having returned from exile in Siberia was People's Commissar 
for Military and Naval Affairs and, as such, managed the founding of the Red Army in 
the U. S. S. R. - 'trot' also relates to horses or donkeys and thus Issy's 'becoming- 
animal', as the Old Norse word for god is Ass. 453 Issy sees the old Norse's (nourse) 
wisdom as stemming from the 'heart', 'art' or 'arse' making her 'heartswise' and body- 
centred. Issy then returns us to textuality by the mention of 'fourwords' (FW 279F 1.2 1) 
or forewords. Of course temporality may be being alluded to through 'fourwords' as 
'forwards' and 'backwards'. There may too be a reference to 'mamalujo' which is made 
up of the four words heading the Gospels: Mark, Matthew, Luke and John. However, 
one must ask here whether these are just Issy's reference to naughty Anglo-Saxon four 
letter words with 'vick[ing]' to be read as 'fuck[ing]'9 Elsewhere of course Issy's 
reference to her wicked double Maggy, as her nurse, '(msch! msch! [me! me! ]) with 
nurse Madge, my linkingclass girl, she's a fright', (FW 459.3-4) might seem to bear 
this out. 
Issy speaks of 'cecilies', (FW 279F 1.3) during the opening sequence. This relates to 
'Nircississies', (FW 526.34) as Isis, kisses and flowers, and even more to 'Secilas'. (FW 
526.35) This underlines the immediately preceding 'salices', (FW 526.32) and the 
salaciousness of Alice and Issy/ Maggy. Deleuze has stressed the correlation between 
the approaches of Lewis Carroll and Joyce in his Logic qf Sense [2.1,2.2,2.5], and I 
believe that in the use of 'cecilies' we see evidence of the way in which Issy conjoins 
productively with Alice. Not only do we have the homophonically encoded or 
encrypted portmanteau words 'nircississies', 'secilas' and 'salices' of the Alice of Alice 
in Wonderland, but also the Alice of Alice Through the Looking Glass (Alices 'through 
their laughing classes'(FW 526.34-35)) together with the multiple Issy's of 
'nircississies', and hence the Rainbow girls. 
The 'laughing classes' also give us the 'looking glasses' and again bring into play 
Alice and the naughty Maggy. Not so much then the 'daughters/ mothers of invention', 
453 Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 22 1. 
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although they are this too, as the scandalous 'doaters of inversion'. Atherton points out 
that: 
Finnegans Wake is full of references to Alice. Joyce found her exactly what he 
needed to complete the elaborated symbol of the Virgin which he formed out of the 
combined characters of Alice, Iseult, the dissociated personality girl Christine 
Beauchamp, and Swift's two Stellas. Alice, of course, was the looking-glass girl; 
there were two Iseults-and Miss Beauchamp had many personalitieS454. The 
combination of them all gives Joyce the effect he wanted of constantly changing 
personalities in the same character. We are probably not meant to conclude that any 
one of the personalities is the main one, for Joyce seems to try to give them all 
equal value. 455 
Yet, the centrality of virginity, which Atherton assigns Issy to, is in some doubt. 
After all, 'kissmiss [is] coming', (FW 624.06) gives us the impersonal intensities of 
Christmas/ the birth of Christ as Issy/Maggy. Both Jesus and Mary his virgin mother are 
thus transmogrified into the undifferentiated 'perverse body' (L 281) of Issy/ Maggy as 
'kissykissy'(FW 102.28) - which Joyce had already intimated was his intention with 
Gerty and Bloom in the masturbatory sequence of the 'Nausicaa' episode, as their 
interaction parodies the simultaneous activities of the church service - and the 
impersonal intensities of a salacious free-flowing sexuality, a monstrous concept long 
repressed by the Church. This gives the 'eternal recurrence' of gifts with a difference, 
released from the limitations of conventional understanding and expression. Issy lisps 
and Joyce may be alluding to this when he uses 'Isp': 'Lsp! I am leafy speaking'. (FW 
619.20) 
However,, in order to kiss, an 'actualised' Issy would have to use her lips, and in 
referring to her synthesis with ALP in 'Alma Luvia Pollabella' (FW 619.16) Joyce, in 
dropping the 'i', may be seen to be dropping the ego from Issy as 'desiring machine'. 
This might seem to emphasise the Deleuzian impersonality of desiring forces in the 
Wake rather than its more explicit 'actualisation' in Uysses. Further emphasis is given 
454 As Adaline Glasheen, ('Finnegans Wake and the Girls from Boston, Mass. ', The 
Hudson Review, Vol. VII (1), 1953), pp. 90-96) tells us Joyce was greatly influenced 
by Morton Prince's accounts of multiple personality and particularlY that of Christine 
Beauchamp in his book The Dissociation ofa Personality. 
455 Atherton, The Bookv at the Wake, p. 128-129. 
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to Issy's egoless conjoining with ALP in the penultimate line of the book: 'Lps. The 
keys to. Given! ', (FW 628.15) which seems to indicate the impersonality of the 
'desiring machine' and its textual pervasiveness in the Wake. 
'Leafy' is not only the Liffey here as ALP, (FW 619.20) but also Issy as a leaf - 
'child of tree,, like some lost unhappy leaf (FW 556.19) - which may be seen as having 
'rhizomatically' detached itself from the 'arborescent' elm of Mrs Quickenough in her 
conversation with the 'straited' stone of Miss Doddpebble, as 'she' works across the 
waters through the living 'middle'(FW 215-216; 620.19-20) of the river as text. During 
ALP's final monologue too in which Issy appears symbiotically with her as 'a 
daughter-wife from the hills', (FW 627.2) operating again between ALP and HCE, Issy 
is again transmogrified into a leaf, and the pages or leaves of the Wake itself. 'My 
leaves have drifted from me'. (FW 628.6) 
Thus, one needs to set these examples against Atherton's virginal representation of 
Issy 'who' projects her 'naughtiness' onto 'her' miffor image Maggy as temptress. (FW 
527.5-8) After all, 'lies' too feature in 'cecilies'. Far from detracting from her 'girlness' 
conceived as childlike innocence this 'wickedness' simply enhances it, for as Deleuze 
and Guattari have said: 'The girl is certainly not defined by virginity' for '[s]he is an 
abstract line, or a line of flight'; (TP 276-277) which continues to locate 'her' on the 
'second plane of writing'. Clearly, one has considerable evidence throughout Chapter 
11.2 and indeed in 'the love letter' itself that Issy is anything but the congealment of 
innocent or virginal forces (FW 279F 1.19-20) which Atherton would attribute to her. 
Issy's warns the reader, just as much as the recipient of 'her' letter in the Wake 
itself, that Jy]ou sh'undn't write you can't if you w'udn't pass for undevelopmented'. 
(FW 279F 1.5-6) For in the Wake as the extreme 'writerly' text we, as readers, do the re- 
writing although the initial 'disentangl[ing]' and 're-embod[ying]' is implicitly directed 
by Joyce as he sets 'up a resonance between two obJIects, [and] produces the 
epiphany'[3. I]. Certainly this sentence may sound as if Issy were repeating back to her 
teacher instructions which he had previously imposed on her, but I would rather suggest 
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that reading the 'love letter' as HCE's, or even Joyce's, ill-concealed guilty secret is to 
4 pass for undevelopmented'. The 'affects' gleaned from writing, reading and textuality 
are surely the point. This does not conflict with Rose and O'Hanlon's understanding of 
, 456 this phrase as 'one should not write if one cannot, lest one pass for underdeveloped 
which rather than seeing the Wake as a 'readerly' text can be better read in terms of 
attentive and knowledgeable readerly re-writing. 
Issy assures us that '[t]his is the propper way to say that, Sr. ', (FW 279F1.6) and 
'her' use of tripple 'p's in 'propper' evidently refers us to Swift's little language, to 
Stella, and 'her' own lisp, as well as to the 'p/k' split of the Celtic languages. 457 
McCarthy adds that P and Q also relates to 'the two girls involved in a nebulous act of 
indiscretion with Earwicker, who in turn merge into the figure of the "prankquean"' 
(FW 21-23). 458 'Multiplicities' abound and there may well be some mileage to be made 
out of ALP's propping up of HCE too. 
What is singular and hence significant about 'propper', it seems to me, is its 
possible embedding of Vladimir Propp's name in the phrase. If this is deliberate then it 
may well be a reference to Propp's seven spheres of action in folk tales 459 of which the 
Norse 'sago'/ saga (FW 279FI. 25) is one. The Wake, read as a folk tale, will then be 
seen to contain not only a 'false hero' and 'villain' as it does in Shaun - also seen as a 
'dispatcher' in his capacity as Shaun the Post -a 'real hero' in Shem, and a 'helper' in 
Anna Livia. 'She' not only helps out HCE but is also a giver or 'donor' as she hands out 
presents from her sack. More importantly, there is a 'sought for person' in Issy herself 
not simply as 'The Mime's' incestuous 'object of desire' always accompanied in 
Russian folk tales, according to Propp, by her 'father' - who here would of course be 
456 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 1. 
457 0 Hehir, A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', pp. 403-405. 
458 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 569. 
459 Vladimir Propp, Morpholok) of the Folktale, trans. by Laurence Scott (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1968). This book was written in 1928 and it may well have 
been known to Joyce in some form or another. 
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HCE, signifying the familial channelling and repressions of incestuous desire in 
modernity - but more significantly the sought for presence pervading Wakean textuality 
and the 'affect' of the Wake itself 
Grace Eckley has pointed out that Joyce's use of children's lore in the Wake allows 
him to 'treat adult themes with ehildish lightness', whilst 'open[ing] a window to the 
adult world' involving 'courtship, marriage, birth and death, sacrifice, oblation and 
. 
460 Deleu7e and Guattari ceremony of a very primitive as well as a sophisticated kind' 
state that ji]t is certain that molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child', and 
'becoming itself is a child or a girl'. (TP277) Joyce makes frequent reference to fairy 
stories and nursery rhymes or 'nonsery reams' (FW 619.17) which add substance to this 
point. Issy/Maggy is always able 'to thalk thildish, [when] theated. with Mag, (FW 
461.28) - that is both 'seated' and sexually 'heated' - and the child always allows for 
humour. Thus, in the ALP/Issy 'assemblage' at the 'end' of the Wake, whereas ALP's 
dignity in the face of death is notable, the fear of 'those therrble prongs! ' (FW 628.5) 
and jc]arry me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fair', (FW 628.8-9) evinces 
the child, humour, and ALP's childishness forming another link with Issy. 
Paradoxically, this child-like quality offers a return to innocence. 
Through such childish talk we have a reference to Goldilocks in 'goldylocks', (FW 
615.23) then Peter Piper in 'Peeter the Picker', (FW 616.09) and Hansel and Gretel or 
'handsel for gertles', (FW 618.03) leading us directly to Humpty Dumpty 'hampty 
damp'. (FW 619.08-09) The Babes in the Wood put in a convoluted appearance in '[t]he 
woods are fond always. As were we their babes in'. (FW 619.23-24) Goody Two Shoes 
is invoked as 'goodiest shoeshoes' (FW 622.10) coupled with Puss in Boots as 
'possumbotts'. (FW 622.11) We also have 'homer comer' as Little Jack Homer, (FW 
623.03) and Mother Goose as 'old mutthergoosip! ' (FW 623.03-04) following close on 
their heels. Finally, of course, this wonderland 'wanterlond', (FW 618.22) or 
'wateriand' of Alice/Issy's being illuminated throughout by Aladdin's lantern 'laddy's 
460 Grace Eckley, Children's Lore in Tinnegans Wake'(Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1985), p. xv. 
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lampern'. (FW 621.07) Eckley's observation, I suggest, not only underlines the 
importance of 'the Mime', but gives support to my Deleuzian reading of Issy's letter by 
expanding this beyond Scandinavian folklore to include children's lore through Alice/ 
Issy, in her 'girl-child' contestation of the adult world. 
In reading the Wake, we as reader-writers must 'chews to swallow all you said', 
(FW279F1.7) we must both chew over many times and finally choose from what Joyce, 
through Issy, has said; and from all they didn't say but merely implied: 'all you saidn't . 
(FW 279F 1.7) Orality offers a space for 'becomings'. We 'can eat [Issy's] words', (FW 
279FI. 7) for 'there's a key in my kiss', which also refers obliquely to the 'seedcake 
kiss' shared by Bloom and Molly, and eaten by him, and more directly to the crossed 
kisses which end the letter: '[w]ith Kiss. Kiss Criss. Cross Criss. Kiss Cross', (FW 
11.27) and Issy as 'desiring machine'. 
Issy's supposed Latin in 'Quick erit faciofacey' (FW 279F 1.8) seems to be an odd 
remark, curiously placed, to say the least. Apparently, Joyce first intended to use this 
phrase to start a new paragraph and then changed his mind . 
46 1 Roland McHugh relates 
this phrase to the Latin quod erat faciendum, and translates it as 'which was to be 
done'. 462 0 flehir and Dillon expand on this by giving us the Latin 'quod erat 
faciendum feci' as 'what had to be done I did'; 'quid erit facio' as 'what will be I do'; 
and 'quid erit feci' as 'what will be I did'. 463 There is clearly an insistence here that we 
pay attention to the intensities which go to make up Issy's kiss, yet in placing 'Quick 
erit faciofacey' next to it, Joyce implies that the 'affect' of the kiss stems from the 
impersonal face instanced by the elided ego in Issy's kissing 'Isp'. 
Issy operates 'machinically' and 'cutting' figures in such operations as I have noted 
previously. Furthermore, the 'Quick' is the seat of emotions, feeling, or 'affect', and in 
461 Hayman, ed., A First-Draft Version of Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 8. 
462 McHugh, Annotations to 'Finnegans Wake', p. 279. 
463 0 Hehir and Dillon, A Classical Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', p. 247. 
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itself it recalls the phrase 'cut to the quick'. Cutting out the ego allows desire to flow 
freely. If the phrase is dependent on Latin, as the above critics assume, then there is 
again an obvious link between Gerty MacDowell 'playing at being an Irish princess', as 
Glasheen puts it, 464 and Issy, for Gerty's seductive display takes place against the 
background of a Roman Catholic church service and the adoration of the Virgin 
conducted in Latin. Issy projects her 'wickedness' onto her mirror image Maggy. Such 
duplicity is caught in the double-facedness of 'faciofacey'. 
Neither McHugh nor 0 Hehir and Dillon pick up on Issy's clear reference to the 
'face' and 'faciality' contained in 'Quick erit faciofacey'. Yet, Issy's vanity figures both 
in this phrase and prominently throughout the Wake. I suggest that this 'wickedness' is 
Issy's awareness of free-flowing desire and as such a privileging of 'the quick' over 'the 
dead'. Deleuze and Guattari devote an entire chapter to the face. (TP 167-192) They 
note that sexuality, and hence the 'girl', and politics are combined through the face, as 
the face ensures that: 
[e]verything remains sexual ... there are new coordinates. ... the 
face depends on an 
abstract [desiring] machine that ... touches all other parts of the 
body, and ... other 
objects without resemblance. The question then becomes what circumstances 
trigger the machine that produces the face and facialization. (TP 170) 
and they find that, 
[t]he face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man 
himself ... The 
face is the typical European ... the 
first divergence types, are racial: 
yellow man, black man ... Racism operates 
by the determination of degrees of 
deviance in relation to the White-Man face ... From the viewpoint of racism ... 
[t]here are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. ... 
Racism ... propagates waves of sameness until 
those who resist- identification have 
been wiped out. (TP 176-178) 
They conclude that 'the face is a politics'; (TP 181) it is an anti-minoritarian, anti- 
female,, racist, patriarchal politics including everyone and attempting to clamp down on 
any deviance from the status quo. As Hardt and Negri put it, Deleuze and Guattari 
464GIasheen, Third Census of 'Finnegans Wake', p. 13 8; and 'Finnegans Wake and the 
Girls from Boston, Mass., pp. 90-96. 
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challenge us to conceive racist practice not in terms of binary divisions and 
exclusion but as a strategy of differential inclusion. No identity is designated as 
Other, no one is excluded from the domain, there is no outside. 465 
Read in conjunction with Cheng's comments above on Joyce's perceptive insight into 
the masculine sexualisation of the 'penisolate ware' (FW 3.06) and the other conflicts 
depicted in the Wake - the repression through feminisation of the Celt by both the 
French 466 and the English 467; Irish resistance 468 to this instanced through Stephen 
Dedalus's encounter with Haines, (U 24) together with Joyce's ironical view of the 
'heroism' of Irish nationalism in the 'Cyclops' episode, and Bloom's perverse attempt 
to counter racism and feminisation in Ulysses (U 376-449) - it is evident that 'Quick 
erit faciofacey' can be seen to relate to a range of Joyce's ethico-political concerns if we 
read it from a Deleuzoguattarian inclusive perspective. Not least, and this is something 
which Cheng does not pick up on, the point that Joyce embeds 'war' in 'ware' or 
'wares' indicates the cause of much modem conflict in the production and distribution 
of goods or 'wares', for we have made material goods the measure of all values in 
modernity. The state of perpetual war(e)fare which Hardt and Negri forecast for global 
capitalism simply carries this one stage further. 
Issy is far more than mere masculine 'object of desire', not simply as Atherton put 
it, '[t]he daughter [a]s all the young girls who have ever been loved by old men 469 , but 
rather the connectivities of the 'desiring machine' itself offering us the prospects of 
'becoming woman' through 'becoming girl'. Thus, Issy, as 'line of flight', in her 
465 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 194. 
466 Ernst Renan, Poetry of the Celtic Races, and Other Essays, trans. by William G. 
Hutchinson (London: Walter Scott, 1897), passim. 
467 Amold, On the Study of Celtic Literature, p. 91. 
468 Joseph Valente, James Joyce and the Problem ofJustice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 29; David Cairns and Shaun Richards, Writing Ireland. - 
Colonialism, Nationalism and Culture (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 
1988), P-91. 
469Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 23. 
232 
'affects' both identifies and dismantles the face of white patriarchal hegemony, which is 
quite an achievement for as Deleuze and Guattari put it: 
Dismantling the face is no mean affair. ... the face is a politics [and] dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. 
Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and 
getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here, the program, the slogan, of 
schizoanalysis is ... know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight. (TP 188) 
Issy's kissing 11(i)ps' do precisely this I believe. 
The seductive sensuality of the text is again brought to the fore in Issy's statement: 
'[w]hen we will conjugate together toloseher tomaster tomiss while morrow fans amare 
hour, verbe de vie and verve to vie, with love ay loved have I on my back spine and 
does for ever'. (FW 279FI. 8-11) Such 'conjugations, I argue, relate to the impersonal 
sexual couplings of the text with the reader through 'the girl of that sexuality' (TP 277) 
and the writer's concern about both the mastery this involves and the dread of losing the 
reader as loved one: 'toloseher tomaster tomiss', as we are set free on a sea of 
portmanteau words. The 'amare hour' ('amare' being the Latin for love 470) is stressed in 
'love ay loved have I on my back spine and does for ever'(ay/ai 471 being Chinese for 
love). This, I believe, is also a statement about the book itself and the forces within its 
textuality as we are reminded of Beckett's statement that the Wake 'is not about 
something it is that something itself 472. 
Deleuze alludes to comments made by Beckett in his 'German Letter of 1937' in 
which he says that, in order to spare no effort in undermining language, it is necessary 
to 'bore one hole after another in it,, until what lurks behind it - be it something or 
470 Ohehir and Dillon, A Classical Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', P. 247. 
471 McHugh, Annotations to 'Finnegans Wake', p. 279. 
472 Samuel Beckett, et al., eds, Our Exaginination Round His Factificationfor 
Incamination of Work in Progress (New York: New Directions, 193 9), p. 14. 
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nothing - begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher role for a writer today'. 
473 
This differs very little from D. H. Lawrence's statement quoted above. (WIP 203-204) 
Moreover, the 'back spine' is both that of the prone girl figured as sexual enticement 
and the spine of the book indicating its seductive textuality. 'We will conjugate 
together' refers, in this reading, as much to the conjugation of the Wake's verbs 'verbe 
de vie and verve to vie' (FW 279. F 1.9- 10) as it does to salacious sexual activity. In this 
connection,, McHugh refers to 'conjugate' as the conjugation of verbs, 474 and also to the 
French of 'verbe de vie and verve to vie'. It seems to me that Issy in emphasising 'life' 
here through 'verbe de vie and verve to vie', uses 'vie' to indicate not just life but the 
time of a life as 'duration' as the French indicates, and possibly as the needed 
revolutionary movements which particularly characterize modem French history. 
Moreover, following Deleuze, I believe that the life Issy offers can be seen here as 
'vying' with 'phallic' mastery and its 'oedipalisation'. 
Furthermore,,, in the 'verve' of life which is set against the 'doing words' of 'Quick 
erit faciofacey' with its masculinist in unction to act we have I believe, Joyce's 
insistence that we value the process of 'becoming' in itself, free from patriarchal norms 
or actions. 475 Here he appears to be working on a parallel line with Bergson, Nietzsche, 
Spinoza and the other philosophers of 'life' whom Deleuze took as formative influences 
on his own ethical and vitalistic philosophy: 'there are never any criteria other than the 
tenor of existence, the intensification of life'. (WIP 74) So 'toloseher tomaster tomiss' 
can be read not only as the Issyian struggle to free desire from its masculinist capture, 
but also the Wake from a masculinist reading. Therefore, 'while morrow fans amare 
hour 
... 
love ay loved' (FW 279F. 9) is linked to the textual verbs of life, 'morrow' is 
also coupled with the Nietzschean 'eternal return' of future time. We then see the 
Issyness or the 'verve', enthusiasm, vigour or love of life as the pervasive 'spirit of the 
473 Samuel Beckett, Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. by 
Ruby Cohn (London: John Calder, 1983), p. 172. 
474 McHugh, Annotations to 'Finnegans Wake', p. 279. 
475 Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, p. 145. 
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literary Work)476 offering the potentialities of a new ftiture, and an ethical injunction, as 
Deleuze and Guattari put it: '[k]nowing how to love means extracting from one's sex 
the particles, the speeds and slownesses, the flows, the n sexes that constitute the girl of 
that sexuality'. (TP 277) Something which a masochistic Bloom, as indicated in Chapter 
Two, is finally unable to accomplish, but which the 'affects' of Issy's textual love offer 
to the reader as a 'line of flight'. 
As Issy 'grig[s] my collage juniorees who, though they flush fuchsia, are they 
octette and viginity in my shade', (FW 279F 1.14-15) 'she' once more returns to the 
sexuality of 'the girl' and a dominant Wakean stylistic mode. Here, one can have 'grig' 
as either a 'small eel', giving rise to further phallic speculation, 'a grasshopper or 
cricket' possibly relating to HCE as Earwicker/ earwig - and I would inteýect 
Deleuze's 'becoming-insect' - or even to the phrase 'merry or lively as a grig' 
indicating apparently that Issy, and the Wake, is full of fun and life. In this connection 
Molly in the 'Penelope' episode of Ulysses 'grigged' Josie Powell by breaking 'in[to] 
fits of laughing with the giggles' and appearing 'in great humour' before her, after 
having won Bloom away from her rival. Josie's chagrin was such that she subsequently 
'didnt darken the door much after we were married'. (U 879) 
'[P]rigs beg in to pry' (FW 279FI. 17) has been interpreted in sexual terms. 
However, a more obvious meaning can be attributed to this phrase. Issy may well be 
directing us to look at prigs and their prying nature as they look askance whilst actually 
gaining surreptitious pleasure from their moralistic voyeurism. Furthermore, in their 
prying, they exercise general judgemental/ moral control in society. After all, isn't 
HCE's sin in the park, as both victim and villain in the voyeristic scene, being hinted at, 
by Issy, and his conscience-stricken 'molarising' morality once more being suggested as 
a recurring 'reterritorialising' theme of the Wake? 
476 R. E. Allen, ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8hedn. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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Issy appears to playfully indicate the ingredients of a salad in her statement, ý' [h] ow 
Olive d'Oyly and Winnie Carr, bejupers, they reized the dressing of a salandmon and 
how a peeper coster and a salt sailor med a mustied poet atwaimen'. (FW 279F 1.21-23) 
In 'Olive d'Oyly' we have olive oil, in 'Winnie Carr' vinegar, in 'bejupers' possibly 
juniper oil used for flavouring, in 'the dressing of a salandmon' both a salad dressing 
and a salmon salad, in 'a peeper coster' a pepper castor, in 'salt sailor' a salt cellar, and 
in 'mustied poet' a mustard pot. Setting aside for the moment the many other different 
readings which this sentence might allow - for instance 'Carr' in Gaelic means 
'spear A77 _ one needs to ask why this inteiJection is here and what significance it plays 
in Issy's letter. 
According to Carol Shloss 478 this passage may simply be a comment on Lucia's 
(salad days', or conversely her mental condition through her 'word salads' and her 
schizophrenic 'malody'. (FW 279F 1.4) However, as argued above, I believe that Bonnie 
Kime Scott is more correct in stating that 'Issy doesn't share Lucia's schizophrenia'. 479 
1 argue, together with Katie Wales, 480 that 'word salads' may be better held to 
characterise the textuality and style of the Wake itself. I also believe that Wakean 'word 
salads' are directly linked to the 'girlness' of Issy. The interpretation of this sentence as 
a reference to a 'word salad' need not bring the entire Lucia/Issy-Joyce connection back 
into close focus as Shloss indicates. Issy may also be speaking lightly of Winnie and 
Olive who together with Beatrice, Nelly and Ida, Amy and Rue make up the Rainbow 
Girls 'trailing their teenes behind them' (FW 227.12-14) and refer, from a Deleuzian 
viewpoint, to the 'singularities' of their multiple 'becomings' made available through 
the Issyian primary 'block of becoming': '[s]ay them all but tell them apart'. (FW 
226.30) 
477 0 Hehir, A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', p. 145. 
478 Shloss, Lucia Joyce, p. 432. 
479 SCOtt' Joyce and Feminism, p. 185. 
480 Wales, The Language oj*James Joyce, p. 150. 
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I need to clarify the distinction between Issy's/ the Wake's 'word salads, and those 
of the clinical schizophrenic. Silvano Arieti has pointed out that Joyce employs ýýclang 
associations' 481 in the Wake, and as Keith Bookef482 argues, jr]epetition, homophonic 
logic, words treated as things - all characteristics of the speech of schizophrenics 
[together with clang associations] are also central features of the writing of Joyce,. 
Moreover, as Deleuze notes, the 'grammatical transformations' of Schreber (L 214) - 
who is so frequently cited by Deleuze and Guattari as a key example of potentially 
creative schizophrenia - are particularised in the oxymoron, as the most common figure 
of speech in his memoirs, a rhetorical feature which is also centrally shared by Joyce, WI 
according to Rabain. 483 Yet, the 'word salads' of the clinically diagnosed schizophrenic 
patient, despite their often uncanny resemblance to Wakean. formations such as '[w]het 
the bee as to deflowret greendy grassies yellowhorse', (FW 360.29-3 0)484 consist in the 
main of 'incoherent speech, poverty of content of language and superficial nonsense 
including digressive, vague, overelaborate, circumstantial speech', 485 if we are to give 
any credence to the 'molarising' diagnosis of the American Psychiatric Association. 
Wakean style and clinically diagnosed schizophrenic's 'word salads', far from being 
synonymous are only superficially similar, as Jung observed in his comparison of 
Joyce's writing with Lucia's ramblings. 486 
481 Silvano Arieti, Creativity: The Magic Synthesis (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 
p. 79. 
482 M. Keith Booker, Joyce, Bakhtin, and the Literary Tradition: Toward a 
Comparative Cultural Poetics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 
p. 61. 
483 J-F. Rabain, 'Figures of Delusion', in Psychosis and Sexual Identity: Toward a Post- 
Analytic View of the Schreber Case, ed. by David B. Allison, et al (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), p. 6 1. 
484 An example supplied by Katie Wales. 
485 American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental 
Disorders., Table 5.1, p. 234. 
486 Carl Gustav Jung, Ulysses. - A Monologue (Brooklyn, New York: Haskell House, 
1977), passim. 
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One picks up on Issy's and the text's salaciousness in 'kill kackle, kook kettle' (FW 
279F 1.25) with its implied 'wetting of the tea' as a favourite Joycean image for orgasm. 
'[K]ackle' may resonate with the phrase 'cut the cackle' and relate to the length and 
repetitiousness of the Earwickian saga, or to Issy's own noisy and superficially 
inconsequential talk. However, as cackle also brings to mind the clucking of a hen, is 
Issy not reminding us that this letter was discovered by Biddy and that it was dug out of 
a midden, and the 'muck heap' of human history and contemporaneity? One recalls the 
lavatorial reference given by McHugh 487 where the capital 'O's in 'Olive d'Oyly' are 
read as the bottom or A(r)se' with '00' supplied when we come to the word 'kook', 
which may then be seen as a reference to the geometric ALP (FW 293) and, in 
Deleuzian terms, the process of 'becoming woman'. Consequently, Issy's 'kettle', 
rather than being simply a utensil for boiling water, could be read in terms of the phrase 
4a pretty kettle of fish', invoking both the fish-like smell of Issy's soiled knickers and a 
Joycean comment on our ethico-political failings. 
Such interpretations only take into account individual words, and it is perhaps 
significant that 'kill kackle, kook kettle' brings four words together in a doubled pattern 
of imperative and noun. Does this relate to the 'fourwords' of Asa (FW 279F 1.2 1) and 
the textuality of 'forewords', or even the four words of Stephen's philosophic tussle 
with the spatial and the temporal in the 'Proteus' episode of Uýysses through 
'nebeneinander' (one-thing-next-another) and 'nacheinander' (one-thing-after-another) 
(U 45), despite the German words being compounds of three not four words? Elsewhere 
in the Wake one finds such a cluster of alliterative Vs and it is here that they occur in 
groups of three rather than four. The 'kill'of our phrase might be related in some way to 
'killykillkilly' (FW 4.7-8) as both 'ostrygods' and 'fishy-gods' are mentioned here (FW 
4.1-2) as they are implicitly in Issy's letter; (FW 279FI. 20) or indeed to the aqjacent 
phrase 'Brekkek Kekkek Kekkek Kekkek! Koax Koax Koax! '. (FW 4.2) Although the 
latter seems to be linked to the Ku Klux Klan and that other Dublin in Georgia as 'the 
Whoyteboyce of Hoodie Head'. (FW 4.5) Perhaps in emphasising the V or hard V 
487 McHugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 220. 
238 
sound Joyce through Issy is primarily referring to the 'P/K' split in Celtic languages, as 
0 Hehir explains. 488 
If this is the case it might also account for similar pairings/ distinctions in the letter 
such as 'killing/ putting', 'peeper coster', and even phrases such as 'prigs beg in to pry 
... plentyprime of housepets to pimp and pamper ... ' which if set against 'kill kackle, 
kook kettle', might be regarded as instancing the Celtic language and a national split, 
and refer back to the aforementioned pre-Babellian unity, (FW 21.9) the Reformation 
and the Protestant/ Catholic split, or, in a Bergsonian/ Deleuzian understanding, the 
intensities and potentialities of the 'virtual' 'whole past' rather than pointing to a solely 
Judeo-Christian problem. However, by emphasising Issy as Wakean textuality, I believe 
that the emphasis could be better placed on the indeterminacies of the text, particularly 
as the pairing of 'p' and V, regarded as 'voiceless stops' by linguists, allows for letter 
substitution so that 'peeper' might become 'keeper', 'kill' change to 'pill', and 'kettle' 
to 'pettle'. Joyce more evidently allows this substitution elsewhere in the Wake with 
'pristopher polombos' and 'Kresbyterians' (FW 120.02) for Christopher Columbus and 
Presbyterians. Such textual indeterminacies return us not only to the Issyian 'girl', as 
capricious and irresponsible in patriarchal and symbolic order terms, but to these as key 
features of Wakese itself, as we once more have 'hides and hints and misses in prints'. 
(FW 20.10-11) 
Issy's exhibitionism, and that of the text, in 'her' ' flaunt[ing] on the flimsyfilmsies' 
(FW 279FI. 14) is shown by McHugh who interprets 'stagstruck' (FW 279FI. 30) as 
stage-struck. 'She' either asks or recalls '[w]asn't it just divining that dog of a dag in 
Skokholme as I sat astrid uppum their Drewitt's altar, as cooledas as culcumbre, 
slapping my straights till the sloping ruins, postillion, postallion, a swinge a swank, with 
you offering me clouts of iliscents and them homers stagstruck on the leasward! '. (FW 
279FI. 26-30) Throughout the sentence as a whole there are indications that Issy is 
presenting herself through all of the 'intensities' which go to makeup a Scandinavian 
sex-goddess implicitly contesting Christianity. She speaks of the divine, an altar, 
offerings, incense, and in the next sentence tells us not to be afraid of her. Thus, the 
488 0 Hehir. A Gaelic Lexiconfor Tinnegans Wake', p. 404. 
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Icelandic summary of Norse mythology cool 'Eddas' is evident in 'cooledas. Clearly 
with 'dag', 'Skokholme' at least in part Stockholm, and by 'their Drewitt's altar' Issv is 
bringing into play the Norse gods scenario, pre-dating and possibly replacing the 
Christianity mentioned in previous sentences, as we have divine and divinity in 
'divining' and 'dog' as a reversal of 'god' and possibly a reversal of the sole 'God' of 
Christianity, whilst 'cumbre' as mountain summit may locate the home of the Norse 
gods. The link with stage-struck exhibitionism and the exhibitionism of the text is 
maintained here through Norse gods and Wagner's operas, which of course includes 
'Tristan and Isolde'. and, as Nietzsche early appreciated, themselves contest 
Christianity. Such 'exhibitionism' finds a distinct resonance through Hardt and Negri's 
conception of 'the multitude's' initial formation in terrns of public 'spectacle', or as 
they put it its 
performative, carnivalesque nature ... 
highly theatrical, with giant puppets, 
costumes, dances, humorous songs, chants, and so forth ... street 
festivals in which 
the anger of protesters co-exists with their joy in the carnival. 489 
In the phrase 'a swinge a swank', (FW 279FI. 29) Issy's alliterative 's' is 
foregrounded. Key textual motifs of swanking and wanking are encapsulated in this 
word. No doubt the 'intensities' composing 'her' 'femininity' would allow Issy to show 
off or 'swank' in new apparel, as the new apparel of the Wakean text, just as Bloom/ 
HCE are known to masturbate or 'wank' in the presence or with the aid of teenage girls 
who may either be affronted or may, like Gerty or Issy/Maggy, be accomplices. 
'[S]winge' appears to relate to the masturbatory act itself as the Old English 'swengen' 
meant 'shake'or to 'toss' which no doubt gives us the schoolboy phrase 'tossing off. 
490 
The depiction of masturbation in Uysses amongst other things certainly called forth a 
'swingeing' moral attack on the book as did the condemnation of HCE staged within the 
Wake itself. Yet, as noted above, Richard Brown argues that it is -Bloom's masturbation 
which allows him to retain a precarious normality in the reader's eyes. 
491 Certainly, the 
scattering of the seeds of the semen indicates that wider productivity which the 
489Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 21 1. 
490 Skeat, The Concise Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 485. 
49 ' Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality. p. 8 8. 
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Bloom/Molly 'seedcake, holds for readers of Ulysses. Masturbation, still theoretically 
punishable by death, 492 is regarded as deeply sinful by the Christian Church, 493 which 
no doubt accounts for its frequent celebration in Ulysses and the Wake. 
Issy's mention of 'stagstruck' (FW 279F 1.30) may be referring less to stage-struck 
than to a 'stag-night' with 'homers' indicating both a stag's antlers and the masculine 
sexual desire which she knowingly provokes; just as Lenehan asks of Blazes Boylan in 
the 'Sirens' episode of Ulysses 'Got the hom or whaff as he impatiently makes his way 
out of the pub to his assignation with Molly. (U 344) Yet, we are also drawn back to 
childhood through nursery rhymes and 'little Jack Homer' (FW 623.03) although this 
reference to the boy who 'stuck in his thumb and pulled out a plum', may also refer to 
Izod/ Issy as the ultimate prize available for the winner of the contest between the twins 
in 'The Mime'. There is too an implicit reference here to 'that house [where] A. Home 
is lord', (U 502) this is the National Maternity Hospital 'well known [through] Dr A. 
Home ... the able and popular master', (U 550) where the medical students gather prior 
to celebrating in the pub, after the birth of Mrs Purefoy's son: 'Horhom, quickening and 
wombfruit' is twice repeated at the beginning of the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode in 
Qysses. (U 499,500) The sexual slang of the 'hominess' of the combatant brothers 
'struck' or provoked by Izod/ Issy as sexual prize, whilst they as the 'stags' 'ruck' or 
engage in a ritual mating contest, would also then be emphasised as indicative of Glugg 
and Chuff s fight at the end of 'the Mime'. (FW 252.14-2 1) One can also recall here 
HCE's 'the Blessed One, the Harbourer-cum-Enheritance. Even Canaan the Hateful' 
(FW 264.8-10) read as incestuous desire, and incest taboo, as HCE contemplates the 
playlet in 'Hom of Heatthen, highbrowed! Brook of Life, back-frish! ' (FW 264.5-7) 
The Scandinavian 'ruka' too which means 'fuel' would of course add to the twins 
competitive flames. 
492 Robert P. Carroll,, Woýf in the Sheepfold. - The Bible as a problemfor Christianity 
(London: SPCK, 1991), p. 79. 
493 Leviticus 18. 
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Of course Issy tells us that 'them homers [were] stagstruck' 'on the leaswardl",, 
(FW 279F 1.30) and whilst 'the lea' coupled with 'sward' may seem to indicate dry land 
and pasture, 'leasward! ' as 'leeward' is not only the opposite of 'windward' but brings 
into play ships and the sea. The connections with Issy as 'line of flight' and ALP 
through water and fluidity are again foregrounded and once again offer a link to the 
epiphanic 'bird-girl'. A ship's drift to the 'leeward' side not only refers us to the 
previous appearances of sailors and sailing ships in the references to 'Vikings', 
Odysseus and the like, but gives us a somewhat different reading of 'homers' as sailors 
playing their phallic 'hompipes'. The invocation of nomadic sailors thus brings into 
play the freedom of unconstrained desire not limited simply to sexuality,, and certainly 
not channelled through the incestuousness of the brothers and sister or constrained by 
the nuclear family's incest-taboo. Issy is also, I suggest, making an evident connection 
with Molly's attempted 'line of flight' made possible in part through the fantasised 
nomadic men she yearns for towards the end of the 'Penelope' episode. (U 925) The 
'war machine' too is inextricably connected to 'nomadism', in Deleuze and Guattari's 
writings as indicated above, and here the 'war machine' can be seen to refer to the 
'betrayals' or subversive undermining of patriarchy and capitalism itself, as well as 
Molly's betrayals. Hardt and Negri's invocation of the poor of the world as a 
potentially 'fluid and powerful network' bears this out., as they envisage it in 'nomadic' 
and 'war-machinic' terms. Thus they liken today's potential revolutionaries to the 
Christians of the later Roman Empire, working inexorably from within to hollow out the 
dominant order of things, and in the process inadvertently preparing the way for a new 
and re uvenating era of barbarian migrations. 494 j 
We are erýjoined to 'sing loud, sweet cheeriot, like anegreon in heaven! ', (FW 
279FI. 32) this seems to be a negro spiritual and once again emphasises the musicality 
of this letter and Issy as 'line of flight'. Is the introduction of the black minoritarian 
slave experience meant to signal something different from that of the conventional 
Catholic Christianity of Irish marital rules; or is it more likely to conjoin them as both 
peoples, the Afro-Americans and the Celtic Irish, are effectively enslaved? We know 
that the early slaves in North America were not allowed to marry as they belonged 
494 Hardt and Negri, Empire, pps. 207,393. 
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completely to the white slave owner and that any sexual union between them was 
considered to be illegitimate as of course were any offspring. Here both McHugh and 0 
Hehir and Dillon have suggestions to offer with the word 'anegreon, McHugh links the 
song/ hymn of 'Swing Low, Sweet Chariot' to the song 'Anacreon in Heaven' via 
'anegreon in heaven! ' and then to a line from it: 'I'll swinge the ringleaders'. 
Firstly we need to remind ourselves that such songs are part of 'Issy's musical 
letter',, 495 and 'swinging' may well relate to jazz. However, such 'swinging' relates as 
much to the hanging of runaway slaves in the Southern States of America before the 
Civil War as hegemonic white rule dispatched yet another negro to heaven. This is 
particularly the case as it also refers to the attitude of the British Government to the 
Irish rebels and their threats and actions in hanging the ringleaders, such as 'the croPpy 
boy' lament frequently featured in Lflysses. (U 365-370) It could also have some 
resonance with 'a swinge' in 'a swinge a swank'(FW 279FI. 29) above as condemned 
men, particularly if hanged in public, were traditionally expected to put on a show of 
defiant bravado showing that they were truly men. This show could indeed include a 
final erection and ejaculation as Alf states in the 'Cyclops' episode of Ulysses, (U 393) 
for no one wants to hear the 'medical evidence' refuting this 'heroic' explanation from 
Herr Professor Luitpold Blumenduft. (U 394) 
0 Hehir and Dillon tell us that 'Anakreon' was a Greek lyric poet which doesn't 
immediately seem to offer much mileage, although Negro spirituals and lyric poetry 
may have something in common. After all Katie Wales states that: 
I have avoided calling the Wake a 'novel', for it seems to me that the kind of 
competence the 'ideal reader' ultimately needs for the Wake is drawn not from the 
experience of reading fiction but from that of reading poetry. Finnegans Wake is an 
epic prose-poem. 496 
Both McHugh and 0 Hehir and Dillon seem to ignore or take as implicit the negro in 
'anegreon' and also, unlike Joyce himself, the presumably heavenly enjoyment of a 
495 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 1. 
496 Wales, The Language qfdames Joyce, p. 15 4. 
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cigar or 'sweet cheeriot'. In Deleuzoguattarian terms the reference to the negro conjures 
up the writer's need to 'become-black' in order to be read as a 'minor' writer: Ja]s 
Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become- 
black'. (TP 292) There does appear to be a continuation of the heavenly hereafter to be 
enjoyed by the singers of the spirituals and the next sentence: 'The good f6ther with the 
twingling in his eye will always have cakes in his pocket to bethroat us with for our 
allmichael good'. (FW279FI. 32-34) 'The good fother' as 'God', the good father, when 
linked to the Archangel Michael through 'allmichael good' suggests the plenitude to 
come for the Christian faithful as God 'will always have cakes in his pocket to bethroat 
us with', even when the cake is reduced to the single wafer of the Catholic Mass, and 
presumably keep us, or them, singing lustily for ever in heaven. 
Yet, according to McHugh, in Issy's statement 'the good fother' rather than 
497 
meaning 'father' here actually equates to 'a cartload' . It might seem more appropriate 
in the context to read Iother' as 'fodder' and relate this to the cakes on offer. Cakes are 
served on a doyley and this is linked with a cart through the opera company Doyley 
Carte and, no doubt, the operatic interests of John Joyce/ Simon Dedalus, Molly and 
Stephen in Ulysses, as Bloom plans a future for him as 'a society singer' in 'Eumaeus'. 
(U 773) Moreover, the 'Olive d'Oyly' (FW 279F 1.2 1) from which this particular line of 
interpretation sprang has been linked above to women in patriarchal society, toilets and 
excreta through its double 'O's'. 
Rose and O'Hanlon reasonably interpret this as Issy's 'father, with a twinkle in his 
eye, [who] will always have cakes in his pocket for her', 498 which reminds us of Bloom 
and the cake of soap he purchases and pockets in 'The Lotus Eaters' episode as well as 
its comforting properties when he runs from Boylan at the end of 'Lestrygonians'. This 
masochistic allusion would bring us back to the Earwickian nuclear family situation 
depicted in 'The Mime' with Issy's reference to Shaun as the angelic Saint Michael 
through 'allmichael good', Shem as Devil, and HCE's benevolent goodwill through the 
497 McIlugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 279. 
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implicit offering of Issy as sexual prize or 'cakes', although this is the prize he really 
wants for himself. Moreover, 'for our allmichael good. Amum' can be read as ýfor our 
Almighty God. Amen'. As such it draws this letter to a near prayer-like close and it 
appears to return me to my argument of previous chapters. 
Amen to all that then, but not quite, rather 'Amum. Amum. And Amum again'(FW 
279171.34) as Issy says. We are suddenly transported beyond Judaeo-Christian beliefs 
and even those of Nordic mythology to Ancient Egypt and 'Amun' - although there was 
a King Amon of Judea about 642-640 BCE. 'Amun', or 'Amon' was the hidden 
Egyptian god, the first and only god, god of the air and fertility, he had no history and 
because of this borrowed the history and form of other gods. 499 In one of his many 
aspects he became a homed god giving us yet another possibility for 'them homers 
stagstruck'). (FW 279171.29-30) In this manifestation, he took on the mutilated 
representation of Seth, 'the creator of confusion, who creates both the tempest and the 
storm throughout the length and breadth of the heavens', 500 and here one recalls God's/ 
HCE's thunder words. Seth signified disorder and violence. He was a ravisher, a 
pederast and fratricide, all disasters were caused by this god of destruction, yet he was 
defeated and emasculated by Horus, and became female or feminised, and in 
consequence the Ancient Egyptians ceased to fear him and cut off his ears in effigy, 
replacing them with homs. 
In his emasculation we then have yet another variation on 'them homers stagstruck' 
as the homs of the cuckold and hence one more reference by Issy to Bloom - who is 
pictured with antlers in the 'Circe' episode - Molly, Boylan, and motifs originating in 
Ulysses. Of course Amun did not restrict himself to merging with Seth, as 'Amun-Re' 
he also united with the sun god 'Re' and in this guise was regarded as 'king of the gods' 
(nesou neyerou). Re was the phoenix god, god of resurrection. In Amun then one has 
498 Rose and O'Hanlon,, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. 15 1. 
499 Inscription on a bas relief found in 1912 within the Deir el-Medineh temple. 
00 Edouard H. Navi Ile, The Egýptian Book of the Dead of the X17HIth to XYth Dywasties 
(London: Society of Biblical Archaeology, 1904), p. 39. 
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the most 'arborescently' elevated version of God, akin to Jehovah, coupled with and 
even indistinguishable from the femininity/ ferninisation attributable to Jesus. 
In this connection,, Issy refers not to Amun but to Amum. as both a 'mum' and a 
'mummy'. The 'mummy' of course offers a link to Egypt and Amun, but 'mum' 
appears to bring into play ALP as mother and the author of the final version of the 
letter. Also 'Amum again' reflects the book's title in a feminised reversal. Rather than 
being about the masculine 'Finn again' it is to be better seen as having been rewritten 
through the letter as 'Amum again'. This would seem to resonate with the significance I 
am giving to Issy/ALP as the 'becoming-woman' through 'becoming-girl' symbiosis 
signifying Wakean textuality. Moreover, Amun's wife, the goddess of heaven, was 
called Mut which may offer a link with the Mutt and Jute episode (FW 15-18) in which 
Shem and Shaun appear as opposing yet interchangeable forces. Such 'rhizomatic' links 
could be taken to further stress the evolving 'feminine' deliquescence of identity - 
vectored through Issy - characterising the twins, and Issy might also be playing on the 
phoenix like qualities of Bloom at the end of the 'Cyclops' episode. 
However, we cannot completely end at this prayerful point. The Issyian letter 
appears to contain a postscript in its final lines. (FW 279F 1.34-3 7) This final sentence is 
as demanding as anything which has gone before: 'For tough troth is stronger than 
fortuitous fiction and it's the surplice money, oh my young friend and ah me sweet 
creature, what buys the bed while wits borrows the clothes'. (FW 279FI. 34-36) Truth 
may be stronger/ stranger than fiction no matter how tough it is to take but where is the 
'truth' here, no matter how strange, and why is fiction regarded as 'fortuitous"? Is this a 
postscript which problematises the 'truths' of Christian/ liberal-humanist morality - in 
the latter case as the 'tough truths' of the market place, the 'bottom line' and 
(competitive advantage' - or is it confirming them? Is this a comment on the 
monotheistic religions in general with their dogmatic beliefs springing from accidental, 
chance or even casual circumstances as 'fortuitous fiction'9 Or is it the still unrealised 
4utopian' vision of a different world peopled by 'the multitude' regarded as currently 
fictitious but eventually fortuitous should the 'new earth' ever be realised. and that it is 
this which is being highlighted, no matter how unlikely this possibility may seem to be 
to us today. It is surely time to take the 'kook kettle' (FW 279F 1.25) off the hob, make a 
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final cup of tea, and 'lock your kekkle up'. (FW 585.24) One comes to the end of this 
reading of Issy's letter with more questions than answers still outstanding: 'the (non)- 
being of persistent question[s]', to which my attempts at best do no more than 
occasionally 'adequately occupy and fill that space'. [1.3] This of course is the beauty 
of the Wake. 
247 
Comments on this interpretation of Issy's letter. 
Yet, if one accepts David Hayman's argument that Issy's letter 'is the juvenile 
version of the "Reverend Letter" 9 501 with this completed adult version regarded as 
'Anna Livia's final draft of her letter', (FW 615-61 9)502 one can take further some 
points mentioned above. From my Deleuzian perspective it is the intensities of 'the girl' 
and/ or 'child' which I find in the juvenile letter which need to be stressed. The final 
version of the letter written by ALP connects with 'riverrun' (FW 3.0 1) as the first word 
of the text through 'Reverend' and strongly suggests that the letter can at least be 
regarded as a microcosm of the Wake as Clive Hart suggests. 503 Yet, I believe that this 
final version reveals fundamental differences between itself and the Wake; they are 
different in time, and I believe that both Hayman's and Hart's argument can and should 
be reversed. It is the 'child like' or 'girl like' aspect of Issy's juvenile letter which 
makes it far more typical of Wakean textuality and motifs as a whole than the final 
version, as I have argued throughout. 
The river is fluidity and movement, it runs. Its processual movement and 
'becomings other' situate it in the 'virtual' and the time of 'duration'. The Reverend 
occupies a static position as subject or role on 'the plane of organisation', he exists in 
clock-time. 'He', it nearly always is a he and certainly was in Joyce's day, is a 'revered 
end', a Deleuzian 'end point' rather than 'a line', a 'Dirtdump' or 'dead pope', (FW 
615.12) the garbage can of received history, not a 'line of flight', unlike Issy/ALP as the 
'becoming-woman' of the Wake. H(C)e is on the textual 'plane of organisation', she is 
on the textual 'plane of immanence'. Through his constant attempts to retain an 
unsullied masculine identity, HCE is the 'molar', 'reterritorialising' agent, demanding 
reverence, she is the 'deterritoriali sing' flipside not always supplying it. Without the 
vitality of Issy's letter ALP's final 'reverend' version cannot capture or encapsulate the 
spirit of the Wake, just as ALP without Issy lacks 'her' essential elan vital. It is in Issy's 
50 1 Hayman, ed., A First-Draft Version of Tinnegans Wake', p. 156. 
502 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 579. 
503 Hart, Structure and Motýf , p. 200. 
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letter, or letters as there are more than one that we get the 'true' microcosm of the 
Wake. ALP's culminatory letter and the Wake only resonate as 'singularities' and work 
in conjunction through Issy's which acts through the 'intensive middle' or 'in between' 
as footnotes between the text. 
The vast and unending 'multiplicities' which Joyce gives us, even in the apparently 
minor footnote at FW 279F 1, through Issy as the Deleuzian 'girl'. are such that we can 
reasonably see it as bringing into play the 'whole world' of the unrealised past and as 
such the 'second synthesis of time', as well as a pathway to the 'third synthesis'. It 
implicitly opposes that 'stratification' and 'segmentation' which 'oedipalised, 'molar- 
line' thinking imposes on us as our 'actualised' death in life of modernity. As individual 
readers we may well see that: 
It is at this mobile and precise point, where all events gather together in one that 
transmutation happens: this is the point at which death turns against death; where 
dying is the negation of death, and the impersonality of dying no longer indicates 
the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but rather the moment when death 
loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the most singular life takes on in 
order to substitute itself for me. (L 153) 
Joyce and Deleuze, I argue, are at one in their attempts to give us a new reality 
through the pathos of humour by dismantling any unified content which they have 
produced, the former mainly through the 'affects' which we see in Issy's letter and 
throughout the Wake itself, and the latter in the main through his disjunctive 'thought': 
'[i]n truth, there are never any contradictions, apparent or real, but only degrees of 
humour'. (AO 68) 1 believe that their intention is to produce a new reality through their 
work, a reality as an ethos or a 'rhizomatic' style which functions 'machinically': 'it 
functions through and because of its own dismantling. It is born of dismantling', (K 48) 
or that fragmentation which characterises Issy and the Wake. 
In the two preceding chapters such an Issyian dismantling can be seen as being 
related to 'the Fall' as the central theme of the book. I believe that to reduce the Wake to 
a depiction of the shame of 'this ardent and guilty father' 504 does Joyce, and far more 
504 C ixous, The Exiles ofJames Joyce, p. 15. 
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importantly his readers, who construct the meaning of the text for themselves, 
absolutely no service whatsoever. The hidden potentialities of the text released by 
Joyce's creativity and genius are then simply obscured or lost. We have to look at 
Joyce's depiction of the Fall in our current and future context and re-write or re-think it 
as we appreciate that today HCE's striving for respectability, unified selthood, and 
general acceptance 'IS' every 'actualised' man (and to a large extent every woman) just 
as he was when Joyce perceptively called 'him' into existence. Hardt and Negri's quest 
for a 'new humanity' under globalised capitalism has yet to be realised. 
HCE in his attempt to evade shame, but actually bringing it upon himself, and 
Anna Livia in her possibly well meaning but ultimately unsuccessful defence of her 
husband, in which she too not only reveals but adds to his reasons for shame, together 
echo our own predicament and consensual evasion as we complacently refuse - like 
Boylan, the Citizen, Cunningham, and Deasy in Ulysses - to call into question the 
fundamental concepts, values and 'affects' of the European tradition which has led to 
our current difficulties. Where we do, as with Bob Doran and Bloom himself, it appears 
that we are faced with insurmountable difficulties. Deleuze would argue that foremost 
amongst these difficulties remains our unwillingness or even a perceived inability to 
eschew our assigned identities and think in terms of 'becomings', the primary example 
of which, as I have explained, is 'becoming-woman' through 'becoming-girl'. 
As Luce Irigaray has pointed out, this entails releasing the intensities: 'of what you 
buried in oblivion to build your world. ... 
how can I return ... I take place only in you ... 
into that dark abyss which you imagine me to be', 505 as we allow the unrealised forces 
which make up the 'whole' past to emerge. Joyce, whether writing of the 'Sirens' or 
Mrs Purefoy in the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode in Uysses, or Stephen's mother depicted 
in A Portrait and Ulysses, or even the forces constituting Issy/ ALP in the Wake, was 
particularly aware of this and detennined to bring it to our attention as an ethical 
problem. He went beyond even this. Whether we create new concepts or new 'affects' 
we need to move beyond the human to a universal perspective, and this I believe is what 
505 Luce Irigaray, Elemental Passions, trans. by Joanne Collie and Judith Still (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p. 36. 
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Joyce aspired to and achieved in the Wake, and why it is so difficult for us to come to 
terms with from the 'sedimented' perspective of our 'oedipalised' selves. Joyce, and 
Deleuze who came to this differently, both created an ethics based on and crucial to life 
itself. We cannot see ethics in terms of humanity alone since this would limit and close 
down any 'becomings' to that which we already know or believe ourselves capable of 
becoming. Both Joyce and Deleuze go beyond such limited human perspectives. Joyce, 
is intuitively aware that life is to be seen in terms of 'duration' and the 'virtual' and is 
not to be conceived exclusively in terms of pre-given forms. There is always the 
potentiality for difference with previously unthought new 'becomings' or 'lines of 
flight' being created. To my mind 'Issy' in the Wake exemplifies this liberatory 
possibility. Joyce is pointing out that we are nothing other than our power to 'become' 
different and obtain new subjectivities. Furthermore, in restricting ourselves to pre- 
given norms and moral codes we effectively deny life. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have attempted to explore whether Joyce's writings, and in particular 
Finnegans Wake, have both productive and liberatory potential in Deleuzian and 
Deleuzoguattarian terms. The thrust of my argument throughout has been that the Wake, 
in its embodiment of Joyce's late style or 'non-style', [3.2] is not only a 'rhizomatic 
text', or even the most 'rhizomatic' or 'schizoanalytic' of all his works, but it is the 
prime example of this in English and probably world literature, surpassing works which 
even Deleuze and Guattari appear to favour or at least equate with Joyce's. 506 1 have 
argued that if Deleuze and Guattari had not only added to their understanding of the 
Joycean epiphany as 'epiphanic machine' the lexical and syntactic experiments which 
Joyce used to achieve this, in addition to the portmanteau words they correctly 
highlight, but even more importantly their own concept of 'becoming-girl' as the 
essential dynamic of 'becoming-woman' and related this to Issy, they would have 
gained a far clearer picture of the unique worth of the Wake. If, in 'arborescently' 
prioritising Joyce's Wake, I can be accused of not sticking to the 'rhizomatic' script of 
Deleuze and Guattari, I believe that an acceptable riposte might well be that neither do 
they - insofar as they make explicit their own prioritisations. In arguing this, I have 
attempted to go beyond the positive assessments of the Wake which Deleuze [1.1-1.4, 
2.1-2.6,3.1,3.3,7.1,9.1 ], and Deleuze and Guattari [4.1,4.2,6.2,8.1 ] make, through 
the 'beyond' which Issy read as 'the girl' and 'line of flight' has offered. In doing so I 
have deliberately contested the thumbs down verdict which they appear to have given 
on Joyce's last work in some of their joint writings [5.1 in particular, but also 6.1,6.3, 
6.41 6.5 and 6.6]. Although I can muster some limited support here, 507 1 am aware that 
no other critic has gone as far out on a limb as I have in making these Deleuzoguattarian 
506 Raymond Roussel [1.3], Lewis Carroll [1.4], Artaud [2.55], and even Klossowski 
[4.2] together with Ezra Pound [6.5], as well as Wagner, Mallarme, Marx and Freud 
[6.4] and Maurice Leblanc, Borges, and Gombrowicz [7.11, all seem to be regarded as 
at least his equal, and both Kafka as well as Beckett [5.1 ] his superiors, in important 
respects. 
507 Murphy, 'The Eternal Return of "The seim anew"', passim; and Garnier, 'The lapse 
and the lap: Joyce with Deleuze % pp. 98-99. One might also add the contributors to the 
James Joyce Quarterly, 'A Deleuze-Guattari Cluster', Part 1,30.2 (Winter, 1993). 
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claims for the Wake against some of the judgements of Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves. Yet, I believe that the Wake so considered moves well beyond the purely 
literary no matter how much re-ordering and re-positioning might be required here as 
Attridge has convincingly argued. 508 
It seems that Deleuze was as concerned to help bring about an ethical as much as a 
political revolution, as the latter needs to result from completely 'new thought' and 
'affects' and cannot take place without the former, which is always in danger of being 
contaminated and destroyed by the 'fascistic' thinking and 'oedipalising' investments of 
past 'actualisations'. I have argued that this applies equally to Joyce, a point with which 
Attridge would again seem to agree. 509 This point that ethical change is all important, in 
the move to changed subjectivities, may have become obscured somewhat in the case of 
Deleuze and Guattari by the political thrust of their best known works, the two volumed 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and Guattari's lifelong interest in and advocacy of 
political revolution. 510 One can cite in particular his well known joint work with the 
extreme left wing political activist Toni Negri5l 1, and the works which followed on 
from this association after Guattari's untimely death. 512 1 have consequently paid 
particular attention to Hardt and Negri's Empire and Multitude in this thesis and found 
them wanting in ten-ns of the vital ethical input acquired from 'great literature'. In Anti- 
Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari state that: 
schizoanalysis as such has strictly no political program to propose. If it did have 
one, it would be grotesque and disquieting at the same time. It does not take itself 
for a party or even a group, and does not claim to be speaking for the masses. No 
508 Attridge, Peculiar Language, pp. 233-234. 
509 lbid, pp. 237-238. 
5 10 Felix Guattari, Afolecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, trans. by Rosemary 
Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). 
51 1 Guattari, and Negri, Communists Like Us. 
5 12 Hardt and Negri, Empire; and Antonio Negri, Revolution Retrieved. - writings on 
Marx, Keynes, the Capitalist Crisis and New Social Subjects, trans. by P. Saunders and 
E. Bostanjoglou (London: Red Notes, 1988). 
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political program will be elaborated within the framework of schizoanalysis. (AO 
380) 
Ansell-Pearson believes that '[t]he politics that emerges from the challenge of 
Deleuze and Guattari is clearly a politics of freedom, but this is freedom conceived in a 
way that has never been articulated by the tradition of modem thought, whether liberal, 
Marxian, or libertarian'. 513 It seems to me that Hardt and Negri in Empire and Multitude 
come closest to articulating Ansell Pearson's 'politics of freedom' in the phase of global 
capitalism, despite their several lacunae. Nevertheless, they fall short in their attempted 
realization of Deleuze and Guattari's aims. It is first an ethical rather than a political 
freedom for which they argue, as indeed does Foucault in commenting on their work. 
(AO Xiii)514 
Similarly with Joyce, I believe, he is not primarily concerned with the 
'PANOPTICAL PURVIEW OF POLITICAL PROGRESS AND THE FUTURE 
PRESENTATION OF THE PAST' (FW 272. RI) in merely political terms, but to 
enjoin the reader to leave behind the murky historical past of the hen's letter you 
'hinnyhennyhindyou', (FW 272.19) by adopting a new ethical perspective and reading 
'THE FUTURE PRESENTATION OF THE PAST' as 'the eternal return' constituting 
the highest possible thought of difference and repetition where the only return is the 
joyful return of difference and new life from the 'whole' past. Together with Deleuze, 
Joycean 'affect' can be seen as allowing an ethical thought both beyond politics and the 
moral law of good and evil and even beyond the natural laws which govern only the 
surface of the world. This is particularly evident in the Wake. 
Deleuze has given us a number of different ethical perspectives ranging from an 
ethics of the 'eternal return', 515 to an ethics of 'the event', 516 an ethics of 'affect' as it is 
513 Keith Ansell Pearson, 'Freedom and the Politics of Desire: Aporia, Paradoxes, and 
Excesses' Political Theory, 26.3 (June, 1998) 399-412 (p. 41 1). 
514 Michel Foucault, 'Preface'. 
515 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, and Dýfference and Repetition. 
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realised in bodies, 517 and even an ethological ethics. 518 However, I believe that these are 
all simply aspects of the same ethics. This, I have argued, is an ethics of 'becoming' 
located in the 'virtual' or the 'plane of immanence', and where textuality is concerned 
'the second plane of writing'. It is an ethics based on Deleuze's 'perspectivism' 
whereby not only can we not step twice into the same Heraclitean river, but the person 
who does the stepping, as a constituent part of the world, is also constantly changing 
like the river. We are all in the process of 'riverrun' as Joyce succinctly implied despite 
our constant attempts to be and remain 'Reverend'. 
This means that whereas every differentiated individual is connected to all of the 
forces and intensities which make up an immanent world, such individuals - given the 
particular experiences and forces through which they are constituted - have a unique 
perspective on and in the world, yet one which is constantly changing and potentially 
'becoming other'. This is certainly not to be taken as a Deleuzian argument for human 
(selthood' as such. I have attempted throughout the thesis, to highlight the manner in 
which Joyce's style results in a magnification of 'affects' which work against such an 
understanding of individuation and unified selthood as it moves into the realms of the 
communal and even the post-human. Deleuze, like Joyce in the Wake, as Jan Ford has 
cogently argued, follows Nietzsche's prescriptive or symptomatological insight: 
that whatever exists is of a piece, and that individuation is the root of all evil [this 
is] a conception of art as the sanguine hope that the spell of individuation may yet 
be broken, as an augury of eventual reintegration. 519 
By instancing such fragmentation and 'rhizomatic' connection through Issy, I 
believe that Joyce may be seen as pre-dating, and even surpassing, Deleuze in this 
respect. As Shari Benstock has observed '[t]he Wake is a kaleidoscope of constantly 
516 Deleuze, The Logic ofSense; Deleuze and Guattari, "at is Philosophy?. 
517 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Philosophy. 
Spinoza, and Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical 
518 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. 
519 Quoted in Ford, 'Jarnes Joyce and Those (K)nights of "Ruful Continence"', p. 246. 
255 
shifting perspectives'; 520 structured by and founded on the portmanteau, but going 
beyond this, and Jean Paris observes that: 
... once 
it is established, it must by its own movement extend itself to the totality of 
living and dead languages. And here indeed is the irony of the portmanteau style: 
the enthroning of a principle of chance which, prolonging the intentions of the 
author,, in so far as they are perceptible, comes little by little to substitute for them, 
to function like a delirious mechanism, accumulating allusions, parodying 
521 analogies, and finally atomizing the Book . 
Such a 'delirious mechanism' accords with the aquisition of a new subjectivity. For, 
'[t]he code of delirium or of desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity', (AO 15) 
experienced as 'intensities', transitions, and 'becomings', leading in turn to a new 
subjectivity. (AO 18-19) 
As Tim Conley notes: '[t]he range of associations for "Plumtree's Potted Meat", as 
it recurs in Uysses, may be numerous but they are limited'. Attridge has made the same 
point about puns as opposed to portmanteau words. 522 Conley continues that '[b]y 
contrast, Finnegans Wake may recycle a word or phrase but it never has the same 
meaning twice, let alone the same situational context within the narrative'. The Wake's 
recontextualising, according to Conley, ensures that 'meanings will always stretch past 
any scope of individual intention'. 523 As Jacques Derrida averred, the postman and with 
him the letter and meaning 'would always and yet never arrive', 524 because as Susan 
Stewart puts it the 'deficiency of signification is rapidly turned into a surplus' 525 with an 
over-abundance of meaning. However such over-abundance does not cancel meaning 
itself but rather does the opposite. As Umber-to Eco points out, 'there is nothing more 
520 Shari Benstock, 'Sexuality and Survival in "Finnegans Wake"', p. 25 1. 
521 Quoted in Attridge, Peculiar Language, p. 206. 
522 lbid, p. 197. 
523 Conley, ' "Oh me none onsens! "', p. 243. 
524 Jacques Derrida, The Post Car& From Socrates to Freud and Beyond., trans. by 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pps. 29,123. 
52*3 Susan Stewart. Nonsense. - Aspects of'Intertextuality in Folklore and Literature 
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meaningful than a text which asserts that there is no meaning'. 526 1 believe that this 
gives us not simply the Lyotardian void which Christine van Boheemen-Saaf 527 has 
read into the Wake but also and more importantly the post-human becomings of life 
itself, through the dynamic of the Issyian text. 
Deleuze states of the productivity of Joyce's late Wakean style: 'style is never a 
matter of the man, it is always a matter of essence (nonstyle)'. [3.2] Yet, Joyce's late 
style is such that whilst authorial intentions are seemingly swept aside by the technique 
he employs the reader is to some extent at least directed by a text constructed like 'a 
tapestry', 528 with its very many 'carefully interwoven' 529 themes. Nevertheless, the 
manner of composition of the Wake allows for a multiplicity of 'rhizomatic' 
connections to be established: 
Finnegans Wake was composed in a manner best described as accretive. Beginning 
with an outline scheme, Joyce proceeded to compose separately a number of 
episodes which he subsequently integrated to constitute a chapter (or sequence of 
chapters). Each episode, or Section, was developed and extended through a number 
of draft stages at each of which several additions, revisions, and deletions of textual 
elements were effected. At a determinable point in its linear development, each 
Section was laterally integrated with one or more other sections and this 
subsequently revised as a uniform textual continuum. 530 
Such a deliberate system of lateral breaks and multiple integrations designed to 
(machinically' cut the linearity of any textual formation through 'a system of 
interruptions or breaks (coupures)', (AO 36) epitomised through Issy, gives us Joyce's 
'epiphanic machine' functioning like 'a delirious [rhizomatic] mechanism', and ensures 
that Joycean 'nonstyle' founded on portmanteau and esoteric words is also 'constituted 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 127. 
526 Umberto Eco, The Limits ofInterpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), p. 7. 
527 Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of'History, passim. 
528 Wales, The Language ofJames Joyce, p. 149. 
529Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 143. 
530 Hayman, 'Draft Analysis: Reader's Guide% p. vii. 
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by the coexistence in the same sentence of an infinite series of viewpoints according to 
which the object [and subject] is dislocated, sets up a resonance or is amplified' [3.2]. 
Such dislocations result in a stammering or stuttering of the language itself which 
are both echoed by and exceed the confessions of HCE to the Cad: 'there is not one 
tittle of truth ... in that purest of fibfib fabrications'. (FW 36.33-34) Here, we seem 
initially to be on firm(ish) commonsensical ground in believing that Earwicker's 
stuttering simply shows his nervousness and possible guilt, as he begs the Cad to 'Shsh 
shake, co-comeraid! ', (FW 36.20) 'A the honours of our mewmew mutual daughters... 
I am woowoo willing to take my stand, sir, upon the monument, that sign of our ruru 
redemption'. (FW 36.22-25) It would seem that stuttering becomes both an oblique way 
of referring to his fall from grace and implicitly 'the Fall' from Eden/grace as the theme 
of the book itself. 'Dimb! He stottered from the latter. Damb! he was dud'. (FW 6.9-10) 
Conceived on the textual 'plane of organisation', or 'first plane of writing', it is an 
indication of HCE's inability to mount a convincing defence of his sinful actions or to 
maintain the unsullied upright identity for which he perpetually strives. Yet, Issyness 
always intervenes and in doing so takes us beyond his statement as a confessional fall 
from grace to the 'plane of immanence' or 'second plane of writing', and the intensities 
which constitute his shame. 
Thus, Deleuze regards such Joycean stutterings as intimately linked to style and the 
forces within and beyond language through his use of portmanteau words, and one must 
add puns and his entire lexical and syntactic resources as I have pointed out before, and 
he connects this to the economic cycles and limits of the forces of the capitalist outside: 
When a language is so strained that it starts to stutter, or to murmur or stammer ... 
then language in its entirety reaches the limit that marks its outside and makes it 
confront silence. When a language is strained in this way, language in its entirety is 
submitted to a pressure that makes it fall silent. Style - the foreign language within 
language - is made up of these two operations; or should we instead speak with 
Proust of a nonstyle, that is, of 'the elements of a style to come which do not yet 
exist'? Style is the economy of language. To make one's language stutter, face to 
face, or face to back, and at the same time to push language as a whole to its limit, 
to its outside, to its silence - this would be like the boom and the crash. (ECCI 13) 
It is through the recognition of and engagement with language pushed to its limits and 
beyond that the Wake's ethical potential for change lies, through an initial Nietzschean 
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'creative destruction', prior to an engagement with its 'line of flight'. One result of this 
could be, as Attridge notes, an 'alter[ation of] cognitive frameworks across a wider 
domain, allowing further acts of creativity in other minds', 531 possibly leading to an 
ethico-political communal movement by 'a people to come' envisioned by Deleuze and 
Guattari, (WIP 218) and brought about at least in part through Joyce's 'epiphanic 
machine'. This would give us a new ethic, 'a cultural consciousness, the conscience of 
the race', as Riquelme, paraphrasing Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait, has put it. 532 (If we 
take 'the race' as extending beyond the Irish people to humanity as a whole, and indeed 
beyond even this to the post-human and life itself. ) It is precisely this 'cultural 
consciousness' which I believe Deleuze and Guattari would wish Hardt and Negri to 
show more attention to in their analysis of the manner in which 'the multitude' is to be 
constituted. 
I argue that the Wake reunites the conditions of real experience through its 
problematic structure, based on portmanteaux but extended through Issy, which 
connects us to the entirety of the immanent 'virtual whole' whilst enabling us to loosen 
our grip and even discard - as we see through Shem in the Shem and Shaun conflicts - 
much of the 'actual'. Just as James Williams points out of Deleuze's philosophic 
principles in this connection: 'Deleuze's insight is that [connecting] must be ephemeral, 
at least at the level of actual possessions whether [these are] identifiable things or ideas 
- including our selves and our sense of acting as a free subject% 
533 and Hardt and Negri 
make this a central point of their argument through the 'common(s)'. 534 We can 
transform ourselves in perceiving difference and thinking the 'seim. anew'. This occurs 
in the Wake despite, or paradoxically because of, the conscious, minute control of his 
531 Derek Attridge, 'Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other', PMLA 114 
(January 1999), pp. 22-23. 
532 J. P. Riqueleme, Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 230. 
533 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference and Repetition', p. 5. 
534 Hardt and Negri, The Multitude, p. 186. 
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text which Rose and O'Hanlon liken to that of 'a mosaic worker' as Joyce meticulously 
'piece[d] together his gargantuan OPUS'. 535 
However, we are neither involved in a total 'reterritorialisation' which such control 
implies, or even a complete 'deterritorialisation' with Joyce's 'nonstyle' ensuring that 
he deliberately loses 'his' grip, but rather a creative ethical act working through the 
tensions and intensities of the intuitive 'middle'. Thus, McBride in addressing the Wake 
as simply a 'schizophrenic phantasmagoria' 536 seems to ignore the 'flipside' of Joyce's 
necessary channelling of these creative yet potentially destructive forces in his act of 
creation, through his determination to ensure that the Wakean 'machine' has 'exactly all 
the meanings one wants it to have according to its functioning; the essential point being 
that it functions, that the machine works'. [3.1] As Deleuze and Guattafi note '[a]rt is 
not chaos but a composition of chaos that ... constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a 
com. posed chaos-neither foreseen nor preconceived. Art transforms chaotic variability 
into chaoid variety'. [8.1 ] 
Roland Barthes in SIZ divided narrative fiction into two main types: lisible, or 
readerly, and scriptible or writerly. 537 Whilst the Wake evidently resides at the far 
extreme of the scriptible text, demanding the reader's constant involvement in 
effectively rewriting it, Wales points out this 'open-endedness [nevertheless] leads to a 
kind of restriction for the reader'. 538 For, as Umberto EC0539argues: 
such 'open' texts are in fact 'closed' in the sense that their readers must mentally 
engage with the text in the way that the text demands, however freely; the reader is 
built into the text, as it were, as part of its structural strategy. 540 
535 Rose and O'Hanlon, Understanding Tinnegans Wake', p. ix. 
536 McBride, 'Finnegans Wake: The Issue of Issy's Schizophrenia', p. 146. 
537 Roland Barthes, SIZ, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974) 
538 Wales, The Language ofdames Joyce, p. 15 5. 
539 Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader (London: Hutchinson, 1979). 
540 Wales, The Language ofdames Jo ce, pp. 15 5 -15 6. y 
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Of course, if this were not the case, and the Wake was simply a 'schizophrenic 
phantasmagoria', it would be impossible to talk of Joyce's overall ethico-political 
thrust. Joyce effectively builds us into the text even though this cannot negate Paris's 
valid observation that 'the principle of chance' brought about by Joyce's portmanteau 
style inevitably replaces the author's intentions. I have argued that it is in the Issyian 
'middle' that Joyce's ethical intentions and 'intensities' and those of the reader 
productively meet in a potential new 'becoming' experienced as 4an intense feeling of 
transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form'. (AO 18) Like 
Deleuze, Joyce makes change and difference fundamental. Bergson puts it this way: 
There is another method of composition, more ambitious, less certain, which 
cannot tell when it will succeed, or even if it will succeed at all. It consists in 
working back from the intellectual and social plane to a point in the soul from 
which there springs an imperative demand for creation. [ ... 
] To obey it completely 
new words have to be coined, new ideas would have to be created, but this would 
no longer be communicating something, it would not be writing. Yet the writer will 
attempt to realise the unrealisable. He will revert to the simple emotion, to the 
form that yearns to create its matter, and will go with it to meet ideas already made, 
words that already exist, briefly social segments of reality. All along the way he 
will feel it manifesting itself in signs borne of itself. He will be driven to strain the 
541 words, to do violence to speech . 
As such., we experience that 'divergence of series, decentring of [Viconian] circles, 
constitution of the chaos which envelops them, internal resonance and movement of 
amplitude, aggression of the simulacra' [2.3] characterising 'pure difference'. 
Kristeva goes some way to meet this in observing that Joyce's Wakean discourse is 
ethical in its breaking down of all identity. 542 She is aware that his 'echolalic' or pre- 
symbolic poetic tones are invested in the feminine-maternal 'semiotic chora' which 
transgresses, subverts and offers the possibility of alternatives to the patriarchal 
54 1 Bergson, The Two Sources ofMorality and Religion, pp. 217-18. (My italics) 
542 Julia Kristeva, 'Oscillations Between Power and Denial', in New French Feminisms, 
eds. Elaine Marks and Isabelle Courtivron (New York: Schocken Books, 1981), p. 138. 
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akc symbolic order. Consequently, I have stressed throughout my readings of the W 
that this ethico-political perspective, centred on impersonal desire, applies as much to 
the Wake as it does to Deleuzian philosophy. As Patrick McGee states, the Wake: 
... articulates a 
desire that ... 
is the antithesis of property ... 
beyond the ideologies 
of gender and nationality. In the Wake ... the articulation of 
desire is the answer and 
the antidote to the domination of place through the concept of private property and 
to the domination of language - whether by a gender, a race or a class - through the 
concept of the proper; it is the opening ... that makes 
it possible to begin to imagine 
an ethics not only of sexual difference, as Irigaray desires, but of difference 
lf 544 itse . 
Such an articulation of an ethics of difference as that created by Joyce in the Wake as 
cevent' is an innovative act which results not simply in lasting alterations to the author's 
subjectivity, which Lacan focuses on, 545 or with the 'epiphany bound up with Joyce's 
ego', 546 as the Lacanian Roberto Harari puts it; but more significantly it offers the 
opportunity to his readership for wider ethical and social change, as Attridge has noted. 
547 Attridge's disarticulations or, as I would prefer to call them, 'pure differences' 
amount in Deleuzian thinking to the release of the potential intensities of new life in 
future time: '[a] nonpsychological life ... the nonorganic 
life that grips the world and 
renders it acentred and rhizomatic'. 548 It is in this sense, I believe, that the ethical and 
political can be united in the future and that Joyce's ethical 'meaning' is revealed. I 
argue that this places Joyce alongside Deleuze in privileging ethics over morality. 
543 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language Language , trans. 
by Maragaret 
Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 62-89. 
544 Patrick McGee, 'Errors and Expectations: the ethics of desire in Finnegans Wake', 
in Laurent Milesi,, ed., James Joyce and the Difference of Language, p. 178. (My 
italics). 
545 Jacques Lacan, 'Joyce le symptOme', in Jacques Aubert and Maria Jolas, eds, Joyce 
et Paris. 1902 ..... 
1920-1940 ..... 
1975: Actes A cinquieme Symposium International 
James Joyce, 2 vols (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1979), pp. 37-48. 
546 Roberto Harari How James Joyce Made His Name. - A Reading of the Final Lacan, 
trans. by Luke Thurston (New York: Other Press,, 2002), p. 345. 
547 Attridge, 'Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other', pp. 22-23. 
548 Ansell Pearson, 'Pure reserve: Deleuze, philosophy, and immanence', p. 149. 
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Joyce, like Deleuze in his philosophy, thus leaves us through the Wake the imperative to 
seek new beginnings, the need to extract 'virtual potentialities' from the rubble of 
modemity. and the need to reinvent history. He effectively rethinks time in terms of 
'duration' in a series of life-giving 'becomings'. 
In making the claim that Finnegans Wake exists more completely on the 'plane of 
immanence' than does Uysses and is an 'haeccetic' culmination of this and all of 
Joyce's previous work, I believe that I airn simply taking further Margot Norris's 
demonstration that the Wake comments upon all Joyce's previous work by carrying his 
intuitive insights to new levels . 
549 The Wake, through Issy, thus becomes in my 
argument the 'BwO' of all of Joyce's oeuvre as here he brings together on the 'second 
plane of writing' - or the textual 'plane of immanence' - through his late 'rhizomatic' 
or 'schizophrenic' style, 'all the divergent series constitutive of the cosmos' [1.3], 
offering us the resonating series which make up all of his previous work and going 
beyond them. 
I have argued that Joyce accomplishes this, not simply by his use of esoteric and 
portmanteau words and other lexical and grammatical devices, but through Issy as 
impersonal 'desiring machine', for 'the BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and 
by which one desires'. (TP 165) Consequently, considered as Joyce's culminating and 
concluding 'Event' which has created its own 'sense ... disengaged or distinguished 
from the state of affairs which produce it and in which it is actualised', (L 211) 1 do not 
think it ridiculous or excessive to apply the following extract, from Nietzsche's well- 
known statement on the death of God, to Finnegans Wake: '[t]his tremendous event is 
still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and 
thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still 
require time to be seen and heard' . 
550 This time is the time of life, the time of 'the 
virtual' or that of the 'plane of immanence'. It is 'duration' itself, offered to us through 
549 Margot Norris, Joyce's Wreb, pps. 8-9,18-21.25. 
550 Nietzsche The Gay Science, p. 182. 
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the Wake. Thus, the Gracehoper recognises that the Ondt, as the embodiment of 
capitalism, has achieved great things, but points out that 'duration' cannot be 
constrained by capitalist imperatives which it always exceeds: 
Yourfeats end enormous, your volumes immense, 
(May the Graces I hopedfor sing your Ondiship song sense! ), 
Your genus its worldwide, your spacest sublime! 
But, Holy Saltmartin, why can't you beat time? (FW 419.5 -8) 
Here, the beating of time also alludes to the musical and hence the ethical nature of 
Joyce's writing, 551 as 4a language which speaks before words', (DR 10) or as Bloom 
points out in the 'Sirens' episode, 'Words? Music? No: it's what's behind'. (U 354) 
According to a Deleuzoguattarian reading of Finnegans Wake, it may be time to move 
on beyond the constraining moralistic clock-time of the State, Religion, liberal- 
humanism, and even the new global capitalism itself, through '[t]eems of times and 
happy returns'. (FW215.22-23) 
Read together, in this way, Joyce's and Deleuze's works may give us more than 
just hope through 'a counter-philosophy of the schizophrenic laughter and revolutionary 
joy of the[ir] great books' '552 they offer us new ethico-political thought and 
'affect' and 
the opportunity for autopoietic 'becomings' pointing the way for 'a people to come'. 
(WIP 218) 
55 1 Bergson, The Two Sources ofMorality and Religion, p. 40. 
S52 Deleuze, 'Nomadic thought, p. 147. 
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Appendix 
References to Joyce by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, 
arranged in chronological order of their original publication date, and in order of 
their appearance in the texts. 
(Passages instanced in 'Joyce Indirect' are indicated by a star: *) 
1. Difference and Repetition (Deleuze, 1968) 
1.1. Eternal return relates to a world of differences implicated one in the other, 
to a complicated, properly chaotic world without identity. Joyce presented the 
vicus q recirculation as causing a chaosmos to turn; and Nietzsche had already )f 
said that chaos and eternal return were not two distinct things but a single and 
same affirmation. The world is neither finite nor infinite as representation would 
have it: it is completed and unlimited. Eternal return is the unlimited of the 
finished itself, the univocal being which is said of difference. With eternal 
return, chao-errancy is opposed to the coherence of representation; it excludes 
both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object 
represented. Re-petition opposes re-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, 
since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in 
the other it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the 
forrnless being ofall differences, the formless power of the ground which carries 
every object to that extreme 'form' in which its representation comes undone. 
The ultimate element of repetition is the disparate [dispars], which stands 
opposed to the identity of representation. Thus, the circle of eternal return, 
difference and repetition (which undoes that of the identical and the 
contradictory) is a tortuous circle in which Sameness is said only of that which 
differs. (1994, p. 57) 
1.2. [W]hen the modem work of art develops its permutating series and its 
circular structures, it indicates to philosophy a path leading to the abandonment 
of representation. It is not enough to multiply perspectives in order to establish 
perspectivism. To every perspective or point of view there must correspond an 
autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense: what matters is the 
divergence of series, the decentring of circles, 'monstrosity'. The totality of 
circles and series is thus a formless ungrounded chaos which has no law other 
than its own repetition, its own reproduction in the development of that which 
diverges and decentres. We know how these conditions are already satisfied in 
such works as Mallarme's Book or Joyce's Finnegans Wake: these are by nature 
problematic works. The identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent 
series defined by esoteric words, just as the identity of the reading subject is 
dissolved into the decentred circles of possible multiple readings. Nothing, 
however, is lost; each series exists only by virtue of the return of the others. 
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Everything has become simulacrum, for by simulacrum we should not 
understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a 
model or privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is 
the instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two 
divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no 
longer point to the existence of an original and a copy. It is in this direction that 
we must look for the conditions, not of possible experience, but of real 
experience (selection, repetition, etc. ). It is here that we find the lived reality of a 
sub-representative domain. If it is true that representation has identity as its 
element and similarity as its unit of measure, then pure presence such as it 
appears in the simulacrum. has the 'disparate' as its unit of measure - in other 
words, always a difference of difference as its immediate element. (1994, pp. 68- 
69) 
* 1.3. [I]t is not by the poverty of its vocabulary that language invents the form 
in which it plays the role of dark precursor, but by its excess, by its most 
positive syntactic and semantic power. In playing this role it differenciates the 
differences between the different things spoken of, relating these immediately to 
one another in series which it causes to resonate. For the same reason ... the 
repetition of words cannot be explained negatively, cannot be presented as a 
bare repetition without difference. Joyce's work obviously appeals to quite 
different procedures [than Raymond Roussel's]. However, it remains a question 
of drawing together a maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent 
series constitutive of the cosmos) by bringing into operation linguistic dark 
precursors (here, esoteric words, portmanteau words) which rely upon no prior 
identity, which are above all not 'identifiable' in principle, but which induce a 
maximum of resemblance and identity into the system as a whole, as though this 
were the result of the process of differenciation of difference in itself (see the 
cosmic letter in Finnegans Wake). What takes place in the system between 
resonating series under the influence of the dark precursor is called 'epiphany'. 
The cosmic extension coincides with the amplitude of a forced movement which 
sweeps aside and overruns the series, ultimately a death instinct, Stephen's 'No' 
which is not the non-being of the negative but the (non)-being of a persistent 
question to which the cosmic 'Yes' of Mrs Bloom corresponds, without being a 
response, since it alone adequately occupies and fills that space (1994, pp. 121 - 
122). 
* 1.4. [ ... the conditions under which a 
book is a cosmos or the cosmos is a book 
appear, and through a variety of very different techniques the ultimate Joycean 
identity emerges, the one we find in Borges and in Gombrowicz: chaos 
cosmos. ] 
Each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story ... 
but 
completely distinct stories which unfold simultaneously. The basic series are 
divergent: not relatively, in the sense that one could retrace one's path and find a 
point of convergence, but absolutely divergent in the sense that the point or 
horizon of convergence lies in a chaos or is constantly displaced within that 
chaos. This chaos is itself the most positive, just as the divergence is the object 
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of affirmation. It is indistinguishable from the great work which contains all the 
complicated series, which affirms and complicates all the series at once. (It is 
not surprising that Joyce should have been so interested in Bruno, the 
theoretician of complicatio. ) ... Each series explicates or develops itself, but in its difference from the other series which it implicates and which implicate it, 
which it envelops and which envelop it; in this chaos which complicates 
everything. The totality of the system, the unity of the divergent series as such, 
corresponds to the objectivity of a 'problem'. Hence the method of questions- 
problems by means of which Joyce animates his work, and before that the 
manner in which Lewis Carroll linked portmanteau words to the status of the 
problematic (1994, pp. 123 -124). 
1.5. [The] conception of the ontological scope of the question animates works of 
art as much as philosophical thought. Works are developed around or on the 
basis of a fracture that they never succeed in filling. The fact that the novel, 
particularly since Joyce, has found a new language in the mode of an 'Enquiry' 
or 'Questionnaire' and presents essentially problematic events and characters 
obviously does not mean that nothing is certain; it is obviously not the 
application of a generalised method of doubt nor the sign of a modem 
scepticism but, on the contrary, the discovery of the question and the 
problematic as a transcendental horizon, as the transcendental element which 
belongs 'essentially" to beings, things and events. It is the novelistic or theatrical 
or musical or philosophical, etc., discovery of the Idea, and at the same time the 
discovery of a transcendent exercise of sensibility, of image-memory, language 
and thought, by means of which each of these faculties communicates in full 
discordance with the others and opens on to the difference of Being by taking its 
own difference as object - in other words, by posing the question of its own 
difference. Hence that form of writing which is nothing but the question 'what is 
writing? ' ... giv[ing] rise to the greatest monotonies and the greatest weaknesses 
of a new-found common sense in the absence of the genius of the Idea, but also 
to the most powerful 'repetitions', the most prodigious inventions in the para- 
sense when the Idea emerges in all its violence. (1994, pp. 195 -196). 
2. Logic qfSense (Deleuze, 1969) 
2.1. It is easy to cite various authors who have known how to create serial 
techniques of an exemplary formalism. Joyce, for example, secured the relation 
between the signifying series 'Bloom' and the signified series 'Ulysses', thanks 
to multiple forms which included an archeology of narrative modes, a system of 
correspondence between numbers, a prodigious employment of esoteric words, a 
method of question and answer and the establishment of currents of thought or 
multiple trains of thought (Carroll's double thinking? ) (1990, pp. 3 8-9). 
2.2. We can speak of events only in the context of the problem whose conditions 
they determine. We can speak of events only as singularities deployed in a 
problematic field, in the vicinity of which the solutions are organized. This is 
why an entire method of problems and solutions traverses Carroll's work ... But 
the paradoxical instance is the Event in which all events communicate and are 
267 
distributed. it is the Unique event, and all other events are its bits and pieces. 
Later on, James Joyce will be able to give sense to a method of questions and 
answers which doubles that of problems - the Inquisitory which grounds the 
Problematic. The question is developed in problems, and the problems are 
enveloped in a fundamental question. And just as solutions do not suppress 
problems, but on the contrary discover in them the subsisting conditions with 
which they would have no sense, answers do not at all suppress, nor do they 
saturate, the question, which persists in all of the answers. There is therefore an 
aspect in which problems remain without a solution, and the question without an 
answer. It is in this sense that problem and question designate ideational 
objectivities and have their own being a minimum of being (see the 'answerless 
riddles' of Alice). We have already seen how esoteric words were essentially 
tied to them. On one hand, the portmanteau words are inseparable from a 
problem which is deployed in the ramified series. ... In each case, there is a distribution of singularities. (1990, pp. 56-57) 
*2.3. [C]ertain literary procedures (the same holds for other arts) permit several 
stories to be told at once. This is, without doubt, the essential characteristic of 
the modem work of art. It is not at all a question of different points of view on 
one story supposedly the same; for points of view would still be submitted to a 
rule of convergence. It is rather a question of different and divergent stories, as 
if an absolutely distinct landscape corresponded to each point of view. There is 
indeed a unity of divergent series insofar as they are divergent, but it is always a 
chaos perpetually thrown off center which becomes one only in the Great Work. 
This unformed chaos, the great letter of Finnegans Wake, is not just any chaos: 
it is the power of affirmation, the power to affirm all the heterogeneous series - 
it 'complicates' within itself all the series (hence the interest of Joyce in Bruno 
as the theoretician of the complicatio). Between these basic series, a sort of 
internal resonance is produced; and this resonance induces aforced movement, 
which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the characteristics of the 
simulacrum,, when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface: it then affirms its 
phantasmatic power, that is, its repressed power. Freud has already shown how 
the phantasm results from at least two series, one infantile and the other post- 
pubescent. The affective charge associated with the phantasm is explained by 
the internal resonance whose bearers are the simulacra. The impression of death, 
of the rupture or dismembering of life, is explained by the amplitude of the 
forced movement which carries them along. Thus the conditions of real 
experience and the structures of the work of art are reunited: divergence of 
series, decentering of circles, constitution of the chaos which envelops them, 
internal resonance and movement of amplitude, aggression of the simulacra. 
(1990, pp. 260-261) 
2.4. The secret of the eternal return is that it does not express an order opposed 
to the chaos engulfing it. On the contrary, it is nothing other than chaos itself, or 
the power of affirming chaos. There is a point where Joyce is Nietzschean when 
he shows that the vicus of recirculation can not affect and cause a 'chaosmos' to 
revolve. To the coherence of representation, the eternal return substitutes 
something else entirely - its own chaodyssey (chao-errance). Between the 
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eternal return and the simulacrum, there is such a profound link that the one 
cannot be understood except through the other. Only the divergent series, insofar 
as they are divergent, return: that is, each series insofar as it displaces its 
difference along with all the others, and all series insofar as they complicate 
their difference within the chaos which is without beginning or end. ... Thus, the 
eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but only insofar as they are 
simulated, produced by the simulation, through the functioning of the 
simulacrum (will to power). It is in this sense that it reverses representation and 
destroys the icons. It does not presuppose the Same and the Similar; on the 
contrary, it constitutes the only Same-the Same of that which differs, and the 
only resemblance-the resemblance of the um-natched. ... It is the power to 
affirm divergence and decentering and makes this power the object of a superior 
affirmation. ... it does not make everything come back. ... What is selected are all 
the procedures opposed to selection; what is excluded, what is made not to 
return, is that which presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which pretends 
to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the chaos, and to provide a 
model or make a copy. For all its long history, Platonism happened only once, 
and Socrates fell under the blade. For the Same and the Similar become simple 
illusions when they cease to be simulated. (1990, pp. 264-265) 
2.5. [End note] 11. It is in this sense that, in Carroll, invention is essentially 
vocabular, rather than syntactical or grammatical. As a consequence, 
portmanteau words can open up an infinity of possible interpretations by 
ramifying the series; nevertheless, syntactical rigor eliminates a certain number 
of these possibilities. The same holds true in Joyce, as Jean Paris has shown in 
Tel Quel (1967), no. 30, p. 64. The opposite is the case with Artaud, but only 
because there is no longer a problem of sense properly speaking. (1990, p. 343) 
2.6. [I]n the Des Forets' novel and its gossip-voyeur, 'seeing' designated a very 
special operation or contemplation. It designated a pure vision of reflections 
which multiply that which they reflect. These reflections offer the voyeur a more 
intense participation than if he had himself experienced these passions, the 
double or the reflection of which he now surveys in the faces of others. This is 
the case in Klossowski's works, when Octave establishes the law of hospitality 
according to which he 'gives' his wife Roberte to the guests. He attempts to 
multiply Roberte's essence, to create as many simulacra and reflections of 
Roberte as there are persons establishing relations with her, and to inspire 
Roberte to emulate somehow her own doubles, thanks to which Octave,, the 
voyeur, possesses and is able to know her better than if he had kept her, quite 
simply, for himself. ... We possess thoroughly only what 
is expropriated, placed 
outside of itself, split into two, reflected in the gaze, and multiplied by 
possessive minds. ... To possess is thus to give over to possession and to see the 
given multiplied in the gift. 'Such common partaking of a dear but living being 
is not without analogy to the devoted gaze of an artist' (this strange theme of 
theft and gift, it will be recalled, appears also in Joyce's Exiles) (1990, pp. 282- 
283). 
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I Proust and Signs, Part Two (Deleuze, 1970-73 553) 
* 3.1. The entire interest thus shifts from the privileged natural moments to the 
artistic machine capable of producing or reproducing them, of multiplying them: 
the Book. In this regard, we can scarcely avoid the comparison with Joyce and 
his machine for producing epiphanies. For Joyce too begins by seeking the 
secret of epiphanies within the object, first within significant contents or ideal 
significations, then in the subjective experience of an aesthete. It is only when 
the significant contents and the ideal significations have collapsed and given 
way to a multiplicity of fragments, to chaos - but in addition, the subjective 
forms to a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality - that the work of art assumes 
its full meaning, that is, exactly all the meanings one wants it to have according 
to its functioning; the essential point being that it functions, that the machine 
works. Then the artist, and the reader in his wake, is the one who 'disentangles' 
and 're-embodies': setting up a resonance between two objects, he produces the 
epiphany, releasing the precious image from the natural conditions that 
determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the chosen artistic conditions 554 . (2000, 
pp. 155-6). 
3.2. [A] s we descend the degrees of essence, from the signs of art to the signs of 
Nature, love, or even worldliness, there is necessarily reintroduced a minimum 
of objective description and associative suggestion; but this is only because 
essence here has material conditions of incarnation that are then substituted for 
the free artistic spiritual conditions, as Joyce would say. But style is never a 
matter of the man, it is always a matter of essence (nonstyle). It is never a matter 
of viewpoint but is constituted by the coexistence in the same sentence of an 
infinite series of viewpoints according to which the object is dislocated, sets up a 
resonance, or is amplified (2000, pp. 166-167). 
*3.3. We should have to compare the Proustian conception of the image with 
other post-Symbolist conceptions: for example, Joyce's epiphany or Pound's 
imagism and vorticism. The following features seem to be shared: image as 
autonomous link between two concrete objects insofar as they are different 
(image, concrete equation); style, as multiplicity of viewpoints toward the same 
object and exchange of viewpoints toward several objects; language, as 
integrating and comprehending its own variations constitutive of a universal 
history and making each fragment speak according to its own voice; literature as 
production, as operation of affect-producing machines; explication, not as 
didactic intention but as technique of envelopment and development; writing as 
553 The original edition was published in 1964, but it was only in Part 2 of the second 
edition which was added in 1970, plus a further essay added to this in 197-33, that 
references to Joyce appeared. 
554 See Joyce, Stephen Hero. We have seen that the same was true of Proust, and that, 
in art, essence itself determined the conditions of its incarnation, instead of depending 
on given natural conditions. 
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ideogrammatic method (with which Proust allies himself on several oecasions) 
(2000, p. 188). 
4. Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972) 
4.1. Hence Proust maintained that the Whole itself is a product, produced as 
nothing more than a part alongside other parts, which it neither unifies nor 
totalizes, though it has an effect on these other parts simply because it 
establishes aberrant paths of communication between noncommunicating 
vessels, transverse unities between elements that retain all their differences 
within their own particular boundaries. Thus in the trip on the train in In Search 
of Lost Time, there is never a totality of what is seen nor a unity of the points of 
view, except along the transversal that the frantic passenger traces from one 
window to the other,, 'in order to draw together, in order to reweave intermittent 
and opposite fragments. ' This drawing together, this reweaving is what Joyce 
called re-embodying. (1984, pp. 43-44). 
4.2. There is a question that Marcel Mauss at least left open: is debt primary in 
relation to exchange, or is it merely a mode of exchange, a means in the service 
of exchange? ... 
[I]f exchange underlies everything [as Levi-Strauss argues], 
why is it that what takes place looks like anything but an exchange? Why must it 
be a gift, or a countergift, and not an exchange? And why is it necessary that the 
giver also be in the position of someone who has been robbed, so as to 
demonstrate clearly that he does not expect an exchange, not even a deferred 
exchange? It is theft that prevents the gift and the countergift from entering into 
an exchangist relation. Desire knows nothing of exchange, it knows only theft 
and gift, at times the one within the other under the effect of a primary 
homosexuality. Thus the antiexchangist amorous machine encountered by Joyce 
in Exiles, and by Klossowski in Roberte. (1984, pp. 18 5 -186). 
5. Kaflca: Toward a Minor Literature (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975) 
5.1. There has been much discussion of the questions 'What is a marginal 
literature? ' and 'What is a popular literature, a proletarian literature? ' The 
criteria are obviously difficult to establish if one doesn't start with a more 
objective concept - that of minor literature. Only the possibility of setting up a 
minor practice of major language from within allows one to define popular 
literature, marginal literature, and so on. Only in this way can literature really 
become a collective machine of expression and really be able to treat and 
develop its contents. Kafka emphatically declares that a minor literature is much 
more able to work over its material . Why this machine of expression, and what is it? We know that it is in a relation of multiple deterritorializations, with 
language; it is the situation of the Jews who have dropped the Czech language at 
the same time as the rural environment, but it is also the situation of the German 
language as a 'paper language'. Well, one can go even farther; one can push this 
movement of deterritorialization of expression even farther. But there are only 
two ways to do this. One way is to artificially enrich this German, to swell it up 
through all the resources of symbolism, of oneirism, of esoteric sense, of a 
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hidden signifier. This is the approach of the Prague school, Gustav Meyrink and 
many others, including Max Brod. But this attempt implies a desperate attempt 
at symbolic reterritorialization, based in archetypes, Kabbala, and alchemy, that 
accentuates its break from the people and will find its political result only in 
Zionism and such things as the 'dream of Zion'. Kafka will quickly choose the 
other way, or, rather, he will invent another way. He will opt for the German 
language of Prague as it is and in its very poverty. Go always farther in the 
direction of deterritorialization, to the point of sobriety. Since the language is 
arid, make it vibrate with a new intensity. Oppose a purely intensive usage of 
language to all symbolic or even significant or simply signifying usages of it. 
Arrive at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression. 
(For these two possible paths, couldn't we find the same alternatives, under 
other conditions, in Joyce and Beckett? As Irishmen, both of them live within 
the genial conditions of a minor literature. That is the glory of this sort of minor 
literature - to be the revolutionary force for all literature. The utilization of 
English and of every language in Joyce. The utilization of English and French in 
Beckett. But the former never stops operating by exhilaration and 
overdetermination and brings about all sorts of worldwide reterritorializations. 
The other proceeds by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, pushing 
deterritorialization to the point where only intensities subsist). (1986, pp. 18-19). 
6. A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) 
6.1. That is why the most resolutely fragmented work can also be presented as 
the Total Work or Magnum Opus. Most modem methods for making series 
proliferate or a multiplicity grow are perfectly valid in one direction, for 
example, a linear direction, whereas a unity of totalization asserts itself even 
more firmly in another, circular or cyclic, dimension. Whenever a multiplicity is 
taken up in a structure, its growth is offset by a reduction in its laws of 
combination. The abortionists of unity are indeed angel makers, doctores 
angelici, because they affirm a properly angelic and superior unity. Joyce's 
words, accurately described as having 'multiple roots', shatter the linear unity 
of the word,, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text, 
or knowledge. Nietzsche's aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only 
to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in 
thought. This is as much as to say that the fascicular system does not really 
break with dualism,, with the complementarity between a subject and an object, a 
natural reality and a spiritual reality: unity is consistently thwarted and 
obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject. The 
world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, but accedes 
to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always 
supplementary dimension to that of its object. The world has become chaos, but 
the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root- 
cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented. 
(1987, p. 6). 
6.2. Nomadic waves or flows of deterritorialization go from the central layer to 
the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the 
old center and launching forth to the new. The organization of the epistrata 
272 
moves in the direction of increasing deterritorialization. Physical particles and 
chemical substances cross thresholds of deterritorialization on their own stratum 
and between strata; these thresholds correspond to more or less stable 
intermediate states, to more or less transitory valences and existences, to 
engagements with this or that other body, to densities of proximity, to more or 
less localizable connections. Not only are physical particles characterized by 
speeds of deterritorialization-Joycean tachyons, particles-holes, and quarks 
recalling the fundamental idea of the 'soup'-but a single chemical substance 
(sulfur or carbon, for example) has a number of more and less deterritorialized 
states. ... Deterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has degrees and thresholds (epistrata), is always relative, and has 
reterritorialization as its flipside or complement. (1987, pp. 53-54). 
6.3. The notion of minority is very complex, with musical, literary, linguistic, as 
well as juridical and political, references. The opposition between minority and 
majority is not simply quantitative. Majority implies a constant, of expression or 
content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it. Let us suppose 
that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European- 
male-speaking a standard language (Joyce's or Ezra Pound's Ulysses). It is 
obvious that 'man' holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than 
mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. That is 
because he appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from 
which the constant is extracted. Majority assumes a state of power and 
domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the 
other way around. Even Marxism 'has almost always translated hegemony from 
the point of view of the national worker, qualified, male and over thirty-five'. A 
determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered 
minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or 
an outsystem. This is evident in all the operations, electoral or otherwise, where 
you are given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the 
limits of the constant ('you mustn't choose to change society. . . '). But at this 
point, everything is reversed. For the majority, insofar as it is analytically 
included in the abstract standard, is never anybody, it is always Nobody- 
Ulysses-whereas the minority is the becoming of everybody, one's potential 
becoming to the extent that one deviates from the model. There is a majoritarian 
'fact', but it is the analytic fact of Nobody, as opposed to the becoming- 
minoritarian of everybody. (1987, p. 105). 
6.4. The unique book, the total work, all possible combinations inside the book, 
the tree-book, the cosmos-book: all of these platitudes so dear to the avant- 
gardes, which cut the book off from its relations with the outside, are even worse 
than the chant of the signifier. Of course, they are entirely bound up with a 
mixed semiotic. But in truth they have a particularly pious origin. Wagner, 
Mallarme, and Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles. If passional delusion is 
profoundly monomaniacal, monomania for its part found a fundamental element 
of its assemblage in monotheism and the Book. The strangest cult (1987, p. 127). 
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6.5. It should not be said that the genius is an extraordinary person, nor that 
everybody has genius. The genius is someone who knows how to make 
everybody/ the whole world a becoming (Ulysses, perhaps: Joyce's failed 
ambition,. Pound's near-success). One has entered becomings-animal 
becomings-molecular, and finally becomings-imperceptible (1987, p. 200). 
6.6. We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human being 
is a segmentary animal. Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata composing us. 
Dwelling, getting around, working, playing: life is spatially and socially 
segmented. The house is segmented according to its rooms' assigned purposes; 
streets, according to the order of the city; the factory, according to the nature of 
the work and operations performed in it. We are segmented in a binary fashion, 
following the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men- 
women, adults-children, and so on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in 
ever larger circles, ever wider disks or coronas, like Joyce's 'letter': my affairs, 
my neighborhood's affairs, my city's, my country's, the world's ... We are Segmented in a linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, 
of which each segment represents an episode or 'proceeding': as soon as we 
finish one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or procedured, in 
the family, in school, in the army, on the job. School tells us, 'You're not at 
home anymore'; the army tells us, 'You're not in school anymore' ... Sometimes the various segments belong to different individuals or groups, and 
sometimes the same individual or group passes from one segment to another. 
But these figures of segmentarity, the binary, circular, and linear, are bound up 
with one another, even cross over into each other, changing according to the 
point of view (1987, pp. 208-9). 
7. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Deleuze, 1988) 
7.1. For Leibniz, as we have seen, bifurcations and divergences of series are 
genuine borders between incompossible worlds, such that the monads that exist 
wholly include the compossible world that moves into existence. For Whitehead 
(and for many modem philosophers), on the contrary, bifurcations, divergences, 
incompossibilities, and discord belong to the same motley world that can no 
longer be included in expressive units, but only made or undone according to 
prehensive units and variable configurations or changing captures. In a same 
chaotic world divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths. It is a 
'chaosmos' of the type found in Joyce, but also in Maurice Leblanc, Borges, or 
Gombrowicz. Even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and 
chooses the richest compossible. He becomes Process, a process that at once 
affirms incompossibilities and passes through them. The play of the world has 
changed in a unique way, because now it has become the play that diverges. 
Beings are pushed apart, kept open through divergent series and incompossible 
totalities that pull them outside, instead of being closed upon the compossible 
and convergent world that they express from within. (1993, p. 8 1). 
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8. "at is Philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991) 
8.1. Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or 
sensation, so that it constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a composed chaos 
neither foreseen nor preconceived. Art transforms chaotic variability into chaoid 
variety, as in El Greco's black and green-gray conflagration, for example, or 
Turner's golden conflagration, or de Stael's red conflagration. Art struggles with 
chaos but it does so in order to render it sensory, even through the most 
charming character, the most enchanted landscape (Watteau) (1994, pp. 204-205) 
9. Essays Critical and Clinical (Deleuze, 1993) 
9. L There are only monstrous, devouring fathers, and petrified, fatherless sons. 
If humanity can be saved ... 
it will only be through the dissolution or 
decomposition of the paternal function. ... As Joyce will say, paternity does not 
exist, it is an emptiness, a nothingness-or rather, a zone of uncertainty haunted 
by brothers, by the brother and sister. The mask of the charitable father must fall 
in order for Primary Nature to be appeased, and for [Melville's] Ahab and 
Claggart to recognize Bartleby and Billy Budd, releasing through the violence of 
the former and the stupor of the latter the fruit with which they were laden: the 
fraternal relation pure and simple. (1997, p. 84). 
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